Global Influence/Hegemony DA

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# Introduction:

Welcome to the US Global Influence (Hegemony) Disadvantage Evidence Set. In here, you’ll find all the research you’ll need to construct a winning disadvantage argument in the Novice Division and beyond on the negative for this year’s topic: Arms Sales.

We’ve organized this evidence into a few different categories:

* **1NC:** This section of the file includes the cards that should be read on the negative in the first negative constructive. These cards should be read in addition to other case arguments that you may already be more familiar with.
* **Negative Extensions:** This section of the file includes arguments to bolster the claims you’ve made in the 1NC in later speeches in the debate, specifically the 2NC and 1NR.
* **Affirmative Answers:** This section includes the cards the affirmative team will need in order to answer the hegemony DA. \*NOTE: You may also have cards that answer this DA in your affirmative file so be sure to check both places.\*

**How to use this file:**

The file is organized by side and the components of a disadvantage. You will need to pick and choose which arguments you will make in a given round after the 1NC. You will not have time to make all of these arguments in any round.

1. Read the summaries of each argument available in the packet
2. Check out the glossary to make sure you understand all of the words and terms.
3. Read and highlight the evidence, making sure you understand the argument being made and pulling out the key parts of each piece of evidence.
4. Pick the arguments you will use in the negative block and as the affirmative.

# Debating the hegemony or global influence da

The goal of the negative is simple: Prove that the plan presented by the affirmative team is a bad idea. The more you focus on the plan and why it is a bad idea, the more often you’ll win debates. The global influence DA is one way you can prove the affirmative is a bad idea. It argues that even if the plan has some good effects it starts a chain reaction that decreases US influence globally and the bad effects of that outweigh the good effects of the affirmative.

 **Speaking Roles on the Negative:**

* **1st Negative Speaker:** Your job is to introduce a range of negative arguments in the 1NC, and to definitively win at least one of those arguments in the 1NR.
* **2nd Negative Speaker:** Your job is to expand upon one or two arguments made in the 1NC, then to choose the best argument made by the negative team and show why the negative should win the debate in the 2NR. You are in charge of choosing negative strategy, since you’ll have to explain it in the 2NR. \*NOTE: In the block decide who will take the DA and only address those arguments in the 2NC or the 1NR. The other speaker can take the case arguments. This is the best way to divide labor in the block.\*

## Overview: How do incorporate the Global Influence DA

The first section of this file includes the 1st Negative Constructive, or the 1NC. You will need to add a link specific to the affirmative that you are debating (Saudi Arabia, China, or another aff). You can find those links in the link section.

The DA should take 1:30-2:00 minutes to read. You’ll need to pull out some of the cards you were reading on case in order to accommodate it. Be sure you can get through all of those arguments before the round. However, you will still need case arguments in order to win the DA. As a reminder, those case arguments include the following and can be found in the appropriate case negative:

* **Solvency:** How will the plan work? Will it result in the consequences that the affirmative team predicts or will it have different consequences?
* **Case Impacts:** These arguments say that the impacts the affirmative claims are not correct.
* **Case Turns:** These are potentially other bad effects of the affirmative.
* **Impact Framing:** These arguments answer the moral obligation claims the affirmative makes.

Go through the arguments and determine which cards you’d like to read in the 1NC and which you’d like to save for the Negative Block (2NC/1NR). You will not have time to make every argument in this file so you need to pick the ones you think are most strategic.

# Topic Introduction: Global Influence or Hegemony DA

The affirmative proposes limiting the Executive Branch’s ability to sell arms to either Saudi Arabia or Taiwan. One of the reasons that the United States sells arms is to increase their influence and power with other countries. Therefor one of the effects of limiting those sales is that it could limit US power and influence with certain countries or in certain regions. There is a theory of war and stability that argues that the United States influence globally is one of the reasons that the international order is more peaceful and stable with a general absence of great power conflict. The United States pulling back from that position would decrease the stability of the international order and increase the risk of conflict.

**Strategic Overview**

To win the DA you will need to win that the risk of conflict is more important than the impacts the affirmative claims. You will also need to win that the affirmative uniquely causes this change, and that it would not occur otherwise.

**Debating the DA as the negative and affirmative:**

When putting together your 1NC block, you’ll want to read the argument straight down. This will start a new flow sheet for the DA so you don’t need to worry about lining these arguments up with anything.

The 2AC will then number their responses straight down to set the order for the flow in the debate. For example:

1. Non-unique <insert card>
2. No link <insert card/analytic>
3. No link <insert card/analytic>
4. No internal link <insert card/analytic>
5. No impact <insert card/analytic>
6. Our impact outweighs <insert card/analytic>

\*Note: While some of these arguments can be analysis you will want a healthy mix of cards in the debate, particularly for claims that will need more expertise or proof.

The block then answers the 2AC. Either the 2NC or the 1NR will be responsible for winning the DA. They will answer those arguments using line by line and the “they say/we say” method:

“They say non-unique however, that’s not true because we say: <insert card/analytic>”

They say 🡪 <Insert argument>
That’s not true because 🡪 <Restate your argument or read a new card to answer their argument>
Prefer our argument because 🡪 <Explain why your argument is better>

Consider the following questions:

* Is US power and influence sustainable or not?
* Do US arms sales impact the overall power and influence of the US in different regions?
* Would a change in those sales lead other countries to lash out more?
* How should the judge evaluate the impacts of the aff and neg against each other?

# Key terms Glossary

**Bilateral** – A relationship or negotiation between two countries.

**Geopolitical** – Relating to politics, especially international relations, as influenced by geographical factors.

**Geostrategic** – A way to look at geopolitics that focuses on strategy.

**Great Power** – Countries that can wield incredible amounts of power both in their sphere of influence and in other regions.

**Hard Power** – Power that is traditionally associated with military might (guns, tanks, number of boots on the ground)

**Hegemony** – The ability of a country to wield the preponderance of power within their sphere of influence.

**Inter-operability** – The ability of technology (in this instance weapons) to work with technology manufactured by another group or country.

**Isolationist** – A political strategy where a country retreats from global politics and just focuses on their domestic concerns.

**Miscalculation** – Making a strategic mistake. In the context of international relations those strategic mistakes are often the source of conflict and potentially war.

**Multipolar** – When there are more than two great powers in the international system.

**Multilateral** – A relationship or negotiation between more than two countries.

**Power** – The ability to get another country or entity to do something they would not otherwise do.

**Preponderance** – having the most in quality, quantity or importance. In this instance it refers to power relative to other countries and regions.

**Protectionism** – A trade policy to limit international trade to favor domestic good.

**Revisionist Power** – Great powers who try to change rather than maintain the current global order.

**Status Quo Power** – Great powers who try and maintain rather than change the global order.

**Sustainable** – Something that can be maintained into the future.

**Unilateral** – One country making a decision for many others.

**Unipolar** – When there is only one great power in the international system.

**Zero Sum** – A system where whatever is gained by one side is lost by the other side.

# 1NC Shell - 1/2

Unique link: The United States is still king of the international arms sales market, but increased competition makes our position vulnerable and the plan reduces sales

Grady 2018. John Grady (retired Director of Communications for the Association of the U.S. Army), Panel: Expansion of U.S. Arms Sales Tool to Expand American Influence, USNI News, Aug. 8, 2018, <https://news.usni.org/2018/08/08/panel-expansion-u-s-arms-sales-tool-expand-american-influence>.

