



SAUDI ARABIA NEGATIVE

Introduction:.....	2	Increased Circumvention generally	15
Being Negative	3	Case Impact Answers	16
Overview: First Negative Constructive (1NC)	4	Middle East War.....	16
Topic Introduction: Saudi Arabia Affirmative	5	Saudi Arabia War.....	17
Key Terms Glossary	6	Iranian Aggression Turn.....	18
No Solvency	7	1NC.....	18
UAE	7	Houthis are worse.....	20
EU Fill in.....	8	Aff allows Iran to expand regionally	21
UK Fill In.....	9	Impact Framing	22
Saudi Fear of Abandonment - Turn.....	10	Nuke War Outweighs	22
Russia Fill in	12	War turns the aff	23
Aff prevents the end of Yemeni War	13	Magnitude Outweighs.....	24
Aff leads to Increased arms sales from Russia.....	14		



INTRODUCTION:

Welcome to the Saudi Arabia Negative Evidence Set. In here, you'll find all the research you'll need to construct a winning negative argument in the Novice Division and beyond on this year's topic: Arms Sales.

We've organized this evidence into a few different categories:

- **Solvency answers:** This section of the file includes arguments that reducing arms sales to Saudi Arabia will not solve the Yemen conflict. There are arguments about how Saudi Arabia will react, how other countries in the region will react and possible alternative sources of arms (the EU, China and Russia)
- **Case Impact Answers:** This section of the file includes arguments about the impacts that the affirmative claims.
- **Iran Turn:** This is an offensive argument that the Iranian influence in the region would be worse than the current Saudi Arabian influence in the region.
- **Impact Framing:** The affirmative makes an argument that the judge has a moral obligation to vote for them to stop starvation and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. This section of the file is built to answer that argument and claims that the judge should prioritize large scale conflict and the damage it does instead.
- **Disadvantage Links:** Once you have completed a certain number of rounds you may begin to debate disadvantages in your league. This section includes the arguments to "link" the affirmative to those arguments. ***NOTE: Do not use these arguments until you are in the correct division for them***

How to use this file:

The file is organized by the types of arguments the negative might need to make. You will need to pick and choose which arguments you will make in a given round. You will not have time to make all of these arguments in any round.

1. Read the summaries of each argument available in the packet
2. Check out the glossary to make sure you understand all of the words and terms.
3. Read and highlight the evidence, making sure you understand the argument being made and pulling out the key parts of each piece of evidence.
4. Pick the arguments you will use in the 1NC.

When you are ready to debate:

1. Prepare a sample first negative constructive (1NC), making changes as you see fit. Read it during the 1NC.
2. Expand on those initial arguments and respond to all of the affirmative's points in the second negative constructive and the first negative rebuttal (2NC/1NR or the Negative Block).
3. Make a closing statement in the second negative rebuttal (2NR), explaining why the affirmative team's plan is a bad idea. Try to anticipate the arguments the 2AR will make and preempt them.



BEING NEGATIVE

The goal of the negative is simple: Prove that the plan presented by the affirmative team is a bad idea. The more you focus on the plan and why it is a bad idea, the more often you'll win debates.

Speech	Time (Minutes)
1 st Affirmative Constructive (1AC)	8
2 nd Negative Speaker Questions 1 st Affirmative Speaker	3
1 st Negative Constructive (1NC)	8
1 st Affirmative Speaker Questions 1 st Negative Speaker	3
2 nd Affirmative Constructive (2AC)	8
1 st Negative Speaker Questions 2 nd Affirmative Speaker	3
2 nd Negative Constructive (2NC)	8
2 nd Affirmative Speaker Questions 2 nd Negative Speaker	3
1 st Negative Rebuttal (1NR)	5
1 st Affirmative Rebuttal (1AR)	5
2 nd Negative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2NR)	5
2 nd Affirmative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2AR)	5

Speaking Roles on the Negative:

- **1st Negative Speaker:** Your job is to introduce a range of negative arguments in the 1NC, and to definitively win at least one of those arguments in the 1NR.
- **2nd Negative Speaker:** Your job is to expand upon one or two arguments made in the 1NC, then to choose the best argument made by the negative team and show why the negative should win the debate in the 2NR. You are in charge of choosing negative strategy, since you'll have to explain it in the 2NR

Phases of a Debate:

1. **1NC:** Outline a few different reasons why the affirmative is a bad idea, without going into too much detail on any one of them.
2. **2NC/1NR:** Think of these as a single speech, given by different people. Each debater should choose one or two (different) arguments from the 1NC and go into greater detail, explaining and adding evidence when needed.
3. **2NR:** The second negative speaker should give a closing argument all about the strongest negative position (after hearing the affirmative speak in the 1AR). Tell the judge why the negative team should win.



OVERVIEW: FIRST NEGATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE (1NC)

The first section of this file will help you assemble the 1st Negative Constructive, or the 1NC. Remember, these are outlines of different arguments you can make—you don't have to include every little detail until later in the debate.

Use these outlines to construct an 8 minute speech that responds to the Saudi Arabia Aff.

- **Solvency:** How will the plan work? Will it result in the consequences that the affirmative team predicts or will it have different consequences? You have arguments here that range from different hypotheses to how Saudi Arabia will respond to the aff to arguments about how other countries will react.
- **Case Impacts:** These arguments say that the impacts the affirmative claims are not correct.
- **Case Turns:** These are potentially other bad effects of the affirmative. In this instance the Iran turn argues that Iranian influence in the Middle East would be worse than Saudi influence.
- **Impact Framing:** These arguments answer the moral obligation claims the affirmative makes.

Go through the arguments and determine which cards you'd like to read in the 1NC and which you'd like to save for the Negative Block (2NC/1NR). You will not have time to make every argument in this file so you need to pick the ones you think are most strategic.



TOPIC INTRODUCTION: SAUDI ARABIA AFFIRMATIVE

The Saudi Arabia affirmative proposes limiting the Executive Branch’s ability to sell arms to Saudi Arabia by passing H.R. 7080 to require that Congress vote on all arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Currently the Trump administration favors selling large numbers of weapons to Saudi Arabia and other countries that are being used to fight Houthi rebels in Yemen. Those arms and weapons are contributing to a humanitarian crisis in Yemen where civilians and children are suffering and dying from the use of those weapons. Children and civilians are also suffering because famine and disease are rampant across Yemen due to this war.

