Saudi Arabia Affirmative

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# Introduction:

Welcome to the Saudi Arabia Affirmative Evidence Set. In here, you’ll find all the research you’ll need to construct a winning affirmative argument in the Novice Division and beyond on this year’s topic: Arms Sales.

We’ve organized this evidence into a few different categories:

* **Sample Affirmative Case:** This file includes a Saudi Arabia - Human Rights affirmative case. There is a complete affirmative case sample ready to use in the 1AC (First Affirmative Constructive), including Inherency, a Plan, Solvency, and an Advantage.
* **Case Extensions:** The negative has a lot of evidence to challenge the validity of your affirmative case, and you’ll find everything you’ll need to respond in the 2AC (Second Affirmative Constructive) here.
* **Hegemony Answers:** The negative will read “off case” arguments, arguments that are reasons to vote against the affirmative that aren’t direct responses to something you’ve said on the affirmative. You’ll read these answers in the 2AC and can find those arguments here.

**How to use this file:**

The file is organized by argument type, and which speech evidence should be used.

1. Read the summaries of each argument available in the packet
2. Check out the glossary to make sure you understand all of the words and terms.
3. Read and highlight the evidence, making sure you understand the argument being made and pulling out the key parts of each piece of evidence.

When you are ready to debate:

1. Prepare the sample first affirmative constructive (1AC), making changes as you see fit. Read it during the 1AC.
2. Expand on those initial arguments and respond to all of the negative’s points in the second affirmative constructive (2AC).
3. Respond to the most important arguments the negative makes and re-build your case during the first affirmative rebuttal (1AR). This is a short speech, so be efficient and strategic which arguments you make and answer.
4. Make a closing statement in the second affirmative rebuttal (2AR), explaining why the affirmative team’s plan is a good idea.

# Being Affirmative

The goal of the affirmative is simple: Suggest a plan of action, show how it will work, and why it is a good idea. If the affirmative’s plan is a good idea at the end of the round, then you will win. The more you focus on the plan and why it is a bad idea, the more often you’ll win debates.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Speech** | **Time (Minutes)** |
| **1st Affirmative Constructive (1AC)** | **8** |
| **2nd Negative Speaker Questions 1st Affirmative Speaker** | **3** |
| **1st Negative Constructive (1NC)** | **8** |
| **1st Affirmative Speaker Questions 1st Negative Speaker** | **3** |
| **2nd Affirmative Constructive (2AC)** | **8**  |
| **1st Negative Speaker Questions 2nd Affirmative Speaker** | **3**  |
| **2nd Negative Constructive (2NC)** | **8**  |
| **2nd Affirmative Speaker Questions 2nd Negative Speaker** | **3**  |
| **1st Negative Rebuttal (1NR)** | **5**  |
| **1st Affirmative Rebuttal (1AR)** | **5** |
| **2nd Negative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2NR)** | **5**  |
| **2nd Affirmative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2AR)** | **5**  |

**Speaking Roles on the Affirmative:**

* **1st Affirmative Speaker:** Your job is to introduce the affirmative case in the 1AC, and to keep the affirmative case (plan, solvency and at least one advantage) alive during the 1AR.
* **2nd Affirmative Speaker:** Your job is answer negative attacks in the 2AC, adding any evidence the affirmative might need, then to make a closing statement explaining why the affirmative team should win in the 2AR. This should focus on why the plan is a good idea and how the advantages are more important than the disadvantages.

**Goals of each speech:**

1. **1AC:** Build your case: Inherency, The Plan, Solvency, and the Advantages.
2. **2AC/1AR:** Respond to the negative’s arguments and add new evidence if needed. You need to be winning at least Solvency and an Advantage after the 1AR to win the debate.
3. **2AR:** The second affirmative speaker should give a closing argument all about why the plan is a good idea. Answer the second negative rebuttal (2NR) and tell the judge why the affirmative team should win.

## Overview: First Affirmative Constructive (1AC)

Each Affirmative Case will have four main parts. You’ll have to win each piece in order to win a debate as the affirmative.

* **Inherency:** What is the problem, and why isn’t it being fixed now? This usually identifies trends or specific barriers to the problem being fixed.
* **The Plan:** What is the affirmative going to do about it? This is a short description of action and should be written with care.
* **Solvency:** How will the plan work? Will it be too expensive, does the technology exist yet? Will it actually work?
* **Advantages:** What are the benefits of doing the plan, or the problems we can avoid by doing it? This is why we should care about the plan.

Your partner will have a chance to support your arguments and read more evidence in the second affirmative constructive (2AC).

The negative team will respond to your arguments, using “on case” responses. They’ll also present some of their own. These “off case” arguments are dangerous and you’ll need to respond in order to win the debate. In the Novice Packet, there are three “off case” positions:

* **Topicality:** Is the Affirmative on topic? Do they fall within the Resolution? If they don’t, the negative doesn’t have to debate the merits of the case, they can beat you on procedural grounds. This is a gateway issue: If you aren’t topical, your case doesn’t matter.
* **Environment Disadvantage:** This argument says that immigration increases the population of the United States. Population growth is linked with a host of environmental problems in the US and around the world, which risks global warming.
* **Wage Disadvantage:** This argument says that immigration will negatively impact the labor market, preventing the growth of wages for workers. This is a major contention of the populist movement in this country, and increased populism leads to racism, xenophobia, and conflict.

There are additionally some aff-specific “off case” arguments that you can use in the negative packet. You’ll find answers to on and off case arguments in the 2AC sections of this packet.

# Topic Introduction: Saudi Arabia Affirmative

The Saudi Arabia affirmative proposes limiting the Executive Branch’s ability to sell arms to Saudi Arabia by passing H.R. 7080 to require that Congress vote on all arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Currently the Trump administration favors selling large numbers of weapons to Saudi Arabia and other countries that are being used to fight Houthi rebels in Yemen. Those arms and weapons are contributing to a humanitarian crisis in Yemen where civilians and children are suffering and dying from the use of those weapons. Children and civilians are also suffering because famine and disease are rampant across Yemen due to this war.

The Trump administration has continued to expand the sale of weapons despite Congressional disapproval. They argue that the Houthi rebels are being supported by Iran and view supporting Saudi Arabia as a necessary move to check Iranian power in the region.

The affirmative argues that the cost of this conflict in civilian lives is too high and that the Saudis would not be able to continue their war in Yemen without arms sales from the U.S.

**Strategic Overview**

The affirmative claims one advantage: human rights. The affirmative argues that the costs of the war in Yemen are too high and the Unites States should not be party to these atrocities regardless of geopolitical concerns. There are two distinct arguments to vote affirmative. The first is that structural violence, poverty, and war should be prioritized over hypothetical wars and power politics. The second is that there is a moral imperative to act against famine. You will need both of these arguments to counter the negative’s arguments against the affirmative.

**Answering arguments in the 2AC:**

When putting together your 2AC block, you’ll want to follow the structure you learned during flowing:

They say 🡪 <Insert argument>
That’s not true because 🡪 <Restate your argument or read a new card to answer their argument>
Prefer our argument because 🡪 <Explain why your argument is better>

Consider the following questions:

* Why does the US sell arms to other countries?
* How might US arms sales impact relationships in the region?
* What are the implications of arms sales for civilians in Yemen and how do we compare those to other potential outcomes?
* If the US doesn’t sell arms could Saudi Arabia get them somewhere else? Would that be better or worse?
* Should Congress have more oversight over arms sales?
* Are there some policies that should not be done because the consequences are so bad?

# Answering The Hegemony Disadvantage

After one or two tournaments your league may also include a hegemony or US influence disadvantage as an option for the negative. This disadvantage will argue that the United States needs to sell arms to Saudi Arabia in order to maintain its power and influence in the region. The consequence of diminishing US influence would be less regional stability and an increased risk of war.

As the affirmative you will want to attack this disadvantage in a few different ways:

Uniqueness – argue that US hegemony or influence is already low and declining for reasons unrelated to arms sales.

Link – argue that US arms sales are not key to maintaining US hegemony and influence in the region.

Impact – argue that US influence doesn’t increase regional stability and that hegemonic decline doesn’t cause war or conflict.

# Answering the Elections Disadvantage

After one or two tournaments your league may also include an elections or politics disadvantage as an option for the negative. This disadvantage will argue that changing the way arms sales occur in the United States will help/hurt specific candidates’ chances of winning the Presidency in 2020. Depending on what those candidates propose that could have bad consequences for a number of policy areas.

As the affirmative you will want to attack this disadvantage in a few different ways:

Uniqueness – argue that another candidate will win.

Link – argue that US arms sales are not the key issue that can change the direction of the election.

Impact – argue that these candidates will not cause the policy changes the DA argues they will OR that the policy changes will not cause the bad impacts.

# Key Terms Glossary

**Al Qaeda** – a militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden. Directly translates to “the base.” Responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

**Authoritarian** – a political system that concentrates power in the hands of a leader or a small elite that is not constitutionally responsible to the body of the people.

**Congressional Oversight** – refers to the review, monitoring and supervision of federal agencies, programs activities and policy implementation of the Executive Branch. This oversight is notably lax in the realm of arm sales.

**Dissident** – a person who opposes official policy, especially that of an authoritarian state.

**Embargo** – an official ban on trade or commercial activity with a particular country. May be general or on specific commodities and goods.

**Houthi Rebels** – a group of Shia militants who originally participated in the Arab Spring but became involved in the political transition after President Saleh stepped down and they were not represented in the transitional government.

**Humanitarian Crisis** – defined as an event or series of events that threaten the health, safety or well-being of a community or large group of people.

**Jamal Khashoggi** – a Saudi Arabian dissident and journalist for The Washington Post who was assassinated at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 10/2/2018.

**Yemen** – a republic in southwest Arabia on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Has been in civil war since 2014

# Human Rights 1AC

## Inherency

The Trump Administration used an emergency declaration to bypass Congressional oversight on weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. Oswald, 19 [Rachel Oswald is a foreign policy reporter for CQNow and a contributor to Roll Call. “Democrats spar with State official over arms sales maneuver,” 12 June 2019, <https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/democrats-spar-with-state-official-over-arms-sales-maneuver>]

A senior State Department official on Wednesday appeared to blame Democrats for the administration’s decision last month to declare a state of emergency over Iran to avoid congressional review of billions of dollars of weapon sales to Arab Gulf states. R. Clarke Cooper, assistant secretary of State for political-military affairs, attributed the emergency order to holds placed in spring 2018 by Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Robert Menendez on $2 billion in proposed precision-guided missile sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Menendez, D-N.J., placed the holds in response to the many civilian casualties in the Yemen civil war, in which the two Gulf nations are fighting against Iranian-backed Houthi insurgents. The holds were broken with the emergency declaration. “Yes, the protracted process did contribute to the conditions that necessitated an emergency,” Cooper testified at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing examining the rationale for the May emergency declaration. Menendez’s holds were not legally binding but part of a longstanding bipartisan tradition between the executive branch and lawmakers for resolving concerns about weapon exports before they are formally announced and put before Congress for review under the Arms Export Control Act. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo cited the emergency declaration as justification to avoid an otherwise mandatory 30-day review period under the arms export law. The $2 billion in missile sales were combined with other weapon systems to form a 22-component $8.1 billion package. Democrats used the hearing to roundly castigate the Trump administration’s rationale for declaring an emergency, alternately characterizing it as “phony” and “bogus.” They accused Cooper and other State Department officials, including Pompeo, of trying to circumvent lawful congressional oversight. “It’s a little hard to believe that we’re supposed to take your complete disregard for the congressional review process as an indication that you value congressional engagement,” Rep. David Cicilline, said to Cooper, who was involved in the decision on the emergency declaration. “This is gas-lighting. Your claiming you’re ignoring this provision is your way of affirming the role Congress plays. That’s an absurdity.” Rep. Abigail Spanberger chided Cooper for his complaints that Democrats were drawing out the arms sale review process. “You’ve referred multiple times to a protracted process and I would just remind you, sir, that the protracted process you are bemoaning is, in fact, the constitutional process that we as members of Congress have a responsibility to exercise when we are selling our weapon systems that are this lethal to countries abroad,” the Virginia Democrat said. Menendez also responded in a statement to CQ Roll Call. “Disdain for law and process is not an excuse to break it,” he said. “It’s also not an excuse to create a fake emergency, mislead Congress, and rush weapons into Saudi hands without assurances that they won’t be used to kill civilians.” After Saudi dissident journalist and Virginia resident Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated by Saudi government agents in Turkey last October, Menendez’s office said the State Department effectively ended substantive engagement over the human rights concerns raised around the proposed weapon sales. “Clearly, the secretary of State decided that he couldn’t answer those concerns substantively or persuasively, and so concocted an emergency so he wouldn’t have to do so,” said Menendez spokesman Juan Pachon. “You have to give Mr. Cooper points for creativity in how he tries to defend the indefensible.”

Some are pushing for a review of arms sales after US weapons have been found in possession of some Al-Qaeda fighters; due diligence is needed. Vittori, 19 [Jodi Vittori nonresident scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program. She is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and received her PhD in International Studies from the University of Denver. “American Weapons in the Wrong Hands,” 19 February 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/19/american-weapons-in-wrong-hands-pub-78408>]

Earlier this month, a CNN investigation provided further evidence that U.S. military equipment has been transferred from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to a variety of militias, including some linked to al-Qaeda. Given the additional scrutiny of U.S.-Saudi relations since the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, recent U.S. Senate and House resolutions on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and ongoing Saudi and Emirati tensions with neighbor Qatar, now is the time for a full-scale review of U.S. arms sales to the Gulf region. There are clear rules against arms transfers to third parties. There are also end-use monitoring requirements for U.S. arms exports, but these checks are hardly universal. Given that at least some of the equipment found in militia hands can be tied to U.S. arms sales, the Department of Defense, State Department, and Commerce Department are clearly not adequately monitoring sales. (Which U.S. agency is responsible for end-use checks depends on the type of sale conducted.) The United States is the largest arms supplier to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two lucrative customers of the U.S. defense industry. Saudi Arabia was the largest importer of U.S. arms, having purchased $112 billion in weapons from 2013 through 2017. The UAE was the second-largest importer of U.S. arms in the same time span. Since 2009, over $27 billion in weapons have been offered to the UAE in thirty-two separate deals under the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program. These arms sales continue, despite both countries’ history of diverting arms to favored militias. Saudi Arabia has been purchasing weapons from third parties to pass on to allied governments and groups at least since the 1970s, sometimes on behalf of the U.S. government. Transparency International’s Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index ranks Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its high-risk category for corruption, with Saudi Arabia receiving a score of zero out of four (zero being the worst) and the UAE receiving a score of one for lacking a well-scrutinized process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols. The CNN investigation comes as Congress ramps up its opposition to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition. Former U.S. president Barack Obama’s administration only reluctantly agreed to support the Saudi-led coalition as it went on the offense in 2015, seeing it as an unwinnable proxy war against Iran. Obama had put restrictions on arms sales and intelligence cooperation with the coalition in 2016, but President Donald Trump’s administration lifted those restrictions in March 2017, just prior to Trump’s overseas visit to Saudi Arabia. Saudi human rights abuses in Yemen using U.S. weapons, such as the airstrike on a school bus in August 2018 that killed forty children, and the murder of Khashoggi have shocked the U.S. public and Congress. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Congress required the departments of Defense and State to certify that the Saudi-led coalition was doing all it could to prevent civilian casualties; the State Department failed to provide that justification when it was due earlier this month. In December, the Senate approved a measure to end arms shipments to Saudi Arabia, despite the Trump administration’s strong opposition to the bill. The measure did not have enough votes to override a presidential veto, but senators have promised to introduce an even tougher bill in 2019. Last week, the House also passed a measure to end U.S. assistance to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, but again without enough votes to override an expected presidential veto. The Trump administration continues to approve arms shipments to the Saudi coalition. In 2018 alone, the United States directly sold $4.4 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia, and the administration approved the latest sale of Patriot missile upgrades in December. Tens of billions of dollars in deals with Saudi Arabia remain in the pipeline as well, awaiting approvals as part of the controversial, alleged May 2017 $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration has shown little inclination to loosen its close ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE despite the death of Khashoggi or the conduct of the war in Yemen. The monarchs of Saudi Arabia and the UAE can conduct these proxy operations and divert equipment with no oversight and almost no input from their own citizens. Both countries are absolute monarchies, and their legislative bodies are advisory and contain only regime-approved members. Both countries also stamp out any free press and most independent civil society. Information on defense policies, including the war in Yemen, is kept secret by the monarchs and their inner circles. Most available information on Saudi and Emirati coalition operations and weapons transfers comes from external parties, such as U.S. government weapons sales notifications, news organizations, and human rights organizations. Given the lack of effective Saudi and Emirati citizen or parliamentary oversight on the conduct of the war in Yemen and associated weapons transfers, it is crucial that the United States and other arms-exporting nations conduct additional due diligence and put controls on any exports to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The CNN investigation demonstrates that the stringent due diligence and accountability that should be required for such sales has not been conducted. As the Trump administration continues to approve arms sales, an emboldened Congress inches ever closer—often across partisan lines—to cutting off those very same sales.