The administration’s goal in streamlining the process for American defense contractors to grow their sales internationally and bringing in unmanned aerial systems is a race for global influence that goes well beyond the marketplace, government and industry association panelists agreed on Wednesday. “Who’s going to make the rules for the next 50 years” for international behavior, Dak Hardwick, assistant vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association, said. Hardwick and others specially cited the growing Chinese interest in overseas military sales and Russia’s success of selling air missile defense systems to Turkey and possibly India. Neither has the strict rules governing the sales or how these systems would be used after purchase the U.S. does. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies event in Washington, Tina Kaidanow, acting assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, added the April presidential memo revising the arms transfer policy and covering unmanned serial systems sales, “is only the first step [to] support and grow our defense industrial base.” She added that every sale, still will be reviewed for compliance with United States law concerning human rights and how each sale could affect arms proliferation. The government expects to meet industry requests to set milestones and timelines so they can plan and budget for potential sales domestically and to allies and partners, Laura Cressey, deputy director for regional security and arms transfers at the State Department said. She added new financing options for foreign partners would be available as an incentive to buy American. “We have a bit of a balancing act here,” she said. For example, the balancing act includes mitigating the risk to the American warfighter five years down the road by selling this specific system with its unique technology to “Y” country. Case-by-case also means that approval is not guaranteed based upon past performance by a contractor or behavior by a nation, she and several panelists said. In some parts of the State Department, it also means trying to “do more with less” to meet accelerated timelines as staffing has been left vacant or cut, she added. To Jeff Abramson, a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, this raised “a great deal of concern” because “priorities are not being weighted” in reaching those decisions. He added arms sales should not be considered “a trade commodity; these are weapons,” not to be rushed the system. Arms sales “are fundamentally a political act,” Melissa Dalton, director of CSIS’ cooperative defense project, added, and the change in policy needs to fit in with the President Donald Trump’s national security strategy. In the memo, she said it uses that standard as a guide but does not spell out how for the various federal agencies involved in arms transfers. “What has changed” most in the international marketplace “is the United States is not alone” in offering quality military equipment, Keith Webster, president of the defense and aerospace export council at the United States Chamber of Commerce, said. He said the United States is not only competing with the Russians and the Chinese, but also with its allies such as the French, Koreans and Israelis. Thirty years ago, “we had a very strong corner on the market,” and only serious competition from the Kremlin.

# 1NC Shell - 2/2

Arms sales are key to U.S. global influence and hegemony abroad

Caverley 2018. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The United States — by dint of its huge military budget, massive defense R&D, and long dominance of the global arms market — can use arms transfers in ways beyond the dreams of its competitors. Indeed, many competitors recognize this, albeit grudgingly. I have interviewed officials in multiple countries (both clients and competitors of the United States) claiming they will defer to U.S. wishes on arms exports if they trust it is done for political rather than economic reasons. Many of America’s closest allies, who are also arms export competitors, look to the United States for leadership on controversial importers such as Saudi Arabia. And, the Trump administration should be given due credit for exercising discretion, given, for instance, its recent unilateral embargo on arms transfer to South Sudan. In fact, one administration official stated flatly that sales “will not come at the expense of human rights.” In no small part, U.S. domination of the global arms trade is based on the world’s belief that the United States uses its clout to advance its political ends, not economic gain. Destroying this reputation will do little to bring jobs to the United States, while doing much to damage American influence abroad.

Sustaining U.S. hegemony is the only way to solve great power conflicts

Kagan 2017. Robert Kagan (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute), Backing Into World War III, Foreign Policy, Feb. 6, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/>

For the United States to accept a return to spheres of influence would not calm the international waters. It would merely return the world to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres. These unsettled, disordered conditions produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent as a powerful unified Germany took shape, and the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity and death on an epic scale. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of World War II that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. It will be more than a shame if Americans were to destroy what they created — and not because it was no longer possible to sustain but simply because they chose to stop trying.

# Uniqueness - Arms Sales

U.S. dominates arms sales markets now, but the U.S. cannot grow its market share and other countries can take ours

Caverley 2018. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The arms market is a surprisingly tiny portion of world trade. Annual estimates range from $86 to 105 billion dollars. Compare this to the global markets for cars ($1.35 trillion), pharmaceuticals ($613 billion), and even “human or animal blood” ($252 billion) and the international arms industry begins to look paltry. By any estimate, the United States already dominates this industry. The State Department’s own estimates for 2015 credit the United States with a whopping 80 percent of the financial value of all global arms deliveries from 2013 to 2017. The most authoritative source of data, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, gives the United States a more conservative, but still commanding, lead of 34 percent of arms deliveries (measured according to an index of military, rather than financial, value) for the same time period. Russia comes in at second place with 22 percent, with the next four leading states scrapping for 5 to 7 percent each. Easing regulations on sales to existing American customers is unlikely to have a huge effect on the size of these transactions, and even with relaxed rules, finding new state customers will be hard. Much of the remaining market is essentially closed to the United States. With the crucial exception of India, there is little opportunity to encroach upon the market share of the number two weapons exporter — Russia — since the United States restricts or bans sales of weapons to important Russian customers like China, Venezuela, Syria, and Vietnam.

# Uniqueness - Hegemony Strong and Sustainable

U.S. Hegemony is strong and sustainable - it’s our choice whether we give up global leadership

Harris 2019. Peter Harris (assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University), When Will the Unipolar World End?, National Interest, May 27, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/when-will-unipolar-world-end-59202>

Crucially, however, the unipolar world will only end when the United States materially loses its near-hegemonic status in Europe or East Asia. It will not be enough for China or Russia to outmatch the United States on paper. Geopolitical conditions on the ground will have to be overturned. Pressure from foreign competitors is only one way this might come about. The other way is that the United States might simply choose to retrench for its own reasons. In fact, this is how Charles Krauthammer predicted that the unipolar world might end: with isolationist forces inside the United States pushing for an end to deep overseas engagement out of a misguided belief that international security no longer depended upon American preponderance abroad. Either way, the bottom line is that the American Century—the unipolar moment—critically depends on the United States maintaining deep political and military engagement in core regions of Eurasia, especially in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It was the Soviet retreat from these regions in 1991 that left the United States preponderant in global affairs in the first place. It will be America’s retreat from them—whether forced or voluntary—that signals unipolarity is over. The unipolar moment is not over yet, even if its demise is well within sight. The critical question for today’s foreign policy analysts is not “What sort of international system will emerge once unipolarity is over?” but rather, “What will it take for unipolarity to be over?” This is because the eventual collapse of the unipolar system will not so much foreshadow a reorganization of world politics as it will serve as confirmation that such restructuring has already taken place.

Heg is strong - hard power and strong foreign politics

Rose 2019, Gideon Rose (editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations), The Fourth Founding, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-12-11/fourth-founding>

The United States’ hard power has indeed declined in relative terms from its postwar peak. But this fact does not have the significance realists assume, because the country’s absolute hard power is greater than ever and is multiplied by its soft power. For generations, the United States has done what realist theory said was impossible, playing international politics as a team sport, not an individual one. On balance, it has considered its role in the order to be the protector of a community, not the exploiter of hapless marks; it has participated in alliances, not run a protection racket. Thanks to that, when it comes time for crucial tasks of system maintenance, it can add its friends’ power to its own.

# Link - Generic

Strong arms sales market key to global leverage over buyers

Caverley 2018. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The United States has the most diverse export portfolio in the world. In the past five years, it has delivered weapons to nearly 100 countries. Its best customer over this period, Saudi Arabia, only bought 13 percent of all U.S. arms exports (all data from SIPRI). By contrast, 58 percent of Russia exports go to just three countries (India, China, and Vietnam). For China, it’s 64 percent (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria). Strong domestic demand also mitigates the pressure on a country to export. From 2010 to 2015 the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all exported about half of their defense production, while Russia exported 39 percent. The United States on average exports only a quarter of the arms produced by its firms. This combination of strong domestic demand and a diverse portfolio of client states makes America’s market power stronger than that of any other exporter. The United States is so economically advantaged in making and selling weapons that it can limit conventional-weapons proliferation, technology diffusion, and corruption in contracting arrangements (and maintain a robust defense industrial base) while retaining its commanding market position. Less powerful exporting states are generally too constrained by the economics of production to pursue any goals besides increased sales. There are a number of ways in which America’s leverage in the area of arms sales — and, therefore, its ability to exercise restraint — can further its foreign policy goals.

# Link - Saudi Arabia

Cutting arms sales to Saudi Arabia backfires - decreases U.S. global influence and causes Saudi Arabian to double down on bad policies

Bisaccio 2018. Derek Bisaccio (Military Markets Analyst), Examining U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, Defense Aerospace, Oct. 23 2018, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/196962/us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia%3A-policy-options.html>

It would be expensive, take significant amounts of time, and require a restructuring of Saudi Arabia’s security outlook, all to import systems whose quality and usefulness Saudi Arabia is already skeptical of. These are strong points, but it is worth pointing out that a significant or total shutdown of U.S. arms cooperation with Saudi Arabia would come with its own set of risks. The most immediate consequence would be jeopardizing American ties with Riyadh, a country that remains influential in the world especially because of its ability to act as a swing oil producer. Opponents of Saudi Arabia in general see no issue with downgrading U.S.-Saudi relations, and perhaps in time the U.S. might view its security interests as diverging from requiring Washington to work with governments like Saudi Arabia’s. But if the Trump administration’s goal in the present is to isolate Iran and concretely address its nuclear and missile programs as well as foreign policy in the region, coordination of efforts with Saudi Arabia will prove essential. Critics of the Crown Prince regularly paint him as reckless, which, if an accurate depiction, should prompt consideration of whether reducing America’s ability to influence Saudi policy choices is the wisest course of action for Washington to take. Depending on how severely the U.S. was to act, cutting defense cooperation could produce the opposite effect than intended with respect to Saudi policies: Saudi Arabia could well double-down, or in any case refuse to budge, rather than concede to Washington. Should the U.S. cut only a few deals, or refuse to sell a few systems, the pressure will be so miniscule as to hardly register in Riyadh.

