Elections DA

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# Introduction:

Welcome to the Elections Disadvantage Evidence Set. In here, you’ll find all the research you’ll need to construct a winning disadvantage argument in the Novice Division and beyond on the negative for this year’s topic: Arms Sales.

We’ve organized this evidence into a few different categories:

* **1NC:** This section of the file includes the cards that should be read on the negative in the first negative constructive. These cards should be read in addition to other case arguments that you may already be more familiar with.

You’ll notice that there are separate 1NCs for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia. That is to help you, however you can mix and match evidence.

* **Negative Extensions:** This section of the file includes arguments to bolster the claims you’ve made in the 1NC in later speeches in the debate, specifically the 2NC and 1NR.
* **Affirmative Answers:** This section includes the cards the affirmative team will need in order to answer the elections DA. \*NOTE: As with the negative while these are split into Taiwan and Saudi Arabia options, you should also look to see if answers are cross applicable. \*

**How to use this file:**

The file is organized by side and the components of a disadvantage. You will need to pick and choose which arguments you will make in a given round after the 1NC. You will not have time to make all of these arguments in any round.

1. Read the summaries of each argument available in the packet
2. Check out the glossary to make sure you understand all of the words and terms.
3. Read and highlight the evidence, making sure you understand the argument being made and pulling out the key parts of each piece of evidence.
4. Pick the arguments you will use in the negative block and as the affirmative.

# Debating the Elections da

The goal of the negative is simple: Prove that the plan presented by the affirmative team is a bad idea. The more you focus on the plan and why it is a bad idea, the more often you’ll win debates. The Elections DA is one way you can prove the affirmative is a bad idea. It argues that even if the plan has some good effects it starts a chain reaction that changes how the elections will happen and that causes bad impacts.

 **Speaking Roles on the Negative:**

* **1st Negative Speaker:** Your job is to introduce a range of negative arguments in the 1NC, and to definitively win at least one of those arguments in the 1NR.
* **2nd Negative Speaker:** Your job is to expand upon one or two arguments made in the 1NC, then to choose the best argument made by the negative team and show why the negative should win the debate in the 2NR. You are in charge of choosing negative strategy, since you’ll have to explain it in the 2NR. \*NOTE: In the block decide who will take the DA and only address those arguments in the 2NC or the 1NR. The other speaker can take the case arguments. This is the best way to divide labor in the block.\*

## Overview: How do incorporate the Global Influence DA

The DA should take 1:30-2:00 minutes to read. You’ll need to pull out some of the cards you were reading on case in order to accommodate it. Be sure you can get through all of those arguments before the round. However, you will still need case arguments in order to win the DA. As a reminder, those case arguments include the following and can be found in the appropriate case negative:

* **Solvency:** How will the plan work? Will it result in the consequences that the affirmative team predicts or will it have different consequences?
* **Case Impacts:** These arguments say that the impacts the affirmative claims are not correct.
* **Case Turns:** These are potentially other bad effects of the affirmative.
* **Impact Framing:** These arguments answer the moral obligation claims the affirmative makes.

Go through the arguments and determine which cards you’d like to read in the 1NC and which you’d like to save for the Negative Block (2NC/1NR). You will not have time to make every argument in this file so you need to pick the ones you think are most strategic.

# Topic Introduction: Elections DA

The affirmative proposes limiting the Executive Branch’s ability to sell arms to either Saudi Arabia or Taiwan. The negative argues that action will hurt the Democrats ability to win in 2020 and allow President Trump to get a second term. That is bad because a Trump administration will not act fast enough on climate change.

**Strategic Overview**

To win the DA you will need to win that the risk of warming because of a change in the election results is important than the impacts the affirmative claims. You will also need to win that the affirmative uniquely causes this change, and that it would not occur otherwise.

**Debating the DA as the negative and affirmative:**

When putting together your 1NC block, you’ll want to read the argument straight down. This will start a new flow sheet for the DA so you don’t need to worry about lining these arguments up with anything.

The 2AC will then number their responses straight down to set the order for the flow in the debate. For example:

1. Non-unique <insert card>
2. No link <insert card/analytic>
3. No link <insert card/analytic>
4. No internal link <insert card/analytic>
5. No impact <insert card/analytic>
6. Our impact outweighs <insert card/analytic>

\*Note: While some of these arguments can be analysis you will want a healthy mix of cards in the debate, particularly for claims that will need more expertise or proof.

The block then answers the 2AC. Either the 2NC or the 1NR will be responsible for winning the DA. They will answer those arguments using line by line and the “they say/we say” method:

“They say non-unique however, that’s not true because we say: <insert card/analytic>”

They say 🡪 <Insert argument>
That’s not true because 🡪 <Restate your argument or read a new card to answer their argument>
Prefer our argument because 🡪 <Explain why your argument is better>

Consider the following questions:

* Is US power and influence sustainable or not?
* Do US arms sales impact the overall power and influence of the US in different regions?
* Would a change in those sales lead other countries to lash out more?
* How should the judge evaluate the impacts of the aff and neg against each other?

# Key terms Glossary

**Foreign policy**: a government's strategy in dealing with other nations

**Incumbent**: (of an official or regime) currently holding office

**Paris Agreement**: an agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, dealing with greenhouse-gas-emissions mitigation, adaptation, and finance, signed in 2016

**Predictive** **modeling**: a process that uses data mining and probability to forecast outcomes. Each model is made up of a number of predictors, which are variables that are likely to influence future results. Once data has been collected for relevant predictors, a statistical model is formulated.

**Swing state**: any state that could reasonably be won by either the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate

**Swing voters**: voters who may not be affiliated with a particular political party (Independent) or who will vote across party lines

**Tipping point**: the point at which a series of small changes or incidents becomes significant enough to cause a larger, more important change

**Turn out** (in context): the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election

**Variable**: an element, feature, or factor that is liable to vary or change

# 1NC Elections Disadvantage Shell vs. Taiwan

#### UNIQUENESS: Democrats are on track to win in 2020, but it’s not a guarantee.

**Yglesias, June 2019**

[ Matthew Yglesias, 6-12-2019, "Trump’s big problem is that he’s unpopular," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/12/18662196/trump-popularity-poll-democrats-2020> MYY]

**If you look at Donald Trump’s polling lately, it sure looks like he’s in trouble for reelection**. **A June 11 Quinnipiac poll showed Trump losing** 40-53 **to Joe Biden.** He’s also down 51-42 to Bernie **Sanders**, 41-49 to Kamala **Harris,** 42-49 to Elizabeth **Warren,** 42-47 to Pete **Buttigieg, and** 42-47 to Cory **Booker.** All plausible contenders at this moment can take heart in the fact that **just 40 to 42 percent of the population feels like voting for Trump’s reelection.** **The public is mostly saying they want to vote for any Democrat**, and the strongest pattern so far indicates better-known Democrats do better than the more obscure ones. **None of this means that Trump is a sure bet to lose** the election in 2020 — public opinion can change fast and there’s nothing particularly predictive about polling this far out — but it’s a pretty clear snapshot of public opinion right now. **Trump, for now, is** unpopular. FiveThirtyEight’s’s polling average shows Trump currently has a 42 percent approval rating. He’s unpopular and losing despite the huge field arrayed against him; he’s **unpopular and losing** despite Democrats’ confused message on impeachment; and he’s unpopular and losing despite some very real continued ability to successfully manipulate the media.

#### LINK: Plan makes Democrats look weak on China. That’s a losing strategy for 2020.

**Wright, May 2019**

[Thomas Wright, 5-14-2019, “Democrats Need to Place China at the Center of Their Foreign Policy” Atlantic Online, Lexis-Nexis, MYY]