The Trump administration has continued to expand the sale of weapons despite Congressional disapproval. They argue that the Houthi rebels are being supported by Iran and view supporting Saudi Arabia as a necessary move to check Iranian power in the region.

The affirmative argues that the cost of this conflict in civilian lives is too high and that the Saudis would not be able to continue their war in Yemen without arms sales from the U.S.

Strategic Overview

The affirmative claims one advantage: human rights. The affirmative argues that the costs of the war in Yemen are too high and the United States should not be party to these atrocities regardless of geopolitical concerns. There are two distinct arguments to vote affirmative. The first is that structural violence, poverty, and war should be prioritized over hypothetical wars and power politics. The second is that there is a moral imperative to act against famine. You will need both of these arguments to counter the negative’s arguments against the affirmative.

Answering arguments as the negative:

When putting together your 1NC block, you’ll want to follow the structure arguments numbered straight down, for example:

“On solvency our first argument is: <insert card/analytic> our second argument is <insert card/analytic>”

However, in the block your opponents will have answered your arguments and you want to answer them in the order they argued. Use the structure below and remember what was discussed during flowing:

They say → <Insert argument>

That’s not true because → <Restate your argument or read a new card to answer their argument>

Prefer our argument because → <Explain why your argument is better>

Consider the following questions:

- Why does the US sell arms to other countries?
- How might US arms sales impact relationships in the region?
- What are the implications of arms sales for civilians in Yemen and how do we compare those to other potential outcomes?
- If the US doesn’t sell arms could Saudi Arabia get them somewhere else? Would that be better or worse?
- Should Congress have more oversight over arms sales?
- Are there some policies that should not be done because the consequences are so bad?



KEY TERMS GLOSSARY

Al Qaeda – a militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden. Directly translates to “the base.” Responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

Authoritarian – a political system that concentrates power in the hands of a leader or a small elite that is not constitutionally responsible to the body of the people.

Congressional Oversight – refers to the review, monitoring and supervision of federal agencies, programs activities and policy implementation of the Executive Branch. This oversight is notably lax in the realm of arm sales.

Dissident – a person who opposes official policy, especially that of an authoritarian state.

Embargo – an official ban on trade or commercial activity with a particular country. May be general or on specific commodities and goods.

Houthi Rebels – a group of Shia militants who originally participated in the Arab Spring but became involved in the political transition after President Saleh stepped down and they were not represented in the transitional government.

Humanitarian Crisis – defined as an event or series of events that threaten the health, safety or well-being of a community or large group of people.

Jamal Khashoggi – a Saudi Arabian dissident and journalist for The Washington Post who was assassinated at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 10/2/2018.

Yemen – a republic in southwest Arabia on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Has been in civil war since 2014



NO SOLVENCY

UAE

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES WILL STILL BE INVOLVED THE AFF ISN'T SUFFICIENT TO SOLVE BYMAN, 18
(Daniel Byman senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, focusing on counterterrorism and Middle East security. "Yemen after a Saudi withdrawal: How much would change?" Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/>)

Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran's ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from Riyadh's point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia's borders. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed.



THE EU WILL CONTINUE TO SELL ARMS TO SAUDI AND THEIR WEAPONS WILL CIRCUMVENT THE AFF COCHRANE, 18 (Paul Cochrane is "EU countries approve arms sales to Saudi, UAE worth 55 times aid to Yemen"; Middle Eastern Eye; November 12, 2018; <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-countries-approve-arms-sales-saudi-uae-worth-55-times-aid-yemen>)

European governments and the European Union publicly wring their hands about the "human tragedy" and need for "life-saving assistance" in war-torn Yemen. Yet while the Saudi-led coalition has bombed the region's poorest country over the past three years, the EU and European countries approved the sale of more than \$86.7bn in arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, according to figures compiled by Middle East Eye. The value of the licences which the countries issued in 2015 and 2016 - the only years for which data is available - amount to more than 55 times what the EU and European countries have donated to the UN's chronically underfunded Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. Meanwhile, independent researchers estimate that more than 56,000 Yemenis have been killed with the UN warning "a clear and present danger" of an imminent famine engulfing 14 million Yemenis – or half of the population. Many governments have promised during the course of the war to stop or restrict sales of the weapons that are being used to maim Yemenis, and the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi last month brought a new wave of public pressure to halt deals with the Saudi kingdom. But only Germany and Norway have suspended their sales – until Khashoggi's murder is explained - while the UK, France and Spain have all signalled that they will continue business as usual.

THE EU WILL CONTINUE TO SELL ARMS TO SAUDI AND IS RAMPING UP, AND IF NOT THEY DIVERT TO EGYPT – THIS IS DOUBLE CIRCUMVENTION. COCHRANE, 18 (Paul Cochrane is "EU countries approve arms sales to Saudi, UAE worth 55 times aid to Yemen"; Middle Eastern Eye; November 12, 2018; <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-countries-approve-arms-sales-saudi-uae-worth-55-times-aid-yemen>)

As the conflict continues in Yemen, the UN's 2018 humanitarian response plan is currently 35 percent underfunded. The \$1.04bn shortfall is just 1.1 percent of approved European arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2015 and 2016 alone. While approved licenses are clearly different from actual exports, in Europe, they nearly always become actual sales, says Andrew Smith, spokesman for the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT). "If a licence is signed which isn't hugely skewed by change in legislation, you have given permission for the sale to go ahead. That means the government won't block it and, if they do block or suspend it for some reason, that gets calculated later on anyway," Smith says. The one exception is France which has included licences still under negotiation since 2014. Overall, given the choice between "maximising arms sales or human rights, it's always arms sales that wins," he says. And the aid, says Andrew Feinstein, executive director of Corruption Watch, and author of *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade*, is "part of a PR veneer created around justifying the arms industry". As the world's largest humanitarian disaster has unfolded, there has been pressure from activists and civil society groups over the past three years which has led Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden to announce that they were freezing or restricting of arms exports to the Gulf. The EU also made overtures at restricting arms exports, with the Council of Ministers – the executive government of the EU - passing a non-binding motion in December 2016 to ban all arms sales to Saudi Arabia. However, despite "a majority voting for the motion, the request was put aside and it has not happened," said Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher, arms and military expenditure programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Neither have the country-level embargo announcements come to fruition. "There's often a gulf between what is said and done in practice," says Smith from CAAT. Furthermore, the EU's attempt at an embargo on arms sales to Saudi Arabia did not include embargoes on other coalition members, including the UAE and Egypt. France, for instance, sold naval vessels to Egypt that could have been used to enforce the maritime blockade of Yemen, notes Wezeman. "The Dutch were supportive of the call for an embargo and not providing material for the aerial campaign, but they were still selling naval equipment; those components could be used in the blockade. They try to look progressive but it's still business as usual," says Anna Stavrianakis, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex and author of *Taking Aim at the Arms Trade*.