# Link - Taiwan

Taiwan arms sales reductions breaks U.S. security credibility globally

Wang 2018. Yuan-Kang Wang (Professor of Political Science Western Michigan University), The 'Realist' Case for the US to Keep Supporting Taiwan, The News Lens, 9/28/2018, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/104917

First, Taiwan’s geostrategic location is of particular value to U.S. national security interests. The island controls the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) extending from Japan to Southeast Asia and serves as a check on China’s maritime expansions into the East and the South China Seas.

If Washington wishes to maintain its preeminent position in Asia, it is in the U.S. interest to include Taiwan (along with Japan, South Korea, and other allies) in its overall Asia strategy. It makes good strategic sense for the United States to help strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities in order to deter Beijing from attacking the island. Strong U.S.-Taiwan security ties ameliorate the power asymmetry across the Taiwan Strait and thereby increase the costs of China’s military coercion.

Second, defending Taiwan is linked to the credibility of the United States for protecting allies and partners in Asia. If Washington abandons Taiwan, Beijing would likely view the concession as a weakening of U.S. resolve for protecting other interests in Asia. Seeing the United States as a “paper tiger,” China might become more aggressive in pursuing territorial interests in maritime Asia.

Moreover, abandoning Taiwan would reduce allies’ confidence in the credibility of U.S. security commitment to them. At a time when Asian states need the United States to counterbalance Chinese power, a U.S. decision to abandon Taiwan would be particularly alarming, sending shock waves across the region.

# Link - Drones

Strong security incentives exist for other countries to use U.S. drone technology

Caverley 2018. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

The potential for unilateral restraint in drones is over. To date, the United States has been extremely discrete in exporting unmanned systems (particularly armed ones). But somewhat comparable products are now readily available from multiple sources in the global market. Over the past five years Israel has filled the gap, delivering 43 percent of all drone exports, with China a rising competitor at 32 percent (source SIPRI). If the United States begins exporting unmanned aerial vehicles more freely, American drones are likely to both dominate the market and be subject to more rigorous regulation. That said, the economic boom is likely to be modest; the entire annual military unmanned aerial vehicle market is projected to be under $10 billion as late as 2026. The security benefits for the United States of drone exports remain considerable however. Interoperability among networked drones from multiple countries will likely play an enormous role in future “informationalized” conflict. Strong security incentives exist for the United States to ensure that allies operate its unmanned systems.

# Internal Link - Arms Sales Key to Heg 1/2

Empirics prove - arms sales bolster American influence abroad and constrain enemies

Caverley 2018. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

As the world’s leading producer, consumer, and exporter of high-end weaponry, the United States has long used arms sales to influence smaller states, manage regional arms races, encourage allies’ inter-operability, and contain rivals’ capabilities, as well as to support its own defense industrial base and broader economy. It equips foreign militaries not only to defend themselves, but to use hardware in common with the United States, making joint operations easier. The governing document for U.S. arms transfers, Presidential Decision Directive 27 from 2014, lists ten “national security and foreign policy goals” that such transfers serve. These range from “Ensuring U.S. military forces, and those of allies and partners, continue to enjoy technological superiority over potential adversaries” to “Ensuring that arms transfers do not contribute to human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law.”

Strong arms sales policies key to foreign policy and to bolster allies

McInnis and Lucas 2015, Kathleen J. McInnis (National Security Analyst) and Nathan J. Lucas (Section Research Manager), What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 18, 2015, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf>

Over the course of its history, the United States has, with relative frequency, supported its allies and partners as they wage their own internal conflicts. These are contingencies wherein the United States has some sort of larger, geopolitical stake in the outcome of an ongoing conflict, but cannot—or politically will not—become a direct party to the conflict. During the Cold War, this indirect support was often an extension of great power competition. In the absence of the Soviet Union, however, the United States continued supporting local actors to advance other national objectives, such as stemming the flow of narcotics into the United States. In these instances, military support and aid are channeled to one belligerent over another, in the hopes that doing so will enable the U.S.-favored party to ultimately win and create an advantageous post-war situation for the United States. This assistance can be as simple as providing weapons and money, or as complex as providing combat advisors.

# Internal Link - Arms Sales Key to Heg 2/2

The United States uses large volumes of arms sales to maintain its hegemony and influence smaller countries

Willardson 2013, Spencer L Willardson (U of Iowa doctoral candidate for Political Science), UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARMS: THE FOREIGN POLICY CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS TRANSFERS, May 2013, <https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4789&context=etd>

The idea that arms transfers can be used as an indicator of foreign policy is not new. Early projects in arms transfers started with the explicit assumption that arms transfers were themselves an expression of policy. One of the first reports from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted that military equipment sales require export licenses and are often “considered at the highest levels of administration” and it is “…therefore reasonable to assume that each arms transaction reflects a decision on the part of the government of the supplying country, and the overall pattern of arms supplies reflects a government policy towards the arms trade” (1975, 21). This same volume distinguished three broad patterns by suppliers of arms to third world countries. These categories were hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive (SIPRI 1975, 21–26). Hegemonic suppliers (the U.S. and U.S.SR) use arms transfers both to “…dominate other, dependent countries” and as a “…means to influence a smaller country in minor matters” (SIPRI 1975, 24). Industrial suppliers are mainly concerned with using exports to maintain domestic defense production in the exporting country. Restrictive supply is a pattern of supply to states where the supplier does not become involved in local or international conflict (1975, 24). These broad patterns were empirically tested using complex “fuzzy set” analysis by Sanjian (1991) who found that these overall broad patterns held.

# Impact - Heg Solves War

US leadership is necessary to block revisionist powers, prevent terrorism, and prevent a global war

Kagan 2017. Robert Kagan (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute), Backing Into World War III, Foreign Policy, Feb. 6, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/>

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable.

# Impact - China - Scenario Shell 1/2

China is using arms sales as a foreign policy tool - if the US decreases sales, China will step in and increase its global influence at the expense of U.S. influence

Tian 2018. Nan Tian (Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme), China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?, RealClearDefense, September 17, 2018, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/17/chinas_arms_trade_a_rival_for_global_influence__113806.html>

Add in Myanmar, and it’s a picture where China usually sells weapons to countries that the West (the US and Western Europe) does not. Such sales are partly due to less stringent human rights conditions linked to arms sales and more affordable weapons, but also recognising the gaps left by the US and thus securing greater geopolitical influence as part of its foreign policy. Comparing the types of weapons sold to African and Asia countries reinforces the argument further. Large ticket items exported to Bangladesh and Pakistan include frigates, corvettes, submarines, and air defence systems. In addition to the transfer of the weapon, such transactions (sales and military aid) include training, maintenance, and exchange of information on the capability of the weapons. All of which enhances country relationships and boosts future collaborations. In contrast, weapons exports to Africa are mostly of lower value in the form of armoured personnel carriers (APCs), light training aircraft, battle tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These are akin to one-time transactions, with limited commitments to training or maintenance. While the ability to buy expensive high-tech weapons is lower in African countries compared to neighbours close to China, China has looked to challenge US influence in Asia with more intimate (military and economic) relations with the likes of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The same is not evident in Africa.

China’s rise won’t stay peaceful - they’ll resort to military action, causing war

Kagan 2017. Robert Kagan (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute), Backing Into World War III, Foreign Policy, Feb. 6, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/>

The two great powers have differed, so far, chiefly in their methods. China has until now been the more careful, cautious, and patient of the two, seeking influence primarily through its great economic clout and using its growing military power chiefly as a source of deterrence and regional intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright use of force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in nature, with strategic objectives. And while Beijing has been wary of using military force until now, it would be a mistake to assume it will continue show such restraint in the future — possibly the near future. Revisionist great powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the Chinese perceive America’s commitment to its allies and its position in the region to be weakening, or its capacity to make good on those commitments to be declining, then they will be more inclined to attempt to use the power they are acquiring in order to achieve their objectives. As the trend lines draw closer, this is where the first crisis is likely to take place.

