

# KRITIK KILLER: WINNING ANSWERS TO THE CRITIQUE

Latin America Edition

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Ryan Galloway  
Associate Professor of Communication Studies  
Samford University

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## INTRODUCTION: A GUIDE TO ANSWERING CRITIQUE ARGUMENTS

BY RICH EDWARDS, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

The entire purpose of *Kritik Killer* is to give high school debaters an edge in answering critique arguments. The philosophy of *Kritik Killer* is that the use of critiques in high school debates undermines the educational purpose of policy debate and could, if it were to catch on, actually endanger the future of interscholastic policy debate.

If you are a high school debater or coach who has never heard a critique debate, *Kritik Killer* is not for you. You are obviously fortunate enough to participate in a circle of policy debate where students still discuss relevant policy matters. I trust that your debate circle remains free of critique arguments, and I encourage you to spend your preparation time working on the specifics of the poverty topic rather than reading about the esoteric arguments contained in these pages.

If you debate in a circle where critique arguments are every-round occurrences, you probably won't benefit from *Kritik Killer*. If critiques are this common in your debate circle, you are most likely being judged by college debaters who are enamored with the kritik. In such an environment, you might as well forget about debating economic engagement issues and spend your days wading through the nearly incomprehensible writings of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. For judges who are willing to follow radical postmodern theorists into the rejection of reason itself, there is little here that will help you. Debaters who live in the world of critiques rarely challenge them directly; they answer one critique with another or they argue that their case actually advances the purpose of the critique. *Kritik Killer* briefs, for the most part, directly oppose the critique in question, thus offering little to teams wishing to "out-radical" the radical critiques.

*Kritik Killer* is designed for those debaters and coaches who occasionally must answer critique arguments. Many judges and coaches freely confess that they are concerned about the way that critique arguments are changing policy debate, but they often find themselves voting for critiques because the answers they hear are so inadequate. *Kritik Killer* is designed to correct these inadequacies.

*So What Is the "Critique?"*

Well, "the" critique means something quite specific. The critique ("critical theory") got its name from German philosophers associated with the "Frankfurt School," which explains why it is sometimes identified by the German spelling, "kritik." The "Frankfurt School" philosophers (Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Jurgen Habermas, and others) shared an association with the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany. All of the Frankfurt School philosophers were advocates of Karl Marx's theory of "historical determinism." This theory held that the excesses of capitalism will inevitably lead to its collapse, allowing "labor" – the only ultimate value – to result in the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Thus, the future of the world will feature an inevitable replacement of capitalism with communism. The Frankfurt School toiled, however, with the question of why the communist transition, if inevitable, seems to be so slow in coming. One common answer is that capitalist power persists because it has succeeded in "masking" its oppressive power. Capitalists mask their evil intentions by using progressive symbols, deceiving the workers into continuing to accept their chains.

Consider some U.S.-based examples of "masking." Marxists believed that the Great Depression of the 1930s was capitalism's last gasp – it should have represented the death knell of capitalism. Yet Franklin Delano Roosevelt with his seemingly progressive moves, "masked" the evils of capitalism by providing temporary jobs through the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. The creation of the Social Security system pacified the masses. Keep in mind that Marxists have not given up on the theory of historical determinism – they still believe that communism will inevitably triumph over capitalism. But the transition to communism will come sooner if the prophets of the movement can

succeed in “unmasking” capitalist symbols. Thus for Marxist theorists, any effort of Western governments to do good can only be for the purpose of masking evil intentions. The critique, therefore, becomes the ultimate “good is really bad” argument. Anything that the United States federal government does which seems (on the surface) to be good is actually bad – it only serves to delay the inevitable transition to a communist future. Given the serious recession of late 2008 and early 2009, it is now likely that kritik teams will argue that a shift to socialism/communism would be possible if we would only allow capitalism to die a natural death.

Defenders of various postmodern critiques may argue that their particular theorist has moved beyond the Marxist grand narrative. Yet if you look under the hood, almost every postmodern theorist (Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Agamben, Baudrillard, Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Deleuze, and numerous others) unabashedly pursue the Marxist narrative. The purpose of their critique is to unmask the evils of capitalism so that it can more quickly be overthrown. Journalist and noted art critic Giles Auty, wrote the following in the June 2000 issue of *Quadrant*: “To deal with postmodernism is like struggling with a Hydra—and one which constantly mutates. Among the Hydra’s heads we might begin with deconstruction, post-colonialism, revisionist history, gender theory, political correctness, multiculturalism and feminism. All share one basic characteristic, in taking their flavor from neo-Marxist theory, which may be identified clearly from a continuing passion for simplistic groupings, explanations and Would-be solutions. Content no longer with communism versus capitalism nor the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie we are now exhorted to believe that the true solution to all of modern society’s ills lies in warfare between men and women, blacks and whites, homosexuals and straights.”

I draw the connection between the postmodern critique and Marxism not to tar-and-feather postmodern theorists with a Marxist label. Serious scholars should certainly be free to debate the merits of Marxism. I draw the connection so that the debater can understand why postmodern theorists are so concerned with the *unmasking* of motives and assumptions. One might normally say, “who cares” what the motives of United States government would be in addressing security problems around the world. These motives are irrelevant compared to the hard reality that threats exist in the world, and need to be resolved. Yet for the postmodern theorist, the motive is, in fact, the most important thing. The profound skepticism of the postmodern theorist leads to the conclusion that the federal government’s action can only be for the purpose of masking the evils of capitalism. Thus the seemingly “good” act becomes actually bad because it perpetuates the “violence” and “evil” of capitalism, giving it an extended life in the United States and undeserved credibility in other countries. Whatever undermines Western power and influence is, therefore, ultimately good. This led one of the leading French postmodern theorists, Jean Baudrillard to make the following comment about the 9/11 terrorist attacks: “The entire world wanted the event to happen. In essence it was the terrorists who committed the deed, but it is we who wished for it” (as quoted in *The Australian*, Oct. 12, 2004, p. 29).

#### *How Are Critiques Used in Policy Debates?*

Critiques are almost always used to turn the debate away from any meaningful discussion of U.S. military policy in order to focus on imponderable questions such as the following: (1) Capitalism: Is capitalism the root cause of insecurity in the world?; (2) Logic: Can we really know anything at all?; (3) Language: By referring to persons as “terrorists” or “rogue states” do we stigmatize them?; (4) Governmentality: By using government to do something do we undermine personal responsibility?; (5) Psychoanalysis: By taking actions in the realm of military policy, are we masking deep seated human impulses and desires? Kenneth Gergen, professor of psychology at Swarthmore College, says that critical tools are now sufficient to turn any real-world discussion into postmodern jibberish:

We now stand with a mammoth arsenal of critical weaponry at our disposal. The power of such technology is unmatched by anything within the scholarly traditions of longstanding. There is virtually no hypothesis, body of evidence, ideological stance, literary canon, value commitment or logical edifice that cannot be dismantled, demolished or derided with the implements at hand. Only rank prejudice, force of habit or the anguished retaliation of

deflated egos can muster a defence against the intellectual explosives within our grasp. Everywhere now in the academic world the capitalist exploiters, male chauvinist pigs, cultural imperialists, warmongers, WASP bigots, wimp liberals and scientific dogmatists are on the run. (*After Postmodernism: Reconstructing Ideology Critique*, 1994, p. 59).