UK FILL IN

THE UK IS A MASSIVE ALT CAUSE—THEY FUEL JUST AS MANY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN YEMEN AND THERE ARE NO CHECKS. SHARMAN, 18 (Jon Sharman is a news reporter, 7-18-18, UK almost doubles arms sales to countries on governments list of human rights abusers, figures reveal, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-arms-sales-double-human-rights-abusers-china-saudi-arabia-israel-yemen-a8452101.html>)

The UK nearly doubled the value of arms sales to countries on the government’s list of human rights abusers in the past year, figures reveal. Licences for arms deals worth some £1.5bn were approved in Whitehall in 2017, up from £820m a year earlier, according to figures compiled by the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) pressure group. Sales were granted to 18 countries on the list, including China, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Israel, Egypt and Pakistan, compared to 20 different states in 2016. The value of sales to Saudi Arabia, currently embroiled in a bloody conflict in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels where thousands of civilians have been killed and millions left in need of aid, alone totalled £1.13bn, the group said. Theresa May’s government is “actively arming and supporting many of the regimes that even it believes are responsible for terrible human rights abuses”, CAAT’s Andrew Smith told The Independent. He added: “There is little oversight in the system, and no controls over how these arms will be used once they have left the UK. The arms sales being agreed today could be used to fuel atrocities for years to come. Right now UK-made fighter jets and bombs are playing a central role in the Saudi-led destruction of Yemen, and the government and arms companies have totally failed to monitor or evaluate how this deadly equipment is being used.” “We are always being told how rigorous and robust the system supposedly is, but nothing could be further from the truth. These arms sales don’t just provide dictatorships and human rights abusers with the means to kill, they also give them a huge degree of political support.”



FEAR OF US ABANDONMENT DRIVES RECKLESS SAUDI BEHAVIOR- CUTTING OFF SALES WILL MAGNIFY

IT. BROMUND, 18 (Theodore R., Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations@Heritage, <https://www.newsday.com/opinion/commentary/what-not-to-do-about-khashoggi-1.22136012>)

The death of Jamal Khashoggi at the hands of Saudi Arabia offers a terrible temptation to the United States: We can indulge our outrage at the expense of our interests. We have few good options, but giving in to that temptation would be the worst thing to do. Everyone involved in this scandal has performed poorly, if not disgracefully. Saudi Arabia has been caught lying about Khashoggi's death. President Donald Trump has sided both with and against the Saudis, thereby earning brickbats from all sides. Turkey pretends to care about Khashoggi but imprisons more journalists than any other nation. And then there is Khashoggi himself. It's awkward to speak ill of the dead, but Khashoggi's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was not a mere youthful flirtation. Just a year ago, he called on the Saudi leadership to cooperate with them, and to lead a unified Arab world to support the Palestinians in their fight against Israel. That doesn't justify killing him. Of the region's four major Muslim powers, Turkey has slid away from the West, Egypt just signed a strategic partnership with Russia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has hated the United States since 1979. That leaves only Saudi Arabia as a possible U.S. ally. Which is why Khashoggi's death has caused such a stir. Revealingly, at about the same time as the writer disappeared, France disrupted an Iranian bomb plot that would have killed tens, if not hundreds, of people in Paris. And yet it's Khashoggi's killing that has grabbed the headlines. That's because Khashoggi isn't just a victim; he's a proxy for a debate about U.S. policy. Obama-era veterans from Ben Rhodes to Michael McFaul have argued that Khashoggi's death proves that President Barack Obama's desire to sidle up to Iran at the expense of the Saudis was correct. This is nonsense. Obama's policy isn't the answer, it's a significant part of the problem. As I have written in this column before, most U.S. alliances are as much about restraining our allies as they are about deterring our enemies. When Obama tilted toward Tehran, he gave Saudi Arabia a reason to start writing its own insurance policy against Iran, its regional enemy. Predictably, the Saudis have made a mess of it. They wanted to secure their flanks, but their war in Yemen is endless and profitless, and their blockade of Qatar, though driven by understandable concern over Iranian influence, has achieved little. At home, the regime's so-called drive against corruption — like the parallel ones in Russia and China — is about centralizing power by eliminating opponents. The killing of Khashoggi, whether it was deliberate or a panicked bungle, is part of that drive — and it has backfired spectacularly. The problem for the United States is that Saudi behavior is destructive. But leaving the Saudis to go it alone would merely be more of the same policy that got us where we are today. Since 2011, when most U.S. forces left Iraq, declining U.S. influence has paralleled rising regional violence — and Iranian power. That violence isn't our fault — but given how rotten the regimes in the region are, we shouldn't have expected them to behave any better. Kicking Saudi Arabia to the curb now is tempting, but it will only quicken the descent by making it clear to the Saudis that they're on their own against the Iranians. Breaking this spiral won't be easy. It may not be possible. Yet we have to try to convince the Saudis that their actions, far from enhancing their security, are undermining it. Ironically, Khashoggi was right about that; the reaction to his death is proof of it. Our response to it should be guided not by self-righteous outrage, but by our interest in talking the Saudis down from their ledge.