## Plan

**Thus the plan: The United States federal government, through an act of Congress, should pass H.R. 7080 and switch to an up vote when authorizing arms sales.**

## Solvency

Passage of HR 7080 would grant Congress broad oversight power and would close the loophole in the AECA that allows for “emergency” declarations to justify arms sales. Mahanty & Eikenberry, 18 [Daniel R. Mahanty (@danmahanty) Director of the U.S. program at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). Prior to joining CIVIC, Dan spent 16 years at the U.S. Department of State. Eric Eikenberry Director of policy & advocacy at the Yemen Peace Project, which seeks to foster a more peaceful and constructive U.S. foreign policy towards Yemen. “How the “Arms Sales Oversight Act” Could Prevent American Arms from Contributing to the Next Overseas Crisis,” 5 December 2018, <https://www.justsecurity.org/61719/arms-sales-oversight-act-prevent-american-arms-contributing-overseas-crisis/>]

The debate over U.S. complicity in Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe is coming to a head in the Senate, with a series of votes on the Sanders-Lee-Murphy war powers resolution. But beyond this immediate measure, other members of Congress are planning to increase their long-term leverage over weapons sales to problematic security partners. Foremost among them, Representatives Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) and Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) recently introduced House Resolution 7080, the “Arms Sale Oversight Act,” to little fanfare. The bill’s unassuming title and procedural focus should not escape the attention of conventional arms control advocates. If passed, H.R. 7080 would expand Congress’s constricted ability to vote down damaging arms sales and mark a first step toward preventing the United States from exacerbating the human cost of conflict. The legislation would reform Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to ensure that any supportive representative can move to discharge a joint resolution of disapproval against a proposed arms sale ten days following its introduction if the presiding committee fails to report it. Win the vote in the House, pass the same joint resolution in the Senate (or vice versa), and Congress has successfully exercised its primary legal means of immediately barring a harmful transfer (whether or not the White House agrees). The measure could dramatically reshape congressional authorities over arms exports. Currently, due to a separate AECA provision, only senators are guaranteed a vote on a joint resolution of disapproval. Absent H.R. 7080’s proposed reform, corresponding House resolutions will remain “highly privileged”—which means that those seeking to stop a transfer at present can only secure a vote only if leadership acquiesces. This inter-chamber imbalance not only robs representatives of a vote in determining U.S. foreign policy, but also diminishes the efforts of conventional arms control advocates in the Senate. Because joint legislation from the House is unlikely to see the floor, Senate efforts can be reduced to signaling opposition to, rather than truly shutting down, an administration’s proposed sale. By correcting this imbalance, H.R. 7080 will open another avenue to ending U.S. enabling of other governments’ gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws. Nowhere is this avenue more needed than for Yemen’s internationalized civil war. There, parties to the conflict routinely conduct indiscriminate attacks on civilians and have created a humanitarian crisis that has pushed millions to the brink of starvation. Yet, it is Saudi Arabia and the UAE, using U.S.-manufactured weapons and logistical support, that have caused the majority of the conflict’s recorded civilian casualties. Causing further concern, a new documentary aired by Deutsche Welle, presents credible evidence that the coalition states have diverted U.S.-manufactured armored vehicles to unaccountable non-state militias. Admittedly, the Senate has rarely made a serious attempt to block an arms sale by resolution of disapproval, but support for exercising greater Congressional oversight over arms sales seems to be on the rise. And even when a resolution of disapproval fails to pass, mere consideration of the legislation can send clear signals to the executive branch and recipient countries alike, and can stimulate valuable policy debate. While S.J. Res. 39, a 2016 effort to block tank sales to Saudi Arabia, mustered 27 votes, S.J. Res. 42, a June 2017 measure to freeze a sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia, garnered 47. The administration has not moved forward with a further sale of as many as 120,000 precision munitions to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE due to Senate opposition; the weapons’ traceable serial numbers, as damning as “made in the USA” stickers, could embroil the United States in further strikes on buses, hospitals, and homes. While the threat of unicameral opposition has worked for now, the reforms advanced by H.R. 7080 would further increase the chances for debate on arms sales in the Congress, and create a more efficient path for the House and Senate to indefinitely arrest a sale. Had the procedures outlined in H.R. 7080 been in place in June 2017, H.J. Res. 102 (the House companion to S.J. Res. 42), could have forced a vote on a motion to discharge instead of dying quietly in committee, creating a debate that, as it did on the Senate side, swayed moderate offices against the sale and focused a news cycle on U.S. complicity in Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians.

The effective embargo, implemented by the aff, would signal to the world our disdain for the Yemeni war and would allow us to hold Saudi Arabia accountable. Spindel, 19 [Jennifer Spindel Assistant Professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center. “The Case for Suspending American Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” 14 May 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/>]

Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t have an effect. A U.S. arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a clear signal of American disproval of Saudi actions in Yemen, and would be an equally important signal to Washington’s allies, who are left wondering if the United States is ambivalent or uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe. By continuing to provide weapons, President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales. Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world [Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction, and serve an important communication role in international politics.

By switching to an approval, instead of a disapproval model, Congress will be given an effective check on executive ability to sell weapons. Ford, 19 [Matt Ford is a staff writer at The New Republic. “A Farewell to Arms Deals,” 11 June 2019, <https://newrepublic.com/article/154160/trump-arms-deals-executive-power-democrats-congress>]

Part of the problem stems from INS v. Chadha, a Supreme Court decision handed down decades ago. It’s an unusual case. After Jagdish Rai Chadha’s student visa expired in 1972, U.S. immigration officials let the Kenyan-born South Asian man stay in the country because of dangerous racial tensions in Kenya. In 1975, however, the House of Representatives overrode that determination, effectively ordering Chadha and five other foreign nationals to be deported. He filed a lawsuit to challenge a provision of U.S. immigration law that granted each chamber of Congress that power. In a landmark 7–2 ruling in 1983, the Supreme Court sided with Chadha and effectively struck down the legislative veto. Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, said that the provision in question was “essentially legislative in purpose and effect.” As a result, it violated the Constitution’s bicameralism requirement by allowing one chamber of Congress to undertake a legislative act on its own. More importantly, the court ruled that such vetoes violate the Constitution’s requirement that all legislation be presented to the president for his signature or veto. Justice Byron White took the rare step of reading his dissent from the bench, signaling his deep disapproval of the court’s decision. “Today’s decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than the court has cumulatively invalidated in its history,” he wrote. He argued that his colleagues had insisted on a separation of powers far stricter than what the Framers had envisioned, one ill-suited for the modern era of the administrative state. “To be sure, the President may have preferred unrestricted power,” White wrote, “but that could be precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check on the exercise of delegated authority.” What would happen next? White wrote that without the legislative veto, lawmakers faced a “Hobson’s choice.” Congress could write narrow laws that delegated little authority, “leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape.” Or it could “abdicate its lawmaking function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies” by writing broad laws for civil servants to flesh out later. “To choose the former leaves major national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role,” White wrote. Lawmakers quickly realized how the court’s decision would reshape their relations with the White House. Among them was Delaware Senator Joe Biden, then a junior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and now a presidential candidate. He pointed to two areas where the justices had upended years of compromise between the two branches: U.S. military involvement under the War Powers Resolution, and arms sales to foreign governments. “The Supreme Court’s decision has shattered a careful and workable accommodation between Congress and the Executive, a development that, in my opinion, threatens our ability to fashion a foreign policy that is consistent, coherent, and safe,” he wrote in a 1984 Syracuse Law Review article. For arms sales, Biden’s solution was to invert the legal mechanism in question. Rather than giving Congress an opportunity to stop each sale before it took effect, his bill would have required the White House to seek affirmative support from lawmakers first. “Under a joint resolution of approval, of course, a sale cannot go through until it is approved by both houses and signed by the President,” he wrote. “That can take up a lot of Senate and House time, but it is the only way for Congress to retain the same degree of control we had over arms sales before Chadha.” This maneuver would remove the mathematical disadvantage faced by lawmakers: the president’s veto power. “Under a joint resolution of disapproval, Congress can get its way only if it has enough votes to override a presidential veto,” Biden explained. “So instead of needing fifty-one senators’ votes to defeat an arms sale we would need sixty-seven, plus two-thirds of the House of Representatives.” In other words, so long as the president can muster the support of one-third of one chamber of Congress, lawmakers are generally powerless to halt controversial arms sales to foreign powers.

## The Advantage: Human Rights

Yemen is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis because the US continues to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. Aljamra, 19 [Helal Aljamra is a Yemeni journalist, Master's Degree in Political Communication from the Higher Institute of Media and Communication in Rabat in 2018. “How U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia Are Prolonging the War in Yemen,” 9 January 2019, <https://insidearabia.com/us-saudi-arabia-war-yemen/>]

The Yemeni people have tried to appeal to the international community to intervene in the conflict in Yemen for years with little success. Despite the words of the UN Secretary General himself and numerous reports published by international organizations describing the war in Yemen as the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis,” the response from the international community has been sparse. Why are the cries of the Yemeni people falling on deaf ears? The answer may lie in the multi-billion dollar arms and trade deals that many countries already have and continue to sign with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Since the beginning of the Saudi-UAE-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015, the West has provided political and logistical support, intelligence, and weapons to fuel the war. Since assuming control of Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense and thus the de facto rule of Saudi Arabia in 2015, MbS has bolstered the kingdom’s relationships with countries such as the U.S., Britain, and France through long-term arms deals. Currently, Saudi Arabia is the top arms importer in the Arab region. Despite strong opposition by several international human rights organizations and activists in the West, most of the proposed arms deals have progressed without impediment. Arms sales to the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania (comprised of Australia and the nearby islands in the Pacific Ocean) have increased dramatically in the past ten years. “Saudi Arabia was the world’s second-largest arms importer, with arms imports increasing by 225 percent [between 2013 and 2017], compared with 2008 to 2012.” The kingdom is followed by Egypt and the UAE, according to a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World superpowers’ perspectives of the conflict in Yemen directly correlate with the volume of weapons they export to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The most steadfast supporters of the Saudi-UAE-driven war appear to be the countries that benefit most from the arms sales and subsidies they receive from the two countries. “In 2013 to 2017, 61 percent of [Saudi] arms imports came from the USA and 23 percent from the UK. Deliveries during this period included 78 combat aircrafts, 72 combat helicopters, 328 tanks, and about 4,000 other armored vehicles,” according to the report. U.S. arms exports to Saudi Arabia alone reached more than $43 billion between 2015 and 2017. Recently, Riyadh has consistently tried to use generous military and trade deals to buy the world’s silence—the most notorious perhaps being the deal that President Trump signed with King Salman in mid-May 2017. This deal included several military, defense, and commercial cooperation agreements; described as “the deal of the century,” the agreements are valued at a total of $460 billion.

Arming authoritarian regimes, like Saudi Arabia, makes us responsible for the violence they carry out. Rovera, 15(Donatella Rovera is the senior crisis response advisor for Amnesty International. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/26/the-human-carnage-of-saudi-arabias-war-in-yemen/>, 8-26)

The conflict has worsened an already dire humanitarian situation in the Middle East’s poorest country. Prior to the conflict, more than half of Yemen’s population was in need of some humanitarian assistance. That number has now increased to more than 80 percent, while a coalition-imposed blockade on commercial imports remains in place in much of the country and the ability of international aid agencies to deliver desperately needed supplies continues to be hindered by the conflict. The damage inflicted by a coalition airstrike last week on the port of the northwestern city of Hudaydah, the only point of entry for humanitarian aid to the north of the country, is only the latest example. The situation is poised to deteriorate further: The U.N. World Food Program warned last week of the possibility of famine in Yemen for millions, mostly women and children. Bombs dropped by the Saudi-led air campaign have all too often landed on civilians, contributing to this humanitarian disaster. In the ruins of the Musaab bin Omar school, the meager possessions of the families who were sheltering there included a few children’s clothes, blankets, and cooking pots. I found no sign of any military activity that could have made the site a military target. But I did see the remains of the weapon used in the attack — a fin from a U.S.-designed MK80 general-purpose bomb, similar to those found at many other locations of coalition strikes. This was far from the only instance where U.S. weapons killed Yemeni civilians. In the nearby village of Waht, another coalition airstrike killed 11 worshipers in a mosque two days earlier. There, too, bewildered survivors and families of the victims asked why they had been targeted. One of the two bombs dropped on the mosque failed to explode and was still mostly intact when I visited the site. It was a U.S.-manufactured MK82 general-purpose bomb, fitted with a fusing system also of U.S. manufacture. The 500-pound bomb was stamped “explosive bomb” and “tritonal” — the latter a designation indicating the type of explosive it contains. Mistakes in the identification of targets and in the execution of attacks can and do happen in wars. In such cases, it is incumbent on the responsible parties to promptly take the necessary corrective action to avoid the recurrence of the same mistakes. But there is no sign that this is occurring in Yemen: Five months since the onset of the coalition airstrike campaign, innocent civilians continue to be killed and maimed every day, raising serious concerns about an apparent disregard for civilian life and for fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. **Strikes that are carried out in the knowledge that they will cause civilian casualties are disproportionate or indiscriminate and constitute war crimes**. While the United States is not formally part of the Saudi-led coalition, it is **assisting the coalition** air campaign by providing intelligence and aerial refueling facilities to coalition bomber jets. The sum total of its assistance to the coalition makes the United States **partly responsible for civilian casualties** resulting from unlawful attacks. Washington has also long been a key supplier of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and other members of the coalition, providing them with the weapons that they are now unleashing in Yemen. Regardless of when the weapons used by coalition forces in Yemen were acquired — whether before or since the start of the air campaign — the countries that supplied the weapons have a responsibility to ensure that they are not used to commit violations of international law. **The poisonous legacy of these U.S.-made weapons will plague Yemen for years to come**. In Inshur, a village near the northern city of Saada, I found a field full of U.S.-made BLU-97 cluster submunitions — small bombs the size of a soda can that are contained in cluster bombs. Many lie in the field, still unexploded and posing a high risk for unsuspecting local residents, farmers, and animal herders who may step on them or pick them up, unaware of the danger. In one of the city’s hospitals, I met a 13-year-old boy who stepped on one of the unexploded cluster bombs in Inshur, causing it to explode. It smashed several bones in his foot. Cluster bombs were banned by an international convention in 2008. But in the 1990s, the United States sold the type of cluster bombs now littering the fields of Inshur to Saudi Arabia. Each of these cluster bombs contains up to 200 small bombs, which are dispersed by the bomb’s explosion over a large area. However, many of these smaller bombs often do not explode on impact, leaving a lethal legacy for years to come. Coalition airstrikes have been particularly intense in the north of the country, notably in and around Saada, a Houthi stronghold that is home to some 50,000 people. When I visited the city in July, I was shocked by the extent of the destruction: Saada now lies in ruin, with most of the population displaced and private homes, shops, markets, and public buildings reduced to rubble in relentless and often indiscriminate air bombardments. A coalition spokesman said in May that the entire city of Saada was considered a military target, in breach of international humanitarian law, which demands that belligerents distinguish between civilians and military targets at all times. International law is clearly being violated in Saada and the surrounding villages. A series of coalition strikes on a village in Sabr, near Saada, killed at least 50 civilians, most of them children, and injured nine others in the afternoon of June 3. Half of the village was completely destroyed. Surviving villagers showed me the piles of rubble which used to be their homes. Ghalib Dhaifallah, a father of four, who lost his 11-year-old son Moaz and 27 other relatives in the attack, told me the boy had been playing with his cousins in the center of the village, at the precise point of impact of one of the airstrikes. “We dug for days looking for the bodies; we recognized some body parts from the clothing only,” he told me.