**The challenge for the Democratic candidates is to connect all the issues, domestic and foreign, into a larger narrative that relates to Americans' daily lives**, illuminates the future, and offers a path forward. **The most likely way to do this is to say that the United States is losing a vitally important competition with China** because the president is obsessed with the past and ignorant about the future. China is the one thing that connects all other things. It directly affects the economy, the financial system, technological innovation, values, and national security. As the Center for American Progress study showed**, it is the only foreign-policy issue,** other than terrorism, **that voters really care about**-not because they seek conflict, but **because they worry about falling behind**. The United States is in a multifaceted competition with China. This is unlikely to involve military conflict, although there is a military dimension to it. The competition is technological, economic, political, diplomatic, and ideological. It is particularly complicated by the fact that the United States and China are interdependent and need to cooperate with each other even as they compete. The president styles himself as tough on China, but as Ely Ratner, director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, put it, Trump is "confrontational but not competitive." Many of his actions are counterproductive and irresponsible. And in some areas of the competition, such as the clash between the free world and autocracy, Trump is on the wrong side. **Putting competition with China at the center of their foreign policy would allow Democrats to make the case for modernization and investment in crucial sectors,** most notably in technology, which is becoming the competition's center of gravity. The conventional wisdom is that the United States is destined to out-innovate China, because open systems beat closed systems. But what was true in the past with nuclear power, the microchip, and the internet may not apply to artificial intelligence, where access to data could give authoritarians an edge. On 5G, the next generation of wireless-networking technology, China has shown itself to be particularly adept, successfully leveraging Huawei's position to remove competitors from the field through subsidies and to undercut them on price. Unlike John F. Kennedy's missile gap, the technology gap is real in key sectors. Presidents Obama and Trump were slow to recognize the problem. And now, the Trump administration is proposing to slash the budget for the very programs and agencies that make America competitive, such as the National Science Foundation and the Department of Education. Technology is not just an industrial question. It also affects values. The way that China and other authoritarian governments are using facial recognition, surveillance, and social-credit scores to consolidate their control, and social media and artificial intelligence to interfere in democracies, raises profound questions for Americans. Voters don't necessarily want to promote democracy, but they do want to defend it. Trump likes to complain that America's allies take advantage of the United States, yet he has repeatedly rejected the European Union's offer to work together to make China play fair in the global economy, dismissing the EU as worse than China. He has demonized Germany and its chancellor, Angela Merkel. Relations with the United Kingdom are at their lowest point since the Suez crisis of 1956. Meanwhile, Trump cozies up to truly problematic allies, such as Viktor OrbÃ¡n, Hungary's wannabe strongman who champions "illiberal democracy" and flirts openly with the China option as well as with Russia. Trump hosted OrbÃ¡n on Monday. The minimalist playbook, which the Democratic field has so far followed, is to ignore that visit or to tweet disapproval. A bolder approach would have been to flip the script on Trump by pointing out that OrbÃ¡n is taking advantage of his alliance with America, and to question whether Hungary can remain a U.S. ally if its troublesome trajectory continues unabated. **The Trump campaign believes that China can be a winning issue in the 2020 campaign. It is already** leaping on Joe Biden's off-the-cuff remark that China "isn't in competition with us." But a few months ago, at the Munich Security Conference, Biden also said that China "seeks to establish itself as a hegemon and a global power player" and that the United States finds itself in "an ideological struggle ... a competition of systems [and] a competition of values" with Beijing and other authoritarian powers. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have both highlighted the risk posed by kleptocratic and autocratic regimes in their foreign-policy speeches, with Warren singling out China in particular.

#### IMPACT: Reelecting Trump causes extinction because of warming.

**Starr , May 2019**

[Paul Starr, professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton and a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction, May 2019, "Trump’s Second Term," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/05/trump-2020-second-term/585994/> MYY]

In short**, the biggest difference between electing Trump in 2016 and reelecting Trump in 2020 would be irreversibility.** **Climate policy is** now **the most obvious example**. For a long time, even many of the people who acknowledged the reality of climate change thought of it as a slow process that did not demand immediate action. But today, **amid extreme weather events and worsening scientific forecasts, the costs of our delay are clearly mounting**, **as are the associated dangers**. **To have a chance at keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius—the objective of the Paris climate agreement**—**the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says that by 2030, CO2 emissions must drop some 45 percent from 2010 levels**. **Instead of declining**, **however, they are rising**. **In his first term, Trump** has **announced plans to cancel existing climate reforms**, such as higher fuel-efficiency standards and limits on emissions from new coal-fired power plants, and he has pledged to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement. **His reelection would put off** a national commitment to **decarbonization until at least the second half of the 2020s**, **while encouraging other countries to do nothing** as well. And change that is delayed becomes more economically and politically difficult. According to the Global Carbon Project, if decarbonization had begun globally in 2000, an **emissions reduction** of about 2 percent a year would have been sufficient to stay below 2 degrees Celsius of warming. **Now** it will **need to be** approximately **5 percent a year.** **If we wait** **a**nother **decade, it will be about 9 percent**. In the United States, the economic disruption and popular resistance sure to arise from such an abrupt transition may be more than our political system can bear. No one knows, moreover, when the world might hit irreversible tipping points such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which would likely doom us to a catastrophic sea-level rise.

# 1NC Elections Disadvantage Shell (vs. Saudi Arabia)

#### UNIQUENESS: Democrats are on track to win in 2020, but it’s not a guarantee.

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[ Matthew Yglesias, 6-12-2019, "Trump’s big problem is that he’s unpopular," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/12/18662196/trump-popularity-poll-democrats-2020> MYY]

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#### LINK: Trump’s pro-Saudi approach helps Democrats win in 2020. The plan reverses his policy.

Demjiran, March 2019

[Karoun Demirjian, Congressional reporter focusing on national security, 3-23-2019, "In Saudi rebuke, Democrats see a path to unseat Trump in 2020," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-saudi-rebuke-democrats-see-a-path-to-unseat-trump-in-2020/2019/03/23/3e059dfe-4bdf-11e9-9663-00ac73f49662_story.html?utm_term=.7aeb7ad259af> MYY]

It took a few years for these efforts to challenge U.S. activity in Yemen — a mission begun under the Obama administration — to move from a fringe issue in Democratic politics to one that party lawmakers fully support. Most Democrats made the shift in response to Trump’s early and unapologetic embrace of Saudi Arabia even as Yemen’s humanitarian crisis worsened. Khashoggi’s killing last fall, and Trump’s subsequent defense of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman despite intelligence assessments indicating he had ordered the slaying, fully solidified Democratic opposition to the Yemen venture. The subject has been thornier for Republicans, who have condemned Saudi leaders over Khashoggi’s killing but wavered on whether to pull support for the military campaign as the president is expected to veto any congressional attempt to do so. Even those critical of the fight in Yemen have balked at endorsing a war-powers resolution because there are no U.S. ground troops there backing Saudi-led efforts against the Houthis — and because bipartisan efforts to limit arms sales to Saudi Arabia don’t have buy-in from party leaders. As Republicans wrestle with the issue, Democrats have taken it to the campaign trail. Within days of Khashoggi’s disappearance in Turkey last October, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), who wrote the Senate’s war-powers resolution, listed Yemen — along with Afghanistan and Iraq — as the United States’ most troubling military boondoggles. In a speech at Johns Hopkins’s School of Advanced International Studies, he declared that “Saudi Arabia is a country clearly inspired by Trump” and that it pursued the “catastrophic” war in Yemen, along with Khashoggi’s killing and other controversial ventures because its crown prince “feels emboldened by the Trump administration’s unquestioning support.” The next month, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) delivered a foreign policy speech at American University in which she said that Trump “refused to halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia in part because he is more interested in appeasing U.S. defense contractors than holding the Saudis accountable.” “American security and American values should come ahead of the profit margins of these private companies,” she continued. “Foreign policy should not be run exclusively by the Pentagon.” Though other congressional Democrats running for president have yet to make similar speeches outlining their foreign policy vision, they have — in tweets and in votes — expressed exasperation with and called for reexamining the alliance with Saudi Arabia. Experienced Democratic strategists are urging party candidates to make Trump’s dealings with Riyadh a litmus test on the president’s character. “It puts on display what so many Americans across the country really detest about the Trump administration: It’s rejection of American values, it’s putting the interest of an autocratic kingdom ahead of our own,” said Ned Price, a spokesman for National Security Action, a group of former Obama administration and Hillary Clinton campaign officials who have offered foreign policy advice to 2020 candidates.

Politically, Trump’s closeness to Saudi leaders is comparable to his praising Russian President Vladimir Putin, Price said, in that it’s “a question of what, precisely, is the motivation of people — including the president and his son-in-law” Jared Kushner, a senior adviser to the president, whose closeness with the Saudi crown prince has aroused suspicion among the administration’s critics, given reports that businesses tied to Kushner and his relatives have sought investment from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations.

Democrats believe they can use the party’s stance on Yemen and Saudi Arabia to pitch a new foreign policy vision for the country — one that prioritizes diplomacy and economic engagement over a heavy reliance on the military and related industries.

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Starr, May 2019

[Paul Starr, professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton and a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction, May 2019, "Trump’s Second Term," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/05/trump-2020-second-term/585994/> MYY]

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# 2nc/1nr – Link – Taiwan

The regular arms sales process means Congress gets blamed, not Trump, through normal means

**State New Service 2015**

[DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BRIEFING FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS - CAPTAIN JEFF DAVIS, USN, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PRESS OPERATIONS NOVEMBER 4, 2015, State New Service, Lexis-Nexis, MYY]

CAPT DAVIS: Right. So, South China Sea first. The question is frequency, and I simple answer is were not going to comment on future operations. We cant, other than to tell you broadly what the Secretary said before, which is we will continue to sail, fly, and operate wherever international law allows, and well continue to assert those rights under international law in the interest of the international community. This isnt about the United States. Its really about the global community. But were not going to telegraph frequencies or when, where, how, et cetera. That actually is counterproductive to the reason why we even do it. To your second question, Taiwan, I dont have anything to announce with regards to arms sales. As you know, **we have a Taiwan Relations Act that we abide by very closely to provide Taiwan with the materials that it needs to defend itself**, but we continue to believe in a one China policy and want there to be a peaceful resolution to the issue thats decided on by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. **Typically for** so all of you know, **the way that we do arms sales** announcements, if you want to if this is something you follow closely or want to follow closely, Id encourage you to subscribe to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA. The way these work Ill just give you a primer on how I know you already know this, Nadia, but for anyone else who follows arms sales. **Defense Security Cooperation Agency** is **the Defense agency that manages arms sales**, and the way that that goes public is they **post on their website every time they make a notification to Congress. So arms sales notifications are made to Congress. Its a 30-day period. Congress can object, and if they dont object, it goes through.** So if youre interested in following blow-by-blow details on arms sales, go to DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Sign up for their releases. If you ever want to check, hey, when did what have we sold to Turkey? Every single arms sale we do, every single arms sale announcement we do is on there. Its a little tip for you. Its the place where I look if you if you call and query me, youll think Im Im actually just going to their website, because its all there, so (laughter) but thank you, Nadia.