National Association for Urban Debate Leagues



ENDING ARMS SALES WON'T END THE WAR; IT WILL EXACERBATE IT, ENCOURAGE IRANIAN AGGRESSION AND WEAKEN KEY ALLIES. PHILLIPS & POSEY, 18

(James, Phillips MA in law and diplomacy (MALD) in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @Heritage Madyson Hutchinson Posey is research and administrative assistant for the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy. <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous>)

The Trump administration has banned 21 Saudi suspects in that murder from entering the U.S., imposed sanctions on 17 Saudi officials, and expressed its willingness to take further action if warranted by ongoing investigations. Many senators seek to do more to punish the Saudis, even if it means sacrificing the interests of the Yemeni government and making a negotiated settlement of the conflict more difficult. The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but ending U.S. support for the multinational coalition in Yemen is not the proper solution. It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah ("Supporters of Allah") movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants "Death to America" and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it.



RUSSIA FILL IN

US INFLUENCE IS KEY TO REDUCE VIOLENCE AND PROMOTE PEACE – WITHDRAWAL GREENLIGHTS AGGRESSION BY RUSSIA AND TERRORISTS. CARAFANO, 18

(James J., vice president of Heritage's Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow. <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/chaos-will-erupt-the-middle-east-if-us-leaves-yemen>)

Three years ago this month, a Saudi-led coalition of Gulf nations waded into Yemen's civil war. The U.S. is aiding the coalition, supplying special forces and sharing intelligence with our Saudi and UAE allies. For some Americans, that's too much. On Feb. 28, Sens. Mike Lee, R-Utah; Bernie Sanders, I-Vt.; and Chris Murphy, D-Conn., introduced a joint resolution invoking the War Powers Act. The goal: to yank all U.S. military support from the conflict. Legal scholars debate the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. Still, even if the Hill could tell the president to pull out of Yemen, it should not. If America walks away, it will only bring more war, not peace. America is there for a reason: to keep the region from falling apart. The collapse of any friendly regime there is bad for us. The greatest threats to Middle East stability and security are Iran and transnational Islamist terrorists groups, principally ISIS and al-Qaida. And it is precisely these forces that are fueling the Yemen war. If Congress forces the administration to abandon our allies, Tehran, ISIS, and al-Qaida would feel emboldened and likely double-down on expanding the war. Meanwhile, Washington would lose its ability to influence how Saudi Arabia and the UAE conduct coalition operations. Without our mitigating presence, the carnage of this vicious war would only increase. And Russia would be tempted to further complicate the situation. Moscow has already vetoed a draft U.N. Security Council resolution to hold Iran accountable for providing Yemen's rebels with the long-range missiles recently fired at the Saudi capital. Putin would interpret an American withdrawal as a green light for additional Russian meddling – the type that Moscow has brought to the Syrian civil war. Instead of turning our back on Yemen, the U.S. should focus on ending the war. The longer the conflict persists, the more the chaos benefits terrorist groups in the region and the more the main rebel group, the Houthis, becomes dependent on Iran. There are no easy answers. Just ask American Enterprise Institute analyst Katherine Zimmerman, who follows the issue as closely as anyone. Her assessment: "The (Saudi-led) coalition's efforts to end the war militarily have been unsuccessful and will likely continue to fail...." There is no clear military solution. There is no clear political resolution either. Yemen's political landscape remains hopelessly fractured. Any settlement talks that exclude key stakeholders are likely to go nowhere. A new U.N. envoy, Martin Griffiths, is expected to try to launch another round of negotiations. But for now, at least, too many key actors seem unwilling to engage in serious peace talks. Rather than pull out, the U.S. should continue to use its presence and influence to establish the conditions that will allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the start of real peace negotiations that put the people of Yemen first. U.S. military activities contribute to both those goals, particularly by supporting counterterrorism operations against ISIS and al-Qaida. In addition to continuing that support, the U.S. should work to diminish Iranian meddling – not just by disrupting its aid to the Houthis, but by broadly attacking Tehran's foreign escapades throughout the region. Pressing the regime overall will strain its capacity to support the rebels in Yemen – and that may lead to all sides in the conflict coming to the peace table sooner rather than later. If Congress wants to see an end to the humanitarian suffering in Yemen, then writing off the current U.S. role there ought to be the last thing lawmakers think about. The U.S. cannot be a bystander. In fact, it may be the only actor with sufficient influence to drive the other players toward a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.



SAUDI STRENGTH KEY TO PEACE- PLAN WEAKENING THEM MEANS ZERO CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

ALMARZOQI, 16 (Mansour , researcher on Saudi politics at Sciences Po de Lyon, France <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-saudi-efforts-yemen-advance-us-interests-17901> 10-2)

No fight against Al Qaeda has any chance of success in Yemen without two elements: a strong central government and a functioning state structure. Without that, any achievement is a mere flash in the pan. These two elements on the one hand, and the predominance of the alliance between the Iran-backed Houthi militia and Saleh forces on the other, are mutually exclusive. Thus, fighting Al Qaeda starts with the Houthi militia becoming a political party and Saleh's acceptance of an inclusive political process. That is why the Arab coalition labored so hard for a solution based on these elements, as evident in the Gulf Initiative, UNSC Resolution 2216, the Kuwait negotiations, and several failed ceasefire attempts. If Saudi military capabilities are weakened, the chances that another state actor can rally the region behind a viable stabilization plan are next to none. Riyadh is the only major Arab world power that is stable and prosperous. And the fact that the Arab and Islamic World are rallying behind Riyadh's leadership is not only motivated by Saudi Arabia's reliability and stability, but also by its diplomatic, economic and military power, as well as its symbolic power as the birthplace of Arab and Islamic civilization. The Arab nation was born in Souk Okaz, grew up in Dar Annadwah, and emerged from the Suspended Poems. The Islamic nation was born in Mecca, grew up in Medina, and emerged from Saqifat Bani Sa'idah. From the Rashideen era, Umayyad era and Abbasid era, to Arab royal families and until today, political and religious elites of the Arab and Islamic worlds trace back their origins to this land. And it is towards this land that more than one billion believers around the world turn their faces five times a day. Blocking arms sales to Saudi Arabia will put the territorial integrity of the Arab world, its security, and the stability of the region in jeopardy. The current balance maintained by Riyadh and its allies will be in a grave danger, and with it American security and interests.