**Civilian casualties from strikes or famine are *entirely preventable* but entail massive suffering. Noack, 18** (Rick Noack, 11-21-18, Sciences Po Paris, BA; Johns Hopkins University, Aitchison Public Service Fellowship in Government; King's College London, MA in terrorism, security and society, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/21/children-have-starved-death-during-saudi-led-intervention-yemen-says-new-report/?utm_term=.b026eca4ad1c>)

More than 85,000 children may have died of hunger since Saudi Arabia intervened in the war in Yemen three years ago, according to Save the Children, an international NGO. “For every child killed by bombs and bullets, dozens are starving to death and it’s **entirely preventable**,” said Tamer Kirolos, Save the Children’s country director in Yemen. With only a few hospitals still operational, the nongovernmental organization says that the human toll of the conflict **cannot be fully captured** by simply relying on official numbers. Instead, the charity used historical mortality rates and United Nations data on Yemeni malnutrition to estimate that more than 25,000, or 20 to 30 percent of all acutely malnourished children, have died every year since April 2015. The estimates, the NGO said, may still be lower than the actual number of deaths. “Children who die in this way **suffer immensely** as their vital organ functions slow down and eventually stop. Their immune systems are so weak they are more prone to infections, with some too frail to even cry,” said Save the Children representative Kirolos. “Parents are having to witness their children wasting away, unable to do anything about it,” he said. According to the United Nations, half the Yemeni population suffers from famine. The United States has remained largely silent on the war, even when Saudi Arabia enacted a blockade on its borders with Yemen last November. Since then, human rights groups have struggled to supply some of the most malnourished areas in the country with food and drinking water. About 90 percent of the country is considered to be desert or arid and the Yemeni government heavily relied on food imports before the conflict. What began as a rebellion by the country’s Shiite-majority Houthi rebels during the Arab Spring has turned into a bigger confrontation between Saudi Arabia and its archrival Iran, which supports the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has received support from eight other Arab states that are also opposed to Iran’s influence. U.S. officials long argued that the involvement of Iran has made it impossible to end the conflict, but criticism of that assessment has mounted as the conflict became the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Western nations have remained careful in calibrating their responses, to neither disgruntle the wealthy and investment-eager Saudi leadership nor domestic human rights supporters. Germany, for instance, reduced its arms equipment sales to Saudi Arabia and vowed to stop them completely, but approved new sales earlier this year. (Those sales have now been stopped amid the killing of Washington Post contributing columnist Khashoggi). In the United States, **Trump has put Saudi investments and arms purchases first**, even as members of his administration have pressured the Saudis to stop the Yemeni conflict. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo both said in October that the war should come to an end. The United States exports more arms to Saudi Arabia than any other country.

**US support for Saudi Arabia places millions at risk-prioritize reducing material violence over geostrategic chess. Almutawakel and Alfaqih, 18** (Almutawakel & Alfaqih, Award winning Human Rights Activists, 11-8-18, Radhya Almutawakel is a co-founder and leader of Mwatana Organization for Human Rights Abdulrasheed Alfaqih is a co-founder and leader of Mwatana Organization for Human Rightshttps://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/08/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-are-starving-yemenis-to-death-mbs-khashoggi-famine-yemen-blockade-houthis/)

But the Saudis and Emiratis **couldn’t continue** their bombing campaign in Yemen **without U.S. military support**. American planes refuel Saudi aircraft en route to their targets, and Saudi and Emirati pilots drop bombs made in the United States and the United Kingdom onto Yemeni homes and schools Nevertheless, U.S. attention to the war in Yemen has been largely confined to **brief spats of outrage** over particularly dramatic attacks, like the August school bus bombing that killed dozens of children. Saudi crimes in Yemen are not limited to regular and intentional bombing of civilians in violation of international humanitarian law. By escalating the war and destroying essential civilian infrastructure, Saudi Arabia is also responsible for the tens of thousands of Yemeni civilians who have died from preventable disease and starvation brought on by the war. The United Nations concluded that blockades have had “devastating effects on the civilian population” in Yemen, as Saudi and Emirati airstrikes have targeted Yemen’s food production and distribution, including the agricultural sector and the fishing industry. Meanwhile, the collapse of Yemen’s currency due to the war has prevented millions of civilians from purchasing the food that exists in markets. Food prices have skyrocketed, but civil servants haven’t received regular salaries in two years. **Yemenis are being starved to death on purpose,** with starvation of civilians used by Saudi Arabia as a weapon of war. Three-quarters of Yemen’s population—over 22 million men, women, and children—are currently dependent on international aid and protection. The U.N. warned in September that Yemen soon will reach a “tipping point,” beyond which it will be **impossible to avoid massive civilian deaths**. Over 8 million people are currently on the verge of starvation, a figure likely to rise to 14 million—half of the country—by the end of 2018Over 8 million people are currently on the verge of starvation, a figure likely to rise to 14 million—half of the country—by the end of 2018 if the fighting does not subside, import obstructions are not removed, and the currency is not stabilized. To be clear, there is no party in this war is without blood on its hands; our organization, Mwatana, has documented violations against civilians by all parties to the conflict in Yemen, not only Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have killed and injured hundreds of civilians through their use of landmines and indiscriminate shelling, while militias backed by the United Arab Emirates, Yemeni government-backed militias, and Houthi militias have arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, and tortured civilians. **But the de facto immunity** that the international community has given Saudi Arabia through its **silence prevents real justice** for violations by all sides. The people of the Middle East have long and bitter experience with international double standards when it comes to human rights, as purported champions of universal rights in the West regularly ignore grave violations by their allies in the region, from the former shah of Iran to Saddam Hussein to Saudi Arabia’s current crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. This double standard was on display during the crown prince’s recent tour of world capitals and Silicon Valley, where he was generally praised as a “reformer,” and media figures recited his vision for Saudi Arabia in the year 2030 without asking what will be left of Yemen by the year 2020 if the war continues. Similarly, this double standard is on display when Western policymakers downplay Saudi and Emirati violations of Yemenis’ human rights by claiming that a close partnership with Riyadh is needed to prevent perceived Iranian threats to the international community, without asking **whether that same community is also endangered** by Saudi Arabia’s daily violations of basic international norms. And yes, there is a double standard in the wall-to-wall coverage of Khashoggi’s horrific murder, when the daily murder of Yemenis by Saudi Arabia and other parties to the conflict in Yemen hardly merits mention. Those in the United States and elsewhere who are incensed by Khashoggi’s murder must summon similar moral clarity and **condemn Saudi Arabia’s daily killing of innocents** in Yemen.Those in the United States and elsewhere who are incensed by Khashoggi’s murder must summon similar moral clarity and condemn Saudi Arabia’s daily killing of innocents in Yemen. If Saudi violations are to be genuinely curtailed, Khashoggi’s killing must mark the beginning, not the end, of accountability for Saudi crimes. Khashoggi’s death has been reduced to a single data point, rather than being seen as the result **of subverting universal values** in favor of geopolitics or business interests. Reversing course—**ending U.S. military support for the Saudi-Emirati intervention** in Yemen and supporting U.N.-led peace efforts and the reopening of Yemen’s air and sea ports—can still **save millions of lives.** If U.S. lawmakers had spoken up and taken action on Yemen years ago, when Saudi Arabia’s rampant violations were already well known, thousands of Yemeni civilians who since then have been killed by airstrikes or starvation **would still be alive today**—and perhaps Jamal Khashoggi would be, too.

**The exacerbation of war by the Saudi coalition independently puts 8 million at the risk of starvation**

**OXFAM ’17** [OXFAM briefing note, December 2017, “MISSILES AND FOOD Yemen’s man-made food security crisis”]

1 ON THE BRINK OF FAMINE At the end of 2017, **Yemen faces the world’s largest food security emergency**. 12 More than two-and-a-half years after the escalation of the conflict in March 2015, **the effects of war, destruction, malnutrition and disease have left 21.7 million people in need of humanitarian or protection assistance**; of these, **10.8 million are in acute need.**13 In less than six months, **the number of people in need has risen by one million**; **16 million people do not have access to clean water and sanitation**,14 **and 17.8 million Yemenis – 66% of the population – do not know where their next meal is coming from.** **The number of Yemenis who are severely food insecure and facing a high risk of starvation now stands at 8.4 million**.15 In IPC phases, 16 this is the equivalent to phase 4 (emergency); that is, one step away from famine (IPC phase 5). **Nothing has been done to prevent Yemen from spiralling into an even deeper food crisis. If nothing is done immediately, thousands of people will die, even before famine is declared**. **The likelihood of famine has intensified significantly since Yemen’s borders were closed by the Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition** in November 2017. **This is largely due to Yemen’s dependency on food and fuel imports**. **As the Middle East’s poorest country, Yemen struggled with food insecurity in some areas long before the escalation of the conflict** in March 2015, and had a national global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate of 12.7% as of August 2014.18 GAM rates indicate the nutritional status of a population and are used to determine the severity of a humanitarian crisis. By the end of 2017, GAM rates in Yemen had increased significantly as a result of the war. In five governorates, 19 GAM rates rose above the global emergency threshold of 15% according to the Nutrition Cluster, 20 and in some locations within these governorates, even doubled, reaching 31%. 21 Even more worrying, severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates have peaked. An estimated 15% of children under the age of five are acutely malnourished, including 462,000 children suffering from SAM, which constitutes an increase by a staggering 200% since 2014. 22 Rates of stunting have risen to 47%. 2 WOMEN, THE FIRST TO SKIP MEALS Yemeni women face one of the world’s greatest gender-based disparities, according to a worldwide study on the gender gap. 25 This imbalance clearly holds in terms of food security and nutrition, where women in Yemen suffer disproportionately. Women are often the first to skip meals or eat smaller portions so that the family ration goes further. Early marriage, already a dire problem in Yemen, has increased again since the escalation of the conflict. Girls as young as eight or 10 years old are married off to reduce the number of family members to feed, but also as a source of income in order to feed the rest of the family and pay off debts. 26 Higher levels of education are strongly correlated with higher nutritional status, yet only 29% of women in Yemen are literate, compared with 70% of men. 27 Consequently, one-quarter of Yemeni women between the ages of 15 and 49 are acutely malnourished. Malnourished women are in turn at increased risk of giving birth to malnourished babies, 28 indicating the correlation between gender inequality and malnutrition. 2 **WHY IS FAMINE LOOMING**? **Yemen’s food crisis is a direct, man-made result of the war. Imposed difficulties in importing food; the destruction of civilian infrastructure; a cash crisis; an entire year of unpaid public salaries; periods of siege and de facto blockades had left Yemenis without the means and processes to access basic staple food, even before the closure of key entry points** for food in early November 2017. Furthermore, **the effects of the war have led to an increase in basic food prices of up to an average 30%,** 29 **due to the costly delays of importing goods through Hodeidah port and the imposition of road taxes throughout the country**. At the same time, **the population has less and less access to cash and paid work. This has led to a vicious cycle as increasing numbers of people descend into food insecurity.** NEAR TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON FOOD IMPORTS **As a food-deficient country, Yemen has always relied on importing food.** Even before the crisis, 90% of Yemen’s food was imported, including 90% of wheat and 100% of rice, which are the country’s staple foods. **The escalation of the conflict has caused major disruption to the food pipeline to and within the country** through the imposition of inspection mechanisms, the partial destruction of infrastructure and dramatically increased costs due to delays and road taxes.

**Morality demands we confront food inequality even in the face of annihilation. Watson, 77** (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)

These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human equity per se. Consequently, the moral action is to **distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences**. This is the hard line apparently drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky—but then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of morality—if taken seriously—**supersede those of conflicting reason**. One may even have to sacrifice one’s life or one’s nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (**even if everyone then dies**). That an action is necessary to save one’s life is **no excuse** for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save one’s life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the highest principle—recant or die—and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough. I have put aside many questions of detail—such as the mechanical problems of distributing food—because detail does not alter the stark conclusion. If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose one’s life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nation—for nations can come and go—one might well argue that unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large group—say one-third of present world population—should be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from **an individual standpoint,** the human species—like the nation—is of **no moral relevance**. From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpoint—as indicated above—survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is **immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual behavior**.

# Solvency - Extensions

## PassING H.R. 7080 Solves

HR 7080 is key to stop the Yemeni crisis and also prevent future instances while providing a check on the executive’s authority to sell arms. Mahanty & Eikenberry, 18 [Daniel R. Mahanty (@danmahanty) Director of the U.S. program at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). Prior to joining CIVIC, Dan spent 16 years at the U.S. Department of State. Eric Eikenberry Director of policy & advocacy at the Yemen Peace Project, which seeks to foster a more peaceful and constructive U.S. foreign policy towards Yemen. “How the “Arms Sales Oversight Act” Could Prevent American Arms from Contributing to the Next Overseas Crisis,” 5 December 2018, <https://www.justsecurity.org/61719/arms-sales-oversight-act-prevent-american-arms-contributing-overseas-crisis/>]

While the most recent and egregious example, Yemen is not the only case where enhanced Congressional oversight is necessary to add reasonable constraints to the arms sales process. By some credible estimates, the United States sells arms, including bombs and missiles, to at least 62 countries that are an active party to a conflict. Some countries to whom the United States sells arms, such as Bahrain and Egypt, have demonstrated a consistent pattern of human rights violations; others present a very clear risk of misuse or diversion, or even the potential for mass atrocities. And some countries with lower levels of capacity simply require a greater degree of due diligence to ensure equipment can be used appropriately. If H.R. 7080 makes it more likely that Congress could exercise more meaningful oversight in even a handful of these cases, the risk of U.S. complicity in human rights abuses or the next humanitarian disaster, wherever it is, could be meaningfully diminished – and at minimal opportunity cost. H.R. 7080 does not have to become law this Congress to have an impact – advocates should view it as an organizing tool around which to rally, and that could ease the way to reforms small and large which can check the executive’s nearly unfettered prerogative to sell weapons to any regime, regardless of their crimes. To begin, H.R. 7080 does not have to pass for next year’s House to respect its provisions as an intra-chamber rule: regardless of eventual passage, Democratic leadership should open this procedural path to the floor for joint resolutions of disapproval as a matter of course. Furthermore, if H.R. 7080 is reintroduced in the 116thCongress, it should be resurfaced alongside a host of measures to strengthen Congress’s hand in overall arms export policy. These can include requiring detailed and unclassified answers from the departments of State and Defense concerning the likelihood that a sale of certain items will exacerbate armed conflict or spur an arms race (theoretically a judgment the executive already makes under AECA) and outlining robust processes for monitoring the way weapons’ are used among recipients with a history of rights violations or violations of the laws of armed conflict, and those for which the indicators suggest a high risk of future violations. Congress should also consider lowering notification thresholds, so that members can vet arms sales valued at less than $50 million. The time is also long past for Congress to unequivocally clarify that the Leahy Law applies to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), thereby prohibiting State and Defense from permitting the transfer or maintenance of defense articles to security forces that have committed unconscionable human rights violations with impunity. There is no simple trick to ending the devastation yielded by the war and intervention in Yemen, which has directly killed at least 57,000, contributed to the further deaths of tens of thousands of children per year from preventable causes, and threatened 14 million with famine. Yet without a congressional freeze on weapons to the coalition states, there will never be enough political space for peace negotiations to take root. So long as short-term profit motive driving executive branch arms sales policy supersedes a reasonable modicum of self-restraint, the Congress, and H.R. 7080 present the best opportunity to limit the risk that American weapons will be involved in – or aggravate – both Yemen’s catastrophe and the next humanitarian crisis.

## Key to hold Saudi Arabia accountable

The effective embargo, implemented by the aff, would signal to the world our disdain for the Yemeni war and would allow us to hold Saudi Arabia accountable. Spindel, 19 [Jennifer Spindel is an assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center. You can follow her on Twitter: @jsspindel. “The Case for Suspending American Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” 14 May 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/>]

Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t have an effect. A U.S. arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a clear signal of American disproval of Saudi actions in Yemen, and would be an equally important signal to Washington’s allies, who are left wondering if the United States is ambivalent or uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe. By continuing to provide weapons, President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales. Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world [Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction, and serve an important communication role in international politics.