GOP are extremely loyal to Trump and Dems vote against him. This means that it’s the Dems who kill Taiwan arms sales.

**Frostenson, January 2019**

[Sarah Frostenson, 1-4-2019, "Republicans In Congress Have Been Very Loyal To Trump. Will It Last?," FiveThirtyEight, <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/republicans-in-congress-have-been-very-loyal-to-trump-will-it-last/> MYY]

Time will tell. But with the 115th Congress now in the books, let’s take a step back and look to it for clues. **Last session,** House **Republicans**, then in the majority, **were largely aligned with Trump — very few broke ranks.**

**Over the first two years of Trump’s presidency, the average GOP member overwhelmingly sided with Trump — 93 percent of the time** **in the House and 91 percent of the time in the Senate,** according to FiveThirtyEight’s Trump score metric, which tracks how often each member of Congress votes with the president. Trump’s position isn’t clear on every vote, so this analysis covers only 96 votes in the House and 84 in the Senate. This is only a small subset of the more than 1,800 votes cast in Congress during the 115th session.1 **Democrats largely voted against the president’s positions**, but they weren’t quite as unified against Trump as Republicans were for him: In the House, the average Democratic member agreed with Trump 23 percent of the time; in the Senate, 31 percent of the time.

American’s want greater engagement with allies – abandoning Taiwan does the opposite.

**Rubin, May 2019**

[Jennifer Rubin, 5-7-19, “Six ways Democrats can zap Trump on foreign policy” Washington Post, Lexis-Nexis, MYY]

Fourth, **Trump makes us weaker by picking fights with close allies**. This hinders the country's ability to defend against emerging threats. **CAP's study found 64 percent of voters agree** with the following: "**The United States faces new threats**, such as cyberattacks, chemical weapons, and drones, **that require coordinated military and intelligence efforts with governments across the world**." Large majorities across partisan and generation divisions agree with that statement. Hence, **the next president should repair relations with allies,** expand trade (especially with democratic allies in North American and Asia) **and increase cooperation** on everything from climate change to fighting white nationalist terrorism.

# 2NC / 1NR – Link Wall – Saudi Arabia

#### Plan’s a win for Trump – ending arms sales is popular.

Daragahi 2018

[Borzou Daragahi, international Correspondent for The Independent. He has been covering the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Europe since 2002, 11-26-2018, "Majority of Americans want congress to cut arms sales to Saudi over Yemen war," Independent, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-arms-sales-embargo-us-yemen-civil-war-famine-trump-congress-a8651931.html> MYY]

A majority of Americans oppose the US government’s support for the ongoing Saudi-led war in Yemen, a survey has shown. Some 58 per cent of respondents wanted lawmakers to curtail or halt the supply of arms for a conflict considered the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian disaster. Only 13 per cent of Americans said they want lawmakers to maintain or increase arms sales to the US allies in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Saudi Arabia is very unpopular.

Amos 2018

[Deborah Amos, covers the Middle East for NPR News. 3-19-2018, "Saudi Arabia: The White House Loves It. Most Americans? Not So Much," NPR.org, <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/19/595018861/trump-may-love-saudi-arabia-but-many-americans-do-not> MYY]

With Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman embarking on a nearly three-week road show across the United States, he will have one major hurdle: Americans don't like his country very much. Despite a 75-year economic and military alliance with Saudi Arabia and regular royal visits, 55 percent of Americans have an unfavorable view of the kingdom, according to a Gallup poll in February. Even longtime U.S. adversaries like China and Cuba have scored more favorably.

American public sentiment is against Saudi Arabia

Keating 2018

[Joshua Keating, staff writer at Slate focused on international affairs, 10-15-2018, "The Saudis May Not Have Realized How Unpopular They Are Outside the White House," Slate Magazine, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/the-saudis-may-not-have-realized-how-unpopular-they-are-outside-the-white-house.html> MYY]

Saudi Arabia is not popular with the U.S. public, either. Only 31 percent of Americans had a favorable view of the kingdom, just behind China and just ahead of Russia, according to a Gallup poll from last year. So members of Congress generally feel safe expressing grave concerns about the kingdom. (Trump himself used to refer to the Saudis as “the world’s biggest funders of terrorism” back when he was running for president.) Presidents, meanwhile, have generally found the U.S.-Saudi partnership too valuable to cut loose, no doubt on the advice of the Pentagon.

# 2NC/1NR Approval Ratings Don’t Matter

**Trump is super unpopular. That means he’s likely to lose.**

**Longman, June 2019**

[Martin Longman, 6-20-2019, "The 2020 election is the Democrats' to lose," Washington Monthly, <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2019/06/20/the-2020-election-is-the-democrats-to-lose/> MYY]

Aaron Blake raises a point that really deserves some careful consideration:

**Most polls have shown a majority of Americans** — **as many as 57 percent** in one poll, but usually a slimmer majority — **say they will definitely not vote to reelect Trump.** It’s one thing to lack appeal to such a large segment of the population; it’s another for them to rule out supporting you entirely. If this segment of the electorate doesn’t budge, it would make Trump’s reelection very difficult; he’d have to hope these people simply don’t turn out to vote, that he could win with a plurality thanks to third-party candidates and/or that he could carry the electoral college without winning the popular vote (again).

When half or more of the country says it’s already certain it won’t vote to reelect you, you are headed for defeat. This is not a case of people lying about being undecided when they actually intend to vote for you but are too ashamed to admit it to a stranger on the phone, either. That phenomenon was widespread enough in 2016 to explain how Trump could win a state like Pennsylvania despite almost never leading there in a reputable opinion poll. People generally don’t go so far as to say that they’ve ruled out voting for you if there’s still a chance in their mind that they actually will.

# 2NC /1NR – Answers – Polls Fail

#### Polling methods have adjusted since 2016 and midterms prove efficacy.

Williams 2018

[Leighton Vaughan Williams, The Conversation Nov. 26, 2018, 2, 11-26-2018, "Why a Democrat is poised to win the 2020 presidential election," Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/why-a-democrat-will-win-the-2020-presidential-election-2018-11> MYY]

So what happened in the 2018 US midterm elections? This time, the FiveThirtyEight "Lite" forecast, based solely on local and national polls weighted by past performance, predicted that the Democrats would pick up a net 38 seats in the House of Representatives. The "Classic" forecast, which also includes fundraising, past voting, and historical trends, predicted that they would pick up a net 39 seats. They needed 23 to take control. With almost all results now declared, it seems that those forecasts are pretty near spot on the projected tally of a net gain of 40 seats by the Democrats. In the Senate, meanwhile, the Republicans were forecast to hold the Senate by 52 seats to 48. The final count is likely to be 53-47. There is also an argument that the small error in the Senate forecast can be accounted for by poor ballot design in Florida, which disadvantaged the Democrat in a very close race. Some analysts currently advocate looking at the turnout of "early voters," broken down by party affiliation, who cast their ballot before polling day. They argue this can be used as an alternative or supplementary forecasting methodology. This year, a prominent advocate of this methodology went with the Republican Senate candidate in Arizona, while FiveThirtyEight chose the Democrat. The Democrat won. Despite this, the jury is still out over whether "early vote" analysis can add any value. There has also been research into the forecasting efficiency of betting/prediction markets compared to polls. This tends to show that the markets have the edge over polls in key respects, although they can themselves be influenced by and overreact to new poll results. There are a number of theories to explain what went wrong with much of the forecasting prior to the Trump and Brexit votes. But looking at the bigger picture, which stretches back to the US presidential election of 1868 (in which Republican Ulysses S Grant defeated Democrat Horatio Seymour), forecasts based on markets (with one notable exception, in 1948) have proved remarkably accurate, as have other forecasting methodologies. To this extent, the accurate forecasting of the 2018 midterms is a return to the norm. And the next president is… But what do the results mean for politics in the US more generally? The bottom line is that there was a considerable swing to the Democrats across most of the country, especially among women and in the suburbs, such that the Republican advantage of almost 1% in the House popular vote in 2016 was turned into a Democrat advantage of about 8% this time. If reproduced in a presidential election, it would be enough to provide a handsome victory for the candidate of the Democratic Party. The size of this swing, and the demographics underpinning it, were identified with a good deal of accuracy by the main forecasting methodologies. This success has clearly restored some confidence in them, and they will now be used to look forward to 2020. Useful current forecasts for the 2020 election include PredictIt, OddsChecker, Betfair, and PredictWise.