AFF LEADS TO INCREASED ARMS SALES FROM RUSSIA

REDUCING ARM SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD CAUSE A FLIP TOWARDS RUSSIA. BRADLEY, 18 [John R. Bradley (University College London, Dartmouth College and Exeter College, Oxford), 1 December 2018, Coffee House, 12-1-2018, "Has Saudi Arabia just pivoted towards Russia?", <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2018/12/has-saudi-arabia-just-pivoted-towards-russia/>]

For all but the most harried journalist motivated by a need to pay off the mortgage, the annual G20 summit – being held this weekend in Buenos Aires – is typically viewed as a perfect cure for insomnia. Who will stand next to whom in the family photo? Will the wording of a final statement be agreed by all leaders before the official deadline? Yawn yawn yawn. However, there is an exception to every rule. And yesterday's opening ceremony proved to be just that. First, a hot mic picked up parts of a tense conversation between the French President and Saudi Crown Prince. While hardly a slanging match, it was the most undiplomatic spat between a Western and Saudi leader ever made public. That was followed by the equally unprecedented spectacle of a bro-five between the latter and Russia's Vladimir Putin. In the space of an hour, we may have witnessed what future history books will say was the moment Saudi Arabia's relations pivoted from the West towards Russia. The relationship between the democratic West and theocratic Saudi Arabia has often been described as a marriage of convenience. The exchange between President Emmanuel Macron and Crown Prince Mohammed will certainly sound familiar to anyone who has been through a messy but not especially bitter divorce: MbS: Don't worry. M: I do worry. I am worried, because I am very exp... MbS: He told me. Thank you. M: I don't want... MbS: No. M: You never listen to me. MbS: I will listen, of course. M: ... MbS: It's OK. I can deal with it. The official word from the Elysee Palace is that the President was giving the Crown Prince a 'very firm' warning over the murder in Istanbul of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi and the continuing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. In the Western media, the two issues have become inextricably linked. For having failed in their effort to oust the Crown Prince, there is now as a push – led by the Washington Post, which has tripled its coverage of Yemen during the past six weeks – to bring an end to the Yemen conflict as retribution for Khashoggi's slaughter. And this is especially embarrassing for Macron. As recently as April, he pledged France's 'full support' for the Saudi position on Yemen, while slamming the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels the Saudis and their allies are battling against. Predictably, this came on the back of arms agreements worth \$18bn. But Macron's exasperated 'You never listen to me' may have been in reference to the Saudi ruler's decision last year to kidnap Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri during a visit to Riyadh, when he was beaten up and forced to read a resignation letter on Saudi TV. It was only after Macron stepped in that Hariri was finally released, and was subsequently able to resume his role as prime minister. In this way, Macron has been strutting around the world lecturing other countries and leaders how to behave as, his critics argue, a way of diverting attention from his own abysmal failures at home. Now he is in the unenviable position of being not only the least popular French president in modern history but also aligned most closely abroad with a Saudi ruler who is perhaps the most despised in the world. Putin, of course, is watching all this with relish. He is experienced in the art of bumping off political opponents, and having eradicated almost all traces of meaningful democracy and freedom of expression at home is able to offer the Crown Prince the hand of friendship without fear of repercussions. He laid the groundwork last year during an official state visit to Moscow by King Salman — the first ever by a reigning monarch. They signed a \$3bn arms deal and pledged tens of billions more in bilateral trade. At the time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the event as 'an historical moment'. Now Saudi Arabia is even negotiating the purchase of Russia's formidable S-400 defense missile system, while threatening to cancel arms deals with the Western countries and instead purchase weaponry from Russia and China if sanctions are imposed over the Khashoggi affair. As with Syria and Iran, the Kremlin is demonstrating how, in contrast to the fickle West, it can rely on to remain a steadfast ally to countries in the Middle East it considers friendly, come hell or high water. The partnership between Saudi Arabia and Russia is not going to flourish overnight. But the crucial difference between our political leaders and theirs is that the latter think not in terms of election cycles while feeding at the trough, but rather how to forge deep strategic partnerships that will bear fruit decades, even centuries, in the future.



INCREASED CIRCUMVENTION GENERALLY

THE PLAN GUARANTEES CIRCUMVENTION MILLER, 12 (Nathanael Tenorio Miller intends to receive a J.D. from Cornell Law School in 2013., The Leahy Law: Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, and the Consequences, Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 45, 2012, <https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Miller-final.pdf>)

What happened to Najib and Ahmad was not an isolated incident, perpetrated by individual soldiers or commanders.¹⁴ Instead, it is a symptom of the wider failure of the Afghan government to address human rights abuses within their armed forces. Three months after Najib and Ahmad's arrest, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, abductions, forcible land grabs, and illegal raids by irregular armed groups and the Afghan Local Police (ALP).¹⁵ This incident also demonstrates the consequences of the United States' circumventing its own laws to permit the distribution of military aid and equipment to countries that violate their citizens' human rights. In many instances, units receiving aid from the United States are responsible for extra-judicial killings, torture, extortion, and rape.¹⁶ The failure of legislation to prevent military aid from flowing to foreign military units responsible for atrocities stems in part from a long-standing pattern in which increasingly broad Executive power pushes back against legislative attempts to limit Presidential authority in foreign policy decision-making.¹⁷ Often, Congress legislates a foreign policy position and the Executive works around the intent, if not always the letter, of the law. Because of subsequent congressional inaction, and a series of Supreme Court decisions effectively depriving any potential party of means to sue for enforcement of human rights legislation, the Executive remains in firm control.¹⁸ Without any independent check on its authority, the Executive's internal controls are insufficient to prevent funding units that have committed human rights abuses.



CASE IMPACT ANSWERS

MIDDLE EAST WAR

MIDDLE EAST WAR WON'T ESCALATE—REGIONAL MILITARIES ARE TOO WEAK. ROVNER, 14 [*John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair of International Politics and National Security, Associate Professor of Political Science, and Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies @ Southern Methodist University, **Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University (*Joshua, **Caitlin Talmadge, Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, The George Washington University, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/less-more-future-us-military-persian-gulf>)]

Happily, however, the situation for the United States today is more like the 1950s than the 1970s. The major regional powers all suffer from serious shortcomings in conventional military power, meaning that none of them will be able to seriously threaten the balance for the foreseeable future. Iran's military has suffered greatly from decades of war and sanctions. Iraq's fledgling security services are almost exclusively focused on internal problems. And Saudi Arabia, the richest country in the region, seems content to rely on a dense network of defenses and proxies rather than pursue any real power projection capabilities. While there are reasons to worry about internal stability, especially given the ongoing fight against ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), **there is very little chance of a major interstate war.** Moreover, threats to oil shipping in the Gulf are real but not overwhelming. All of this points to a simple and optimistic conclusion: the United States can protect its core interest in the free flow of oil without having to commit to a large and enduring naval or ground presence to the Gulf.