## Key to Coalition Building

Aff is key to build coalitions that would help rein in Saudi actions; forces them to rethink their strategic goals. Spindel, 19 [Jennifer Spindel is an assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center. You can follow her on Twitter: @jsspindel. “The Case for Suspending American Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” 14 May 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/>]

Because arms transfers (and denials) are powerful signals, they can have an effect even before a transfer is actually completed. This suggests that even the announcement of an embargo against Saudi Arabia could have an effect. Take, for example, Taiwan’s recent request for a fleet of new fighter jets. As reports mounted that Trump had given “tacit approval” to a deal for F-16 jets, China’s protests increased. The United States has not sold advanced fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992, partially out of fear of angering China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province. Even if the deal for F-16s is formally approved, Taiwan is unlikely to see the jets until at least 2021, and the balance of power between China and Taiwan would not change. As one researcher observed, the sale would be a “huge shock” for Beijing, “But it would be more of a political shock than a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.” Yet China’s immediate, negative reaction to even the announcement of a potential deal shows how powerful arms transfer signals can be. If this same logic is applied to an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, an arms embargo would signal that Saudi Arabia does not have the support of the United States. This signal would be an important first step in changing Saudi behavior because it would override other statements and actions the United States has sent that indicate support. And Trump has given Saudi Arabia a number of positive signals: He called Saudi Arabia a “great ally” and dismissed reports that that the Saudi government was involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has expressed interested in selling nuclear power plants and technology to Saudi Arabia. And he has repeatedly claimed that he has made a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia (he hasn’t). With these clear signals of support, why should Saudi Arabia alter its behavior based on resolutions that come out of the House or Senate, which are likely to be vetoed by Trump, anyway? An arms embargo would be a clear and unambiguous signal that the United States disproves of Saudi actions in Yemen. The second reason for supporting an embargo concerns U.S. allies and the logistical difficulties of making an embargo have an effect. One of the reasons embargoes have little material impact is because they require cooperation among weapons exporting states. A ban on sales from one country will have little effect if the target of the embargo can seek arms elsewhere. Germany, instituted an arms ban against Riyadh in November 2018, and German leaders have pressured other European states to stop selling arms to the Saudis. Germany understands the importance of the embargo as a political signal: as a representative of the German Green Party explained, “The re-start of arms exports to Saudi Arabia would be a fatal foreign policy signal and would contribute to the continued destabilization of the Middle East.” But the German embargo has had minimal effect because Saudi Arabia can get arms elsewhere. According to the 2019 Military Balance, most of Saudi Arabia’s equipment is American or French in origin, such as the M1A2 Abrams and AMX-30 tanks, Apache and Dauphin helicopters, and F-15C/D fighter jets. Saudi Arabia has some equipment manufactured wholly or in part in Germany, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Tornado ground attack craft, but these weapons are a small portion of its complete arsenal. A U.S. embargo would send an important signal to the allies who also supply Saudi Arabia, allowing them to explain participation in the embargo to their own domestic constituencies. This is especially important for countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, that need to export arms to keep their own production lines running. While the research shows that sustaining an arms embargo is often the most difficult step, embargoes can restrain sending states’ arms exports. Even if a U.S. embargo won’t have a direct effect on Saudi Arabia on its own, an embargo is important for building coalitions for a more expansive embargo that could affect Saudi behavior.

## Congress is key

By switching to an approval, instead of a disapproval model, Congress will be given an effective check on the executive ability to sell weapons. Ford, 19 [Matt Ford is a staff writer at The New Republic. “A Farewell to Arms Deals,” 11 June 2019, <https://newrepublic.com/article/154160/trump-arms-deals-executive-power-democrats-congress>]

Part of the problem stems from INS v. Chadha, a Supreme Court decision handed down decades ago. It’s an unusual case. After Jagdish Rai Chadha’s student visa expired in 1972, U.S. immigration officials let the Kenyan-born South Asian man stay in the country because of dangerous racial tensions in Kenya. In 1975, however, the House of Representatives overrode that determination, effectively ordering Chadha and five other foreign nationals to be deported. He filed a lawsuit to challenge a provision of U.S. immigration law that granted each chamber of Congress that power. In a landmark 7–2 ruling in 1983, the Supreme Court sided with Chadha and effectively struck down the legislative veto. Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, said that the provision in question was “essentially legislative in purpose and effect.” As a result, it violated the Constitution’s bicameralism requirement by allowing one chamber of Congress to undertake a legislative act on its own. More importantly, the court ruled that such vetoes violate the Constitution’s requirement that all legislation be presented to the president for his signature or veto. Justice Byron White took the rare step of reading his dissent from the bench, signaling his deep disapproval of the court’s decision. “Today’s decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than the court has cumulatively invalidated in its history,” he wrote. He argued that his colleagues had insisted on a separation of powers far stricter than what the Framers had envisioned, one ill-suited for the modern era of the administrative state. “To be sure, the President may have preferred unrestricted power,” White wrote, “but that could be precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check on the exercise of delegated authority.” What would happen next? White wrote that without the legislative veto, lawmakers faced a “Hobson’s choice.” Congress could write narrow laws that delegated little authority, “leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape.” Or it could “abdicate its lawmaking function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies” by writing broad laws for civil servants to flesh out later. “To choose the former leaves major national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role,” White wrote. Lawmakers quickly realized how the court’s decision would reshape their relations with the White House. Among them was Delaware Senator Joe Biden, then a junior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and now a presidential candidate. He pointed to two areas where the justices had upended years of compromise between the two branches: U.S. military involvement under the War Powers Resolution, and arms sales to foreign governments. “The Supreme Court’s decision has shattered a careful and workable accommodation between Congress and the Executive, a development that, in my opinion, threatens our ability to fashion a foreign policy that is consistent, coherent, and safe,” he wrote in a 1984 Syracuse Law Review article. For arms sales, Biden’s solution was to invert the legal mechanism in question. Rather than giving Congress an opportunity to stop each sale before it took effect, his bill would have required the White House to seek affirmative support from lawmakers first. “Under a joint resolution of approval, of course, a sale cannot go through until it is approved by both houses and signed by the President,” he wrote. “That can take up a lot of Senate and House time, but it is the only way for Congress to retain the same degree of control we had over arms sales before Chadha.” This maneuver would remove the mathematical disadvantage faced by lawmakers: the president’s veto power. “Under a joint resolution of disapproval, Congress can get its way only if it has enough votes to override a presidential veto,” Biden explained. “So instead of needing fifty-one senators’ votes to defeat an arms sale we would need sixty-seven, plus two-thirds of the House of Representatives.” In other words, so long as the president can muster the support of one-third of one chamber of Congress, lawmakers are generally powerless to halt controversial arms sales to foreign powers.

The plan solves by requiring congress to approve all arms deals, not just disapprove. This spurs meaningful scrutiny and risk assessment. Thrall & Dorminey, 18 – A. Trevor Thrall is an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Caroline Dorminey is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute. (“Risky Business The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, March 13, 2018 | Number 836)

Amend the AECA to Require Congressional Approval for All Arms Sales—Finally, we recommend that the AECA be amended to require congressional approval for all arms sales. The current law is designed to make arms sales easy by making it difficult for Congress to block them. **Blocking a sale requires a majority vote in both houses of Congress**, with such votes typically cropping up inconveniently in the middle of other, more-pressing issues on the legislative agenda. Congress has exerted little or no influence over arms sales and has allowed the executive branch near-complete autonomy. Requiring a congressional vote to approve arms sales, on the other hand, would subject arms deals to much more intense scrutiny than has traditionally been the case, and blocking misguided arms sales would be much easier. Requiring a separate piece of legislation to approve each arms deal, not simply requiring a resolution against, would encourage deliberations about the strategic benefits of any proposed deal.

Congress is needed to restrict international arms sales. Allan, 19 [Elizabeth Allan is a first-year student at Yale Law School. She holds Bachelor’s degrees in International Affairs and Arabic from the University of Georgia and an MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford, where she studied as a Rhodes Scholar. She has also worked as a consultant in the Middle East and West Africa. “The Yemen Resolution and the Historical U.S.-Saudi Security Relationship,” 25 April 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemen-resolution-and-historical-us-saudi-security-relationship]

As this history demonstrates, the fact that Congress and the president are at odds over U.S. security policy toward Saudi Arabia is not a new development in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In the current dispute, Congress is leveraging several old tools for influencing security policy—including opposition to arms sales under the AECA and restrictions on foreign assistance—and previously unused tools, such as the War Powers Resolution. Congress’s specific objections to the U.S.-Saudi security relationship reflect contemporary concerns over the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Beyond Yemen, however, several structural factors complicate traditional pillars of the U.S.-Saudi security alliance, including concerns that Saudi Arabia’s actions are undermining regional security, growing scrutiny of Saudi Arabia’s internal politics (for example, its human rights track record), and the U.S.’s increased capacity to produce domestic oil (although Saudi Arabia remains important to global energy markets). Those in support of continuing the relationship emphasize that, although the Saudi-U.S. partnership is far from perfect, it has strategic benefits, particularly in counterterrorism, opposition to Iran, and maintenance of regional stability against a more chaotic alternative. Ultimately, congressional supporters and skeptics must cooperate with the executive branch to change U.S. security strategy, and the Trump administration has consistently indicated that it has no intention of turning away from the U.S.-Saudi alliance. As long as this remains administration policy, Congress may use various legislative tools to chip away at U.S. security support for the kingdom—but there is unlikely to be a fundamental realignment in the U.S.-Saudi security relationship.

## Morality Extensions

Cutting off arm sales is the only moral response to war in Yemen. Mohamed and Shaif, 16(Rasha Mohamed is Amnesty International’s Yemen researcher. Follow her on Twitter at: @RashaMoh2. Rawan Shaif is a freelance journalist covering Yemen. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/25/civilian-casualties-war-crimes-saudi-arabia-yemen-war/)

The Houthis and their allies — armed groups loyal to Saleh — are the declared targets of the coalition’s 1-year-old air campaign. In reality, however, it is the civilians, such as Basrallah and Rubaid, and their children, who are predominantly the victims of this protracted war. Hundreds of civilians have been killed in airstrikes while asleep in their homes, when going about their daily activities, or in the very places where they had sought refuge from the conflict. The United States, Britain, and others, meanwhile, have continued to supply a steady stream of weaponry and logistical support to Saudi Arabia and its coalition. One year on, it still remains unclear who is winning the war. Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners claim to have regained control of more than 80 percent of the country, but the Houthis remain in control of the key strongholds of Sanaa, Ibb, and Taiz. Moreover, armed groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State are gaining ground and support in the south and southeast parts of the country, taking advantage of the security vacuum to consolidate their power. One thing is clear: Yemeni civilians are losing the most. This wanton disregard for the lives of civilians continues unabated... At approximately 11:30 a.m. on March 15, the market in Khamees, a town in northern Yemen, was destroyed in two apparent airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition, claiming the lives of 106 civilians, including 24 children. One man, Hasan Masafi, who spoke to us over the phone, couldn’t even grieve his 18-year-old son’s death because he couldn’t locate his whole body. “We were only able to find his right leg,” he said. The facts speak for themselves, and evidence of violations of international humanitarian law cannot be dismissed as mere hearsay, as the British government has attempted to do with U.N. reports. Amnesty International and other organizations have presented compelling evidence over the past year that indicates all parties to the Yemen conflict have committed war crimes. But some countries do not want to see the evidence that is staring them in the face. **Flooding the region with arms is akin to adding fuel to the fire**. Attacks like the one on Khamees market have become the norm for civilians in Yemen. More than 3,000 civilians have been killed during the conflict, according to the United Nations. Thousands of others have been injured, more than 2.5 million have been displaced, and 83 percent of Yemenis are reliant on humanitarian assistance. There is barely a single corner of Yemen or a single soul that hasn’t in some way been touched and scarred by this war. The Saudi-led coalition’s response to reports of civilians unlawfully killed — and homes, schools, and infrastructure destroyed — has been to constantly repeat the mantra that “only military targets are hit by airstrikes.” The situation on the ground tells a very different story. With each unlawful coalition airstrike, it becomes more evident that Saudi Arabia and other coalition members either **do not care about** respecting international humanitarian law or are **incapable of adhering** to its fundamental rules. And yet, Britain, the United States, and France continue to authorize lucrative arms deals with the Saudi-led coalition — apparently without batting an eyelash. Since November 2013, the U.S. Defense Department has authorized more than $35.7 billion in major arms deals to Saudi Arabia.Since November 2013, the U.S. Defense Department has authorized more than $35.7 billion in major arms deals to Saudi Arabia. This includes the announcement of a $1.29 billion U.S. arms sale to Saudi Arabia in November 2015 that will supply Riyadh with 18,440 bombs and 1,500 warheads. Meanwhile, during his time in office, British Prime Minister David Cameron has overseen the sale of more than $9 billion worth of weaponry to Saudi Arabia, including nearly $4 billion since airstrikes on Yemen began, according to the Campaign Against Arms Trade, a London-based NGO. Regardless of when the weapons used by coalition forces in Yemen were acquired — whether before or since the start of the air campaign — the countries that supplied them have a responsibility to ensure that they are not facilitating violations of international law. While the relentless coalition airstrikes account for most of the civilian deaths in the conflict, civilians also find themselves increasingly trapped in the crossfire between Houthi and anti-Houthi armed groups, with each side supported by different units of the now-divided armed forces. A case in point is the southern city of Taiz, which has suffered restrictions on movement of food and medical supplies since at least November. Attacks continue to maim and kill civilians, including children. When Amnesty International visited the city in July 2015, we witnessed the irresponsible conduct of fighters firsthand and documented 30 ground attacks, which led to more than 100 casualties. One of those victims was 12-year-old Ayham Anees, who was killed in an apparent Houthi mortar attack in May. Munther Mohamed, Anees’s uncle, described rushing to the scene after hearing children’s screams following the attack. “I also saw my nephew Ayham, whose head had separated from his body,” he said. “I had told the children to play in the middle of the alley because it was the safest place, but it was not.” The crisis in Taiz has only gotten worse in recent days. While the Houthis have been partially pushed out of the city center, they still maintain control of the majority of the governorate. Where the Houthis have been forced to retreat, they have laid landmines — internationally banned weapons that have already claimed dozens of civilian lives. Last week, the spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition announced that operations are nearing their end in Yemen. What that means in practice is not yet clear, as airstrikes continue to pound the country. But accountability doesn’t take a back seat just because military operations may be winding down. It’s time to bring these crimes against civilians to an end. With peace talks expected to take place in Kuwait on April 18, all parties must prioritize several crucial conditions: protecting the long-term interests of ordinary Yemenis, ensuring an end to the horrors of the past year, and guaranteeing that those responsible will be held accountable. All those civilian lives lost as a result of violations won’t be forgotten, even if this chapter of war closes. It’s too late for the children of Salah Basrallah. But **there’s no excuse not to do the right thing now**. States should act immediately to ensure that **none of Yemen’s warring parties** is supplied — either directly or indirectly — with weapons, munitions, military equipment, or technology that **would be used in any furtherance of the conflict**. And they must do everything in their power to ensure there is an independent international investigation into violations by all sides aimed at ensuring justice and reparation — for Salah Basrallah and the thousands of other victims of this deadly war.