# Impact - China - China Uses Arms Sales to Challenge U.S.

China wants to use arms sales to increase its global influence at the expense of U.S. hegemony

Darling 2019. Dan Darling (senior analyst covering both the Europe and Asia-Pacific regions for Forecast International's International Military Markets group), China’s Arms Exports: Up, Up and Away, Defense Security Monitor, May 9, 2019, <https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2019/05/09/chinas-arms-exports-up-up-and-away/>

By offering an affordable price point, flexible payment options, and assurance of delivery to the end user, China has steadily cultivated a customer base across the developing world. The lack of political restrictions on the sale and delivery of Chinese hardware to interested parties and the broader trade packages presented to recipient countries by the Chinese government serve to further entice potential buyers. On top of this, Chinese products are often cheaper for the buyer on the export market than Western and even Russian hardware. Thus the access to a weapons market for countries that may not be able to purchase Western hardware makes Chinese-sourced materiel highly palatable to a buyer. Furthermore, knowing that Beijing will not hold political qualifiers over them (human rights concerns, etc.) means they in turn have a trustworthy provider in that a deal is unlikely to be canceled midstream. From China’s vantage point, its arms exports help to promote its growing self-sufficiency in defense technology, wield increasing global influence, and support Beijing’s broader foreign policy aims be they economic, political or military. For now, Chinese arms sales pose a modest challenge to U.S. interests and Washington’s stature as the leading global defense supplier. Indeed, China’s arms export success has eaten into Russia’s market share and presented a greater challenge to Moscow than to the U.S. But going forward, with Chinese defense technologies developing and maturing and China’s influence in areas such as Africa increasing, the U.S. will inevitably feel the brunt of greater competition from its preeminent strategic rival.

Arms sales are a key component of the us foreign policy plan to stop China’s rise and maintain heg

Huang 2018, Kristen Huang, China’s arms sales rise as it vies with US for influence on the world stage, South China Morning Post, Mar. 12, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2136877/chinas-arms-sales-rise-it-vies-us-influence-world-stage>

The administration of US President Donald Trump has dubbed China as a “rival”, and the latest SIPRI report shows how the US has used arms transfers as a foreign policy tool to offset Beijing’s growing influence. For example, US arms deliveries to India grew by 557 per cent between 2008 and 2017, the year China and India became embroiled in a protracted border dispute over the Doklam region in the Himalayas. “This development is part of the growing strategic partnership between the two countries under which the USA has begun to supply India with advanced military equipment,” the report said. The US has also started to increase its security cooperation with Vietnam, which is embroiled in a dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea. In 2017 it delivered one patrol ship, the USS Morgenthau, to Vietnam – the first major US arms transfer to that country. Tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea also saw Japan moving closer to the US, the report said. It said Tokyo turned to the US for several types of advanced weapons between 2013 and 2017, including the first batches of a total of 42 combat aircraft. Japan also ordered advanced air and missile defence systems from the US in the same period..

# Impact - China - Zero-Sum Link

The global arms market is zero-sum - If the U.S. doesn’t sell weapons, other countries with fewer end-use restrictions like China and Russia will corner the market

Grady 2018, John Grady (retired Director of Communications for the Association of the U.S. Army), Panel: Expansion of U.S. Arms Sales Tool to Expand American Influence, USNI News, Aug. 8, 2018, <https://news.usni.org/2018/08/08/panel-expansion-u-s-arms-sales-tool-expand-american-influence>.

 “Who’s going to make the rules for the next 50 years” for international behavior, Dak Hardwick, assistant vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association, said. Hardwick and others specially cited the growing Chinese interest in overseas military sales and Russia’s success of selling air missile defense systems to Turkey and possibly India. Neither has the strict rules governing the sales or how these systems would be used after purchase the U.S. does. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies event in Washington, Tina Kaidanow, acting assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, added the April presidential memo revising the arms transfer policy and covering unmanned serial systems sales, “is only the first step [to] support and grow our defense industrial base.” She added that every sale, still will be reviewed for compliance with United States law concerning human rights and how each sale could affect arms proliferation.

# Impact China - Heg Impact

China’s rise kills hegemony

Mastro 2019. Oriana Skylar Mastro (assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), The Stealth Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Feb/Jan 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

Until now, China has succeeded in growing without provoking. Yet there is a limit to how powerful a country can get without directly challenging the incumbent power, and China is now reaching that point. Under Xi, China has begun confronting American power head-on. Given the country’s internal challenges, China’s rise could still stall. But history has shown that in the vast majority of cases in which a country was able to sustain its rise, the rising power ended up overtaking the dominant power, whether peacefully or through war. That does not mean that the United States cannot buck the historical trend. To remain dominant, Washington will have to change course. It will have to deepen, rather than lessen, its involvement in the liberal international order. It will have to double down on, rather than abandon, its commitment to American values. And perhaps most important, it will have to ensure that its leadership benefits others rather than pursue a strategy based on “America first.”

China’s rise and U.S. hegemony are zero sum

Leung and White 2018. Zoe Leung (Senior Program Associate of EWI's Asia-Pacific program) Jace White (Program Assistant with the Asia-Pacific Program at the EastWest Institute), and China's Rise Doesn't Equate to America's Fall, National Interest, June 21, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-rise-doesnt-equate-americas-fall-26368>

Power politics between the two great powers is inevitably a zero-sum game; a rise in Chinese power is treated as running counter to U.S. interests, and vice versa, regardless of intentions. While Washington remains skeptical of Beijing’s ambitions in its “Peaceful Development” and Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is equally suspicious of the U.S.-led alliance system and regards it as a tool left over from the Cold War, designed to isolate and contain China. Tallying recent developments in the long list of contentious bilateral issues reveals a pattern of widening strategic mistrust that must be managed.

# Impact - China - AT: China Doesn’t Want Heg

China wants to directly challenge U.S. hegemony

Mastro 2019. Oriana Skylar Mastro (assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), The Stealth Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Feb/Jan 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

Thanks to this novel strategy, China has been able to grow into one of the most powerful countries in the world, second, perhaps, only to the United States. And if it had chosen to persist with this strategy, the country would have continued to stay off the United States’ radar screen. But rising powers can delay provocation for only so long, and the bad news for the United States—and for peace and security in Asia—is that China has now entered the beginning stages of a direct challenge to the U.S.-led order. Under Xi, China is unabashedly undermining the U.S. alliance system in Asia. It has encouraged the Philippines to distance itself from the United States, it has supported South Korea’s efforts to take a softer line toward North Korea, and it has backed Japan’s stance against American protectionism. It is building offensive military systems capable of controlling the sea and airspace within the so-called first island chain and of projecting power past the second. It is blatantly militarizing the South China Sea, no longer relying on fishing vessels or domestic law enforcement agencies to exercise its conception of sovereignty. It has even started engaging in military activities outside Asia, including establishing its first overseas base, in Djibouti. All these moves suggest one thing: China is no longer content to play second fiddle to the United States and seeks to directly challenge its position in the Indo-Pacific region.

# Impact - China - AT: China Won’t Expand Arms Sales 1/2

Africa proves that China will move into new markets, increasing its global influence

Tian 2018. Nan Tian (Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme), China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?, RealClearDefense, September 17, 2018, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/17/chinas_arms_trade_a_rival_for_global_influence__113806.html>

Couple this with China’s growing arms industry and arms exports, the question of vital importance is whether weapon sales have become a new foreign policy tool for China in Africa. Development of the Chinese arms industry has enabled it to become a major arms exporter (number five in the world) in recent years. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, the 38% increase in total arms exports was second only to Israel. In this time Chinese export to Africa rose by 55%, and its share of total African arms imports increased from 8.4 to 17%. Although Russia remains the largest supplier of major weapons to Africa (39% of the region’s imports), some see the rise of Chinese arms exports to the region as having a threefold rationale: Beijing’s push to become a major arms producer. Compete against Russia to capture this growing arms market. A foreign policy tool to gain regional influence for future economic and political interests. Although the total volume of major arms flow from China to Africa is less than half of Russia’s, it sells to far more African countries than Russia. Between 2013–17, Russia sold major arms to 14 Africa countries, compared to the 23 of China. This “blanket” style of selling does not typically fit with the notion of linking targeted arms sales with foreign policy objectives. The diversity in the types of weapons and of arms recipients (e.g., from Algeria to South Africa and Kenya to Cote d'Ivoire) suggests a more demand and supply relationship. As China continues to develop its arms industry, **any international buyer will help expand its network**, offer important developmental feedback, and improve weapon quality and company profitability. The fall in export of Russian made weapons to Africa corresponded with the rise in Chinese exports, potentially due to the availability of more cost-effective options. This is especially the case in Algeria, where import of major Chinese arms increased by 46-fold between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, while the transfer of Russian weapons fell by 35%. Yet in-depth analysis into Chinese arms exports to Africa shows Algeria as an outlier that is biasing the recent trends. Of all major weapons exported from China to Africa between 2013 and 2017, 46% went to Algeria, prime among them are three heavy corvettes delivered in 2015 and 2016. Remove Algeria and major arms exports to Africa decreased by 12% between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017. Other major African buyers of Chinese weapons are Morocco and Nigeria. It seems that suggestions linking China’s BRI project, its military base in Djibouti, and increased military engagement in the related countries are not founded on arms transfers evidence.