### *What's Wrong With Critiques?*

First, critiques circumvent the logical processes for decision that have made policy debate such a powerful tool for teaching critical thinking skills. Unlike other debate forms – Lincoln Douglas, public forum, parliamentary debate – policy debate has had the benefit of logical decision models. The prototypical model is the “stock issues” – significance of harm, inherency, solvency, desirability (advantage over disadvantage), and topicality. The critique doesn't operate within any of the stock issues. It totally ignores harm, inherency, and solvency. It fails as a disadvantage argument because it offers no reason that the affirmative plan uniquely causes the critique. U.S. federal government programs promote free market capitalism regardless of whether the plan is adopted. Many policy debaters and judges have moved beyond the “stock issues” decision model to policy making, hypothesis testing, or some other decision paradigm. Yet the critique attempts to operate outside of all such models. In fact, most postmodern critiques attack the very notion of “linear logic” as an inherently destructive Western mindset.

Second, critiques are internally contradictory – the only thing they are certain about is that there is no such thing as certainty. Consider the following summary of Jacques Derrida's assault on logic itself:

Derrida believed Western thought has been riddled since the time of Plato by a cancer he called “logocentrism.” This is, at its core, the assumption that language describes the world in a fairly transparent way. You might think that the words you use are impartial tools for understanding the world – but this is, Derrida argued, a delusion. If I describe, say, Charles Manson as “mad,” many people would assume I was describing an objective state called “madness” that exists in the world. Derrida would say the idea of “madness” is just a floating concept, a “signifier,” that makes little sense except in relation to other words. The thing out there – the actual madness, the “signified” – is almost impossible to grasp; we are lost in a sea of words that prevent us from actually experiencing reality directly. Derrida wants to break down the belief that there is an objective external reality connected to our words, a world “out there” that can be explored through language, science and rationality. There are, he said, no universal truths, no progress and ultimately no sense, only “decentred,” small stories that are often silenced by a search for rationality and consistency. The Enlightenment – the 18th century tradition that gave us our notions of rationality and progress – is just another empty narrative, a sweet set of delusions. (Johann Hari, *The Independent*, Oct. 13, 2004, p. 39)

Such relativist arguments were actually around at the time of Plato. B.W. Van Norden, professor of philosophy at Vassar College, described Plato's response as follows: “About 2,400 years ago, Plato presented what almost all philosophers have since regarded as a definitive refutation of cognitive relativism. Plato argued (in response to Protagoras) that cognitive relativism is self-contradictory” (*What Is Relativism*, Aug. 24, 2006, Available at: [www.faculty.vassar.edu/~brvannor/Phil105/](http://www.faculty.vassar.edu/~brvannor/Phil105/)). Peter Suber, philosophy professor at Earlham College, also commented on this contradiction: “I have trouble accepting these postmodern propositions because they are not only indemonstrable but self-subverting. Traditional philosophy admirably recognized the difficulties of advocating relativism without self-contradiction. To simplify these: if I say that ‘all beliefs are relative to historical circumstances,’ then this claim applies to itself. If it is false, we can ignore it; if it is true, then it is merely relative to its time and place, hence not true in general or true for most other people” (*Earlhamite*, Winter 1993, p. 12). Keith Windschuttle, professor of history at Australia's New South Wales Institute of Technology, wrote the following in his 1996 book, *The Killing of History*: “It is not difficult to show that a relativist concept of truth of this kind is untenable. If what is true is always relative to a particular society, there are no propositions that can be true across all societies. However, this means that Foucault's own claim cannot be true for all societies. So

he contradicts himself. What he says cannot be true at all” (p. 131).

Third, critique theorists become unwitting allies of ultraconservative philosophies in Western societies. Those who would defend unbridled capitalism argue that the poor should be left to fend for themselves; the best way to help the poor is by allowing rich capitalists to pursue their own self interests – the wealth can then “trickle-down” to the poor. Traditional liberalism (along with its democratic humanist allies) argues that in a good society, people should accept the responsibility to assist less fortunate individuals. Harvard philosopher John Rawls, for example, argued in his 1971 book, *A Theory of Justice*, that justice requires a society to attempt to serve the needs of the “least advantaged.” Modern philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that there is a “categorical imperative” to take action against injustice. Postmodernism takes a cynical view toward any efforts to correct social or environmental evils: such efforts simply mask the deeper crimes of capitalism. Ironically, such postmodern philosophies end up joining forces with ultraconservatives who advocate inaction in the face of tragedy.

Kenneth Gergen, professor of psychology at Swarthmore College, warned of this postmodern tendency in the 1994 book, *After Postmodernism: Reconstructing Ideology Critique*:

As I am proposing, the common form of argumentation, with assertion and critique serving as the adjacency pair of focal significance, is deeply problematic. Critique establishes a binary ontology, reifying the terms of disagreement, and removing other entries from the ledger. Further, critique as a rhetorical move has the effect of demeaning the opposition, generating animosity, atomizing the culture and blocking the way to resolution. Contemporary critique, informed by post-empiricist, critical and post-structuralist thought, carries with it the additional difficulties of favouring the very kinds of totalizing discourses against which it is set, and destroying the grounds of its own rationality. (p. 70)

Fourth, the value relativism inherent in postmodern critiques enables despotism and oppression. Most postmodern theorists argue that all value hierarchies are hypocritical – they are merely examples of “choice posing as truth.” This cynical relativism leads to the conclusion that the Rwandan genocide is really no worse than the imagined violence of free enterprise capitalism. Richard Wolin, professor of history at the City University of New York describes the danger of moral relativism in his 2004 book, *The Seduction of Unreason*:

The postmodern left risks depriving democracy of valuable normative resources at an hour of extreme historical need. In times of crisis – such as the current global war on terrorism in which basic rights and liberties have been manifestly jeopardized – that the elements of a “democratic minimum” be preserved is imperative. Postmodern political thought, which devalues coalition building and consensus in favor of identity politics and political agonistics, prematurely discounts this heritage. It thereby inherits one of the most problematic traits of “leftism”: the cynical assumption that democratic norms are little more than a veil for vested interests. Of course, they can and do serve such purposes, but they also offer a crucial element of ethical leverage by means of which dominant interests may be exposed and transformed. The political gains that have been registered during the last three decades by previously marginalized social groups (women, gays, ethnic minorities) testify to a logic of political inclusion. They demonstrate capacities for progressive political change that remain lodged in democratic precepts and institutions. To surrender entirely these potentials means abandoning progressive politics altogether (pp. xiv-xv).

Professor Wolin details the numerous instances in which leading postmodern theorists were enablers of fascism. This list begins with Martin Heidegger and Paul De Man who defended Hitler’s “final solution” during the Nazi era. Michel Foucault chose to become an enthusiastic advocate of Iran’s turn toward Islamic radicalism. Wolin charges postmodernism with providing philosophical cover for despots around the globe:

This idea of cultural relativism, which had been canonized in the work of Claude Levi-Strauss during the 1950s, was then epistemologically enshrined by the French philosophies of



difference – Derrida, Deleuze, and Lyotard – that attained prominence during the 1960s. Yet once the much-emulated Third World Liberation movements in Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, and a variety of African nations (Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, the Central African Republic) turned despotic, the afore-mentioned philosophies of difference became increasingly difficult to defend. Instead, what was once presented as a solution now appeared to be part of the problem: in the name of these philosophies one could seemingly justify all manner of non-Western ethical and political excess – Foucault's strange fascination with Iran's "revolution of the Mullahs" offers an excellent case in point. (p. 270)

In the ideal world of the postmodern theorist, democratic capitalism would be replaced by a Marxist utopia. We have a few examples of efforts to construct Marxist utopias: the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and the various Eastern European dictatorships. All such efforts have not just failed – they have been remarkable failures. Yet the postmodern insistence on pursuing Marxist narratives even given the history of such failures leads professor Wolin to observe a postmodern "fascination with fascism" (p. xii).