MIDDLE EAST WAR WON'T ESCALATE – BALANCED ALLIANCES, CHINESE NON-INTERVENTION, AND COOPERATION PREVENT GREAT POWER DRAW-IN. MEAD, 14 [Walter Russell Mead, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University, Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine and a non-resident Scholar at the Hudson Institute, 2014 ("Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?" *Huffington Post*, July 7th, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html)]

The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago. **GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW** What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms. Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending. But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible. **AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES** And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain. Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close. While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.



NO CHANCE OF INSTABILITY. OBAID, 11 (Nawaf, Senior Fellow – King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and Ph.D. Candidate in War Studies – King's College (London), "Why Saudi Arabia is Stable Amid the Mideast Unrest", Washington Post, 3-10, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030904372.html>)

Saudi Arabia shares some characteristics that have been causes for unrest - such as high unemployment among its youth and public-sector corruption - but the kingdom has **strengths** its neighbors lack. Its strong economy and weak opposition are clear. Less understood in the West is another critical element: a nationalism that has been fostered by and is strongly linked to the monarchy. These qualities make it **highly unlikely** that the unrest in other Arab countries will spread to the kingdom. Economically, Saudi Arabia is able to fund projects that satisfy the needs of its growing population. Record revenue from energy exports has been invested in infrastructure and social services. It has spent tens of billions the past several years on universities and other schools, hospitals, rail lines and housing developments. An additional \$29.5 billion in financial benefits to poorer Saudis - including help for the unemployed - was recently announced, as were raises for public servants and efforts to mitigate inflationary pressures. Last year, the salaries of all soldiers and military officers were increased. Although Saudi Arabia has amassed more than \$500 billion in foreign reserves during the reign of King Abdullah - a measure widely seen as representative of the government's fiscal responsibility - the kingdom still faces economic challenges. By world standards, Saudi Arabia is wealthy; the global poverty line is \$1.25 per day. All Saudis receive housing assistance and free health care and education; per capita income is about \$18,500. Yet many Saudis feel that this standard of living is not commensurate with a country so rich in resources. To address embarrassment and unhappiness, the government launched a national strategy a few years ago to combat poverty, aiming to reduce the number of those living below the poverty level (\$1,015 per month) from 13.3 percent in 2010 to 2.2 percent in 2020. Another initiative is on track to help the 1.63 percent of Saudis living in "extreme poverty" (less than \$450 per month) by the end of this year. The culturally conservative Saudi society is also resistant to revolution. This reticence toward unpredictable change helps explain why the grass-roots "liberal" movement in the kingdom is just a few scattered groups that carry little support among the general population. Islamist reform movements are also small and fragmented. Five recent petitions by these groups gathered fewer than 4,500 signatures. Historically, Saudi Arabia has been dominated by allegiance to tribe and region. The most serious threat to Saudi leadership in the past decade may have been posed by al-Qaeda, but that group lost whatever public support it had after a series of bombings in Riyadh in 2003. A concerted counterterrorism effort, supported by the population, wiped out the group's network in the kingdom by 2006. Meanwhile, over the past two decades, a growing nationalist sentiment has been binding together Saudi society. External threats, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and, more recently, the rise of Iran and its anti-Arab policies, coupled with internal crises such as the al-Qaeda bombings have bolstered this patriotism. Saudi leaders have pursued domestic policies to unify the population, including the 1.5 million minority Shiites, who have long harbored grievances over discrimination and lack of opportunity. Loan programs have been expanded to bring students from outlying tribal areas to urban schools, shifting their allegiance from local to national leaders. The military has been recruiting from across the social spectrum. Restrictions against free expression have been loosened. Vibrant debates and government criticism are common in the press, as coverage of the disastrous Jeddah floods recently and the government's initial inept response showed. Huge celebrations were held during the last Saudi National Day, whereas in the past, conservative religious authorities had opposed any expressions of fidelity to the state. The country's soccer league and national team have also formed important catalysts for fostering a strong sense of pride in being Saudi. Another simple but critical factor is that King Abdullah is a deeply popular leader of a monarchy that the vast majority of Saudis view as legitimate. The "Allegiance Commission" - which chooses the next leader from the sons and grandsons of King Abdulaziz, who united the kingdom in 1932- ensures that transitions are smooth and popularly supported. Satisfaction with the leadership, economic strength and nascent nationalism mark a unity in Saudi Arabia that is of a different fabric than those that are tearing across the Arab world. While other regimes reap the bitter harvest of irresponsible fiscal policies, social disunion and unpopular leadership, the Saudi monarchy is likely to remain a bulwark of regional stability and security.



IRANIAN AGGRESSION TURN

1 NC

SAUDI COALITION IS KEEPING IRANIAN FUNDED HOUTHIS AT BAY, BUT THEY WILL TAKE OVER YEMEN ABSENT US SUPPORT TO THE COALITION – CAUSES IRAN PROLIF, REGIONAL AGGRESSION, AND TERRORISM. GORDON, 19 [Evelyn Gordon 1-30-19 [Israeli journalist and commentator, former reporter for the Jerusalem Post, BA Princeton], "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally," JNS.org, <https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/> (January 30, 2019)]