# Impact - China - AT: China Won’t Expand Arms Sales 2/2

U.S. drone restrictions prove China wants to move into markets the U.S. leaves

ChinaPower 2018. China Power is a working group of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, How dominant is China in the global arms trade?, CSIS, June 29, 2018, <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/>

China is actively working to strengthen its foothold in certain markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North African country totaled $483 million between 2008 and 2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at $499 million in 2016 as several weapon orders were fulfilled. These procurements included three C-28A frigates, which were ordered by Algeria in 2012. Although not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a non-proliferation agreement targeted at missiles and systems capable of delivery weapons of mass destruction, Beijing is generally compliant with international protocols. The 2002 Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, for instance, outlines measures to safeguard against proliferation. In June 2017, China published a draft of the Export Control Law, which if enacted will update existing legislation and establish a comprehensive export control regime. Beijing has been quick to adapt its domestic regulations to account for emerging technology. This has enabled it to fill the void left by other suppliers. The US, which has long been at the forefront of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development, has purposely restricted the export of its UAVs. Regulations that until recently characterized long-range unmanned aerial systems as cruise missiles, have also limited overseas access of American UAVs. These factors have created a ripe market opportunity for China, which has made its UAVs available to countries such as Nigeria and Egypt.

# Impact - Russia - Scenario Shell 1/2

U.S. arms exports currently crushing the Russian market - Russia can’t modernize its military without arms sales

Caverley 2018. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else. In the spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian weapons, the United States can directly compete against Russia in one important market. India accounts for a stunning 39 percent of Russia’s recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more importantly, U.S. sales would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing most production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be a central goal of U.S. arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step in this direction.

# Impact - Russia - Scenario Shell 2/2

Russian modernization and aggression leads to miscalculation and nuclear war

Oliker 2018. Olga Oliker (senior associate of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)), Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-10-15/moscows-nuclear-enigma>

Talk to anybody in Washington (except, perhaps, the U.S. president), and you will hear an ominous mantra: the Russians are back. Moscow, resurgent, is sowing discord among Western states and trying to reestablish its sphere of influence in former Soviet countries and beyond. One development, in particular, has caused much hyperventilating in Western ministries and think tanks: the Russian Federation not only has more nuclear weapons than any other country in the world but also is investing in an arsenal of modern, low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used for limited nuclear warfare. These investments have many analysts worried that Russia would be the first to pull the nuclear trigger in a future war, and that it would do so early on, hoping to quickly bomb its adversary into submission and end the conflict—a strategy dubbed “escalate to de-escalate.” If military confrontation of any kind might push Moscow to go nuclear, preparing for war with Russia means preparing for a potential nuclear war. The United States, the thinking goes, can only defend itself and its allies by modernizing its own nuclear arsenal. Above all, Washington should develop more low-yield nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield or risk being outgunned in a future war. But those who fret about the Russian arsenal misread the Kremlin’s intentions and put forward the wrong solutions. The real danger is not a new and more aggressive Russian nuclear strategy; it is the Kremlin’s failure to communicate its goals effectively to leaders in Washington and elsewhere. Russia’s actual strategy has not diverged much from plain old-fashioned deterrence: Russia believes that any major war with the United States could result in a massive U.S. nuclear attack, and so it maintains a nuclear arsenal of its own in order to discourage such an attack. But its policy of deliberate ambiguity is feeding into apprehension in Washington, driving a dangerous cycle of escalation that is bound to worsen suspicions and heighten the risk that clashes will escalate.

# Impact - Russia - Ext. Russian Arms Sales Key to Russian Military

Russian foreign arms sales fund the domestic arms industry and military production

Willardson 2013, Spencer L Willardson (U of Iowa doctoral candidate for Political Science), UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARMS: THE FOREIGN POLICY CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS TRANSFERS, May 2013, <https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4789&context=etd>

The fact that Russia remains the second largest arms exporter in the world is an accomplishment in its own right. Putin’s reorganization of the arms export business under the umbrella of Rosoboroneksport has helped Russia to regain the market share it lost to the United States in the 1990s (see Chapter 3). Putin’s model of state interests utilizes assets from core sectors in the economy to enrich the state. ROE fulfills a vital mission in Russia’s state system because it provides an outlet for Russian arms and brings in cash to the Kremlin’s coffers. It also provides a focus for the domestic arms industry, which employs large numbers of people – a holdover from the Soviet mobilization economy (Gaddy 1996). Arms exports also help to prop up the “security economy” that involves both the production of weapons and the military itself. There is some evidence that the focus on arms exports may become a problem for the state. Defense firms are reaching capacity limits, quality issues plague Russian products, and Russia’s two main customers are diversifying their arms import portfolio (Cooper 2010, 153–4). Cooper (2010, 168) in his assessment of the future of the Russian defense industry wonders whether “…in an era of globalization and economic liberalism, vast state, or quasi-state, corporate structures can be an engine of successful modernization, innovation and economic viability.” As recently as 2012, Russia’s president has been involved in negotiating, or at least advocating for large arms deals. We saw this pattern in the case of arms sales to Turkey and Jordan in the case studies in this chapter. As long as Russia’s preference regarding foreign policy is to export to protect critical sectors and fill the state coffers, the decision-making behavior of ROE will not change. That is, it will continue to make whatever deals it can with whomever it can.

# Global Influence Disadvantage - Affirmative Answers

# Non-Unique - Alternate Causes for Failing Arms Sales Leadership

Multiple alternate causes contribute to decreased future arms sales - better market competition, buyer diversification, and localization demands

Arad 2018. Shimon Arad (retired colonel of the Israeli Defense Forces), TRUMP’S ARMS EXPORTS POLICY: DEBUNKING KEY ASSUMPTIONS, September 28, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/trumps-arms-exports-policy-debunking-key-assumptions/>

However, a number of trends combine to make Washington nervous about its lead in global arms sales. The first is a growing effort by other technologically innovative arms exporters to compete with the United States for markets. Arms sales by Britain, France, Spain, China, and Russia have reduced America’s potential share of the important markets of the Middle East (49 percent of the U.S. arms exports between 2013 and 2017) and Asia. To a certain extent, the people behind the new CAT policy believe that the strict and rigid regulatory and procedural frameworks that governed the arms exports processes have undermined the U.S. competitiveness in the global arms market and the implementation of the new policy is anticipated to increase sales. A second trend is the deliberate policy of client states to diversify their arms purchases. The Arab Sunni states, for example, have in the last couple of years spent tens of billions of dollars on European or Russian arms rather than on U.S.-made weapon systems. Even a country like Egypt, which has received nearly $80 billion in military and economic aid over the past 30 years, has tapped from its reserves and loans from Gulf states and from suppliers in order to purchase at least $13 billion worth of arms since 2013 from France, Russia, and Germany rather than from the United States. The new CAT policy aims to encourage allies and partners to buy U.S.-made arms, including by increasing competitiveness by dropping surcharges on products and lowering the costs of transportation. A third trend is the growing demands of client states for more substantial offsets and localization of production and maintenance, including the transfer of technology. Thus, for example, under its Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia wants to eventually subject foreign military contracts to a 50 percent localization rule, based on a partnership model that includes the sharing of technologies and skills. The Middle East’s growing armored vehicles market, which is expected to reach more than $31 billion by 2021, is an example of a growing demand for the transfer of technical knowledge which is used to strengthen an indigenous defense sector that has already begun to export its own products. Some Western European countries are more forthcoming on this issue than the United States. However, some U.S. companies have begun forming subsidiaries abroad.