A sixth problem is that most kritiks, despite their claims to the contrary, actually follow a utilitarian logic where the end justifies the means. They argue that we should not waste our time considering whether helping people is "the right thing to do." Instead, we should reject such policies because their rejection would speed the demise of capitalism. An unworthy means is used to achieve a supposedly worthy end. By this logic, we should allow people to suffer all the more because by so doing, we will expose the evils of capitalism and achieve some ultimate socialist utopia.

A final problem with the postmodern critique is the use of nearly incomprehensible jargon. I have taught graduate courses in rhetorical theory where I have assigned students to read the key works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, and other postmodern theorists. Even for students with an outstanding background in classical and modern rhetorical theory, it is almost impossible to meaningfully interpret postmodern texts. Yet critique arguments routinely invite high school students to make sense of arguments which confuse most Ph.D. candidates in philosophy. Lest you think I am exaggerating the difficulty of understanding Foucault and Derrida, consider the following examples. Following is a paragraph from the first page of Foucault's classic 1969 book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*:

One last precaution must be taken to disconnect the unquestioned continuities by which we organise, in advance, the discourse that we are to analyse: we must renounce two linked, but opposite themes. The first involves a wish that it should never be possible to assign, in the order of discourse, the irruption of a real event; that beyond any apparent beginning, there is always a secret origin – so secret and so fundamental that it can never be quite grasped in itself. Thus one is led inevitably, through the naivety of chronologies, towards an ever-receding point that is never itself present in any history; this point is merely its own void; and from that point all beginnings can never be more than recommencements or occultation (in one and the same gesture, this *and* that). To this theme is connected another according to which all manifest discourse is secretly based on an 'already-said'; and that this 'already said' is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already been written, but a 'never-said', an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath, a writing that is merely the hollow of its own mark. It is supposed therefore that everything that is formulated in discourse was already articulated in that semi-silence that precedes it, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, but which it covers and silences. The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this 'not-said' is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said. The first theme sees the historical analysis of discourse as the quest for and the repetition of an origin that eludes all historical determination; the second sees it as the interpretation of 'hearing' of an 'already-said' that is at the same time a 'not-said'. We must renounce all those themes whose function is to ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its secret presence to itself in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence. We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its

sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs.

Jacques Derrida's famous 1974 book, *Of Grammatology*, lays out the essence of his postmodern view. Following is the opening paragraph from his work:

However the topic is considered, the problem of language has never been simply one problem among others. But never as much as at present has it invaded, as such, the global horizon of the most diverse researches and the most heterogeneous discourses, diverse and heterogeneous in their intention, method, and ideology. The devaluation of the word "language" itself, and how, in the very hold it has upon us, it betrays a loose vocabulary; the temptation of a cheap seduction, the passive yielding to fashion, the consciousness of the avant-garde, in other words—ignorance—are evidences of this effect. This inflation of the sign "language" is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself. Yet, by one of its aspects or shadows, it is itself still a sign: this crisis is also a symptom. It indicates, as if in spite of itself, that a historico-metaphysical epoch must finally determine as language the totality of its problematic horizon. It must do so not only because all that desire had wished to wrest from the play of language finds itself recaptured within that play but also because, for the same reason, language itself is menaced in its very life, helpless, adrift in the threat of limitlessness, brought back to its own finitude at the very moment when its limits seem to disappear, when it ceases to be self-assured, contained, and guaranteed by the infinite signified which seemed to exceed it.

Derrida and other postmodern theorists seem to delight in using language in ways designed to disguise meaning. Derrida is the founder of a postmodern method of language interpretation called "deconstruction." Jonathan Kandell, writing an October 10, 2004 article in the *New York Times*, described the difficulty in understanding deconstruction:

Toward the end of the 20th century, deconstruction became a code word of intellectual discourse, much as existentialism and structuralism — two other fashionable, slippery philosophies that also emerged from France after World War II — had been before it. Mr. Derrida and his followers were unwilling — some say unable — to define deconstruction with any precision, so it has remained misunderstood, or interpreted in endlessly contradictory ways. Typical of Mr. Derrida's murky explanations of his philosophy was a 1993 paper he presented at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, in New York, which began: "Needless to say, one more time, deconstruction, if there is such a thing, takes place as the experience of the impossible." (p. 1)

Perhaps the most remarkable demonstration of the difficulty of understanding postmodern thought is the publication in the Spring/Summer 1996 edition of *Social Text* an article by Alan Sokal, professor of physics at New York University. Professor Sokal became convinced that postmodern theorists were engaged in an academic fraud: using incomprehensible language designed to confuse others into thinking that it is profound. Sokal tested this theory by constructing a jibberish-filled article for submission to a leading peer-reviewed postmodern journal, *Social Text*. His article was entitled "Transcending the Boundaries: Towards a Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity." Consider the following sentence from his article: "I suggest that pi ( $\pi$ ) isn't constant and universal, but relative to the position of an observer, and is, therefore, subject to ineluctable historicity." The language of the article was intentionally incomprehensible, yet it was selected for publication. Immediately after publication, Sokal revealed the hoax. He tried to convince the editors of *Social Text* to publish his reaction to their decision to publish his article, but they declined to further embarrass themselves.

Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, a professor at the University Catholique de Louvain in France, wrote a 1998 book entitled *Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science*. This book argues that the language used by postmodern theorists is difficult to understand precisely because it is

without meaning:

What is worse, in our opinion, is the adverse effect that abandoning clear thinking and clear writing has on teaching and culture. Students learn to repeat and to embellish discourses that they only barely understand. They can even, if they are lucky, make an academic career out of it by becoming expert in the manipulation of an erudite jargon. After all, one of us managed, after only three months of study, to master the postmodern lingo well enough to publish an article in a prestigious journal. As commentator Katha Pollitt astutely noted, “the comedy of the Sokal incident is that it suggests that even the postmodernists don't really understand one another's writing and make their way through the text by moving from one familiar name or notion to the next like a frog jumping across a murky pond by way of lily pads.” The deliberately obscure discourses of postmodernism, and the intellectual dishonesty they engender, poison a part of intellectual life and strengthen the facile anti-intellectualism that is already all too widespread in the general public. (pp. 206-207)

### *What Are Language Critiques?*

In a semifinal round of a major college tournament a few years ago, one team read a piece of evidence using the word “blackmail.” The opposing team at that point chose to abandon every other argument in the debate round and launched a language critique argument based upon a claim that the word “blackmail” uses a “white is good/black is bad” stereotype. The negative team won the debate with the argument that the opposing team should be punished for using a word which perpetuates a racial stereotype. In the world of the language critique, the most obvious offenders would be teams using racist or sexist language (“policeman” rather than “police officer,” “he” rather than “he or she,” etc.). In most cases, offending terms are not constructed by debaters themselves, but instead occur in the evidence cards read in the debate.