An expert report submitted to the U.N. Security Council this month concluded that Iran is illegally funding Yemen's Houthi rebels by giving them oil, which they can sell for cash. From last year's version of the same report, we learned that Iran is arming the Houthis with missiles and drones, in violation of a U.N. arms embargo. Thus whatever the Houthis were when the war started, they are now effectively an Iranian subsidiary, dependent on Tehran for both cash and arms. That is just one of many reasons to be appalled by the Senate's renewed effort to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led fight against the Houthis. Not only is this strategically idiotic, but it contradicts the Senate's own stated goal of protecting human rights. And the legislation reintroduced this week sends a terrible message, even if a presidential veto will presumably keep it from becoming law. On the strategic side, let's start with the fact that an organization whose official slogan is "God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam" isn't one Americans should want ruling anything, much less a country whose location enables it to dominate a strategic waterway vital to the global oil industry. And without the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis would long since have taken over Yemen. In other countries, like Syria and Lebanon, Iranian military and financial aid has repeatedly enabled its proxies to overwhelm the opposition; that this hasn't yet happened in Yemen is only because there, unlike in Syria and Lebanon, the Saudi coalition has provided its local allies with substantial assistance, including airstrikes. Second, empowering allies is always better than empowering enemies. Granted, Saudi Arabia a highly imperfect ally, but it is at least nominally in America's camp. Iran, in contrast, has been America's avowed enemy since 1979, and its proxies have been responsible for hundreds, if not thousands, of American deaths in Lebanon and Iraq. Thus for the Senate to weaken Riyadh and strengthen Tehran, which targeting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen does, would be foolish at any time. But it's especially foolish at a time when America ostensibly seeks to exert maximum pressure on Iran to curb its multifarious bad behavior—its nuclear program, about which it has repeatedly lied; its ballistic-missile program, which defies a U.N. Security Council resolution; its regional aggression, which has already enabled it to dominate Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; and its terrorism, including recent attacks in the heart of Europe. Maximum pressure requires both financial and military components, as the case of the Soviet Union shows. It was America's massive military buildup under Ronald Reagan, combined with its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which made Moscow's military adventurism too expensive for its ailing economy to support. Iran, like the Soviet Union, has a weak economy, which has been further undermined by America's reinstatement of stringent sanctions. Yet the economic pressure will be multiplied if Iran has to keep pouring resources into its numerous proxy wars rather than being able to win them cheaply. Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria obviously further this effort, since Iran must keep replacing what Israel destroys. But the Saudi coalition in Yemen is similarly forcing Iran to keep expending resources on a war it thought would be easily won. Thus if Washington is serious about countering Tehran and doesn't want to risk American troops in the process, supporting regional allies who are bleeding Iran is the only alternative.

National Association for Urban Debate Leagues

THAT CLOSES THE HORMUZ STRAIT, CAUSES A GLOBAL RECESSION, AND DRAWS IN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA – OUR EVIDENCE ASSUMES US IMPORT INDEPENDENCE AND IRANIAN CAUTION.

KOPITS, 17 [(Kopits, Steven, MA International Econ and MBA Finance @ Columbia, degree @ Haverford. "Oil could top \$200 if Saudi-Iran war breaks out". CNBC News. November 10, 2017. <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/10/saudi-iran-war-would-create-domino-effect-of-global-disaster-commentary.html>)]

Events appear to be spinning out of control in the Middle East, and the threat a Saudi-Iranian war is looking increasingly credible. Make no mistake, an out and out conflict between the two nations would be an unmitigated disaster for the region and the world. Last week, Houthi rebels in Yemen launched a missile targeting a Saudi airport near Riyadh. The missile was intercepted, but a Saudi-led military coalition battling the Yemeni rebels called the attack a "blatant military aggression by the Iranian regime which may amount to an act of war." The Saudis reserved the "right to respond", according to the official Saudi Press Agency. The major OPEC oil producers, all abutting the Persian Gulf, export almost 20 percent of the world's oil supply through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to global markets. The strait, a mere 34 miles wide at its narrowest, sits pinched between Iran to the north and Oman to the south. Were a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran to erupt, this chokepoint could easily be closed. Indeed, shipping could stop even before a single ship is damaged. If insurers perceive an imminent risk of attack on a tanker in the region, they would either suspend insurance or charge exorbitant rates for coverage. Under the circumstances, vessel owners could opt to wait out the hostilities rather than risk their tankers. Of course, the strait could also be closed as a direct result of military hostilities, for example, by Iran. The impact of such a closure on the global economy would be severe and immediate. For example, the Suez Crisis of 1957 saw 10 percent of the world's oil production taken off the market. Within a month, the U.S. and Europe were facing a recession which would last the better part of a year. In 1973, the Arab-Israeli War and resulting Arab OPEC embargo would bring long lines to gas stations as the oil price quadrupled. On an annual basis, global oil production held steady, but Persian Gulf exports to the U.S. fell by 1.2 million barrels / day, or about 7 percent of total U.S. consumption. This oil shock would plunge the U.S. into a recession which lasted for two years. In the event of a Saudi-Iranian hostilities lead to a sustained outage of Persian Gulf exports, a severe and prompt global recession will follow similarly. Much as in 1973, U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf still amount to 8 percent of consumption, the loss of which was sufficient to knock 10 percent from GDP from 1973 to 1975. However, China and other importers would seek to outbid the U.S. on its imports from countries like Nigeria, Angola and even Brazil and Columbia. In all, U.S. imports could fall by 15 percent of total consumption--twice the drop from 1957 to 1973 and sufficient to plunge the U.S. into a deep recession lasting years. On the other hand, U.S. import dependence has fallen dramatically since the start of the shale revolution. Even as the U.S. coastal regions would suffer from high oil prices, boom times would return to Louisiana, Texas and on up to North Dakota and Canada's Alberta province. A loss of 20 percent of the world's oil supply would push oil prices into the \$200 / barrel range. The shale sector would see its glory days. Those countries without material oil production would suffer the most, notably Europe and East Asia, in particular Japan and South Korea. China's situation would be dire. In the last few years, Chinese import dependence has become acute. Oil imports cover more than three-quarters of total Chinese consumption, and half of China's imports originate in the Persian Gulf. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not only put China into recession, but given the high degree of financialization of the economy, could create a wider societal and political crisis. The reaction of the Chinese government is difficult to anticipate, but China would certainly bring maximal pressure on the U.S. and Persian Gulf countries to end the conflict, by whatever means. The ultimate takeaway for China would be the necessity to build, at all speed, a global military and diplomatic presence capable of projecting force to influence events in the Middle East and, if necessary, to displace the U.S. in the region. Finally, given the history of cooperation between North Korea and Iran on missile programs, the threat of missile strikes from Iran could exacerbate tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon could become the absolute priority in the conflict and lead to a rapid escalation of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.