# 2NC /1NR – Answers – Trump’s Foreign Policy Popular

#### Voters feel like Trump’s foreign policy is a reason to elect someone else, especially undecided and swing voters.

Lawler, May 2019

[Dave Lawler, editor at Axios previously with the Telegraph, 5-20-2019, "Trade war and Russia top voters' concerns about Trump's foreign policy, poll finds," Axios, https://www.axios.com/poll-trump-foreign-policy-approval-rating-2020-8cea6883-ce3f-477b-8006-91fb66cec8c8.html]

Voters tend to approve of many aspects of Trump’s foreign policy, such as pushing NATO countries to spend more on defense and attempting negotiations with North Korea. However, 46% believe Trump has made America less safe, compared to 38% who say he’s made the country safer. Meanwhile, 57% believe he has made America less respected around the world, while 67% worry he “lacks the temperament we need in a commander in chief.” What to watch: 41% of respondents say Trump’s foreign policy is a reason to re-elect him, 45% say it’s a reason to elect someone else, and 14% say it’s not a consideration. Given a range of foreign policy considerations and asked to select the most important, swing voters prioritize “protecting Americans from terrorism,” “keeping America out of war” and “standing up for American values like human rights and democracy.” Voters trust Democrats more than Republicans to keep the U.S. out of war, work effectively with other countries and defend American values, but trust Republicans more to protect the country from terrorism. The pollsters also tested 20 potential lines of attack against Trump and found that undecided voters were most concerned that Trump was weakening alliances, defending dictators and waging a trade war that will cost jobs and raise prices.

# 2NC /1NR – Answers – No link Threshold

#### Foreign Policy is uniquely key to the 2020 election. It’s a weakness for Trump.

Smeltz, June 2019

[Dina Smeltz, Former Division Chief and Analyst At The U.S. State Department’S Office Of Opinion Research, Is A Senior Fellow Of Public Opinion And Foreign Policy At The Chicago Council On Global Affairs., 6-26-2019, "Who Says Foreign Policy Doesn’t Win Elections?," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2019-06-26/who-says-foreign-policy-doesnt-win-elections> MYY]

One reason foreign policy hasn’t featured centrally in presidential politics is that voter preferences in this area have historically been slow to change. Gallup has asked Americans about the U.S. role in solving international problems 13 times since 2001, and the number of respondents who said that the United States should play a leading or major role hovered consistently around seven in ten. Chicago Council Surveys dating back to 1974 also show that remarkably stable majorities support an active U.S. international role. With so much consensus about the need for active U.S. engagement in world affairs, presidential aspirants have often struggled to distinguish themselves on foreign policy. Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry voted for the Iraq war before he criticized Bush’s handling of it in 2004, and in 1968, little daylight separated presidential candidates Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey on the Vietnam War. A majority of Americans still support U.S. engagement and shared leadership in international affairs, as well as U.S. participation in alliances and agreements. In fact, the U.S. electorate has grown even more committed to these principles over the last two years, while the president has moved in the opposite direction. Reams of polling data reveal the deep unpopularity of his overseas agenda—from Iran to climate change to trade—and fully 57 percent of respondents to the recent Center for American Progress survey said they disapproved of his foreign policy performance. It makes sense, then, that Democratic presidential hopefuls will exploit these vulnerabilities on the campaign trail. This time, foreign policy might just tip the election.

Even if Foreign Policy is not the most important issue, the election will be decided by small shifts.

Rakich, March 2019

[Nathaniel Rakich, 3-12-2019, "What Early 2020 Ratings Can And Can’t Tell Us," FiveThirtyEight, <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-early-2020-ratings-can-and-cant-tell-us/> MYY]

If the election is close, which party benefits from the Electoral College could be even more important than the national popular vote — as we saw in 2016. And the Electoral College advantage tends to be determined by small shifts — a couple of percentage points or less — at the state level. Over the last five presidential elections, 12 states have vacillated between being redder than the national average and bluer than the national average.

# 2NC /1NR – Answers – No Internal Link

#### Even if Dems don’t win the Senate, a new Democrat President can put us back in the Paris climate accord.

Mooney 2018

[Chris Mooney, covers climate change, energy, and the environment. He has reported from the 2015 Paris climate negotiations, the Northwest Passage, and the Greenland ice sheet, among other locations, and has written four books about science, politics and climate change, 12-12-2018, "Trump can’t actually exit the Paris deal until the day after the 2020 election. That’s a big deal.," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/12/heres-what-election-means-us-withdrawal-paris-climate-deal/?utm_term=.4375b1bba3fd> MYY]

This is where things get very interesting. If we assume that Trump will be the Republican nominee again, and that any Democrat running against him would want to rejoin the Paris agreement, then the election could potentially put the United States right back in again if the Democrat wins. Granted, on this timeline, the United States would at least briefly leave the agreement even in the event of a Democratic victory. That’s because the new president is not inaugurated until January 2021. But after that, reversal could be swift, at least under the Obama administration’s interpretation that the agreement is not one that needs to be submitted to the Senate for ratification. It would then take 30 days after submission of notice for the United States to rejoin the agreement formally, Biniaz explained. This, again, is based on the text of the Paris climate agreement. Of course, if Trump wins, and has withdrawn from the agreement formally, then his victory could be expected to cement the U.S. withdrawal.

# 2NC/1NR Answers – Non-unique

**Democrats are likely to win due to demographic changes, but turn out is key.**

**Brownstein, June 2019** [Ronald Brownstein, senior editor at The Atlantic., 6-13-2019, "Brace for a Voter-Turnout Tsunami," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/2020-election-voter-turnout-could-be-record-breaking/591607/> MYY]

**The nature of the population eligible to vote is evolving in a way that should** indeed **help Democrats**. McDonald estimates **that the number of eligible voters increases by about 5 million each year, or about 20 million from one presidential election to the next**. **That increase predominantly flows from two sources: young people** who turn 18 **and immigrants who become citizens. Since people of color are now approaching a majority of the under-18 population—and also constitute most immigrants**—McDonald and other experts believe it’s likely that minorities represent a majority of the people who have become eligible to vote since 2016.

The generational contrast in the eligible voting pool is also stark. States of Change, a nonpartisan project studying shifts in the electorate, projects that **Millennials** (born, according to the organization’s definition, from 1981 to 2000) **will constitute 34.2 percent of eligible voters next year. Post-Millennials** (born after 2000) w**ill make up another 3.4 percent. That means those two groups combined will virtually equal the share of eligible voters composed of Baby Boomer**s (28.4 percent) **and the Silent and Greatest Generations** (another 9.4 percent).

**These shifts have enormous implications because of the generational gulf in attitudes toward Trump and the parties more broadly.** **His approval rating has consistently lagged among the more racially diverse, socially tolerant younger generations**. Though Trump and the GOP have shown some signs of weakness recently among seniors, he has generally polled much better among voters older than 50, in part because a much larger share of Americans in that cohort are white.

“The group of voters that is going to increase at the fastest rate [in 2020] is Millennials,” says Josh Schwerin, the communications director of Priorities USA, a leading Democratic super PAC that is already organizing in swing states for next year. “Donald Trump is at a horrible standing with them and doing nothing to help himself.”

But **the change in the eligible-voter pool is only one factor in determining who actually votes in each election**. It represents, in effect, the denominator in the equation; the numerator is how big a share of eligible voters in each group shows up. **The effect of the growing number of eligible Millennials and minorities** (particularly Latinos) **has been blunted because their turnout has lagged behind** that of older voters and white people—a dynamic that has especially affected Democrats in the diversifying Sun Belt states, where they have struggled to overturn years of Republican dominance.

In 2016, the Census calculated that almost two-thirds of eligible white voters cast a ballot. By contrast, African American turnout fell to 59 percent—a sharp decline from both of Barack Obama’s elections—and Latino turnout remained at typically modest levels, just below 48 percent. Young people stayed home, too: Only about 46 percent of eligible voters under 30 turned out, far below the participation among those 45 and older.

**In 2018, though, those patterns altered. Turnout typically falls for all voter groups in midterm elections** compared with the previous presidential race, but that falloff was much smaller than usual last year. Moreover**, while turnout surged across virtually all groups, it increased most sharply among the voters who historically have participated at the lowest levels**. For instance, the Census Bureau reported that **turnout among voters under 30 last year jumped to about 36 percent of eligible voters, compared with just 20 percent in 2014**. That still left young people far behind the turnout rate among seniors, about two-thirds of whom voted, but their rate of increase from the previous election was much greater. Similarly, the Census Bureau found that the turnout rate in 2018 increased more for Latinos and Asian Americans than it did for white people.