The philosophical background for the language critique arises from two primary sources: the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and postmodern deconstruction. The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis refers to the early twentieth century work of Yale University linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. The Hypothesis holds that language structures thought. Both Sapir and Whorf based their conclusions on the study of Native American languages of the Inuit and Hopi tribes. They claimed that certain characteristics of Native American thought were the result of the structure of their language. It was claimed, for example, that the grammar of the Inuit language lacks nouns, making it impossible to conceive of permanence. To refer to a house, a speaker of this language would use a verb form (“housing”) to imply that right now the object is serving as a house, though fifty years ago it was a collection of trees, and fifty years from now it will most likely be dust. The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis holds that non-members of the Inuit culture cannot understand their meanings because these meanings are too deeply entrenched in the language structures.

Consider the application of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis to politically-correct speech codes. On high school and college campuses across the country there are concerted efforts to mark certain words and expressions as outside the boundaries of acceptable conversation. People who object to speech codes say banning certain words will not correct racism or sexism; people who are sexist will continue to be sexist regardless of whether we clean up their language. But defenders of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis would say this is not true. If language use structures thought, then by changing the words people use, we can actually change the way that they think.

Deconstruction – the philosophical brain child of Jacques Derrida, Paul De Man, and postmodern theorists – attempts to search in the corners of a text (in our case meaning evidence cards) for indications of cultural biases and presuppositions. Defenders of deconstruction believe that oppressive structures will attempt to hide themselves in language, but that a careful critic will be able to spot the vestiges of these structures. This explains why a language critique might seem to react to a single chance word or expression in such a vehement way.

In *Kritik Killer*, you will find evidence to support a frontal attack on the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis as well as on the method of deconstruction. You will also find evidence talking about the way that the

language critique chills meaningful dialogue. Consider the following statement from Edward Lucas in June 9, 1991 issue of *The Independent*:

The fear that certain words and opinions will bring an unjustified charge of racism chills the intellectual climate. Even at conservative, prosperous Princeton, a survey found between a half and two thirds of undergraduates did not feel they could speak freely in the classroom. "What bothers me is that this has become an alternative to critical thought," said Paul Starr, a sociologist at Princeton. "With respect to race and gender, there is a climate which inhibits free discussion. (p. 13)

Morris Wolfe, writing in the January 31, 1991 issue of *The Globe and Mail*, likened the language critique to George Orwell's "thought police:"

Thought Police, who want it all now, seem worried about every -ism but dogmatism. Their moral terrorism seems indistinguishable from the tactics of a Meir Kahane or a Louis Farrakhan. I find especially offensive the manipulation of students by their faculty and fellow students. As one American professor puts it, "You have to let students say the most outrageous and stupid things. To get people to think and talk, to question their own ideas, you don't regulate their speech." There's far more intolerance these days among the educated than among the uneducated. Isn't it supposed to be the other way around? The tyranny of politically correct thinking is a scary thing.

#### *How Do You Answer a Critique?*

When critiques are used, three essential elements come into play: (1) framework, (2) link, and (3) implications. The framework for analysis determines the role that the critique should play in policy debate; these arguments are designed to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the critique as a debate argument. Critique opponents will, of course, argue that the critique is an illegitimate debate argument. You will find dozens of pages of briefs in this edition of *Kritik Killer* designed to address framework questions.

Link arguments attempt to determine whether the critique has anything to do with the advocacy of the opposing team. In many instances a critique is simply an indictment of the present system, leaving it unclear what the argument has to do with a particular affirmative case.

Implication arguments: Even if the critique is "true" (an ironic term given that most postmodern critiques argue that truth doesn't exist), why should it cause a judge to vote against the opposing team?

The truth of the matter is that most critiques are so counter-intuitive that they will fall under their own weight if inquisitive debaters can force the proponents of the critiques to explain them. So long as the debate remains at the jibberish level ("the reification of social alienation" or "we have to choose between Habermasian discourse and the subtextual paradigm of context") then the critique is allowed to continue to wear the Emperor's new clothes.

#### *Final Thoughts on Critiques*

Most critiques invite debaters and judges to wallow in imponderable questions of meaning while ignoring policy issues. Advocates of critiques will argue that since "fiat" is only an artificial creation, the outcome of a debate will have no real impact on military policies in any case. Critique advocates say that debaters should spend their time in debates worrying only about those things they can directly do something about, namely, their own attitudes toward "important" subjects such as the evils of capitalism and colonialism. From this perspective, the "political" is not as important as the "personal." Regardless of the role of "fiat," however, debaters should be willing to take some responsibility for their own personal advocacy. Why is it more important to engage in the rhetoric of blaming and guilt assignment, than to advocate for responsible social policies in the military arena?

The intellectual influence of the postmodern critique is on the decline in the academic world at the very time that it seems to be catching on in the debate community. Emily Eakin, writing in the October 17, 2004 issue of the *New York Times*, said that "Mr. Derrida outlived fellow theorists Louis Althusser,

Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze, but signs of theory's waning influence had been accumulating around him for years. Since the early 1990's, the grand intellectual paradigms with which these men were prominently associated – Marxism, psychoanalysis, structuralism – had steadily lost adherents and prestige. The world had changed but not necessarily in the ways some of big theory's fervent champions had hoped. Ideas once greeted as potential catalysts for revolution began to seem banal, irrelevant or simply inadequate to the task of achieving social change” (p. IV-12). Professors Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont offered this postmortem in their 1998 book, *Fashionable Nonsense*: “Almost forty years later, revolutionaries have aged and marginality has become institutionalized. Ideas that contained some truth, if properly understood, have degenerated into a vulgate that mixes bizarre confusions with overblown banalities. It seems to us that postmodernism, whatever usefulness it originally had as a corrective to hardened orthodoxies, has lived this out and is now running its natural course. Although the name was not ideally chosen to invite a succession (what can come after post-?), we are under the inescapable impression that times are changing” (pp. 210-211). History professor Richard Wolin writes in his 2004 book, *The Seduction of Unreason*, that “it is one of the supreme ironies of the contemporary period that postmodernism's demise has been most rapid and extensive in contemporary France, its putative philosophical birthplace” (p. xiii). Wolin says that French philosophy has abandoned postmodern views in favor of the “New Philosophers” such as Andre Glucksmann and Bernard Henri-Levy, who were appalled by the “killing fields” of Pol Pot's Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge leader had been educated in Paris during the 1950s) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, French intellectuals began returning to the indigenous tradition of democratic republicanism—thereby leaving the 1960s leftists holding the bag of an outmoded philosophical anarchism” (p. 9).

Despite the best efforts of postmodern theorists, there is not a moral equivalence between the United States and the world's worst despots. Capitalism did not construct the Gulag Archipelago or cause the Rwandan genocide. It was not the Bush administration that caused the killing in Darfur. The Obama administration policies are not morally inferior to those of socialist Venezuela or Cuba. Professor Richard Wolin explains that “the current disaffection with postmodernism is in no small measure attributable to recent political circumstances. Humanism's return spells postmodernism's demise. Totalitarianism was the twentieth century's defining political experience. Its aftermath has left us with a new categorical imperative: no more Auschwitzes or Gulags. We now know that an ineffaceable difference separates democratic and totalitarian regimes. Despite their manifest empirical failings, democratic polities possess a capacity for internal political change that totalitarian societies do not. A discourse such as postmodernism that celebrates the virtues of cultural relativism and that remains ambivalent, at best, vis-à-vis democratic norms is inadequate to the moral and political demands of the contemporary hour” (*The Seduction of Unreason*, 2004, pp. xiii-xiv).