## Sends Signal To Allies

**The plan sends a signal to allies that US support must be earned encouraging moderation- this stabilizes the region, oil prices, reduces terrorism and proliferation. Walt, 18** (Stephen Walt PhD, IR@Harvard, 1-16 https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/)

Fortunately, no state inside or outside the Middle East was then — or is today — in a position to control it. As a result, the United States does not have to do much to maintain a regional balance of power. Instead of giving Saudi Arabia or Israel **a blank check to counter some mythical Iranian hegemon**, Washington should seek more **balanced relations** with all states in the region, Iran included. This more equitable approach would facilitate cooperation on issues where U.S. and Iranian interests align, such as **Afghanistan**. The prospect of better relations with the United States would give Tehran an **incentive to moderate its behavior**. Past U.S. efforts to isolate the clerical regime **encouraged it to play a spoiler’s role** instead, with some degree of success. This approach would also **discourage America’s present allies** from taking U**.S. support for granted** and encourage them **to do more to retain its favor**. America’s current regional allies (and their domestic lobbies) would surely protest vehemently if Washington stopped backing them to the hilt and sought even a modest détente with Iran. But that is ultimately their problem, not America’s. **Excessive U.S. support encourages allies to behave recklessly,** as Israel does when it expands illegal settlements and as Saudi Arabia is doing with its military campaign in Yemen, its diplomatic squabble with Qatar, and its bungled attempt to reshape politics inside Lebanon. **If U.S. allies understood that Washington was talking to everyone**, however, they would have more reason to **listen to America’s advice** lest it **curtail its support and look elsewhere**. **Having many options is the ultimate source of leverage**. Playing balance-of-power politics in the Middle East does not require Washington to abandon its current allies completely or tilt toward Tehran. Rather, it means using U.S. power to maintain a rough balance, discourage overt efforts to alter the status quo, and prevent any state from dominating the region while helping local powers resolve their differences. **Lowering the temperature** in this way would **safeguard access to oil**, **dampen desire in the region for weapons of mass destruction**, and give these states less reason to **fund extremists and other proxies.**

## Status Quo Policy Outdated

**Military aid is an outdated model- it doesn’t give the US influence or leverage. Walsh & Schmitt, 18** [Walsh, Cairo Bureau chief, and Schmitt, national security writer, 12-25-18 (Declan and Eric, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-us-saudi-civilian-war.html]

For decades, the United States sold tens of billions of dollars in arms to Saudi Arabia on an unspoken premise: that they would rarely be used. The Saudis amassed the world’s third-largest fleet of F-15 jets, after the United States and Israel, but their pilots almost never saw action. They shot down two Iranian jets over the Persian Gulf in 1984, two Iraqi warplanes during the 1991 gulf war and they conducted a handful of bombing raids along the border with Yemen in 2009. The United States had similar expectations for its arms sales to other Persian Gulf countries. “There was a belief that these countries wouldn’t end up using this equipment, and we were just selling them expensive paperweights,” said Andrew Miller, a former State Department official now with the Project on Middle East Democracy. Then came Prince Mohammed bin Salman. When the prince, then the Saudi defense minister, sent fighter jets to Yemen in March 2015, Pentagon officials were flustered to receive just 48 hours notice of the first strikes against Houthi rebels, two former senior American officials said. American officials were persuaded by Saudi assurances the campaign would be over in weeks. But as the weeks turned to years, and the prospect of victory receded, the Americans found themselves backing a military campaign that was exacting **a steep civilian toll**, largely as a result of Saudi and Emirati airstrikes. American military officials posted to the coalition war room in Riyadh noticed that inexperienced Saudi pilots flew at high altitudes to avoid enemy fire, military officials said. The tactic reduced the risk to the pilots but transferred it to civilians, who were exposed to less accurate bombings. Coalition planners misidentified targets and their pilots struck them at the wrong time — destroying a vehicle as it passed through a crowded bazaar, for instance, instead of waiting until it reached an open road. The coalition routinely ignored a no-strike list — drawn up by the United States Central Command and the United Nations — **of hospitals, schools and other places where civilians gathered.** At times, coalition officers **subverted their own** chain of command. In one instance, a devastating strike that killed 155 people in a funeral hall was ordered by a junior officer who countermanded an order from a more senior officer, a State Department official said. The Americans offered help. The State Department financed an investigative body to review errant airstrikes and propose corrective action. Pentagon lawyers trained Saudi officers in the laws of war. Military officers suggested putting gun cameras on Saudi and Emiratis warplanes to see how strikes were being conducted. The coalition balked. In June 2017, American officials extracted new promises of safeguards, including stricter rules of engagement and an expansion of the no-strike list to about 33,000 targets — provisions that allowed the secretary of state, then Rex W. Tillerson, to win support in Congress for the sale of more than $510 million in precision-guided munitions to the kingdom. But **those measures seemed to make little difference**. Just over a year later, in August 2018, a coalition airstrike killed at least 40 boys on a packed school bus in northern Yemen. Still, American leaders insisted **they need to keep helping** the Saudi coalition. America’s role in the war was “absolutely essential” to safeguard civilians, the general in charge of Central Command, Gen. Joseph L. Votel, told a charged Senate hearing in March. “I think this does give us the best opportunity to address these concerns,” he said.

## Stopping Sales Solves

**Stopping arms sales solves**

**Riedel ’18** [Bruce Riedel Senior Fellow and Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project 10/10/18, “After Khashoggi, US arms sales to the Saudis are essential leverage,” Brooking Institute]

Eighteen months ago, Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia and said he had concluded $110 billion dollars in arms sales with the kingdom. It was fake news then and it’s still fake news today. The Saudis have not concluded a single major arms deal with Washington on Trump’s watch. Nonetheless, **the U.S. arms relationship with the kingdom is the most important leverage Washington has as it contemplates reacting to the alleged murder of Jamal Khashoggi**. FOLLOW THE MONEY In June 2017, after the president’s visit to Riyadh—his first official foreign travel—we published a Brookings blog post detailing that his claims to have sold $110 billion in weapons were spurious. Other media outlets subsequently came to the same conclusion. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman visited the White House this year, the president indirectly confirmed that non-deal by chiding the prince for spending only “peanuts” on arms from America. **The Saudis have continued to buy spare parts, munitions, and technical support for the enormous amount of American equipment they have bought from previous administrations**. **The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely dependent on American** and British **support for its air fleet of F15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and Tornado aircraft. If** either **Washington** or London **halts the flow of logistics, the RSAF will be grounded**. **The Saudi army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard are similarly dependent on foreigners** (the Saudi Arabian National Guard is heavily dependent on Canada). **The same is also true for the Saudis allies like Bahrain.** Under President Obama, Saudi Arabia spent well over $110 billion in U.S. weapons, including for aircraft, helicopters, and air defense missiles. These deals were the largest in American history. Saudi commentators routinely decried Obama for failing to protect Saudi interests, but the kingdom loved his arms deals. But the kingdom has not bought any new arms platform during the Trump administration. Only one has even been seriously discussed: A $15 billion deal for THAAD, terminal high altitude area defense missiles, has gotten the most attention and preliminary approval from Congress, but the Saudis let pass a September deadline for the deal with Lockheed Martin. **The Saudis certainly need more air defenses with the pro-Iran Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen firing ballistic missiles at Saudi cities. The three and a half year-old Saudi war in Yemen is hugely expensive.** There are no public figures from the Saudi government about the war’s costs, but a conservative estimate would be at least $50 billion per year. **Maintenance costs for aircraft and warships go up dramatically when they are constantly in combat operations. The Royal Saudi Navy has been blockading Yemen for over 40 months. The RSAF has conducted thousands of air strikes.** The war is draining the kingdom’s coffers. And **responsibility for the war is on Mohammed bin Salman**, who as defense minister has driven Riyadh into this quagmire. **Shaking the arms relationship is by far the most important way to clip his wings**.

## Forces a Cease Fire

**Plan would force a cease fire**

**Bruton ’18** [F. Brinley Bruton, 11/5/18, “The U.S. wants the Yemen war to end. Will it stop selling arms to Saudi Arabia?,” NBC News]

**Washington supports Saudi Arabia** and its ally, the United Arab Emirates**, through billions in arms sales**. It also refuels their jets mid-air, provides training and shares intelligence. So **if the U.S. wants to try to force the Saudis' hands, it has leverage**. **The best way to force the Saudis to change their ways is to stop sending weapons**, **according to Human Rights Watch’s Yemen researcher Kristine Beckerle**. “You’ve gotten so many violations already over the past three and a half years, so what Pompeo and Mattis should be doing is saying, ‘These are the benchmarks. We’re going to hold up weapons sales until you actually fulfill these tasks,’" she said, referring to the apparent bombing of civilian sites by the coalition. **American arms deliveries to the Saudis reached $5.5 billion last year**, up from $1.7 billion in 2009, according to the U.K.-based Campaign Against Arms Trade which compiled the figures using Department of Defense statistics. **The U.S. government agreed to sell more than $79 billion in arms to Riyadh** over that period. **In a May 2017 stop in Saudi Arabia — his first trip abroad as president — Donald Trump announced $110 billion in immediate sales of U.S. arms and equipment, with $350 billion in additional deals over the next 10 years.** While it is unclear how much of Trump's announcement covered deals that had already been unveiled, **the president has touted such arms sales to the Saudis in an effort to explain the importance of the relationship with the kingdom**. American officials have also been keen to focus on what they say is the country's key role on combating terrorism and fighting Iranian influence throughout the region. Andrew Smith of the Campaign Against Arms Trade said last week's calls for a cease-fire by Mattis and Pompeo were long overdue. "**Over the last three and a half years Saudi-led forces have inflicted a terrible humanitarian catastrophe on Yemen**," he said. "**We hope that the current pressure can serve as a turning point. For far too long, arms-dealing governments have prioritized arms company profits over the rights and lives of Yemeni people**." Over the summer, lawmakers included a provision in a defense bill requiring the administration to certify Saudi Arabia and its allies were trying to reduce civilian casualties in Yemen. In August, the coalition bombed a school bus carrying children, killing dozens. The deadly strike prompted international outrage. Weeks later, Pompeo certified to Congress that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were working to reduce civilian casualties in Yemen — a legal requirement to allow U.S. aircraft to refuel the countries’ warplanes. Saudi officials have not commented on last week's comments by Mattis and Pompeo. But there are signs that the U.S. is bringing pressure to bear on Riyadh. On Wednesday, a group of Republican senators pressed the administration to cut off civilian nuclear talks with Saudi Arabia. A day later, the State Department confirmed **senior U.S. officials have been in talks with both sides of the Yemen conflict** and said that **"the climate is right" for negotiations to end the war.**

# Human Rights Adv - Extensions

## Violate Arms Trade Treaty

In violation of the Arms Trade Treaty, the US has been selling arms to Saudi Arabia; these weapons have ben used for human rights violations in Yemen. Aljamra, 19 [Helal Aljamra Yemeni journalist, Master's Degree in Political Communication from the Higher Institute of Media and Communication in Rabat in 2018. “How U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia Are Prolonging the War in Yemen,” 9 January 2019, <https://insidearabia.com/us-saudi-arabia-war-yemen/>]

Washington’s relations with the countries in the Arabian Gulf are complicated, but its relationship with Saudi Arabia, in particular, is markedly more intricate. While the relationship between the two countries is not a relationship of equals, both countries rely on each other to some degree, and both are loath to admit it. However, U.S.-Saudi relations have shifted under the Trump administration and the de facto leadership of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). Business as Usual for U.S.-Saudi Relations? Although it seems that Saudi Arabia has effectively been able to buy both President Trump’s silence and support with multi-billion dollar arms deals thus far, recent statements from the U.S. president have indicated that Washington may not be catering to Riyadh’s every whim. In early October, President Trump told King Salman that “he would not last in power ‘for two weeks’ without the backing of the U.S. military.” At a rally in West Virginia, President Trump asked rhetorically why the U.S. continues to subsidize the militaries of wealthy nations such as Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. His confident assurance that these countries should be paying the U.S. for protection shows that issues of diplomacy and human rights are mere cold business transactions to the American Commander-in-Chief. Nevertheless, military protection is not the only form of U.S. defense that Riyadh risks losing if it continues to act recklessly on a national, regional, and international level. The kingdom could lose the impunity that it enjoys thanks to American support. Can Saudi Arabia afford to jeopardize itself in this manner, especially with its increasingly problematic human rights track record and the ongoing investigation into the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi? The U.S. has been supporting and protecting the Saudi-UAE-led coalition since the beginning of its military intervention in Yemen three and a half years ago. Despite the devastating loss of human life caused by coalition airstrikes, the administration continues to support the Saudi-UAE-led military intervention and claims that U.S. supervision of these airstrikes is reducing the likelihood of “mistakes”—this notwithstanding the Senate’s recent vote under the War Powers Resolution to curb presidential power to wage this war. United Nations (UN) experts published a report in September that accused all parties to the conflict in Yemen of being responsible for human rights violations that could potentially amount to war crimes. Notwithstanding these findings, the U.S., Britain, Germany, France, and other countries continue to sell weapons to Yemen’s warring parties. “There is extensive evidence that irresponsible arms flows to the [Saudi Arabia-UAE-led] coalition have resulted in enormous harm to Yemeni civilians. But this has not deterred the USA, the UK and other states, including France, Spain, and Italy, from continuing transfers of billions of dollars worth of such arms,” Amnesty International reported. In addition to killing thousands of innocent Yemeni civilians, these arms sales also make a mockery of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a multilateral treaty that seeks to reduce human suffering and safeguard global peace by regulating the international trade of conventional weapons. Since coming into force on December 24, 2014, 96 states have ratified the treaty and another 130 have signed it without ratifying it. While the U.S. is a signatory of the treaty, the US Senate has yet to ratify it. Saudi Arabia has yet to do either. President Trump’s consistent disregard of human rights concerns in his foreign policy decisions has, in the view of many, enabled the rise of the Saudi kingdom’s tyrannical crown prince. Ironically, however, the U.S. president’s enthusiasm for strengthening relations with Riyadh has not prevented him from taking every opportunity to exploit Saudi Arabia’s weaknesses publically, extort lower oil prices from the kingdom, and coerce its leadership to pay for Washington’s silence.

## Yemeni Humanitarian Crisis

Yemen is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis because the US continues to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. Aljamra, 19 [Helal Aljamra Yemeni journalist, Master's Degree in Political Communication from the Higher Institute of Media and Communication in Rabat in 2018. “How U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia Are Prolonging the War in Yemen,” 9 January 2019, <https://insidearabia.com/us-saudi-arabia-war-yemen/>]

The Yemeni people have tried to appeal to the international community to intervene in the conflict in Yemen for years with little success. Despite the words of the UN Secretary General himself and numerous reports published by international organizations describing the war in Yemen as the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis,” the response from the international community has been sparse. Why are the cries of the Yemeni people falling on deaf ears? The answer may lie in the multi-billion dollar arms and trade deals that many countries already have and continue to sign with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Since the beginning of the Saudi-UAE-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015, the West has provided political and logistical support, intelligence, and weapons to fuel the war. Since assuming control of Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense and thus the de facto rule of Saudi Arabia in 2015, MbS has bolstered the kingdom’s relationships with countries such as the U.S., Britain, and France through long-term arms deals. Currently, Saudi Arabia is the top arms importer in the Arab region. Despite strong opposition by several international human rights organizations and activists in the West, most of the proposed arms deals have progressed without impediment. Arms sales to the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania (comprised of Australia and the nearby islands in the Pacific Ocean) have increased dramatically in the past ten years. “Saudi Arabia was the world’s second-largest arms importer, with arms imports increasing by 225 percent [between 2013 and 2017], compared with 2008 to 2012.” The kingdom is followed by Egypt and the UAE, according to a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World superpowers’ perspectives of the conflict in Yemen directly correlate with the volume of weapons they export to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The most steadfast supporters of the Saudi-UAE-driven war appear to be the countries that benefit most from the arms sales and subsidies they receive from the two countries. “In 2013 to 2017, 61 percent of [Saudi] arms imports came from the USA and 23 percent from the UK. Deliveries during this period included 78 combat aircrafts, 72 combat helicopters, 328 tanks, and about 4,000 other armored vehicles,” according to the report. U.S. arms exports to Saudi Arabia alone reached more than $43 billion between 2015 and 2017. Recently, Riyadh has consistently tried to use generous military and trade deals to buy the world’s silence—the most notorious perhaps being the deal that President Trump signed with King Salman in mid-May 2017. This deal included several military, defense, and commercial cooperation agreements; described as “the deal of the century,” the agreements are valued at a total of $460 billion.

## Khashoggi

Trump would rather make money selling arms to Saudi Arabia instead of punishing them for their role in the Khashoggi killing. Macias, 18 [Amanda Macias covers national security, defense industry and the intelligence community for CNBC. “Saudi Arabia is the top US weapons buyer – but it doesn’t spend as much as Trump boasts,” 15 October 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/15/saudi-arabia-top-us-weapons-buyer-but-doesnt-spend-as-much-as-trump-boasts.html>]

President Donald Trump has been hesitant to jeopardize U.S. arms deals with Saudi Arabia even as outrage grows over the disappearance of journalist and Saudi royal family critic Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi Arabia is America’s No. 1 weapons buyer. Between 2013 and 2017, Riyadh accounted for 18 percent of total U.S. arms sales or about $9 billion, according to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. But a closer look reveals that the sales aren’t quite as big as Trump has boasted. The president recently praised Riyadh’s ambitions to buy $110 billion worth of U.S.-made arms. But that money hasn’t come through yet, according to State Department or Defense Security Cooperation Agency announcements. The president has cited the importance of the nations’ relationship, pushing back on potentially slapping retaliatory sanctions on Saudi Arabia over Khashoggi’s fate. Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich monarchy is one of America’s most crucial strategic partners in the Middle East and a significant patron of U.S. defense companies. “I tell you what I don’t want to do,” Trump said to CBS’ “60 Minutes” on Sunday, when asked about blocking arms sales to Riyadh. “Boeing, Lockheed, Raytheon, all these [companies]. I don’t want to hurt jobs. I don’t want to lose an order like that. There are other ways of punishing, to use a word that’s a pretty harsh word, but it’s true.” Last week, Trump told reporters that he was disinterested in stopping a Saudi Arabian “investment of $110 billion into the United States,” despite tensions over Khashoggi’s disappearance. “I know [senators are] talking about different kinds of sanctions, but [Saudi Arabia is] spending $110 billion on military equipment and on things that create jobs,” Trump said Thursday. “I don’t like the concept of stopping an investment of $110 billion into the United States.”