**Trump is likely to lose tons of voters.**

**MNA, June 2019**

[MNA, 6-16-2019, “probability of Trump's defeat in upcoming presidential election” Mehr News Agency, Lexis-Nexis, MYY]

Recent **polls in the United States show that** Donald **Trump's defeat in presidential elections next year is likely. These polls are published while Trump in the field of foreign policy is extremely confused and incapacitated**. He has practically lost the game against Iran, China, and Venezuela. Looking at the results of recent polls and analyzing Western media from the latest Trump status, it can help us understand the current political situation in the United States: **Trump's big problem is that he's unpopular** Matthew Yglesias wrote in Vox that **If you look at** Donald **Trump's polling** lately, **it sure looks like he's in trouble for reelection.** A June 11 **Quinnipiac poll showed Trump losing** 40-53 to Joe Biden. He's also down 51-42 to Bernie Sanders, 41-49 to Kamala Harris, 42-49 to Elizabeth Warren, 42-47 to Pete Buttigieg, and 42-47 to Cory Booker. **All plausible contenders** at this moment **can take heart in the fact that just 40 to 42 percent of the population feels like voting for Trump's reelection**. **The public is mostly saying they want to vote for any Democrat,** and the strongest pattern so far indicates better-known Democrats do better than the more obscure ones. None of this means that Trump is a sure bet to lose the election in 2020 — public opinion can change fast and there's nothing particularly predictive about polling this far out — but it's a pretty clear snapshot of public opinion right now. Trump, for now, is unpopular. FiveThirtyEight's's polling average shows Trump currently has a 42 percent approval rating. He's unpopular and losing despite the huge field arrayed against him; he's unpopular and losing despite Democrats' confused message on impeachment, and he's unpopular and losing despite some very real continued ability to successfully manipulate the media. The head-to-head polling doesn't really tell us much about events 18 months in the future, but it does tell us there's no counterintuitive process whereby Trump secures the votes of tons of people who say he's doing a bad job as president. He is getting the votes of basically the exact same share of the population as thinks he's doing a good job. And as of now, that doesn't look like it's nearly enough people to win. Democrats are very anti-complacency after being taken by surprise in 2016. Ben LaBolt, a former Barack Obama spokesperson who now works at a communications consulting firm, set a lot of heads on fire over the weekend with an Atlantic article charging that Democrats were blowing 2020 already. **Trump is spending a ton of money on reelection ads**, LaBolt argued, and Democrats aren't running their anti-Trump ads yet. Obviously, consultants would love it if rich Democrats would turn their anti-Trump fervor into early ad spending, **but whatever Trump is doing right now clearly isn't working**. Saving resources for the future when he may hit upon something that does work and needs to be countered seems perfectly sensibl

**Trump would lose if the election was held today.**

**Enten, June 2019**

[Harry Enten, 6-8-2019, "Trump would likely lose an election held today," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/08/politics/trump-2020-reelection-against-joe-biden-analysis/index.html> MYY]

But **Trump** likely **needs something to change if he wants to win** reelection. Biden, currently the Democratic frontrunner, has a clear lead over Trump in the state that had the closest margin in the 2016 presidential election. And this Michigan poll was not the only survey out this week that indicates Trump's reelection bid is currently in trouble. **A Quinnipiac University poll from Texas showed Biden ahead of Trump by 48% to 44%.** **This is a state that hasn't voted Democratic in a presidential election since 1976.** And while the Texas US Senate race was close in 2018, not one reputable presidential election poll at any point in any election cycle has even shown a Democratic presidential candidate ahead since 1992. **These polls come on top of previous data indicating how much trouble Trump would be in if the election were held today**. He trailed Biden by 11 points in a May Quinnipiac poll from Pennsylvania. This was a state that Trump won by a little less than a point after it had voted for the Democratic presidential nominee in every election from 1992 to 2012. Nationally, we see the same thing. Biden has led Trump by 8 points in an average of polls taken since the beginning of the year. It shouldn't be surprising that, ahead of next year's primary contests, Biden has a clear lead over Trump. It mostly lines up with what Trump's approval rating suggests should be the case. **Take a look at Trump's net approval** (approval minus disapproval) ratings in last year's exit polls: **Michigan:** net approval rating of **-12 points**. **Pennsylvania:** net approval rating of **-10 points**. Texas: net approval rating of 0 points. **Nationally:** net approval rating **of -9 points**. With the exception of the Texas poll, Biden's margin is within a point in each respective jurisdiction of Trump's net approval rating in the exit polls last year. And even in Texas, Trump's net approval in the exit poll looks a lot like the net approval rating Quinnipiac recorded recently of -1 point. Perhaps most importantly, **Trump's deficit in each place is far greater than it was heading into the 2016 presidential election**. As you may recall, Trump outperformed the final polls in 2016. Biden's currently doing at least 8 points better in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Texas than Clinton was in the final polls in 2016. Nationwide, Biden's doing about 5 points better against Trump than Clinton was heading into the 2016 election. The bottom line is this: Trump's clearly in the hole right now against Biden. He's in a worse position than he was before the election in 2016. **It's very unlikely that a polling error can explain away the deficit Trump faces right now** versus his most likely opponent.

# 2NC/1NR Answers – no internal link

**Even if Democrats don’t win the Senate, a new Democrat President can put us back in Paris climate accord.**

**Mooney 2018**

[Chris Mooney, covers climate change, energy, and the environment. He has reported from the 2015 Paris climate negotiations, the Northwest Passage, and the Greenland ice sheet, among other locations, and has written four books about science, politics and climate change, 12-12-2018, "Trump can’t actually exit the Paris deal until the day after the 2020 election. That’s a big deal.," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/12/heres-what-election-means-us-withdrawal-paris-climate-deal/?utm_term=.4375b1bba3fd> MYY]

This is where things get very interesting. If we assume that Trump will be the Republican nominee again, and that **any Democrat running against him would want to rejoin the Paris agreement**, then **the election could potentially put the United States right back in again if the Democrat wins.** Granted, on this timeline, the United States would at least briefly leave the agreement even in the event of a Democratic victory. That’s because the new president is not inaugurated until January 2021. But after that, **reversal could be swift, at least under the Obama administration’s interpretation that the agreement is not one that needs to be submitted to the Senate for ratification**. **It would then take 30 days after submission of notice for the United States to rejoin the agreement** formally, Biniaz explained. This, again, is based on the text of the Paris climate agreement. Of course, **if Trump wins**, and has withdrawn from the agreement formally, **then his victory could be expected to cement the U.S. withdrawal**.

**Withdrawal from Paris climate accord wrecks global efforts to address climate change.**

**Yong et al 2017**

[Yong-Xiangzhang, Qing-Chenchao, qiu-Hongzheng, leihuanga, Researchers at the National Climate Center, China Meteorological Administration, &China Meteorological Administration, 8-1-2017, "The withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement and its impact on global climate change governance," Advances In Climate Change Research, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1674927817300849> MYY]

The U.S. is the second-highest amount of GHG emitter. U.S. climate policy heavily influences global climate governance. There is a view (Kemp, 2017) that the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement will trigger new global leadership and will remove obstacles set by the U.S. to the implementation of Paris Agreement. However, in reality, **U.S. withdrawal will impact the flourishing international climate regime as never before.** First, the **withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement indicates that the U.S. is becoming a consumer rather than a support supplier of responses to global climate change** governance. **The transition** of the U.S. from consumer to supplier **will greatly weaken** the supply of global public goods and affect **the willingness of other suppliers** (Bloomberg, 2016), thus **negatively affecting the efficacy of the implementation Paris Agreement**. In the global context, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement is not merely a climate issue but an issue linked with geological political relationships among main economies. Therefore, it has crucial implications in international political economics and will greatly influence the environmental political balance between China and the U.S., the U.S. and the EU, and China and the EU. Second, the large sum cut from the financial support to the Multiple Environmental Fund will curb the progress in meeting the targets of the Paris Agreement. According to the Financial Budget of the U.S. in its 2018 Fiscal Year, the budgets for international climate activities by the Department of State and USAID have been cut by US$ 10.9 billion or by 28.7% together. The financial support to Global Climate Change Initiatives has been canceled. The Global Climate Change Initiatives support all climate-related bilateral actions that track and reduce emissions and enhance the capacity of developing countries to develop renewable energy, as well as provide financial support to the UNFCCC and IPCC. In addition, the contribution of the U.S. to the Green Climate Fund has been canceled. The Obama administration previously committed US$ 3 billion to help developing countries mitigate climate impacts. The Obama administration has paid US$ 1 billion. The remaining funds have been canceled. Third, although **the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement impacts the extensiveness and effectiveness of global climate governance**, it is not enough to change the global emission structure. However, if the U.S. refuses to fulfill the commitments in its NDC, **it will be a bad example for other countries. Other countries might reverse their positions in international climate change or take no actions, thus harming the cooperation established among countries and shocking the global cooperation mechanism**. Analysis has shown that India and China have provided great contributions to reduce GHG emissions in light of their active mitigation policies. In 2030, global carbon emissions will be reduced by 2–3 billion tCO2. This figure is considerably higher than the 400 million tCO2 claimed by Trump (Höhne et al., 2017). If Trump's climate policy is fully implemented, U.S. emissions will remain constant instead of decreasing.

# 2AC Answers to Elections TAIWAN

#### 1. Approval ratings don’t matter - Even if Trump’s approval ratings are low, their consistency shows the strength of his base.