I frequently hear prominent college debate coaches lament what critiques have done to college debate. For high school policy debate, it is not yet too late. Critiques debates are still rare events in many parts of the country. Many judges would like an opportunity to vote against critiques, but they have to have substantive answers allowing them to justify their vote. Many users of critiques in high school debates win purely from the shock value of their arguments; they win because the affirmative team is confused and unsure how to answer a critique based in nearly incomprehensible language. Using the briefs and analysis in *Kritik Killer*, you can do your part to preserve policy debate at the high school level.

Debaters will stop using the critique if they stop winning with it; do your part to help bring about such a desirable outcome!

Richard E. Edwards, Ph.D.  
Professor of Communication Studies  
Baylor University  
Richard\_Edwards@baylor.edu

## INTRODUCTION TO KRITIKS OF RACE CONSCIOUSNESS

BY RYAN GALLOWAY, SAMFORD UNIVERSITY

This volume of Kritik Killers picks up where the previous volume of Kritik Killers left off. Rich Edwards provides an excellent overview to general kritiks, and this volume will explore kritiks of race consciousness, which have become popular in recent years. Due to the prevalence of such kritiks and the lack of a discrete set of kritiks on the three varied countries in the resolution, this volume is dedicated to answering teams that choose to make race consciousness a central portion of their analysis. This volume will retain last year's section on answering kritiks of transportation infrastructure as well as other kritiks, but will begin with a focus on how to answer kritiks dealing with race consciousness.

### **Kritik One: Kritiks of White Supremacy**

In recent years, teams have increasingly critiqued both debate and society from the perspective of critical race theory (CRT). A focal point of such kritiks is the idea of white supremacy. White supremacy is the term used instead of racism to identify "the routine assumptions that structure the system" and "encode a deep privileging of white students and, in particular, the legitimization, defence and extension of Black inequity" (Mike Cole, POWER AND EDUCATION, 2009, Retrieved May 21, 2013 from <http://www.worldwords.co.uk/rss/abstract.asp?j=power&aid=3522&doi=1>).

To better understand the concept of white supremacy, one should understand the idea of white privilege. Critical race theorists argue that white people in the United States inherently gain forms of privilege just by being white. Peggy McIntosh's essay, "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Backpack," identifies multiple forms of white privilege. Here are a few from the essay:

1. I can if I wish arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the time.
2. If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area which I can afford and in which I would want to live.
3. I can be pretty sure that my neighbors in such a location will be neutral or pleasant to me.
4. I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not be followed or harassed. (McIntosh, retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://www.uakron.edu/dotAsset/1662103.pdf>)

The theory of white supremacy argues that there are structures in society that operate to maintain white privilege in society, and efforts to combat discrimination without attacking these structures are worthless. Mere cosmetic reforms to challenge racism will not challenge the structures of white supremacy. Because white people control the bulk of wealth and power in society causes them to operate in their own self-interest, and maintain an invisible system of privilege that benefits white society. Mike Cole quotes the definition of white supremacy from Frances Lee Ansley:

[white supremacy] as referring not ... only ... the self-conscious racism of white supremacist hate groups', but also to: a political, economic, and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white supremacy and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings. (Mike Cole, POWER AND EDUCATION, 2009, Retrieved May 21, 2013 from <http://www.worldwords.co.uk/rss/abstract.asp?j=power&aid=3522&doi=1>).

Debaters use the theory of white supremacy in two ways. First, it is a common theme of affirmative cases and negative kritiks. The team will argue that white supremacy must be challenged and uprooted before other actions can be taken. Second, and more pertinent to the essay, is that invisible norms of white privilege in debate itself are challenged by teams. Several of these attacks against common practices in debate are summarized by Tim Wise:

The reason I call this process a white one is because whites (and especially affluent ones), much more so than folks of color, have the luxury of looking at life or death issues of war, peace, famine, unemployment, or criminal justice as a game, as a mere exercise in intellectual and rhetorical banter. For me to get up and debate, for example, whether or not full employment is a good idea presupposes that my folks are not likely out of work as I go about the task. To debate whether racial profiling is legitimate likewise presupposes that I, the debater, am not likely to be someone who was confronted by the practice as my team drove to the tournament that day, or as we passed through security at the airport. In this way, competitive debate reinforces whiteness and affluence as normative conditions, and makes the process more attractive to affluent white students. Kids of color and working-class youth of all colors are simply not as likely to gravitate to an activity where pretty much half the time they'll be forced to take positions that, if implemented in the real world, might devastate their communities (Tim Wise, WHITE LIKE ME, 2011).

Thus, teams will indict the activity of debate and the present norms of big impacts, roleplaying the state, and the de-emphasis of personal narratives as all features of white supremacy in the activity. Teams that choose this race conscious approach frequently run affirmatives from a position of personal experience, often eschewing the topic altogether or debating the topic in a metaphorical manner.

The essay now turns to how to answer the kritik of white supremacy. To challenge the idea of white supremacy, it is good to turn to Marxists, who view society as structured by class instead of race. The Marxist attack on the focus on white supremacy proceeds in four parts.

First, focusing on white supremacy directs attention away from the modes of production in society. Society is inequitable because of class, and not race. Placing attention on race as the fundamental point of challenging oppression in society moves the oppression dynamic away from where it truly exists: who controls the means of production. Even the definition of white supremacy cited above illustrates that those who control wealth control power in society. It is this wealth concentration that should be challenged first.

Second, a focus on white supremacy homogenizes all white people. Not all white people benefit equally from a system of white privilege. Millions of white Americans are poor, underfed, impoverished, and lack access to a quality education. These forms of oppression would go overlooked by a focus on white supremacy.

Third, a focus on white supremacy ignores non-race related forms of discrimination. For example, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and discrimination based on class are forms of oppression that go unrecognized by the assumption that all discrimination occurs because of race.

Finally, a focus on white supremacy destroys coalitions designed to solve racism. The designation of white supremacy destroys support groups among the white community who are sympathetic to the cause of fighting racism. Much as Dr. Martin Luther King reached out to sympathetic white people in an effort to challenge discrimination, those who fight oppression must look for allies among all communities.

### **Kritik Two: The Personalization of Debate**

Another trend in recent years is the personalization of debate. This generally happens in two ways. First, affirmative teams will argue that the topic should be looked at from a personal perspective. As an example, we should look at energy policy in our everyday lives. Usually, teams will avoid governmental action or provide personalized evidence to advocate for change at a governmental level.

Second, teams will argue that the debate round should be evaluated from a personal perspective, arguing that traditional debate rounds are oppressive in some manner, and the judge should vote to create a less oppressive debate space. Joseph Zompetti of Illinois State University describes this trend as follows:

In the past five years or so, some debaters and debate teams have introduced the diversity problem into actual debate rounds, arguing that "traditional" debate is exclusionary and problematic. Their arguments focus on several core issues: traditional debate excludes certain types of evidence (i.e., narratives, music, etc.), traditional debate privileges affluent individuals (i.e., the cost of summer institutes, travel budgets, etc.), traditional debate ignores the reality of many individuals who are already at a disadvantage in the activity (i.e., debaters of color and women). These teams then use these types of arguments, coupled with a patchwork of hip-hop music clips and personal testimony, along with soliloquies on how the current resolution precludes their perspectives. (Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.)