Export policy won’t affect what other countries buy - buyers are trying to diversify

Arad 2018. Shimon Arad (retired colonel of the Israeli Defense Forces), TRUMP’S ARMS EXPORTS POLICY: DEBUNKING KEY ASSUMPTIONS, September 28, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/trumps-arms-exports-policy-debunking-key-assumptions/>

Moreover, as noted above, some of Washington’s major clients, such as the Gulf states and India have a deliberate policy of diversifying their arms imports. A streamlined U.S. approach to arms exports makes little difference to deliberate arms diversification strategies adopted by client countries. At its core, a policy of diversification is designed to increase leverage on the United States, to retain freedom of action, and to hedge against possible negative U.S. regional policies and to push up the quality of the capabilities being offered. Therefore, easing U.S. defense export regulations or reducing surcharge rates will not necessarily make much difference to the choices that these countries will make regarding the purchase of American versus non-American-made weapon systems.

# Non-Unique - Hegemony is Dead

U.S. hegemony and global influence has declined for 20 years - too late to reverse the trend

Galston 2019. William A. Galston (Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution and College Park Professor at the University of Maryland), Is It Too Late to Counter China’s Rise?, WSJ, April 2, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-it-too-late-to-counter-chinas-rise-11554246370>

Two decades ago, the U.S. was on top of the world—the unchallenged superpower, the “indispensable nation.” Today scholars are drawing analogies to Britain at the beginning of the 20th century, its global pre-eminence was being eroded by a surge of American economic power. However you look at it, the past 20 years have been a geopolitical catastrophe for the U.S. In retrospect, we can see that the 9/11 attacks lured America down a self-defeating path. Determined to prevent a repeat, we entered an endless, no-win war in Afghanistan from which we are still trying to disentangle ourselves. Though the war in Iraq ended quickly in what was portrayed as a victory, we inherited a divided and broken country that fell apart as soon as we left, and have spent additional billions of dollars to put back together—not to mention the Americans who gave their lives to reclaim the territory Islamic State seized afterward. All this was a massive diversion from the most important long-term challenge the U.S. faced—the rise of China. The lack of focus led Washington to make two crucial mistakes. Leaders of both parties dramatically underestimated the impact on the U.S. economy of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Over the next decade, a surge of Chinese imports wiped out millions of manufacturing jobs. Small U.S. manufacturers located outside large cities were hit particularly hard, contributing to the divide between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas that increasingly shapes American politics along with our economy. The second mistake was even more fateful. U.S. leaders assumed that China’s entrance into the global economic system signaled its willingness to play by the rules of market economies, and to amend any trade practices that violated international norms. In this hopeful view, China would get richer, its middle class would expand, and popular demand for social and political liberties would intensify. While China might never democratize fully, it would become a less autocratic society that posed no systemic threat to liberal democracy. Mr. Xi’s emergence as China’s pre-eminent leader has dispelled these illusions. He believes that the state must play the leading role in economic development—and that economic power should be translated into political and military power. He appears determined to dislodge the U.S. from its long-held perch in East Asian defense and trade. Mr. Xi is convinced that the “China Model”—economic growth without political liberty—represents a superior alternative to liberal democracy, with applications far beyond China’s borders. He understands that China’s ability to mobilize vast amounts of capital for public purposes is a valuable tool for building global political influence. And now his country owns a tenth of Europe’s port capacity. The U.S. has wasted 20 years. Finally we see the problem. Is it too late to solve it?

# Link Turn - Selling Fewer Arms Increases Influence

Link turn - the Plan’s restraint improves U.S. global influence

Caverley 2018. Jonathan D. Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME, War on the Rocks, Apr. 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>

Another reason the United States tends to be restrained in arms sales is the accompanying “red tape,” much of which the Trump initiative will seek to remove. U.S. regulations surpass those suggested in the toothless U.N. Conventional Arms Trade Treaty, which four of the most important market-makers — Russia, China, India, and Saudi Arabia — have not bothered to even sign. The United States makes onerous demands — including on-site inspections on sovereign territory — of importing states to ensure weapons do not get transferred to third parties, and require that these weapons only be employed for their intended use (i.e. self-defense). While not always consistently enforced, these requirements remain a powerful latent foreign policy tool. Contrary to what industry lobbyists might say, this is not a source competitive disadvantage. It is a sign of American market power and a source of American influence. A Russian observer, writing in a U.N. report, notes rather drily that the U.S. export control system is both much more effective than any other country’s and “frequently used for influencing the end-user’s foreign policy.” The United States has used these rules to limit and shape proliferation, from banning the sale of Israeli airborne early warning systems to China to preventing the transfer of used light aircraft from Spain to Venezuela. It strictly regulates, when it wants to, how these weapons are used by the purchasing states themselves. Even France, a longtime ally in counter-terror and major power in its own right, needs to get U.S. approval before deploying its own Reapers. The capability and value of the American product (as well as the continued alignment of both countries’ interests) are enough for France to swallow its sovereign pride on this front. U.S. arms exports rely on a simple bargain: Clients join an American-dominated global supply chain in return for better value weapons, larger orders of subcomponents from local firms, and access to leading-edge weapons technology. These smaller states, in turn, surrender to the United States large swathes of their foreign and defense policies, including foregoing sales to regimes that threaten U.S. interests. The process is characterized by hard bargaining and by a considerable degree of coercion by the United States, such as when it temporarily kicked Israel out of the Joint Strike Fighter program for selling unmanned aerial vehicle parts to China.

# No Internal Link - Arms Sales Don’t Solve Heg

Arms sales are symbolic only - they don’t generate real influence

Mastro 2019. Oriana Skylar Mastro (assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), The Stealth Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Feb/Jan 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

Another way the United States can maintain its edge is to take a cue from China and become more entrepreneurial in how it acquires and exercises power. The standard playbook Washington has been following since the end of the Cold War will no longer do. If the United States is upset with a country over its human rights abuses, for example, reducing or even cutting off economic and diplomatic ties as punishment risks ceding influence to a less discriminating China. Instead, Washington should increase its engagement with the unsavory government, pursuing U.S. interests not just on a diplomatic level but also on a people-to-people level. Similarly, when it comes to military relations, the United States needs to upgrade its tool kit. Port visits, air shows, and even foreign military sales and joint exercises are often merely symbolic and fail to demonstrate the United States’ commitment to a country. Far more effective in preparing for conflict would be efforts to create common threat perceptions through enhanced intelligence sharing and joint contingency planning.

# No Internal Link - Trump Doesn’t Use Arms Sale Influence - 1/2

Saudi Arabia proves the internal link is false in the Trump era - Trump doesn’t use arms sales as influence

Rogin 2018, Josh Rogin (national security columnist), Trump has it ‘totally and completely backwards’ on Saudi arms sales, Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/10/16/trump-has-it-totally-and-completely-backwards-on-saudi-arms-sales/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.31639edbe62a>

When President Trump argues that the United States can’t halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia over the Saudis’ alleged murder of journalist and Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi, he’s giving up a key piece of leverage over Riyadh for no reason at all. What’s worse, Trump is also turning one of America’s best strategic assets into a liability, a massive unforced error that could weaken the United States worldwide. Trump has said repeatedly he doesn’t want to halt — or even threaten to halt — U.S. arms sales to the Saudi regime because (he says) it would cost U.S. jobs and hand over a sweet contract to Moscow or Beijing. “They are ordering military equipment. Everybody in the world wanted that order. Russia wanted it, China wanted it, we wanted it. We got it,” Trump said on “60 Minutes” Sunday. “I don’t want to hurt jobs. I don’t want to lose an order like that.” Set aside that Trump’s claim of $110 billion of arms sales to Saudi Arabia as announced last year is hugely exaggerated, considering that number mostly refers to deals struck during the Obama administration and new deals that haven’t yet materialized. The significant arms-sales relationship we do have with Saudi Arabia gives us enormous leverage over them, leverage Trump should use to pressure King Salman to reveal what his regime knows about Khashoggi’s disappearance. Saudi Arabia’s military is already built around U.S. and British defense platforms, meaning they can’t easily switch to Russian or Chinese systems. Riyadh is especially dependent on U.S. arms right now because their bloody war in Yemen requires a constant flow of U.S. munitions, not to mention U.S. intelligence, maintenance and refueling support. U.S. arms sales are not simply a financial deal or a jobs program; they represent a strategic advantage of the United States. Countries want U.S. weapons because they are the best. That gives us connections, influence and, yes, leverage over these countries. That’s how arms sales have always worked, until Trump flipped the script. “The White House seems to be saying that Trump Doctrine is that the U.S. will ignore your human rights abuses, assassinations or war crimes as long as you buy things from us. He’s got it totally and completely backwards,” Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) told me. “What’s the point of being a military superpower if we lose leverage when we do business with another country?” “What the president doesn’t realize is that this makes him look weak and small. World leaders will now know they can act with impunity so long as they are buying American weapons. That’s an insane message to send,” Murphy said. “The United States should never be boxed in because of who we sell weapons to — countries who buy U.S. weapons should feel enormous pressure to stay on our good side.”