Vittert & Lind 2019

[Liberty Vittert, Professor of the Practice of Data Science, Washington University in St Louis, & Brendan Lind, JD/MBA Candidate, Harvard Business School, 6-12-2019, "Despite Unpopularity, Trump Can Win 2020. Here's How.," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/despite-unpopularity-trump-can-win-2020-heres-how-62177> MYY]

As with any statistical analysis, the trends are more important than the raw numbers. The 2016 election was historically unprecedented in terms of favorability of the candidates, as is the political polarization of the U.S. Look at the spread We think that pollsters, and the general public, shouldn’t compare Trump’s approval ratings to past presidents. What can be compared? The difference of highs and lows. According to historical Gallup polls, Trump’s spread – the difference between the highest recorded and lowest recorded approval rating poll – has never been more than 13%. Not a single president since this type of robust polling began, back to Franklin D. Roosevelt, has ever shown this level of consistency in approval ratings. In fact, the next-smallest spreadwas 27%, for John F. Kennedy. Trump’s approval ratings show that he has the strongest base in historical times. 2020 by the numbers There are still nine months to go until the first ballots will be cast in the race to the White House for 2020, and the Democratic nominee’s identity will most likely not be known for almost a year. Still, Trump’s chances of reelection are being discussed daily. Trump’s approval ratings are unlikely to go over 50%, given his lackluster starting point. So what does he actually need to win? A simple statistical model applied to recorded approval ratings shows Trump has been garnering higher and higher approval ratings since taking office. Put simply, his base is staying strong and even growing. This is in direct contrast to all presidents except Bill Clinton. Past incumbent presidents followed the rule that 49% approval and above means winning reelection, and anything below meant no second term. But Trump did not start at, nor will most likely ever reach, that level of approval. Americans may again see something that, statistically speaking, has never been seen before. Approval ratings have high correlations with predicting the next president, but with Trump, the numbers are outside any historical trends. The most unpopular winner ever may very likely win again.

2. Non-unique – Trump will win. Tons of factors favor him.

Continetti 2019

[Matthew Continetti, American journalist and the editor-in-chief of The Washington Free Beacon, 6-24-2019, “Populist wave could re-elect Trump in 2020” *National Post,* Lexis-Nexis, MYY]

Political professionals are so focused on the microdetails of the 2020 U.S. presidential elections that they miss the macro trends favouring Donald Trump as he kicks off his re-election campaign in Florida. They are looking at national and state polls when the "America First" president ought to be viewed in a global context. The lobbyists, consultants and pundits inside Washington's Beltway are obsessed with recent data that show Trump losing to several Democratic challengers. But surveys taken more than a year before Election Day are meaningless. More importantly, Trump benefits from incumbency and continued economic recovery, and he's riding a wave of national populism that has yet to crest. Only two of the nine presidents up for re-election since the Second World War have lost. In the past century the public has booted a party from the White House after a single term just once. And Jimmy Carter's presidency was plagued by foreign-policy setbacks and stagflation. Neither condition pertains today. The United States is not engaged in a major war. And the economic recovery that began in mid-2009 has continued under Trump, with unemployment at half-century lows. Manufacturing employment has increased. Economic growth approached three per cent last year. The Dow Jones industrial average has increased by about a third since Inauguration Day 2017. Circumstances might change, of course. The flare-up with Iran and mixed signals from the bond market remind us that our political future isn't a straight-line projection of the present. But Trump is wary of foreign entanglements, and a slowdown is not the same as a recession. Sustained peace and prosperity improve Trump's chances of a second term. So does the continuing revolt against global elites. One of the many oddities of this presidency is that a uniquely American figure such as Trump is part of a worldwide phenomenon. But there really can be no doubt that Trump was among the first heralds of an anti-elitist turn that has disrupted politics from London to Melbourne. The issues animating this upheaval have not disappeared. Nor is Trump likely to. Brexit, Election Day 2016, the collapse of the centre-left in France, Germany and Italy, the so-called yellow vest protests, the losses by centrist parties in the recent European elections and a political upset in Australia have been categorized as examples of "populism" or "nationalism." They are labelled a reaction against "globalization." But these grand terms mask as much as they reveal. And sometimes they are used to play down or dismiss political activity that an analyst finds uncouth, retrograde or offensive.

3. No internal link - Democrats will lose the Senate. That means their agenda is a nonstarter.

Golshan & Nielsen 2019

[Tara Golshan and Ella Nilsen, 6-5-2019, "Democrats’ extremely uphill battle to retake the Senate majority in 2020, explained," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/5/18306339/senate-democrats-2020-election-map> MYY]

The No. 1 item on the agenda for Democrats in 2020 is defeating Donald Trump. But the Democratic agenda hinges on retaking the Senate. And that could be an uphill battle. Senate Republicans hold a three-seat majority and will have to defend 22 seats in 2020. Democrats, meanwhile, are up in just 12 states. But the map still doesn’t look good for them. “What makes this map very deceiving was in 2018, Democrats had to defend five seats in states Trump won by 19 points or more,” said Jennifer Duffy, a Senate expert at the nonpartisan Cook Political Report. “In this case, there’s no Republican sitting in a state that Clinton won by more than 5.” Just three Republican seats seem truly competitive, as far as the Cook Political Report is concerned: Colorado, Arizona, and Maine. The rest is a sea of red, including the seat Democrats have to defend in ultraconservative Alabama. Compounding Democrats’ problems is a group of high-profile potential Senate candidates opting to run for president or just sit the whole thing out. Herein lies the central contradiction in 2020 politics: Democrats are telling voters the election — up and down the ballot — is of grave consequence. But undermining that push is the tacit belief that the Senate, and the party’s power in it, is a shadow of what it once was. “If people thought it mattered that Democrats controlled the Senate, then they would run to be a Democrat in the Senate,” said James Wallner, a political scientist with the conservative think tank R Street. That said, even if Democrats manage to retake the White House, a Senate majority stands between them and the ability to pursue any real legislative agenda and, crucially, the ability to confirm nominees to the Supreme Court and other important positions. Without the Senate, Democrats’ ideas will remain pipe dreams.

# 2AC – Answers To Elections – Saudi Arabia

1. Polls Fail - At best polls can predict national vote, but fail at the state level. Means they can’t predict the electoral college**.**

**Berley 2018**

[Max Berley, 10-29-2018, "Perils Of Polling," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/business/perils-of-polling/2018/10/29/51c7301a-dbae-11e8-8bac-bfe01fcdc3a6_story.html?nid=menu_nav_accessibilityforscreenreader&amp;outputType=accessibility&amp;utm_term=.f6d2ac39e8ce> MYY]

**Polls used to be seen as the gold standard for assessing politicians, elections and voter concerns**. In recent years, polling’s reputation has been tarnished. **In the 2017 U.K. election, final polls underestimated the Labour vote and overestimated support for the U.K. Independence Party**. **Almost every poll in the 2016 U.S. election missed support for** Republican Donald **Trump**, who won the presidency. In 2016, pollsters failed to predict the clear victory of the “leave” camp in the U.K. referendum on whether to stay in the European Union and the rejection of the Colombian peace deal with rebels. In 2015, polls were wrong on outcomes in Israel, the U.K. and Greece. The bungles have undermined the industry’s claim to scientific rigor. Can poll crafters devise a better formula that delivers more accurate results in this no-time-to-spare mobile era? The Situation Ahead of the 2018 U.S. midterm elections in November, many people fear that the polls can’t be trusted. While post mortems of **the 2016** election noted that **national polls correctly predicted that Hillary Clinton would win the total U.S. popular vote, polls at the state level were badly off and underestimated Trump** support. **Because the U.S. president is ultimately chosen by the Electoral College, which is guided by state results, almost no polls predicted the Trump victory**. **Pollsters** certainly **face a range of constraints**. **In the U.S., a majority of people now live in homes without a landline phone.** **So to reach a representative group, firms have increased calls to mobile phones**, which are now three-quarters of some samples. To do this, pollsters have to dial numbers by hand (U.S. law bans cell phone autodialing) and make more calls, since mobile users tend to screen out unknown callers and fewer will sit through 20 minutes of questions. This isn’t cheap — mobile-phone surveys can cost nearly twice as much — or easy. **Pew Research’s response rate on its 1997 polls was 36 percent; it was just 9 percent in 2016**

2. No link uniqueness and no link – Trump is already winning on foreign policy.

**Ward 2019**

[Alex Ward, 4-1-2019, "Trump’s foreign policy narrative could help him win in 2020," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/1/18285395/trump-2020-foreign-policy-democrats> MYY]

President Donald **Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign will surely be helped by the foreign policy story he can sell to voters**. **Foreign policy isn’t something Americans usually care about at the ballot box** — they mostly have domestic concerns — although a major foreign policy blunder could weigh down a candidacy. But it helps that **Trump’s Democratic opponents aren’t particularly strong on foreign policy** — in fact, only two have seriously put forward their ideas so far. And more importantly, **Trump actually has a pretty good story to tell. Consider what he could** conceivably **say: He defeated ISIS. Nuclear and missile testing by North Korea has stopped**, and negotiations to end its nuclear program are underway. **He’s made Israel really happy. He’s pushing back on regimes in Iran, Venezuela, and Russia**. **He’s fixing** long-standing **trade problems with Mexico and** Canada as well as **China.** Military spending is on the rise. Europeans are finally allocating more money for defense. His administration has gotten further than his predecessors in the Afghanistan peace process. When asked to describe his foreign policy, **Trump campaign** national press secretary Kayleigh McEnany **told me “**President **Trump’s foreign policy accomplishments are vast”** and that he “has undeniably put America First and exhibited strength on the world stage.” Of course, all of these boasts would require caveats — a lot of caveats. But **there’s some truth** to them, too. For example, the US-North Korea standoff is certainly at its lowest tension point in years, ISIS did lose its territorial “caliphate,” and the as-yet-unapproved trade deal with Mexico and Canada is better for workers. **That’s not to say Trump is bulletproof on foreign policy: He’s** also cozied up to several dictators, ignored major threats like climate change, **supported the Saudi-led war on Yemen**, backed Riyadh after its de facto leader orchestrated the murder on US resident and dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, slashed refugee levels, and global attitudes toward America worsened during his presidency. And Democrats will surely try to make the case that Trump’s foreign policy isn’t as good as he’ll say it is. “He’s going to run on a series of claims about his foreign policy ‘achievements,’” a top Democratic presidential campaign staffer who was not authorized to speak to press told me. “Anyone who follows this stuff knows they’re not true, but maybe not if you’re watching Fox News. It’s like foreign policy gaslighting.” **Overall, though, Trump can still boast that his “America First” approach** on the surface **looks pretty good — and it could help him win again**.