This section of Kritik Killers provides evidence designed to answer both the personalization of policy problems as well as the personalization of debate.

First, you should argue that the personalization of public policy problems trades-off with real world solutions to those problems. As we become focused on the individual, we become less focused on the structural problems that need to be solved in society. Mari Boor Tonn, a professor of communication studies at Maryland, provides much of the evidence for this section via a study of the Clinton administration's efforts to create a dialogue on race that emphasized personal experience. She found that frequently the personal experiences became ends in and of themselves, and diverted activists' attention and energy from policy solutions to problems.

Second, debaters should debate from a universal standpoint so they can recognize collective interests. While understanding one's own standpoint has merit, the unique value of debate is that it allows us to take the perspective of the other. In so doing, we can better understand the common and collective interests we all share to move forward in solving real world problems.

Third, debating from personal experience devalues statistics and data, the real vehicles to solutions of oppression in society. When one over-values personal experience in debate settings, statistics and data become devalued. However, it is only through rigorous use of statistics can one come to understand the underlying problems that affect society as a whole, and not just individuals. Because no one wants to discredit the personal experiences

of an individual, advocates become chilled into pointing out that the raw statistical data may be at odds with the individual's personal experience.

With regard to personalizing the debate space, teams should first argue that personalizing the debate space trades-off with structural solutions to debate problems. Debate does face a crisis of a lack of minority and female participation, but arguments within individual debate rounds do little to solve such problems. A better strategy is to analyze the structural impediments like lack of resources, lack of minority outreach, and lack of effective education provided to disempowered communities in an effort to rectify the imbalances that currently confront debate.

Second, the debate format is a poor format to discuss structural issues. Debate has time limits that prevent the full discussion of ideas. Debate is competitive, which means that one side cannot agree with vital components of the other side's arguments and hope to win. Debates are also isolated events with one winner and one loser. Debate rounds are simply not good forums to discuss issues of oppression within the activity.

Finally, other formats are superior to debate rounds to discuss issues of structural inequality. Tournaments frequently host events where people discuss issues related to the community. In addition, communication conferences can discuss these issues without the disadvantages that stem from a competitive format. Finally, online discussions can be engaged in to better understand the challenges facing the activity.

This section also contains evidence discussing the importance of effective democratic deliberation at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Simply put, the United States and the world face a series of growing challenges that will require an engaged citizenry. Whether it is the issue of racism, sexism, environmentalism, hunger, etc. the world needs engaged advocates trained to participate in deliberative democracy. Trading off with the goal of creating this informed citizenry for the questionable benefits of personal activism hurts the effort to provide solutions to these ever present structural problems the world confronts.

#### **Kritik Three: The Use of Narratives in Debate**

Another trend common in modern debate is the use of personal narratives. Narratives are seen as a form of liberatory politics, and one that is more accessible to racial minorities. Frequently, teams will offer their own narratives, and argue that their narratives are liberatory and should be preferred as a form of evidence in the debate.

To counter personal narratives, you should employ several responses. First, narratives can re-entrench racial domination because they move away from the rational to the emotional. Statistical evidence and reason are better counters to racial hegemony than mere narratives.

Second, narratives will breed counter-narratives. The oppressed aren't the only ones with stories to tell. Indeed, elite groups are well-equipped to use the narrative paradigm for their own devices. And the reason why counter-narratives are so dangerous is that people tend to accept stories that ring true to their own experiences, i.e. the status quo society. Without statistics and data to counter their world-view, people will just pick the story that sounds best to them, which is not the story of the radical liberator, but the hegemonic oppressor. After all, people will just pick the story they are used to hearing.

Finally, individual narratives trade-off from efforts to form collective interests. The very uniqueness of the narrative creates a division in politics—one story is different from another and therefore splinters the ability of movements to come together to challenge oppressive structures. Instead of looking to personalize the political, one should focus on collective interests in the political sphere, so groups can mobilize, organize, and find common ground for change.

#### **Kritik Four: Identity Politics**

A type of argument common to teams employing a race consciousness approach is to argue in favor of identity politics, or a unique type of identity that comes from belonging to a particular racial group, ethnic group, or being a sexual minority. Teams argue that voting for them will empower this particular group and lead to methods to fight oppression.

However, arguing in favor of identity politics creates problems of its own. First, identity politics leads to isolation in the fight for oppression. By claiming that African-Americans or Hispanics experience oppression in a fundamentally different manner than other groups, the opportunity to find commonalities across groups in the fight for social justice is undermined. Each group becomes fragmented along ethnic lines, preventing coalition building in the struggle for freedom.

Second, identity politics leads to us-them dichotomies. In other words, because we are part of a unique identity group, others are not like us. Evidence in this section indicates that using racial lines in an effort to fight against racism only re-entrenches racism and lays the foundations for ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Finally, identity politics can be co-opted by the right. Aggrieved minority groups are not the only identities one can claim, as right-wing fundamentalist groups can also claim that they are oppressed. The tea party can claim to be an oppressed minority, and use the politics of the affirmative to re-entrench racial and economic suppression. The



division of society into different racial and ethnic groups can also be used by the wealthy and the powerful to maintain domination.

**Kritik Five: Black/White Binary**

The final argument in this section on race consciousness critiques the use of the black/white binary in racial relations. This binary assumes that most discrimination happens by whites against blacks in American society, and that racism is viewed through this lens. This lens ignores that discrimination is practiced by non-whites, and that discrimination occurs against non-black minorities. Only by replacing the black/white binary can progressive solutions to racism be found.

First, the link to the black/white binary must be established. This section contains links to the discourse of the civil rights movements, as well as the writings of Cornel West, Toni Morrison, and Frank Wilderson. These authors portray racism in American society as primarily a white against black phenomenon, and ignore the racism that takes places against Latinos, immigrants, Asian Americans, etc.

Second, the harm to the black/white binary must be established. The primary harm is the destruction of coalitions necessary to solve racism. Racism is multi-faceted and must be approached as such. By creating a limiting view of racism in American society, the black/white paradigm prevents effective coalitions to solve the harm.

Finally, a superior alternative is to recognize racism as multi-faceted and to reject re-entrenchment of the black/white paradigm. Evidence in this section calls for a re-thinking of the paradigm and a move toward a more inclusive view of racism.

**Concluding Thoughts**

This essay and volume of Kritik Killers should give you plenty to say against teams that take a race consciousness approach toward the topic, or to the debate activity itself. While topicality is also a viable weapon against such teams, one of the best approaches is to merely understand their arguments and to engage them on their substance. A great deal is written about critical race theory and potential solutions to racism in the United States. Through research, understanding, and critical thinking, your arguments and debating against such teams will improve.