## AT: US Support Makes war safer – it is counterproductive

**US support allegedly makes the war safer, however the record shows US support greenlights atrocity. By the time your RFD is over 6 Yemeni children will have been killed. Seligman, 18** (Lara Seligman is Foreign Policy's Pentagon correspondent, Seligman 10-9-18, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/09/starvation-and-child-soldiers-in-yemen/>)

“There is undue risk being posed to civilians because of the fact that this is a war being conducted from 20,000 feet,” Miliband said in an interview with Foreign Policy. “The excesses of the Houthis do not excuse the flouting of international humanitarian norms.” Yemen’s infrastructure and civilian population have been decimated by the war between Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government, backed by a Saudi-led and U.S. military-supported coalition of Gulf states. With 22 million civilians in need of humanitarian aid and nearly 10 million facing famine by the end of the year, Yemen has been called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. More than half the population does not have access to drinking water, and according to UNICEF, a child in Yemen **dies every 10 minutes** from illness and starvation. Miliband, who is also a former member of the British Parliament, arrived in Yemen soon after the most violent month this year for civilians and one of the deadliest since the Saudi-led coalition intervened in 2015. In total, 450 civilians were killed in the first nine days of August, and many more are at risk of dying of starvation or preventable conditions, he said. Illness is also a significant threat, Miliband stressed. Yemenis lived through the worst cholera outbreak in modern history last year, with more than 1 million cases (over half of which were children). While the mass outbreak was stemmed, the cases of cholera have tripled in Hodeida since the coalition launched its offensive in June, according to reports. “When the war has been going on for so long, three and a half years, with no real movement in the front line, you realize that the so-called stalemate is far from static—it is actually imposing enormous human suffering,” Miliband said. The IRC has one of the largest humanitarian operations in Yemen and has been able to reach 1 million people across the country with about 800 staff working in both Houthi- and government-controlled areas. Miliband’s staff is training Yemenis to provide essential services. “It’s really important to understand that aid workers are local people,” Miliband said. “We are hiring in vast bulk Yemenis and local people, and we train them, and they then have local intelligence, the local credibility, the local consent to be able to do their work.” But the blockade of Hodeida, where 70 to 80 percent of Yemen’s commercial and humanitarian imports enter the country, means that aid workers do not have enough medicine, fuel, or essential items to do their work. Not only does the blockade obstruct access to food and medicine, but it also means that the cost of fuel is skyrocketing, making it vastly more difficult for IRC staff to travel around the country. Meanwhile, humanitarian workers have had a hard time obtaining the necessary permits required to pass safely through checkpoints due to bureaucratic red tape. Of course, the workers themselves also face violence on both sides of the conflict. During his trip, Miliband heard from staff members about the risk of being targeted by missile strikes or setting off land mines. The violence in Yemen poses political dangers as well, Miliband stressed. As the conflict metastasizes, radical militant groups, such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have been **“thriving on the chaos**,” he said. While U.S. involvement aims to reduce Iranian influence, Tehran is actually **becoming more influential**, he added. Miliband called on the international community to agree to an immediate cease-fire. The next step, he said, is to allow the flow of humanitarian aid through Hodeida and open Sanaa’s airport to commercial traffic. To halt further economic collapse, Miliband urged that salaries be paid to the 1.2 million civil servants providing life-saving assistance across the country. “I’m a great believer in the philosophy that when you are in a hole, you should stop digging,” Miliband said. “The war strategy that is being pursued is digging a deeper hole rather than helping us out of it.” While the humanitarian effort can lessen the number of those dying, Miliband stressed that **only “effective politics” could stop the killing**. He pointed to a “complete lack of military progress,” noting that after 18,000 bombing raids since 2015, which caused 75 percent of the war’s civilian casualties, the Houthis still control 70 percent of the country. But diplomatic efforts hit a snag recently, when Houthi representatives failed to show up to the first meeting in Geneva convened by the U.N. special envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. Miliband urged all sides in the conflict to engage in the peace process. He also called on the U.S. government to **end its support for the Saudi-led coalition and take a more forceful approach to halting the violence**. He disputed the claim that the coalition is doing everything possible to minimize civilian casualties. This argument “obviously sits askance with the reality on the ground,” he said. **The United States has more leverage than it claims**, he added. “Everything we know about the U.S. stance is that it **does make a difference because the actors in the drama do look to the U.S. for actions or restraints**,” Miliband said. “The great danger is the Yemeni conflict becomes a terrible stain on the U.S. reputation.”

## Mass Suffering

**US arms sales are being used in Saudi Arabia’s campaign in Yemen – causing mass deaths to hundreds of thousands of civilians**

**Bazzi ’18** [Mohamad Bazzi is an associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday, “The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To,” The Atlantic, 9/30/18]

**In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly** this week, President Donald **Trump signaled to Saudi Arabia that he would avoid criticizing its destabilizing actions in the Middle East**. Instead, **he blamed only Iran**, the kingdom’s regional rival, for funding “havoc and slaughter.” Trump praised Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for pledging billions in aid and “pursuing multiple avenues to ending Yemen’s horrible, horrific civil war.” **He failed to mention that Yemen’s current conflict escalated dramatically in early 2015, when Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab countries to intervene in the war. That war has long since devolved into a humanitarian catastrophe**. The United Nations stopped counting its civilian death toll two years ago, when it hit 10,000. An independent estimate by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, which tracks conflicts worldwide, found that **nearly 50,000 people**, including combatants, **died between January 2016 and July 2018. The war has also left more than 22 million people—75 percent of the population of Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the world—in need of humanitarian aid.** As public anger over America’s role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, **Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America’s longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties**. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking “demonstrable actions” to avoid harming civilians and making a “good faith” effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This **assistance**, much of which began under the Obama administration, **includes** the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and **billions of dollars worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force.** On September 12, Secretary of State Mike **Pompeo assured Congress that the coalition was trying to minimize civilian casualties** and enable deliveries of humanitarian aid to Yemen**. Yet his claim contradicted virtually every other independent assessment of the war**, **including a recent report by a group of United Nations experts and several Human Rights Watch investigations that alleged the coalition had committed war crimes**. Meanwhile, in a memo Pompeo sent to Congress, he noted another reason for continued U.S. support for the coalition: containing Iran and its influence on the Houthis. Like the Saudis and Emiratis, the Trump administration sees in the Houthis the same sort of threat as other Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah, which has sent thousands of fighters to help Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. In late August, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations tweeted a photo that had circulated in the Arab press of a meeting in Beirut between the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Houthi officials. U.S. officials claimed it showed “the nature of the regional terrorist threat,” and added: “Iranian proxies in Lebanon & Yemen pose major dangers to peace & stability in the entire Middle East.” But beyond recent missile attacks on Saudi Arabia—in retaliation for Saudi air strikes—the Houthis have displayed little regional ambition. Ironically, as the war drags on, the Houthis will grow more dependent on support from Iran and its allies. By accepting the coalition’s cosmetic attempts to minimize civilian casualties, **the Trump administration is signaling to Saudi and Emirati leaders its apparent belief that a clear military victory in Yemen remains possible.** And **as long as the coalition believes it can crush the Houthis, there’s little incentive for it to negotiate. Trump, then, has bought into Saudi Arabia’s zero-sum calculation: that a military win in Yemen for the kingdom and its allies would be a defeat for Iran, while a negotiated settlement with the Houthis would be a victory for Tehran**. Blinded by its obsession with Iran**, the Trump administration is perpetuating an unwinnable war and undermining the likelihood of a political settlement**.

**Congressional checks on US arms sales to Saudi Arabia are key to prevent hundreds of thousands of deaths**

**Bazzi ’18** [Mohamad Bazzi is an associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday, “The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To,” The Atlantic, 9/30/18]

**While the Saudis are quick to blame Iran for the war, several researchers, including Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa and a former analyst at Canada’s Department of National Defense, have shown that the Houthis did not receive significant support from Tehran before the Saudi intervention in 2015**. Iran has stepped up military assistance to the Houthis since the war, and Hezbollah has begun sending military advisers to train the Yemeni rebels. But the costs of this assistance fall far short of those incurred by Saudi Arabia and its allies. For Iran, the Yemen conflict is a low-cost way to bleed its regional rival. **The Saudis and Emiratis have largely ignored international criticism of civilian deaths and appeals for a political settlement**—**and the Trump administration’s latest signal of support shows that strategy is working**. Investigations by the UN and other bodies have found both the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition responsible for potential war crimes. But **air strikes by the Saudis** and their allies “**have caused most of the documented civilian casualties**,” **the UN concluded in a report last month**. On August 9, the Saudi coalition bombed a school bus in the northern town of Dahyan, killing 54 people, 44 of them children, and wounding dozens, according to Yemeni health officials. For weeks, the coalition defended the airstrike, but on September 1—with the deadline looming for the Trump administration to certify Saudi and UAE efforts to reduce civilian casualties—the coalition admitted that the bombing was a mistake and that it would “hold those who committed mistakes” accountable. U.S. officials seized on that statement as evidence that the Saudi coalition is willing to change its behavior. But for three and a half years now, there has been “little evidence of any attempt by parties to the conflict to minimize civilian casualties,” said Kamel Jendoubi, the chair of the UN investigation team that documented war crimes. **The Trump administration has shown little interest in using arms deals as leverage for a political settlement, or to force the Saudis to take concerns about civilian deaths more seriously.** In March 2017, **Trump reversed a decision by the Obama administration to suspend the sale of more than $500 million in laser-guided bombs and other munitions to the Saudi military**. As more members of Congress expressed criticism of Saudi actions in Yemen, the Senate narrowly approved that sale. After the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at several Saudi cities in late 2017, the Trump administration again escalated U.S. involvement in the war. The New York Times broke the news that the Pentagon had secretly dispatched U.S. special forces to the Saudi-Yemen border to help the Saudi military locate and destroy Houthi missile sites. Frustrated by the deepening U.S. role, two dozen members of the House introduced a resolution this week invoking the 1973 War Powers Act, arguing that Congress never authorized American support for the Saudi coalition and instructing Trump to withdraw U.S. forces. **Saudi and Emirati leaders want a clear-cut victory in their regional rivalry with Iran, and they have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s unconditional support to stall negotiations**. A recent UN effort to hold peace talks between the Houthis, Hadi’s government, and the Saudi-led coalition collapsed in early September, after the Houthi delegation did not show up in Geneva. Houthi leaders said the Saudis, who control Yemen’s airspace, would not guarantee their safe travel. Days later, **Yemeni forces loyal to the Saudi-UAE alliance launched a new offensive aimed at forcing the Houthis out of Hodeidah port**, which is **the major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen**. **UN officials warn that a prolonged battle for the port and its surroundings could lead to the death of 250,000 people, mainly from mass starvation.** After the Trump administration’s endorsement this month**, the Saudi-UAE alliance has even less incentive to prevent civilian casualties and new humanitarian disasters.** **Saudi Arabia and its allies are more likely to accept a peace process if it is clear that the United States won’t support an open-ended war in Yemen and won’t provide the military assistance required to keep the war apparatus going.** But Trump has shown little sign of pressuring his Saudi and Emirati allies, least of all over Yemen. **The only realistic check left is in Congress**, where more voices are asking why the world’s most powerful country is helping to perpetuate the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

## Arms Worsen the Conflict

**US Arm Sales uniquely worsen the conflict**

**Bazzi ’18** [Mohamad Bazzi is a journalism professor at New York University. He is writing a book on the proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 6/11/18, The Guardian, “The war in Yemen is disastrous. America is only making things worse,” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/11/trump-yemen-saudi-arabi-war-us-involvement-worsening-crisis>]

Donald **Trump is quietly escalating America’s role in the Saudi-led war on Yemen**, disregarding the huge humanitarian toll and voices in Congress that are trying to rein in the Pentagon’s involvement. Trump administration officials are considering a request from Saudi Arabia and its ally, the United Arab Emirates, for direct US military help to retake Yemen’s main port from Houthi rebels. **The Hodeidah port is a major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen, and a prolonged battle could be catastrophic for millions of civilians who depend on already limited aid.** With little public attention or debate**, the president has already expanded US military assistance to his Saudi and UAE allies** – **in ways that are prolonging the Yemen war and increasing civilian suffering**. Soon after **Trump** took office in early 2017, his administration **reversed a decision by** former president Barack **Obama to suspend the sale of over $500m in laser-guided bombs and other munitions to the Saudi military, over concerns about civilian deaths in Yemen**. The US Senate narrowly approved that sale, in a vote of 53 to 47, almost handing Trump an embarrassing defeat. In late 2017, after the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at several Saudi cities, the Pentagon secretly sent US special forces to the Saudi-Yemen border, to help the Saudi military locate and destroy Houthi missile sites. While US troops did not cross into Yemen to directly fight Yemen’s rebels, the clandestine mission escalated US participation in a war that has dragged on since Saudi Arabia and its allies began bombing the Houthis in March 2015. **The war has killed at least 10,000 Yemenis and left more than 22 million people –three-quarters of Yemen’s population – in need of humanitarian aid**. At least 8 million Yemenis are on the brink of famine, and 1 million are infected with cholera. The increased US military support for Saudi actions in Yemen is part of a larger policy shift by Trump and his top advisers since he took office, in which Trump voices constant support for Saudi Arabia and perpetual criticism of its regional rival, Iran. The transformation was solidified during Trump’s visit to the kingdom in May 2017, which he chose as the first stop on his maiden foreign trip as president. Saudi leaders gave Trump a grandiose welcome: they filled the streets of Riyadh with billboards of Trump and the Saudi King Salman; organized extravagant receptions and sword dances; and awarded Trump the kingdom’s highest honor, a gold medallion named after the founding monarch. **The Saudi campaign to seduce Trump worked**. Since then, Trump has offered virtually unqualified support for Saudi leaders, especially the young and ambitious crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is the architect of the disastrous war in Yemen. By blatantly taking sides, **Trump exacerbated the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and inflamed sectarian conflict in the region**. During his visit to Riyadh, **Trump announced a series of weapons sales to the kingdom that will total nearly $110bn over 10 years**. Trump, along with Jared Kushner, his son-in-law and senior adviser, who played a major role in negotiating parts of the agreement, were quick to claim credit for a massive arms deal that would boost the US economy. But many of the weapons that the Saudis plan to buy – including dozens of F-15 fighter jets, Patriot missile-defense systems, Apache attack helicopters, hundreds of armored vehicles and thousands of bombs and missiles – were already approved by Obama. From 2009 to 2016, **the Obama administration authorized a record $115bn in military sales to Saudi Arabia**, far more than any previous administration. Of that total, **US and Saudi officials signed formal deals worth about $58bn, and Washington delivered $14bn worth of weaponry. Much of that weaponry is being used in Yemen**, with US technical support. In October 2016**, warplanes from the Saudi-led coalition bombed a community hall in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, where mourners had gathered for a funeral, killing at least 140 people and wounding hundreds.** After that attack – the deadliest since Saudi Arabia launched its war – the **Obama administration** pledged to conduct “an immediate **review**” of its logistical support for the Saudi coalition. But that **review led to minor changes: the US withdrew a handful of personnel from Saudi Arabia** and suspended the sale of some munitions. Toward the end of the Obama administration, some American officials worried that **US support to the Saudis** – especially intelligence assistance in identifying targets and mid-air refueling for Saudi aircraft – **would make the United States a co-belligerent in the war under international law**. That means **Washington could be implicated in war crimes and US personnel could, in theory, be exposed to international prosecution**. In 2015, as the civilian death toll rose in Yemen, US officials debated internally for months about whether to go ahead with arms sales to Saud Arabia. But these concerns evaporated after Trump took office. Like much of his chaotic foreign policy, **Trump is escalating US military involvement in Yemen without pushing for a political settlement to the Saudi-led war. His total support for Saudi Arabia and its allies is making the world’s worst humanitarian crisis even more severe.**