# No Internal Link - Trump Doesn’t Use Arms Sale Influence - 2/2

Trump empirically does not utilize any international influence arms sales might provide

Rogin 2018, Josh Rogin (national security columnist), Trump has it ‘totally and completely backwards’ on Saudi arms sales, Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/10/16/trump-has-it-totally-and-completely-backwards-on-saudi-arms-sales/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.31639edbe62a>

Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) made a similar point Sunday on CNN’s “State of the Union” with Jake Tapper. “Arm sales are important, not because of the money, but because it also provides leverage over their future behavior,” he said. “You know … they will need our spare parts. They will need our training. And those are things we can use to influence their behavior.” Congress does have a role to play in approving arms sales, and all indications are that they plan to intervene on sales to Riyadh if it is shown that the Saudi regime had a hand in Khashoggi’s death. The State Department approved a $15 billion sale of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile defense system to Saudi Arabia this month. The Pentagon said last week Saudi Arabia has signed letters of offer or acceptance of $14.5 billion worth of American helicopters, tanks, ships, weapons and training. In June, the Senate narrowly voted down a resolution to halt the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of precision-guided munitions to the Saudi military out of concern they could be used to target Yemeni civilians. After the vote, Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking Democrat Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) said he opposed the sale, placing it in limbo. The threat of congressional action would be more effective if the president of the United States wasn’t publicly undermining Congress’s message, said William Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. “Trump is not even trying to use this leverage,” he said. “He’s completely given it away, and not only that, he’s announced to the world that he’s giving it away.” Through a basic misunderstanding of national security and diplomacy, the president has once again undermined U.S. interests and made the work of his own team — including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo — much more difficult. Thinking of arms sales purely in dollar terms doesn’t make any sense.

# Internal Link Turn - Arms Sales Bad for Hegemony 1/3

The neg has the link backwards - increased arms sales let defense contractors create bad foreign policy

Castagno 2019. Peter Castagno (Master’s Degree in International Conflict Resolution), The Arms Trade Is Intensifying Under Trump, Truthout, Feb. 20, 2019, <https://truthout.org/articles/the-arms-trade-is-intensifying-under-trump/>

The Trump administration’s commitment to advancing arms sales is not only apparent in the legion of officials with severe conflicts of interests occupying the cabinet, but also through directives in official arms export policy. The State Department’s updated Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy Implementation Plan was released in November 2018 and detailed loosened restrictions on the sale of drones and other weapons, new financing options for countries who can’t afford U.S. weaponry, and aims to put pressure on diplomats to put arms deals at the forefront of their mission. Rachel Stohl, an arms trade expert with the Stimson Center, described the updated policy, saying, “If you read between the lines, it could be a green light for the U.S. to sell more with less restraint.” A glaring example of the arms industry’s influence on State Department policy is demonstrated by a September 20, 2018, report from The Wall Street Journal. According to the report, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was convinced to continue support for the Saudi campaign in Yemen for the sake of a $2 billion arms deal with U.S.-based defense contractor Raytheon. The State Department’s legislative affairs staff, who influenced Pompeo’s decision, is led by Assistant Secretary of State Charles Faulkner, a former Raytheon lobbyist. Recent developments by the Trump administration have clarified the nature of the relationship between defense contractors and the federal government, but it would be erroneous to place the majority of the blame on him for the greater trend in global arms sales. Under President Barack Obama, arms exports doubled compared to President George W. Bush, reaching more than $200 billion in total approved deals (approved deals don’t represent actualized contracts, as deals can take years to be ordered and completed). The rapid increase in exports was part of a broader strategy to replace U.S. soldiers with surrogates in allied countries, as well as to placate allies in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — countries incensed by the administration’s nuclear deal with Iran. Despite brokering more arms deals than any administration since World War II, President Obama did enforce holds on arms exports to some countries deemed guilty of human rights abuses, including Bahrain, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. All of these holds were lifted shortly after the Trump administration took power. The Trump administration’s priorities on arms sales were further demonstrated after the CIA confirmed Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman’s role in ordering the savage execution of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. President Trump resisted calls to punish the Saudi prince on the grounds that punitive action would jeopardize lucrative arms deals with the kingdom. President Trump’s claims vastly overstated the amount of jobs and money to be lost if the U.S. withdrew support for Saudi military adventurism.

# Internal Link Turn - Arms Sales Bad for Hegemony 2/3

Turn: Arms sales are a risk to American security interests - weapons are used against Americans

Thrall and Dorminey, 2018: A. Trevor Thrall (associate professor of international security at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Caroline Dorminey (policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, March 13, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#full

U.S. arms sales policy is out of control. Since 2002, the United States has sold more than $197 billion worth of major conventional weapons and related military support to 167 countries. In just his first year in office, President Donald Trump inked arms deals at a record pace, generating hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of potential sales. Though the president trumpets each deal as a victory for the United States, an analysis of American arms sales since 2002 reveals that the arms trade is a risky business. The United States has repeatedly sold weapons to nations engaged in deadly conflicts, and to those with horrendous human rights records, under conditions in which it has been impossible to predict where the weapons would end up or how they would be used. On repeated occasions, American troops have fought opponents armed with American weapons. Advocates argue that arms sales bolster American security by enhancing the military capabilities of allies, providing leverage over the behavior and policies of client nations, and boosting the American economy while strengthening the defense industrial base. We argue that the economic benefits of arms sales are dubious and that their strategic utility is far more uncertain and limited than most realize. Arms sales also create a host of negative, unintended consequences for the United States, for those buying the weapons, and for the regions into which American weapons flow. Washington’s historical faith in arms sales is seriously misplaced. The United States should revise its arms sales policy to improve the risk assessment process, to ban sales to countries where the risk of negative consequences is too high, and to limit sales to cases in which they will directly enhance American security.

Arms sales cause conflicts - increases military confidence of recipients and changes the balance of power

Thrall and Dorminey, 2018: A. Trevor Thrall (associate professor of international security at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Caroline Dorminey (policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, March 13, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#full

Instability, Violence, and Conflict. First, arms sales can make conflict more likely.79 This may occur because recipients of new weapons feel more confident about launching attacks or because changes in the local balance of power can fuel tensions and promote preventive strikes by others. A study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, for example, found that although arms sales appeared to have some restraining effect on major-power allies, they had the opposite effect in other cases, and concluded that “increased arms transfers from major powers make states significantly more likely to be militarized dispute initiators.”80 Another study focused on sub-Saharan Africa from 1967 to 1997 found that “arms transfers are significant and positive predictors of increased probability of war.”81 Recent history provides supporting evidence for these findings: since 2011, Saudi Arabia, the leading buyer of American weapons, has intervened to varying degrees in Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar.