3. No Internal link - If Democrats don’t win the Senate, then they can’t solve warming.

**Hunt 2019**

[Albert Hunt,, former executive editor of Bloomberg News. He previously served as reporter, bureau chief and Washington editor for the Wall Street Journal, 6-16-2019, "Democrats' 2020 Achilles's heel: The Senate," TheHill, <https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/448753-democrats-2020-achilles-heel-the-senate> MYY]

**The stakes are huge.** Amid all **the political chatter about** the presidential contest and whether the **Democrats** can keep the House, there's a sobering reminder: **If they win the presidency and the House but Republican Mitch McConnell is still the senate majority leader, they can forget about any new agenda.** The Kentucky Republican has shown he will bend or change any rules or procedures to thwart the opposition. Senate control likely will be less of an issue if Donald Trump wins reelection. It's hard to see how Republicans lose their current 53-to-47 advantage while retaining the White House. This cycle, almost two-thirds, or 22, of the Senate seats up for election are Republican-held. Still, **for Democrats to capture control, they must win in a handful of red states Trump carried last time**. In talking to party strategists in Washington and battleground states — mainly Democrats — there are two critical variables. One is the top of the ticket, or can the party's nominee run better than Hillary Clinton did in states such as North Carolina, Iowa, Arizona and Georgia? The other is will strong senate candidates, with sufficient money resources, emerge in several states? Six months ago, the party anticipated top-tier challengers such as Montana's Steve Bullock and Colorado's John Hickenlooper or others who ran dazzling races last year, almost pulling off big upsets, such as Beto O'Rourke in Texas or Stacey Abrams in Georgia. Instead, those people are running for president or have specifically ruled out a Senate race. In several of these contests, Democrats say they have solid backups. In Colorado — which is one of the top two Senate targets, along with Arizona — a dozen candidates already are running against incumbent Sen. Cory Gardner, a respected lawmaker who’s facing a tough slog in a blue state where Trump is unpopular. Democrats believe they have a good chance to win if they nominate someone such as Mike Johnston, a former state senator and Obama education adviser — less so if a left-winger wins the primary. In Arizona, Mark Kelly, an astronaut and the spouse of Gabby Giffords, a former congresswoman and a gun violence victim, is given at least an even chance against Republican Sen. Martha McSally, who lost a senate race last year and then was appointed to another seat. Democrats, as of today, feel reasonably confident about their 12 incumbent seats, except for Trump-loving Alabama, where Sen. Doug Jones defeated a rabid right-winger in a 2017 special election. **Democrats then must win all, or most of, four seats** — **three in states Trump carried — North Carolina, Iowa and Georgia — and in closely contested Maine.** Two of these incumbents, Susan Collins of Maine and Joni Ernst of Iowa, are pretty popular. Democrats believe they have female candidates in both states who will be competitive if the top of the ticket runs well. Likewise, the party sees improving prospects in a couple of southern states — Georgia and especially North Carolina, where they now hold the governorship. In Georgia the incumbent, David Perdue, is a knee-jerk Trumpite who won last time in a banner Republican year. North Carolina's Thom Tillis, a conservative, might be softened up for the general election by irrational attacks from right-wingers. In both states, a viable challenger has yet to emerge, however. If there is a long shot, look to Kentucky. It should be impossible to defeat McConnell, a six-term senator who is unsurpassed in doing what it takes to win. Trump carried the state by 30 points. The likely Democratic candidate, Amy McGrath, lost a congressional contest last November. Yet McConnell, nine months older than Joe Biden, for all his clout in Congress, isn't well-liked in his home state, where even some conservatives see him as a greedy Washington insider. McGrath, a former Marine combat pilot, could be the ideal McConnell antidote. It'll be very uphill. **If Democrats** **don't pick up four or five** of these **seats, even if they win the White House, forget about expanding health care, bold action on climate change and immigration**, or much higher taxes on the rich.

# Aff – Extensions – Approval ratings don’t matter

### Default effect means that Trump will win even if people are unhappy.

Al-Gharbi 2017 [Musa Al-Gharbi, Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow in Sociology, Columbia University, 5-10-2017, "Trump will likely win reelection in 2020," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/trump-will-likely-win-reelection-in-2020-77362> MYY]

Even when people are unhappy with a state of affairs, they are usually disinclined to change it. In my area of research, the cognitive and behavioral sciences, this is known as the “default effect.” Software and entertainment companies exploit this tendency to empower programs to collect as much data as possible from consumers, or to keep us glued to our seats for “one more episode” of a streaming show. Overall, only 5 percent of users ever change these settings, despite widespread concerns about how companies might be using collected information or manipulating people’s choices. The default effect also powerfully shapes U.S. politics. Four more years Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to four consecutive terms as president of the United States, serving from the Great Depression to World War II. To prevent future leaders from possibly holding and consolidating power indefinitely, the 22nd Amendment was passed, limiting subsequent officeholders to a maximum of two terms. Eleven presidents have been elected since then. Eight of these administrations won a renewed mandate: Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy/Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Even the three single-term aberrations largely underscore the incumbency norm. Had Ford won in 1976, it would have marked three consecutive terms for the GOP. If George H.W. Bush had won in 1992, it would have meant four consecutive Republican terms. Since 1932, only once has a party held the White House for less than eight years: the administration of Democrat Jimmy Carter from 1976 to 1980. Therefore, it’s a big deal that Trump is now the default in American politics. Simply by virtue of this, he is likely to be reelected. Popularity is overrated Trump won his first term despite record low approval ratings, triumphing over the marginally less unpopular Hillary Clinton. He will probably be able to repeat this feat if necessary. The president continues to enjoy staunch support from the voters who put him in the White House. He has raised millions of dollars in small donations for reelection, pulling in twice as much money as Barack Obama in his first 100 days. And he’s already putting that money to use running ads in key states that trumpet his achievements and criticize political rivals. Although most don’t like or trust Trump, polls show he seems to be meeting or exceeding Americans’ expectations so far. In fact, an ABC News/ Washington Post survey suggests that if the election had been held again in late April, Trump would have not only won the Electoral College, but the popular vote as well – despite his declining approval rating. To further underscore this point, consider congressional reelection patterns. Since World War II, the incumbency rate has been about 80 percent for the House of Representatives and 73 percent for the Senate. Going into the 2016 election, Congress’ approval rating was at an abysmal 15 percent. Yet their incumbency rate was actually higher than usual: 97 percent in the House and 98 percent in the Senate. As a function of the default effect, the particular seats which happen to be open this cycle, and Republican dominance of state governments which has allowed them to draw key congressional districts in their favor – it will be extremely difficult for Democrats to gain even a simple majority in the Senate in 2018. The House? Even less likely. Trump … or who? Due to the default effect, what matters most is not how the public feels about the incumbent, but how they feel about the most likely alternative.

# Aff – EXTENSIONS – Polls fail

#### Predictive models can’t account for major variables or unexpected events. This means their Disadvantage is a bunch of nonsense.

Bernstein 2019 [Jonathan Bernstein, 5-24-2019, "Don’t Trust Predictions About 2020," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-24/don-t-trust-predictions-about-the-2020-election> MYY]

I wouldn't go quite as far as Rebecca Traister, who makes the case that we basically can’t predict anything at all about elections. But it's probably a useful way to approach the 2020 presidential contest. I've spoken with political scientists, including experts on voting behavior and elections, who range from thinking that President Donald Trump should be a solid favorite to believing that Democrats are likely to win. It's possible that the old prediction formulas will work in 2020. But it's also easy to identify factors that those models can't account for. Is Trump capped at a low approval rating? Will the Republican tilt in the Electoral College reappear? What should we make of the unusually high turnout (for both parties) in the 2018 midterms? Election predictions generally rely on the assumption that old patterns will hold. As a result, they’re exposed to the risk that something important has changed, either permanently or over the short term. As for the Democratic nomination, I’m still confident that we have no idea who’s going to win. Joe Biden's recent surge has receded a bit; he's dropped from a peak polling average of around 41% back down to about 35%. That's not bad. But we know that early polls are heavily influenced by name recognition. A bit over a third of the vote for a former vice president? His endorsement situation is the same: a solid lead, but so far nothing like the powerhouse support that party actors gave to Hillary Clinton in 2008 or George W. Bush in 2000. Biden could certainly win, but it's also easy to imagine others chipping away at him as they get better known.Certainly, Biden is doing better than the other well-known contender, Bernie Sanders. Here's where I think it's wrong to say we know nothing at all: It's surely bad news for a returning runner-up to be a distant second in the polls, and well behind in endorsements. I wouldn't count Sanders out entirely. But he appears to be a factional candidate, and factional candidates rarely win.As for the rest? I tried to make a top five, and really couldn't. I'd probably pick Biden, Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren, but I'm not sure who the other two would be – Cory Booker? Amy Klobuchar? – and any of at least half a dozen contenders could win without surprising me at all.What am I confident about? At least one of the candidates now at 1% or so in the polls will surge up to around 5% between now and the fall – and once at that level, a second surge is possible. The thing is that the first surge is pretty close to random: Anyone can have a great debate moment or a viral video. A further surge isn't quite so arbitrary. It helps to have support from party actors; to have conventional credentials; to embrace the party’s policies and priorities; and probably to have solid campaigning skills, although that’s harder to judge.To put it another way: I'm confident that short-term fluctuations in the polls are pretty random, but in the long run support from the party will likely be essential. I'm also confident that the gigantic candidate field will be winnowed down pretty quickly. I'm less confident, but still believe, that “electability” will turn out to be pretty meaningless as a practical consideration: Like charisma or likeability, voters will wind up attributing it to whoever they already support. And I’m pretty sure you should ignore pundits who proclaim that so-and-so will definitely finish in the top three in Iowa or that some other candidate has no chance to do so. As for who will be nominated? I can make a pretty solid case for about a dozen contenders – but I can also make the case for how every single one of them could be gone very early.