Dr. Ryan W. Galloway  
Associate Professor of Communication Studies  
Director of Debate  
Samford University

**\*\*\*ANSWERS TO KRITIKS OF RACE CONCIIOUSNESS\*\*\***

**WHITE SUPREMACY KRITIK ANSWERS**

**A. THEORIES OF WHITE SUPREMACY ARE FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED.**

1. A focus on white supremacy as an explanation for inequality is counter-productive for four reasons.

Mike Cole (Bishop Grosseteste University) POWER AND EDUCATION, 2009, Retrieved May 21, 2013 from <http://www.words.co.uk/rss/abstract.asp?j=power&aid=3522&doi=1>

Marxism, Racialization, and Modes of Production. From a Marxist perspective, 'white supremacy' used to describe current reality is inadequate for a number of reasons. Elsewhere (Cole, 2009a, b) I have identified and critiqued four problems with the concept of 'white supremacy'. The first is that it can direct critical attention away from modes of production; the second is that it homogenizes all white people together as being in positions of power and privilege; the third is that it inadequately explains what I have referred to as 'non-colour-coded racism'; and the fourth is that it is totally counter-productive as a political unifier and rallying point against racism.

2. The deconstructive approach of critical race theory fails.

Jeffrey J. Pyle, Boston College Law Review, 1999. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss3/6>

"Critique," however, never built anything, and liberalism, for all its shortcomings, is at least constructive. It provides broadly-accepted, reasonably well-defined principles to which political advocates may appeal in ways that transcend sheer power, with at least some hope of incremental success. Critical race theory would "deconstruct" this imperfect tradition, but offers nothing in its place.

**B. THEORIES OF WHITE SUPREMACY UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO SOLVE CLASS-BASED OPPRESSION.**

1. White supremacy undermines attempts to challenge capitalism:

Mike Cole (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) 2009. ETHNICITIES, 246.

Anti-racists have made some progress, in the UK at least, after years of 'establishment' opposition, in making anti-racism a mainstream rallying point, and this is reflected, in part, in legislation (e.g. the 2000 Race Relations Amendment Act). Even if it were a good idea, the chances of making 'the abolition of whiteness' a successful political unifier and rallying point against racism are virtually non-existent. And yet, for John Preston (2007: 13), 'The abolition of whiteness is . . . not just an optional extra in terms of defeating capitalism (nor something which will be necessarily abolished post-capitalism) but fundamental to the Marxist educational project as praxis.' Indeed, for Preston (2007: 196) 'The abolition of capitalism and whiteness seem to be fundamentally connected in the current historical circumstances of Western capitalist development.' From a Marxist perspective, coupling the 'abolition of whiteness' to the 'abolition of capitalism' is a worrying development that, if it gained ground in Marxist theory in any substantial way, would most certainly undermine the Marxist project, even more than it has been undermined already (for an analysis of the success of the Ruling Class in forging consensus to capitalism in the UK, see Cole, 2008c). Implications of bringing the 'abolition of whiteness' into schools are discussed later.

2. Diverting attention away from the modes of production ignores how poverty locks in racism in the United States:

Mike Cole, 2009 ("Critical Race Theory comes to the UK : A Marxist response," Ethnicities, <http://etn.sagepub.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/content/9/2/246.full.pdf+html>, DOI: 10.1177/1468796809103462)

For me, the Marxist concept of racialization is most useful in articulating racism to modes of production, and I have developed these links at length elsewhere (e.g. Cole, 2004a, 2004b). Manning Marable (2004) has used the concept of racialization to connect to modes of production in the US. He has described the current era in the US as 'The New Racial Domain' (NRD). This New Racial Domain, he argues, is 'different from other earlier forms of racial domination, such as slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and ghettoization, or strict residential segregation, in several critical respects'. These early forms of racialization, he goes on, were based primarily, if not exclusively, in the political economy of US capitalism. 'Meaningful social reforms such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were debated almost entirely within the context of America's expanding, domestic economy, and a background of Keynesian, welfare state public policies.' The political economy of the New Racial Domain, on the other hand, is driven and largely determined by the forces of transnational capitalism, and the public policies of state neoliberalism, which rests on an unholy trinity, or

deadly triad, of structural barriers to a decent life. These oppressive structures are mass unemployment, mass incarceration and mass disfranchisement, with each factor directly feeding and accelerating the others, 'creating an ever-widening circle of social disadvantage, poverty, and civil death, touching the lives of tens of millions of US people'. For Marable, adopting a Marxist perspective, 'The process begins at the point of production. For decades, US corporations have been outsourcing millions of better-paying jobs outside the country. The class warfare against unions has led to a steep decline in the percentage of US workers.' As Marable concludes: 'Within whole US urban neighborhoods losing virtually their entire economic manufacturing and industrial employment, and with neoliberal social policies in place cutting job training programs, welfare, and public housing, millions of Americans now exist in conditions that exceed the devastation of the Great Depression of the 1930s. In 2004, in New York's Central Harlem community, 50 percent of all black male adults were currently unemployed. When one considers that this figure does not count those black males who are in the military, or inside prisons, it's truly amazing and depressing. Moreover, the new jobs being generated for the most part lack the health benefits, pensions, and wages that manufacturing and industrial employment once offered.'

3. Must eliminate class discrimination to solve racial discrimination:

Mike Cole (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) 2009. ETHNICITIES, 246.

In summary, I must reject the insistence of CRT to valorize 'race' over class. Marxism has the crucial benefit of contextualizing practices in capitalist relations of production. It gives priority to the abolition of class society because without its demise, racism (as well as other forms of discrimination) is likely to continue in its various guises.

4. Capitalism props up racism and sexism:

Mike Cole (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) 2009. ETHNICITIES, 246.

A WAY FORWARD FOR CRITICAL RACE THEORY As we have seen, for Mills (2003: 160), 'White Marxism [is] predicated on colorless classes in struggle.' Mills argues that if socialism is to come then 'white supremacy/majoritarian domination' must be overthrown first in 'the struggle for social democracy'. Only after 'white supremacy' has been overthrown and 'social democracy' established is the next stage – socialism – possible. This seems to be in line with Mills' argument that 'a non-white supremacist capitalism is morally and politically preferable to . . . white supremacist capitalism' (Mills, cited in Pateman and Mills, 2007: 31), something with which I would totally concur. However, given the massive advantages to capitalism of racialized capitalism, capitalism without racism (or sexism), as I have suggested earlier, is almost inconceivable.

5. Valorizing race over class allows racism and discrimination to continue in various guises:

Mike Cole, 2009 ("Critical Race Theory comes to the UK : A Marxist response," Ethnicities, <http://etn.sagepub.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/content/9/2/246.full.pdf+html>, DOI: 10.1177/1468796809103462) In summary, I must reject the insistence of CRT to valorize 'race' over class. Marxism has the crucial benefit of contextualizing practices in capitalist relations of production. It gives priority to the abolition of class society because without its demise, racism (as well as other forms of discrimination) is likely to continue in its various guises.

### C. WHITE SUPREMACY KRITIKS FAIL TO SOLVE OPPRESSION.

1. A focus on white supremacy fails to acknowledge non color coded racism.

Mike Cole (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) Nov. 23, 2007. Retrieved May 21, 2013 from <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/311222.article>

A second problem with "white supremacy" is that it is inherently unable to explain non-colour-coded racism. In the UK, for example, this form of racism has been and is directed at the Irish and at gypsy/traveller communities. There is also a well-documented history of anti-Semitism, too. It is also important to underline the fact that Islamophobia is not necessarily triggered by skin colour. It is often sparked by one or more (perceived) symbols of the Muslim faith. Finally, a new form of non-colour-coded racism has manifested itself recently in the UK. This has all the hallmarks of traditional racism, but it is directed towards newly arrived groups of people. It has been described by A. Sivanandan, director of the Institute of Race Relations, as "xeno-racism". It appears that there are some similarities in the xeno-racialisation of Eastern European migrant workers and the racialisation of Asian and black workers in the immediate postwar period, a point I address in my latest book.