HOUTHIS ARE WORSE

URNS THE CASE – HOUTHIS ARE A BAJILLION TIMES WORSE THAN THE SAUDIS. GORDON, 19 [Evelyn Gordon 1-30-19 [Israeli journalist and commentator, former reporter for the Jerusalem Post, BA Princeton], "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally," JNS.org, <https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/> (January 30, 2019)]

Still, how can America possibly support a coalition that's committing gross human-rights violations in Yemen? The answer is easy: **Horrible as Riyadh's behavior is, the Houthis are worse.** Thus **by ending support for the Saudi coalition, American would empower an even greater evil. A perfect example is the issue of child soldiers.** The New York Times ran a front-page story last month accusing the Saudis of using Sudanese child soldiers in Yemen. Though it didn't provide many hard numbers, it implied that there could well be several thousand such soldiers. This is incontrovertibly bad. But what the Times carefully concealed from its readers is that the Saudis' use of child soldiers pales before that of the Houthis. According to an Associated Press report earlier that month, **the Houthis openly admit to employing a whopping 18,000 child soldiers.** Moreover, while the Saudis are taking boys aged 14 to 17, **the Houthis are using children as young as 10.** And while the Saudis are recruiting their impoverished volunteers by offering pay sufficient to make their families permanently self-supporting (assuming the returning veterans invest it, as most do, in profit-making ventures like cattle or shops), **the Houthis use other tactics: They kidnap children outright, coerce them to enlist in exchange for a relative's freedom from jail, or force poor parents to choose between "volunteering" their child and making an unaffordable cash contribution to the war effort. Parents who resist are shot.** In short, **bad as the Saudis' human-rights violations are, the Houthis' violations are far worse.** And **by ending support for the Saudi coalition, the Senate would consign Yemen to the barbarous rule of those very same Houthis.**

Case solvency proves the link – if Saudi is still strong, they don't solve their case – our DA isn't reliant on Iran becoming a regional hegemon but rather just increased aggression EVEN IF it fails – also they don't need military might – the Houthis are on Iran's side



AFF ALLOWS IRAN TO EXPAND REGIONALLY

AFF PLAN WOULD ALLOW IRAN TO GAIN REGIONAL DOMINANCE AND SHUT OFF MAJOR OIL SHIPPING LANES. POSEY & PHILLIPS, 18

[Madyson Hutchinson Posey is a former Research and Administrative Assistant. James Phillips is a Senior Research Fellow @The Heritage Foundation, Ending U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences," 6 December 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous>]

Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah ("Supporters of Allah") movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missile strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants "Death to America" and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it. The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations, except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia, France, and other countries. The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political settlement impossible. The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this war with or without U.S. support. Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran's hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.



IMPACT FRAMING

NUKE WAR OUTWEIGHS

NUKE WAR OUTWEIGHS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE BOULDING, 78 [Ken, is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, "Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354]

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalgamate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of international peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war" which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational corporations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science-based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research standards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, armaments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, however, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, to change the course of events as we head toward ultimate catastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated methodologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce something like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which reinforced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moderately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-1974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temperate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconvenience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twentieth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not accounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, advancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if anything goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of isolated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peace.



WAR TURNS THE AFF

WAR TURNS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE – EXACERBATES GENDERED VIOLENCE. PAIN, 15 Rachel, Department of Geography, and Centre for Social Justice and Community Action, Political Geography, 'Intimate war,' 44 . pp. 64-73.

More directly, there are increases in domestic and sexual violence in times and zones of war. In Jones' (2013) account of American soldiers' return from Afghanistan and Iraq, she documents rising rates of homicide committed by service members and new veterans, and rape, sexual assault and domestic violence resulting from the effect of military culture, all of which are consistent with earlier wars across history (see also Leatherman, 2011). Through these continuities, Jones (2010) argues, war keeps going. Militarization, conflict, post-conflict and displacement exacerbate domestic violence, and it becomes more lethal where weapons are easily available (Adelman, 2003; Cockburn, 2004). War also presents new forms of violence against women (WHO, 2013); Sela-Shayovitz (2010) draws direct links between terrorism and increasing femicide in Israel, while Mojab (2004) documents a rise in the 'nationalist tradition' of honour killings in Iraqi Kurdistan after the 1991 Gulf War. There are especially high rates of violence in the transition from war to peace, as gender-based violence shifts from the public back to the private sphere (Hans, 2004).

WAR TURNS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE NOT VICE VERSA. GOLDSTEIN, 1 – IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice." Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps, among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.⁹ So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression." The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.



Moral equality means even a small risk of preventing extinction outweighs structural violence – future generations. Bostrom, 12 (Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, “We’re Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,” interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity’s existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn’t matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn’t matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn’t automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

High risk, low probability impacts come first – necessary for human survival. Vlek, 10 (Charles, professor emeritus, behavioral and social sciences @ Groningen university, 2010, "Judicious management of uncertain risks: I. Developments and criticisms of risk analysis and precautionary reasoning," Routledge, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669871003629887/>)

Serious uncertain risks in modern society Clearly, risk-taking is needed for human survival and development: ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’. Many real-life risks can be reasonably well assessed or even calculated beforehand; both the nature of a negative outcome and its probability may be relatively clear a priori. Thus, at least in principle, it is possible to contemplate such risks as either high, medium or low, as either acceptable or not, and/or as more or less controllable by the risk-taker. However, the enormous technological development and economic expansion in the industrial countries since World War II have gradually caused new risks to arise (see the examples in Table 2). These risks may be called ‘environmental’, but in most cases, public health seems equally at stake, either directly (as in avian influenza) or indirectly (as in GMOs). Page (1978) has described the new environmental risks using nine characteristics: (1) ignorance of mechanism, (2) modest benefits, (3) catastrophic costs, (4) low probability of disaster, (5) internal benefits, (6) external costs, (7) collective risk, (8) latency of effects, and (9) irreversibility of effects. Clearly, such risks Journal of Risk Research 521 are serious, complex, uncertain and socio-politically ambiguous, four ‘challenges of contemporary risks’ as identified by Klinke et al. (2006; see also Klinke and Renn 2002). Such uncertain, ill-quantifiable risks cannot be clearly delineated, structured, assessed and evaluated. This makes them (gradually) distinct from ‘certain’, reasonably quantifiable risks.