**These arms are used specifically against civilians**

**Malsin ’17** [Jared Malsin, 5/22/17, Time, <http://time.com/4787797/donald-trump-yemen-saudi-arabia-arms-deal/>]

When President Donald **Trump closed a nearly $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia** on Saturday, his deputies’ spirits soared. Policy advisor Jared Kushner high-fived National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster as he entered the room where they held talks with Saudi officials. Aide Gary Cohn told pool reporters **the deals represented “a lot of money**. Big dollars. Big dollars.” **The weapons sale was one of the largest in history, totaling close to $110 billion worth of tanks, artillery, radar systems, armored personnel carriers, and Blackhawk helicopters. The package also included ships, patrol boats, Patriot missiles, and THAAD missile defense systems. Much of that military hardware will likely be pressed into service in the Saudi fight against its neighbor Yemen, where more than 10,000 people have been killed over more than two years of heavy airstrikes and fighting.** This puts the U.S. in a precarious ethical position, say human rights groups and former U.S. officials. **The Saudi-led airstrike campaign has hit numerous schools, hospitals, factories, and other civilian targets, leading to well-documented allegations of war crimes by human rights organizations**. **The war has also pushed much of the country to the brink of starvation, with more than 17 million people facing famine**, according to the U.N. “There’s a humanitarian aspect that tends to be ignored. This is something that will come back to bite the Saudis as well, and by implication the Americans, because we’re the ones providing the bombs and bullets,” says Robert Jordan, the former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia appointed by George W. Bush. “The implication is not necessarily that these are war crimes, but it is a stain on the reputation of both the Saudis and potentially the Americans to continue this kind of bloodshed with indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations,” he tells TIME in a phone interview. Far from Washington and the ever-expanding investigation into Trump’s relations with Russia, the president trumpeted the weapons deal as a step that will boost Saudi security and the American economy. The agreement was exactly the sort of decisive, business-oriented deal on which Trump bases his personal brand. But in this case, **the deal** also **further entangles the United States in a political and humanitarian crisis that threatens to spiral out of control.** Read more: In Speech on Islam, Trump Strikes a More Moderate Tone **Saudi Arabia**, the UAE, and a coalition of predominantly Arab states **launched a military intervention in Yemen in 2015 in order to drive back Houthi rebels who seized the capital and forced the recognized government to flee.** Saudi officials say the campaign is also intended to combat the expanding influence of Iran, which they accuse of supporting the rebels. The Houthis, representing a Zaydi-Shiite minority concentrated in Yemen’s north, are also allied with the forces of Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was forced out following mass protests during the region-wide Arab uprisings of 2011. Under the Obama administration, **the United States supported the bombing campaign from the beginning, including providing tanker aircraft to refuel Saudi coalition jets in midair.** As civilian deaths mounted, Obama scaled back support in 2016, halting the sale of cluster bombs and also halting a $400 million transfer of precision guided missiles, citing what one U.S. official called “systemic, endemic” problems with how the Saudi military chose targets in Yemen. Rights advocates criticized Obama’s decision to stop the deliveries of some weapons as an inadequate gesture. But **Trump’s surge in weapons dispenses with any pretense of American disapproval for the conduct of the campaign in Yemen.**

# AT: Case Arguments

## AT: China and/or Russia Fill In

China can’t fill the void the US would leave post plan; their weapons aren’t sophisticated enough. Zheng, 18 [Sarah Zheng joined the Post as a reporter in 2016. She graduated from Tufts University with a degree in international relations and film and media studies. She reports on China's foreign policy. “China may seek to boost ties with Saudi Arabia but it ‘can’t fill US arms sales gap’,” 17 October 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168849/china-may-seek-boost-ties-saudi-arabia-it-cant-fill-us-arms>]

China may continue to engage more with Saudi Arabia if Washington imposes sanctions over the disappearance and presumed murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but it cannot supplant US arms sales as President Donald Trump believes, analysts say. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrived in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday as Washington weighs actions against Riyadh over the fate of Khashoggi, a US resident and vocal critic of the Saudi regime who vanished two weeks ago. But Trump has been reluctant to support sanctions, citing the impact to a US$110 billion arms deal he helped broker last year. “I don’t like the concept of stopping an investment of US$110 billion into the United States because you know what they’re going to do?” Trump told reporters last week. “They’re going to take that money and spend it in Russia or China or someplace else.” Saudi Arabia has long sought to diversify away from its reliance on the US and has increasingly stepped up its engagement with China, its largest trading partner with US$42.36 billion in bilateral trade in 2017. Last March, the two countries also signed US$65 billion worth of deals in areas ranging from energy to space technology. The Arab nation could turn to countries such as China and Russia to help fulfil its military needs if US sanctions were imposed, a step that would “create an economic disaster that would rock the entire world”, according to a widely cited opinion piece by the general manager of the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya news channel. In the editorial, Turki Aldakhil said Saudi Arabia – the world’s largest oil exporter – was considering more than 30 countermeasures to be taken against the US, including trading oil in yuan instead of the US dollar. But in the military realm, China’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia lag far behind those of the US and its European allies. Beijing exported only around US$20 million in arms last year compared to US$3.4 billion from Washington, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank. Jamal Khashoggi fallout: how much damage can Saudi Arabia do to the global economy? Jonathan Fulton, assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, said China had grown more serious in its regional arms relationships with Gulf states in recent years, with the potential to serve as a “wedge” as US-Saudi relations frayed. Along with Riyadh’s previous indications that it was willing to consider funding in yuan, increased arms sales would be a “natural progression” of their relationship, he said. “Part of the reason why [Saudi Arabia] is diversifying is there’s been so many kinds of structural changes in the relationship with the US,” Fulton said. “Another important part is just obviously the commercial relationship and economic relationship between these Gulf states and China, with these energy exports. We’re seeing a lot more engagement both ways.” But as evidence piles up that Saudi Arabia ordered Khashoggi’s assassination, which the government denies, the backlash is getting louder. A bipartisan group of US senators have pressured Trump to enact sanctions and key corporate sponsors have pulled out of the high-profile “Davos in the Desert” investment forum to be held in Riyadh this month. “I would expect to see some kind of … Saudi-led way to ease the tensions between the US and Riyadh because I don’t think they can afford to let the US relationship deteriorate,” Fulton said. Simone van Nieuwenhuizen, an Australia-based researcher of China-Middle East relations at the University of Technology Sydney, said China would be “extremely unlikely” to follow US sanctions if they were levelled against Saudi Arabia, but may not necessarily increase trade with the country either. “I think China is likely to keep a low profile on this issue and see how it plays out before directly addressing it,” she said. “While its technology is developing, China still lags behind the US in the sophistication and capability of its military equipment. It simply can’t fill the gap.” Robert Mason, director of the Middle East Studies Centre at the American University in Cairo, said China would not want to get involved at this stage to avoid further tensions with the Trump administration.

It would be near impossible for Saudi Arabia to switch to buying from Russia or China. Guyer, 19 [Jonathan Guyer is managing editor of The American Prospect. He has written for Foreign Policy, The New Yorker, Harper's, Le Monde diplomatique, and Rolling Stone. A former fellow of Harvard's Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, he is completing a book about political cartoons and comics in the Middle East. “Needed: A U.S. Policy on Saudi Arabia,” 18 March 2019, <https://prospect.org/article/needed-us-policy-on-saudi-arabia>]

Saudi money also flows to the U.S. in the form of weapons sales, to be sure, but the numbers cited by Trump have proved to be vastly exaggerated, with Trump’s purported $110 billion figure, touted in a March 2018 Oval Office meeting with MBS, shown to be mythical. Only about $4 billion or $5 billion in sales were signed since then, and much higher levels of sales were carried out under Obama. These days, even small-bore deals are getting unwelcome attention. Last year, $61 million worth of weapons made in New Hampshire were sent to Saudi by a company that didn’t want itself named publicly. Over the past decade, these types of deals—huge orders for weapons that were rarely used, certainly not on the battlefield—were a boon to American defense contractors. Congress enthusiastically supported them. But as images of the grievous attacks and humanitarian crisis in Yemen reach American televisions, this is starting to change. The Saudis, however, are dependent on expensive U.S. weapons platforms, and it will be difficult for them to begin buying weapons from Russia or China. Their weapons systems and aircraft squadrons are all American, and require almost constant American repairs. As a hardball tactic, Congress could try to pass laws that would effectively ground the Saudi air force. And the next administration could condition close military systems collaboration on Saudi behavior. There are other avenues of cooperation, and the Saudi government’s role as the custodian of two of three holiest mosques in the Islamic faith have made them important symbolic allies. But gone are the days when Saudis were great financiers of American foreign-policy adventurism, like funding the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the ’80s. The role of Saudi windfall oil profits and petrodollar “recycling,” which was so important to both U.S. banks and Third World oil-consuming countries in the 1980s and 1990s, is also long past. The human-rights agenda, so often touted as part of U.S. policy, has never held Saudi to much of a standard. Importantly, the Obama administration’s support for the 2011 Arab uprisings frightened the sclerotic Saudi leadership. Washington had sold out Mubarak, its partner of 30 years. “Clearly, we’ve given the Saudis a lesson,” Freeman told me. “We reinforced the thought that we can’t be depended on.”

It would take a long time for Saudi Arabia to transition from a US backed weapons arsenal. Spindel, 19 [Jennifer Spindel is an assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma, and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center. You can follow her on Twitter: @jsspindel. “The Case for Suspending American Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” 14 May 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/>]

Beyond signaling, we know U.S. arms sales often end up in the wrong hands, and have been used in Yemen. The Saudi-led war in Yemen has led to starvation conditions, caused thousands of civilian casualties, and has led to the displacement of millions of people. The United Nations estimates that 80 percent of Yemen’s population – 24 million people – require some form of humanitarian or protection assistance, and that the severity of the situation is increasing. Would an arms embargo create meaningful change in Yemen? An initial effect of an embargo is that Saudi Arabia would have to work harder to access war materiel. As Jonathan Caverley noted, more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s arms delivered in the past five years came from the United States. Even if this percentage decreases over time, it will be costly for Saudi Arabia to transition to a primarily Russian- or Chinese-supplied military. Though Saudi Arabia might be willing to pay this cost, it would still have to pay, and take the time to transition to its new weapons systems. This would represent a brief break in hostilities that could facilitate the delivery of aid and assistance in Yemen. The United States could, in theory, impose stricter end-user controls on Saudi Arabia. This would have the advantage of keeping Saudi Arabia within the world of U.S. weapons systems, and might prevent it from diversifying its suppliers, which would ultimately weaken any leverage the United States might have. Longer-term, it would not be to America’s advantage if Saudi Arabia takes a lesson from Turkey, and starts courting Russia as a new arms supplier. It is difficult to enforce end-user controls, since, once a weapon is transferred, the recipient can use it however it wishes. It might also be the case that Saudi Arabia would object to stricter end-user controls, and would seek new suppliers as a result. An arms embargo will not be a panacea. But not doing something sets a problematic precedent, and allows the difficulty of coordinating an arms embargo outweigh the potential benefits of one. An embargo is unlikely to have an immediate effect on Saudi behavior, because an embargo would be a political signal, rather than a blunt instrument of coercion. It will take time for a multilateral embargo to emerge and be put into place, and the United States should work with its allies to help support their ability to participate in the embargo. Not acting, however, would continue to implicitly endorse Saudi behavior, and would make it more difficult for U.S. allies to believe that future threats of an embargo are credible.

## AT: Aff increases internal pressure on MBS

MBS will face internal pressures regardless; aff has a responsibility to the US and not MBS. Guyer, 19 [Jonathan Guyer is managing editor of The American Prospect. A former fellow of Harvard's Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study. “Needed: A U.S. Policy on Saudi Arabia,” 18 March 2019, <https://prospect.org/article/needed-us-policy-on-saudi-arabia>]

If Saudi Arabia is unwilling to reform on these three points, then perhaps it is time to raise first-order questions about why the U.S. military is so deeply ensconced in the Middle East and the long-term benefits of such inertia. Washington could begin by considering a path toward a constructive relationship with Iran. Containment of Tehran hasn’t worked, and a move toward rapprochement would theoretically provide the U.S. with more options. Over time, the U.S. might downgrade the Saudi relationship and pursue a new regional strategy, reducing the American military profile in the Persian Gulf, sharing the security burden with European and Asian allies, and perhaps even relocating the U.S. Fifth Fleet currently based in Bahrain. Threatening or carrying out a military pullback is risky, but so is supporting an autocrat increasingly at odds with his own people and bent on destabilizing the region. An alternative view is that meddling in Saudi affairs could backfire. The Saudi leadership will resent U.S. interference in the court, even among those concerned about MBS’s cruelty. But the perils of a cavalier crown prince increase whether the U.S. intervenes or not. Indeed, it’s the spectrum of American support for MBS across two administrations that has led to this entanglement. The U.S. has a responsibility, after coddling Saudi Arabia for decades, to take a firm line in containing further misadventures. If the U.S. doesn’t try the full tool kit of approaches, then it is condoning MBS’s wet work and assuring that worse is yet to come.

## AT: Saudi needs arms for protection

Saudi Arabia is the most well armed country in the Middle East; it’s not even close. Wezeman, 18 [Pieter D. Wezeman is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme. “Saudi Arabia, armaments and conflict in the Middle East,” 14 December 2018, <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2018/saudi-arabia-armaments-and-conflict-middle-east>]

The SIPRI arms transfers database yields a long list of arms imported by Saudi Arabia in the period 2013–2017. As these are generally advanced weapons, Saudi Arabia is the most well-armed country in the Gulf region in terms of its inventory of modern equipment. Only a few examples are necessary to illustrate the types of recently acquired weapons that are important to Saudi Arabia’s capability to wage war in Yemen while at the same time conducting internal military operations, maintaining a military capability at the border with Iraq, facing Iran militarily and contemplating the possibility of deploying its military in Syria. A combination of newly procured air force assets has increased the reach and strike power of the Saudi Arabian armed forces. The Royal Saudi Air Forces (RSAF) uses several types of combat aircraft, all of which have been used in the war in Yemen. During the 1990s, the USA supplied 72 F-15S. Starting in 2016, these began being replaced by 154 F-15SA, a heavily modernized version of the F-15S ordered from the USA in 2011. In addition, the USA continues to deliver large quantities of ordnance for these aircraft, such as SLAM-ER cruise missiles with a 280-kilometre range, and a variety of guided bombs that have been used in Yemen. The United Kingdom supplied Tornado combat aircraft in the 1990s, and 84 of these were upgraded in the period 2007–13 to enable them to carry new guided weapons, such as Storm Shadow cruise missiles which have a range of at least 250 kilometres. These and other guided weapons delivered by the UK have been used in Yemen since 2015, and deliveries are ongoing. The UK also delivered 72 Typhoon combat aircraft in 2009–17 and contract negotiations for 48 more were continuing in 2018. Saudi Arabia bases its long-range strike capability on aircraft, but it also maintains a secretive Strategic Missile Force equipped with a small arsenal of DF-3 ballistic missiles. These have a range of at least 2500 km and were supplied by China in 1988. There are indications that this force was modernized around 2010. A small fleet of tanker aircraft extends the range and increases the payload of Saudi Arabia’s combat aircraft. To supplement its existing tanker aircraft, six new A-330 MRTT built by the trans-European Airbus consortium were delivered from Spain between 2011 and 2015. The significance of this tanker fleet was highlighted when, in November 2018, Saudi Arabia stated that it no longer required aerial refuelling support from the USA for its operations in Yemen ‘because it could now handle it by itself’. Nonetheless, it remains uncertain just how independent the country really is in this regard. Sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control equipment is crucial to the Saudi Arabian military. Five E-3 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft were acquired from the USA in the 1980s and are currently being extensively upgraded. In addition, Sweden supplied two Erieye AEW&C aircraft in 2014. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is improving its capability to defend against air and missile attacks. In 2014–17 it received 21 Patriot PAC-3 air defence systems from the USA, which have been used with mixed success to defend Riyadh and other places in Saudi Arabia against ballistic missiles fired by Houthi rebels from Yemen. In November 2018 Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the USA to buy THAAD systems, the most advanced anti-missile system available. Together, the increasing reach of the RSAF combined with improved target acquisition capabilities and evolving air and missile defence systems widen the technological gap between the Saudi Arabian arsenal and that of its main rival, Iran. Saudi Arabia’s land and naval forces are also continuously being improved. In the period 2013–17, for example, the army and National Guard received over 3000 armoured vehicles from Austria, Canada, France, Georgia, South Africa, Turkey and the USA. Many of the vehicle types delivered in recent years have been highly visible in coverage of the war in Yemen. The Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF), which play an important role in the blockade of Yemen, has initiated several major procurement projects in recent years, including orders for at least 33 patrol boats from Germany in 2014, two large patrol boats from France in 2015, 4 highly advanced frigates from the USA in 2017 and 5 corvettes from Spain in 2018. One aspect of Saudi Arabian military activities remains especially difficult to assess as reliable information is so scarce—the extent of the support it provides to its allies in the Middle East, often in competition with Iranian support to its allies. For example, there are strong indications that Saudi Arabia has supplied significant amounts of weaponry to rebel forces in Syria and to government forces or related armed groups in Yemen. These weapons come from existing Saudi Arabian stocks or have reportedly been procured specifically for this purpose from Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia, among others.