# Aff – Extensions – Non-unique

#### Trump wins in 2020 because of incumbent advantage and strong economy.

Buncombe 2018 [Andrew Buncombe, 2-27-2018, “Donald Trump has confirmed he's running for re-election in 2020 and this is why he'll probably win; While his opponents may loathe to admit it, Trump still has a lot going for him” *Independent,* Lexis-Nexis, MYY]

Yet while his opponents may loathe to admit it, Trump has a lot going for him - as evidenced by the odds of two-to-one listed by oddschecker.com, which aggregates various betting shops odds. (The closest rivals are Elizabeth Warren, Kamala Harris and Bernie Sanders at 11 to one.) Firstly, Trump is the incumbent, and incumbent presidents usually win when they run for re-election. Individuals such as George HW Bush, who lost to Bill Clinton in 1992 after reneging on a promise not to increase taxes, are the exception to the rule. The office brings huge advantage in terms of media coverage, name recognition and the ability to raise money. The second thing Trump has in his favour is that, to the people who voted for him and gave him that stunning win, think of him as nothing less than a hero. A poll taken on the anniversary of his election found that 82 per cent of those who supported him would do so again. But it is not just among his hardcore supporters that Trump has sold support. Following a first term in which Trump rowed back on regulations Barack Obama had introduced at the Environmental Protection Agency, cracked down on immigration, enacted a version of his travel ban, got Neil Gorsuch confirmed on the Supreme Court and, crucially, oversaw a tax reform package the Republicans had not seen for 30 years, Trump can present himself to the GOP as a man who has delivered on his promises. In a recent article headlined "Republicans Are Coming Home To Trump", the polling and politics website FiveThirtyEight reported that a Gallup poll put Trump's approval rating among self-identified Republicans at 86 per cent. "It was the third straight week that his rating was above 85 per cent - an improvement compared with 2017," it said. For all the major issues facing the US - climate change, inequality, racial tension, gender struggles and Trump's puerile and bullying use of social media - when it comes to voting, for most Americans no issue is more important than that of their wallets. If people feel the economy is doing well, that their job is safe, that they have a little more money left over at the end of the month, then they typically tend to vote not to change that. Right now, unemployment stands at 4.1 per cent, a 10-year low. While much of the credit for that belongs to Barack Obama, Trump has already seized it as his victory. Wages in the United States increased 4.4 per cent in November of 2017 over the same month in the previous year, and they seem set to continue - a figure that could equal anything during Obama's term. The other, crucial thing the President has in his favour is that for all of the anti-Trump sentiment that exists in the country, the Democrats do not look battle-ready. A series of special elections have revealed that the party has not agreed to a solid or substantial platform other than opposing Trump. As many party figures have said, they need to offer voters a genuine alternative message, especially on economics. Indeed, often it seems the party is still having the same fight over which it split in 2016, as it sought to decide whether to opt for the cautious incrementalism represented by Hillary Clinton or the more radical change proposed by Sanders. And while there are a lot of very good, quality candidates within the party, the fact that the generation of yesteryear - 68-year-old Warren, Sanders, 76, and 75-year-old Joe Biden - are topping the polls offers little hope to those looking for new ideas. Nothing underscored the party's haplessness more than the recent suggestion that Oprah Winfrey may do battle against Trump.

# Aff – EXTENSTIONS – No link uniqueness and no link

#### Trump has numerous foreign policy wins – at best the links to the plan are a drop in the bucket.

Thiessen 2018

[Marc A. Thiessen, Columnist focusing on foreign and domestic policy, 9-18-2018, "Chaos Or Not, Trump Is Racking Up A Record Of Foreign Policy Success," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chaos-or-not-trump-is-racking-up-a-record-of-foreign-policy-success/2018/09/18/97cf611a-bb59-11e8-bdc0-90f81cc58c5d_story.html?utm_term=.fb7a82d9849f> MYY]

When Trump was elected in 2016, many worried that he would usher in a new age of American isolationism and withdrawal. That hasn’t happened. Trump has pursued a foreign policy that is not only not isolationist but also a significant improvement over his predecessor’s. In Syria, while Trump did not eliminate Assad, he did enforce President Barack Obama’s red line against the use of chemical weapons, punishing violations not once but twice — and restoring America’s credibility on the world stage. Last week, Trump launched the U.S.-led coalition’s assault on the Islamic State’s last stronghold on the Syrian-Iraqi border, which will eliminate its physical caliphate. And unlike Obama, Trump is not taking America’s boot off the terrorists’ necks. The Post reports that the president has approved a new strategy that “indefinitely extends the military effort” in Syria until a government acceptable to all Syrians is established and all Iranian military and proxy forces are driven out. Conservative columnist Patrick Buchanan, a die-hard isolationist, recently asked: “Is Trump Going Neocon in Syria?” In Israel, Trump moved the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, which he recognized as the country’s capital — something three of his predecessors promised, but failed, to do. He also withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and refocused U.S. efforts in the Middle East on shoring up relations with allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia instead of courting Iran. In Afghanistan, after a careful deliberative process in which Trump (correctly) pressed his generals for answers to tough questions, the president reversed his campaign position favoring a troop pullout and sent additional forces, with no timetable for withdrawal. In Turkey, Trump is taking a hard line with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regime, imposing tariffs as the Turkish lira has gone into free fall. Trump’s move was intended to punish Erdogan for his continued detention of an American pastor, Andrew Brunson, and followed his threats against U.S. forces in Syria and his plans to buy an S-400 advanced air-defense system from Moscow. Trump has also taken a surprisingly tough line with Russia. He approved a massive arms and aid package for Ukraine, expelled 60 Russian diplomats and authorized new sanctions against Moscow at least four times for: (1) interfering in U.S. elections, (2) violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, (3) launching a chemical-weapon attack against a Russian national in Britain and (4) violating North Korea sanctions. And the Trump administration recently warned Russia that it would face “total economic isolation” if Moscow backed the Assad regime’s assault in Idlib. Trump’s policies more than make up for his disastrous Helsinki news conference with Russian President Vladi­mir Putin in July. On North Korea, Trump issued credible threats of military action, which brought Kim Jong Un to the negotiating table. The chances of successful denuclearization are slim, but every other approach by Trump’s predecessors has failed. And there is reason for hope that Trump will not sign a bad deal, because he set a very high bar for a good deal when he withdrew from Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran. The list of good foreign-policy moves goes on. Trump has taken a strong stand against the narco-dictatorship in Venezuela, and his administration even considered supporting coup plotters seeking to remove the Maduro regime. He strengthened NATO by getting allies to kick in billions more toward the alliance’s collective security. He declared war on the International Criminal Court, which purports to have jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers and citizens even though America is not a signatory to the treaty creating the ICC.

# aff– Extensions – No internal link

#### 2. They say that Democrats can put us back in Paris climate accord, but Paris fails to avert catastrophic warming.

Samans 2017

[Richard Samans, 1-6-2017, "The Paris Accord Won't Stop Global Warming on Its Own," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/26/the-paris-accord-wont-stop-global-warming-on-its-own/> MYY]

The 2015 United Nations Paris climate agreement was an important political accomplishment, but confronting climate change will ultimately require an economic breakthrough. The Paris agreement established a consensus goal for humanity: a maximum temperature increase of 2 degrees Celsius over the level prevailing before the dawn of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-1700s. It also created a universally acceptable political framework in which states make nonbinding, nationally determined contributions toward this goal, subject to periodic peer review and voluntary adjustment. As important as this diplomatic achievement was, it represents only half the job that the international community must perform. To stabilize the planet’s warming by midcentury at levels our children and grandchildren will find manageable, the world needs a new economic framework to accelerate the propagation of low-carbon energy innovations that entrepreneurs are increasingly bringing to market on competitive terms. Even with the national commitments registered under the Paris agreement, the world remains on course for a catastrophic 3 degree temperature rise rather than the 2 degree goal set in Paris.