# Internal Link Turn - Arms Sales Bad for Hegemony 3/3

Empirics proves the turn is correct - the government’s risk assessments are ignored

Thrall and Dorminey, 2018: A. Trevor Thrall (associate professor of international security at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Caroline Dorminey (policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, March 13, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#full

In order to comply with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the U.S. government must generate a risk assessment in order to confirm that sales are unlikely to produce unwanted outcomes. This requirement makes sense, because history shows that arms sales can lead to a host of negative, unintended consequences. These consequences come in many forms, from those that affect the United States, such as blowback and entanglement in foreign conflicts, to those that affect entire regions, such as instability and dispersion, to those that affect the recipient regime itself, such as enabling oppression and increasing the likelihood of military coups. Forecasting how weapons will be used, especially over the course of decades, is difficult, but history provides evidence of the factors that make negative outcomes more likely. Sadly, however, even a cursory review of American arms sales over time makes it clear that neither the White House, nor the Pentagon, nor the State Department — all of which are involved in approving potential sales — takes the risk assessment process seriously. Historically, the United States has sold weapons to almost any nation that wanted to buy them — suggesting that the risk assessment process is rigged to not find risk. From 2002 to 2016, America delivered $197 billion in weapons to 167 states worldwide.6 Thirty-two of these countries purchased at least $1 billion in arms. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was America’s biggest client, purchasing $25.8 billion worth of weapons — including F-15s and a litany of helicopters, naval assets, and associated munitions. As shown in Table 1, the top 10 clients collectively bought $124 billion in arms — accounting for roughly two-thirds of the value of America’s total global exports since 2002. Given the amount of chaos, instability, and conflict in the world, it is difficult to imagine what sort of process would assess as many as 167 of the world’s roughly 200 countries as safe bets to receive American weapons. Moreover, the United States has a long history of selling weapons to nations where the immediate risks were obvious. From 1981 to 2010, the United States sold small arms and light weapons to 59 percent and major conventional weapons to 35 percent of countries actively engaged in a high-level conflict. The United States sold small arms to 66 percent and major conventional weapons to 40 percent of countries actively engaged in a low-level conflict.7 As one author noted, in 1994 there were 50 ongoing ethnic and territorial conflicts in the world and the United States had armed at least one side in 45 of them. Since 9/11, the United States has sold weapons to at least two dyads in conflict: Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Turkey and the Kurds.8

# AT: China - China Does Not Want to Challenge U.S.

China won’t challenge U.S. dominance

Mastro 2019. Oriana Skylar Mastro (assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), The Stealth Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Feb/Jan 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

“China will not, repeat, not repeat the old practice of a strong country seeking hegemony,” Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said last September. It was a message that Chinese officials have been pushing ever since their country’s spectacular rise began. For decades, they have been at pains to downplay China’s power and reassure other countries—especially the United States—of its benign intentions. Jiang Zemin, China’s leader in the 1990s, called for mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation in the country’s foreign relations. Under Hu Jintao, who took the reins of power in 2002, “peaceful development” became the phrase of the moment. The current president, Xi Jinping, insisted in September 2017 that China “lacks the gene” that drives great powers to seek hegemony. It is easy to dismiss such protestations as simple deceit. In fact, however, Chinese leaders are telling the truth: Beijing truly does not want to replace Washington at the top of the international system. China has no interest in establishing a web of global alliances, sustaining a far-flung global military presence, sending troops thousands of miles from its borders, leading international institutions that would constrain its own behavior, or spreading its system of government abroad.

China clearly does not want to challenge the US in arms sales

The Strait Times 2018, China defends military spending rise as low, proportional, Reuters , Mar. 6, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-defends-military-spending-rise-as-low-proportional>.

"China has obviously not fallen into the mindset of engaging in an arms race with the US. Otherwise, it could totally realise double-digit increases in its defence expenditure," the paper said in its editorial. US provocations in the South China Sea, tension in the Taiwan Strait, and the United States, Japan, Australia and India forming alliances demand a rise in spending, it added. "But Beijing has stuck to its own template and was not disturbed by external factors."

# AT: China - China’s Rise is Peaceful

China’s rise won’t cause war - it wants to preserve its economy

Wibawa 2019. Tasha Wibawa (journalist), Could China's rise to power really be 'peaceful' and different to anything we've ever seen before?, ABC, June 14, 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/ [2019-06-15/chinas-peaceful-rise-south-china-sea-belt-and-road-huawei/11201526](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-15/chinas-peaceful-rise-south-china-sea-belt-and-road-huawei/11201526)

Jane Golley, China expert at the Australian National University, told the ABC it is "natural and expected" for an emerging superpower like China to create plans to protect its own interests. Dr Golley said the militarisation of the South China Sea "does not inherently contradict a peaceful development", explaining that it is a security measure to ensure shipping lanes would be open in the event of war. "The costs of war would take away from China's economic gains," she said. "What China is pursuing is economic power, and investment and economics is inherently peaceful." Ms Golley added that "American assertiveness" has led China — under President Xi — to build up its military "in line with its economic power". "Why wouldn't a rising power prepare a contingency in the event of a conflict with a superpower?" However, while China pursues a peaceful foreign policy unless provoked, domestically it is a different story, she said. "Beijing is enacting policies which are certainly worrying," Ms Golley told the ABC. "You see it in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and within its own borders, but I'm yet to see comprehensive evidence of aggression overseas." Dr Monk emphasised it is important to keep a "cool head" about comparing China's rise to its great power predecessors. He said the world's former superpowers — including Europe's colonial powers and Japan — have previously risen through "an unprecedented catastrophe", such as world wars or the mass enslavement of peoples. "The possibility of [similar conflict] occurring in the 21st century as a result of China's rise is non-existent," Dr Monk told the ABC. "[China] has become integrated as a late starter in a mature international system of trade and investment, and if it messes that system up it would suffer egregiously."

No China impact - China only cares about regional hegemony and it explicitly wants to avoid antagonizing the U.S.

Mastro 2019. Oriana Skylar Mastro (assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), The Stealth Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Feb/Jan 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

But to focus on this reluctance, and the reassuring Chinese statements reflecting it, is a mistake. Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential. In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed. As one Chinese official put it to me, “Being a great power means you get to do what you want, and no one can say anything about it.” In other words, China is trying to displace, rather than replace, the United States. The way that China has gone about this project has caused many observers to mistakenly conclude that the country is merely trying to coexist with American power rather than fundamentally overturn the order in Asia and compete with U.S. influence globally. In fact, ambiguity has been part of the strategy: Chinese leaders have recognized that in order to succeed, they must avoid provoking an unfavorable response, and so they have refrained from directly challenging the United States, replicating its order-building model, or matching its globally active military. Although Beijing has pursued an indirect and entrepreneurial strategy of accumulating power, make no mistake: the ultimate goal is to push the United States out of the Indo-Pacific and rival it on the global stage.

# AT: Russia - No War

No Russia war from modernization

Polikanov 2016**.** Dmitry Polikanov (Vice President of The PIR-Center and Chairman of Trialogue International Club), Why a military conflict between Russia and the US is unlikely, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/why-military-conflict-between-russia-and-us-unlikely

The expert community has been crying wolf for a long time now: “War is at the doorstep!” The gloomy predictions indicate that Russia and the United States are at the brink of direct military clashes, as if they were trying to celebrate the 54th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis in some perverse way. However, any conflict, if it happens, will most probably be accidental – the parties are not yet ready for full-scale military confrontation. In the last few years, Russia has been modernizing its armed forces to replace the outdated Soviet-era materiel and structure. Numerous exercises, trillions of rubles spent, new equipment and combat vehicles emerging out of the blue, and a charismatic defense minister who changed the entire image of the Russian Army and brought back its popularity with society – all these steps provided for the fast (and real) growth of national military might. However, it remains rather limited in comparison with the overall total potential of the NATO states. Some would say that the alliance is reluctant to take any serious decisions and is nothing more than a paper tiger. Nonetheless, the brainwashing of the last two years has significantly improved the decision-making capacity of NATO and the chances for achieving consensus over the “Russian threat.” The ability to mobilize quickly strong conventional forces is still low, as NATO generals admit themselves. However, active recent revival of the nuclear sharing arrangements and the consolidation of U.S. troops in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe present enough deterrence against any light-minded action. It is clear that the war will not happen in Europe (and not even in Ukraine with its unpredictable leadership). However, wherever it occurs, NATO forces can eventually be mobilized to help their allies. Moreover, Moscow has largely been pursuing a defensive policy over the past 16 years. Even now, when “the Russians are (seemingly) coming,” an independent observer would probably notice that the lion’s share of the activities of Moscow are reactive rather than proactive. The Kremlin enjoys petty provocations from time to time (like ongoing incidents in the air over the Baltic Sea), but is quite cautious in undertaking any serious action, which would require the use of force and lead to tangible casualties. Even when Turkey shot down the Russian plane along the Syrian border, there was practically no military response and, on the contrary, it all ended up with a new friendship with Ankara. Moscow is now fond of “asymmetric measures” and they do not leave any room for substantial armed clashes. Russian President Vladimir Putin is fond of his status as the victim of Western pressure and the image of the global peace supporter. It is not in his interests to start a war – he would rather wait for the Western “attack” and would not necessarily give it an immediate response, in order to get the proper media effect. The U.S. side is passive as well. Many analysts assume that both of the presidential candidates would support a war – the difference is only in the scale. Republican candidate Donald Trump, despite his extravagant nature, sounds more like an isolationist and would likely mean a “small war.” Democrat Hillary Clinton, given her recent anti-Putin rhetoric, may be more willing to launch a “big war.”