## AT: Arms sales key to US Econ

Selling arms to Saudi Arabia will not have an impact on the US economy; multiple reasons. Campbell, 18 [Alexia Fernández Campbell is a Politics & Policy Reporter for Vox. “Trump says selling weapons to Saudi Arabia will create a lot of jobs. That’s not true.,” 20 November 2018, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/17/17967510/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-sales-khashoggi>]

In May 2017, Trump made his first foreign trip to the Saudi capital of Riyadh, where he met with MBS, the kingdom’s new crown prince. Trump said he was brokering a $110 billion arms deal that would create “jobs, jobs, jobs.” Even though Trump had lifted the hold on the $500 bomb sale, some members of Congress tried to block it. They couldn’t. In June, the Senate narrowly approved the deal. Since then, the Saudi-led coalition has killed thousands of civilians with American-made bombs, including at least 40 children who were riding a school bus. The United Nations now considers the situation in Yemen “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.” But instead of reprimanding MBS, Trump has continued to push for arms sales to the kingdom, touting the supposed economic benefits for the United States. When MBS visited the White House in March, Trump was effusive about it. He even held up a US map highlighting all the states that would get jobs from the arms deal with Saudi Arabia. The map stated that 40,000 jobs would be created, though the administration didn’t cite the source for that number (In recent days, Trump has thrown out even more ludicrous numbers). He doesn’t say where he got these estimates because no one knows exactly how many US jobs depend on arms sales. The federal government doesn’t keep data on that, and it doesn’t even break down how many total jobs are related to manufacturing military equipment. That’s because it’s a tiny fraction of the US labor force. Here’s what we do know: The private-sector defense industry directly employed a total of 355,500 in 2016, according to the most the recent estimates from the Aerospace Industries Association. That includes manufacturing jobs, but also every other job in the defense industry, even those who are supplying uniforms for soldiers. This entire group makes up less than 0.5 percent of the total US labor force. And their main client is the US military, not the Saudi military. About 153,800 American workers are directly involved in making commercial and military aircraft, according to the most recent industry employment numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. But that includes workers who make passenger planes for commercial airlines, a much larger sector of the economy that those who make military jets and helicopters. But we can get pretty specific data on how many American workers are making bombs. That data is more clear-cut, and Saudi Arabia buys plenty of American bombs for its war in Yemen. Only about 7,666 workers were making bombs for the defense and law enforcement industries in 2016, and that includes explosives sold to the entire US military. It’s doubtful these jobs are entirely dependent on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. In short, the US economy does not need Saudi Arabia to keep buying bombs. (Besides, MBS wants all arms deals to include some production in the kingdom.)

## AT: Arms Sales key to US jobs

Arms sales have a very small impact on manufacturing. Campbell, 18 [Alexia Fernández Campbell is a Politics & Policy Reporter for Vox. “Trump says selling weapons to Saudi Arabia will create a lot of jobs. That’s not true.,” 20 November 2018, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/17/17967510/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-sales-khashoggi>]

In the short term, selling weapons to Saudi Arabia may support some US factory jobs. But here’s the thing: Saudi Arabia plans to start manufacturing a lot of those weapons at home. Building up a local weapons manufacturing industry is part of the crown prince’s much-touted 2030 economic development plan, which is supposed to reduce the kingdom’s economic dependence on oil exports. Saudi Arabia expects half of all jobs created by weapons deals to be local jobs. Here’s what he says in an outline of the plan that the Saudi government has posted online: Localization will be achieved through direct investments and strategic partnerships with leading companies in this sector. These moves will transfer knowledge and technology, and build national expertise in the fields of manufacturing, maintenance, repair, research and development. We will also train our employees and establish more specialized and integrated industrial complexes. American defense contractors that sell a lot of military equipment to Saudi Arabia are on board. Raytheon, for example, is in the process of opening a subsidiary in Riyadh. Aside from shifting manufacturing jobs overseas, Saudi Arabia’s defense industry could eventually compete with the US defense industry. This focus would completely change the current economic relationship between both countries, according to Reuters. Since Trump took office, Saudi Arabia has signed about $14.5 billion in commitments to buy US weaponry. No contracts have actually been signed, so details are scarce. Items in the pipeline include bombs, missiles, tanks, and aircraft. But at least one involves manufacturing parts overseas, not in the United States. Now Congress is reportedly reviewing another proposed sale of 12,000 guided bombs to Saudi Arabia, according to Reuters. The Senate could cancel the sale if they can get enough votes, and some senators have suggested this as a form of sanctions in response to the Khashoggi case. Trump said that would be bad for American workers. But, once again, US workers don’t need Saudi Arabia.

## AT: Aff can’t solve – Prefer our evidence

Their arguments are a product of a massive Saudi lobbying effort Hiatt et al, 18 [WaPo Editorial Board 10-24-18 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/does-saudi-money-leave-room-for-an-honest-debate/2018/10/24/678654c2-d7bb-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html?utm_term=.ecdabd07f4fe>]

WASHINGTON NEEDS to have a thorough debate about Saudi Arabia and whether the bilateral relationship as it now stands serves U.S. interests. That raises a difficult question: Is it possible to have an honest discussion when so many American experts are, in one way or another, **on the Saudi payroll?** Many countries spend heavily to influence Congress or U.S. public opinion, but the Saudi operation dwarfs most of them. In the decade after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, in which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals, the regime spent more than $100 million to rebuild its image here, according to Ben Freeman of the Center for International Policy. Last year alone it spent $27.3 million on lobbyists and consultants, according to public records; more than 200 people have registered as Saudi agents. Prominent Washington think tanks, including the Middle East Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, have accepted millions in Saudi money; so have universities, museums and other cultural organizations. U.S. financial firms are brokering big deals for the Saudi government, which is effectively controlled by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Members of Congress or journalists looking for expert advice on Saudi Arabia might typically turn to former ambassadors or former chiefs of the Pentagon’s Central Command. But a number of them are connected to those think tanks or financial firms. According to Mr. Freeman, lobbyists made nearly $400,000 in campaign contributions last year to Senate and House members they contacted on behalf of the Saudis; in 11 cases, the contributions were made on the same day as the contact. One of those lobbyists is Norm Coleman, a former Republican senator. He told The Post that “the relationship with Saudi Arabia is critically important, and its partnership in confronting the Iranian threat is critical for U.S. security.” That’s an oft-made and legitimate argument. But do those who hear it take into account the fact that Mr. Coleman is **paid to represent Saudi rather than U.S. interests**?

## AT: Europe fills in

No Europe fill in – there’s a consensus. Noack, 18 (Rick, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/22/denmark-joins-germany-halting-arms-sales-saudi-arabia/?utm\_term=.56c1983e0134)

Denmark and Finland both announced Thursday that they would halt future arms exports to Saudi Arabia, following a similar decision by neighboring Germany earlier this month. The Danish and Finnish announcements come the same week President Trump backed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, despite the CIA assessing that he ordered the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Denmark’s ban includes goods that can be used both for military and civilian purposes but is still less expansive than the German measures, which also included sales that had already been approved. While the Nordic countries are tiny arms equipment exporters in comparison with bigger players such as the United States, Britain or France, their decision will probably exacerbate concerns within the European arms industry of a **growing anti-Saudi consensus** in the European Union and beyond.

# AT: Hegemony DA

## Heg Decline Inevitable

Trump’s policies are a symptom of hegemonic decline, not the cause – us involvement in the Middle East, the economy, income inequality, and the rise of China are all impersonal alt causes the aff can’t solve for Layne, 18

[Christopher, 2018, International Affairs, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana”, p. 1-2, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_6_249_Layne.pdf>, DMH]

Donald Trump’s election in November 2016 sent a shiver down the collective spines of the foreign policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic, which view him as a dire threat to the durability of the liberal, rules-based international order (LRBIO). The morning after the election, David E. Sanger of the New York Times argued that Trump’s victory ‘will plunge the United States into an era of unknowns that has little parallel in the nation’s 240-year history’.1 Fearing that Trump’s ‘America First’ policy would undo US security alliances in Europe and east Asia, the Washington Post columnist David Ignatius noted that ‘by putting America’s interests first so nakedly, he may push many US allies in Europe and Asia to make their own deals with a newly assertive Russia and a rising China’.2 Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, worried that ‘Mr Trump’s proposed policies threaten to take an axe to the liberal world order that the US has supported and sustained since 1945’.3 The FT’s Philip Stephens stated that ‘“America First” promotes belligerent isolationism—an approach to international order rooted in power rather then a rule of law’. Indeed, Stephens asserted, Trump was ‘repudiating the basic organizing idea of the west: the notion that the world’s democracies can oversee a fair and inclusive rules-based system to underwrite global peace and security’.4 As I explain below, the LRBIO actually is the international order—the Pax Americana—that the United States constructed after the Second World War: it is now fraying, but Donald Trump is a symptom of this, not the cause. There are both internal and external factors that explain why the Pax Americana is under stress. Internally, income inequality, stagnant real incomes, the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs and slow productivity growth have hollowed out the middle class. These trends have hit the white working class especially hard, and their effect has been amplified by rapid demographic changes taking place in the United States. By artfully employing ‘dog whistle’6 tactics, Trump was able to capitalize on the concern among blue-collar voters about America’s changing national identity. The political blowback from these trends helped to fuel Trump’s victory—a triumph that can be viewed as a populist backlash against globalization’s effects, and against the elites—the ‘One Percent’—who are seen to have profited from it.7 Externally, the Pax Americana is imperilled by the shifting of the world’s economic—and geopolitical—centres of gravity from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia, which presages the end of the West’s five centuries of global dominance. As Financial Times chief economic commentator Martin Wolf notes, this change really is ‘all about the rise of Asia, and, most importantly, China’.8 To be precise, rather than Donald Trump’s election, it is the big, impersonal forces of history— the relative decline of American power, and the emergence of a risen China—that explain why the Pax Americana’s days are numbered. For good measure, both the paralysing effects of the US political system’s polarization, and America’s own policies—the mismanagement of its economy that led to the Great Recession in 2008, and the ‘forever wars’ in which it has become entrapped in the Middle East and Afghanistan—have given these big, impersonal forces of history a powerful shove forward.9

Economic and political changes make heg decline inevitable – Trump is just a symptom

Acharya,17

(Amitav, 9-8-17, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order\*”, 272, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge>core/content/view/DBD581C139022B1745154175D2BEC639/S089267941700020Xa.pdf/after\_liberal\_hegemony\_the\_advent\_of \_a\_multiplex\_world\_order.pdf, accessed 7-11-18, J.B)

The domestic challenges to the liberal order led by Trump and his supporters could be overstated, however. After all, Hillary Clinton won a majority of the popular vote, and the Brexit referendum only passed by a slim margin. More importantly, however, the crisis of the liberal order has deeper roots, owing to long-term and structural changes in the global economy and politics. As such, Trump’s ascent to power is a consequence—not a cause—of the decline of the liberal order, especially of its failure to address the concerns of domestic constituents left behind by the global power shift. Given these factors, Trump is unlikely to reverse the decline of the liberal order even if he wanted to. Instead, he may well push it over the precipice.

U.S. military heg decline is inevitable – emerging regional powers will form balancing coalitions to offset the military supremacy of the U.S. and promote multipolarity as a foreign policy objective Ebert et al., 18

[Hannes, Daniel Flemes, German Institute of Global and Area Studies Shumpeter Fellow, February 2018, Rising Powers Quarterly, “Rethinking Regional Leadership in the Global Disorder”, Volume 3, No. 1, p. 9, <http://risingpowersproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Rising-Powers-Quarterly-Volume-3-Issue-1.pdf>, accessed 7-8-18, DMH]

A crucial reason for the declining but enduring US hegemony in international relations is its military supremacy. Washington still accounts for more than half of for global defense expenditures. In conventional military terms the US will remain the dominant global power for a long time. From a Realist perspective a multipolar system could be the results from the emergence of balancing coalitions against the global system’s dominant power by regional powers who successfully achieved the position of the unipole in their regions (Wohlforth 1999, p.30). Linking this statement with the developing countries’ lack of power in the international system (measurable for instance in IMF voting power or permanent seats at the UN Security Council) multipolarisation becomes a priority foreign policy objective of developing states. In addition to forming balancing coalitions, these regional powers will likely seek to advance the transformation toward multipolarity by increasing their influence in international institutions. In particular, the governments of Southern states that have the capacity to build regional unipolarities,must be interested in finding an effective way to challenge the current international hierarchy and to transform themselves into power poles of a future multipolar system. One way to project significant global influence (decision-maker status) is by consolidation regional powerhood as a base for pursuing national interests in the multipolar order.

## Link Turn

Current policy of arms sales uniquely limits US hegemony; we are giving Iran access to info that can hurt us in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bollag, 19 [Uri Bollag is a Senior Breaking News Editor at The Jerusalem Post. “U.S. arms land in hands of terror groups in Yemen, incl. Iranians – report,” 5 February 2019, <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/US-arms-land-in-hands-of-terror-groups-in-Yemen-incl-Iranians-report-579738>]

Arms sold by the United States to Saudi Arabia have been passed on to extremist groups in Yemen and have even landed in the hands of Iranian-backed rebels, potentially exposing sensitive information to the Iranian regime, an investigative report by CNN revealed on Monday. The findings show that Saudi Arabia has violated US agreements about transferring such weapons. The weapons were transferred directly by the Saudi government and its coalition partners to groups waging war on its behalf to push the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels out of Yemen, which has been torn apart by the struggle for power since 2015. The investigation found that guns, anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles, heat-seeking lasers and artillery are all being traded on the black market in Yemen, with little accountability over who acquires these weapons. Among others, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) now counts US-produced armored vehicles of the Oshkosh brand among its inventory. AQAP is considered a terrorist organization by the US, yet it fights alongside Saudi-backed militias in Yemen and belongs to the coalition-supported 35th Brigade of the Yemeni army. But Iranian-supported militias fighting the coalition have also captured some of the military hardware, giving Iranian intelligence the opportunity to gain sensitive information on US military technology. A member of the Preventative Security Force, a secret unit overseeing transfers of military technology to and from Tehran, confirmed to CNN that the Iranians have thoroughly inspected mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles they had captured. This is particularly worrying to the US military because improvised explosive devices are the main cause of deaths of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Taking into account the inability to track all of the equipment that has been transferred to Saudi Arabia, the findings raise questions about whether the US administration can trust the kingdom to handle such important weaponry after it has become evident that they are handing out these arms in return for loyalty and influence. American support for Saudi Arabia is at a recent low after the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi last October caused outrage and led many voices inside Congress to call on US President Donald Trump to put an end to his friendly ties with the monarchy, a request the American president is not likely to heed. In the wake of the Khashoggi scandal, Trump said it would be foolish to cancel the multi-billion dollar arms deals with Saudi Arabia.

## No Heg War

Empirics go aff – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. **Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc**. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. **Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria.** The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. **Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal.** Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States**. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin.** Something else appears to be at work.