2. They offer no explanation for anti-semitism, Irish racism, and Islamophobia:

Mike Cole, (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) June 2009. *THE JOURNAL FOR CRITICAL EDUCATION POLICY STUDIES*, 30.

Suffice it to point out here that the existence of anti-semitism (e.g. Townsend, 2009), anti-Irish racism (e.g. Mac An Ghaill, 2000), anti-Gypsy Roma Traveller (GRT) racism (e.g. Duffy and Tomlinson, 2009), xenophobic racism (e.g. Fekete, 2009) and Islamophobia (since this is not necessarily based on skin colour) all challenge the concept of 'white supremacy' and militate against notions of 'all white-identified people benefit', at least as a universal declaration [3]. Lack of 'white benefit' is particularly acute at given periods of history in certain geographical locations. Current anti-GRT racism in predominantly 'white' areas of the UK is but one example.

3. Concepts of white supremacy homogenize all white people.

Mike Cole (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) Nov. 23, 2007. Retrieved May 21, 2013 from <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/311222.article>

The problem with standard critical race theory is the narrowness of its remit, says Mike Cole. One of the main tenets of critical race theory is that "white supremacy" is the norm in societies rather than merely the province of the racist right (the other major tenet is primacy of "race" over class). There are a number of significant problems with this use of the term "white supremacy". The first is that it homogenises all white people together in positions of power and privilege.

4. And, their method of focusing only on whiteness ignores the millions of working-class white people in poverty—class, not race, is the dominant form of oppression:

Mike Cole, 2009 ("Critical Race Theory comes to the UK : A Marxist response," *Ethnicities*, <http://etn.sagepub.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/content/9/2/246.full.pdf+html>, DOI: 10.1177/1468796809103462) Mills (1997: 37) acknowledges that not 'all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but . . . as a statistical generalization, the objective life chances of whites are significantly better'. While this is, of course, true, we should not lose sight of the life chances of millions of working-class white people. To take poverty as one example, in the US, while it is the case that the number of black people living below the poverty line is some three times that of whites, this still leaves over 16 million 'white but not Hispanic' people living in poverty in the US (US Census Bureau, 2007). This is indicative of a society predicated on racialized capitalism, rather than indicative of a white supremacist society. While the US is witnessing the effects of the NRD with massively disproportionate effects on black people and other people of colour, white people are also affected. The outsourcing by US corporations of millions of better-paying jobs outside the country, the class warfare against unions, which has led to a steep decline in the percentage of US workers, affects white workers too. The loss to US urban neighbourhoods of virtually their entire economic manufacturing and industrial employment creates unemployment for white workers as well, and neo-liberal social policies cut the job training programmes, welfare and public housing of whites as well as blacks and other people of colour. In the UK, there are similar indicators of a society underpinned by rampant racism, with black people currently twice as poor as whites, and those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin over three times as poor as whites (Platt, 2007). Once again, however, this still leaves some 12 million poor white people in the UK, who are, like their American counterparts, on the receiving end of global neoliberal capitalism.

5. Their theory makes racism only color-coded: this ignores non-color coded racism—like suspected Muslims being isolated for their names:

Mike Cole, 2009 ("Critical Race Theory comes to the UK : A Marxist response," *Ethnicities*, <http://etn.sagepub.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/content/9/2/246.full.pdf+html>, DOI: 10.1177/1468796809103462) Much of the world in the 21st century is imbued with the vestiges of the old (British) and the new (US) imperialism. Thus there coexists the longstanding denigration of Asian cultures and the more recent intensification of Islamophobia, which is directly related to US foreign policy. As living testimony to the two imperialisms, Benjamin Zephaniah states: . . . when I come through the airport nowadays, in Britain and the US especially, they always question me on the Muslim part of my name. They are always on the verge of taking me away because they think converts are the dangerous ones. (Zephaniah, 2004: 19)

6. The color-coded nature of white supremacy is ill-equipped to handle modern racism like Islamophobia:

Mike Cole, 2009 ("Critical Race Theory comes to the UK : A Marxist response," *Ethnicities*, <http://etn.sagepub.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/content/9/2/246.full.pdf+html>, DOI: 10.1177/1468796809103462) Racialization, under conditions of imperialism, is fired by what Dallmayr (2004: 11) has described as 'the intoxicating effects of global rule' that anticipates 'corresponding levels of total depravity and corruption among the rulers'. Global rule, of course, is first and foremost, about global profits, and serves to relate old and

new imperialisms. In being colour-coded, CRT is ill-equipped to analyse multifaceted Islamophobia, and its connection to capital, national and international.

D. WHITE SUPREMACY KRITIKS SPLINTER COALITIONS NECESSARY TO SOLVE RACISM.

1. Critical race theory destroys the coalition-building necessary to achieve true reform.

Jeffrey J. Pyle, Boston College Law Review, 1999. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss3/6>

Third, race-crits are politically ineffective because they deliberately choose racialist rhetoric that alienates whites. Unlike Dr. King, who extended his hand to whites and expressed his faith that they could redeem the promises of their ancestors, race-crits give up on whites as slaves to bigotry. Consider Bell's "Space Traders" story: in the year 2000, Bell posits, seventy percent of Americans would vote to send blacks away in spaceships if presented with the right benefit. Jewish Americans would oppose the trade, he says, but not from principle. They would fear that "in the absence of blacks, Jews could become the scapegoats." Some rich whites would protest the deal, but only because they know that blacks deflect potential class-based unrest by poor whites, who are pacified in the knowledge that they "at least, remained ahead of blacks." In sum, Bell clearly implies, all whites are racist—those who appear to stand up for minorities are only looking out for number one. It is hard to imagine how this story could inspire anything but frustration, dismay and resentment among white readers. There is much to be done on behalf of minorities—the criminal justice system, for example, screams for reform." But like it or not, nothing can be accomplished in this country without widespread support from white Americans. Name-calling and blame games like those of the race-crits can only make reforms less likely to occur.

2. A focus on white supremacy alienates coalition members necessary to combat racism.

Mike Cole (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) Nov. 23, 2007. Retrieved May 21, 2013 from <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/311222.article>

"White supremacy" is counterproductive as a political unifier and rallying point against racism. John Preston concluded an article in *The Times Higher* advocating critical race theory ("All shades of a wide white world", October 19) by citing the US journal *Race Traitor*, which seeks the "abolition of the racial category 'white'". Elsewhere, Preston has argued "the abolition of whiteness is ... not just an optional extra in terms of defeating capitalism (nor something which will be necessarily abolished post-capitalism) but fundamental to the Marxist educational project as praxis". Indeed, for Preston, "the abolition of capitalism and whiteness seem to be fundamentally connected in the current historical circumstances of Western capitalist development". From my Marxist perspective, coupling the "abolition of whiteness" to the "abolition of capitalism" is a worrying development that, if it gained ground in Marxist theory, would most certainly further undermine the Marxist project. I am not questioning the sincerity of the protagonists of "the abolition of whiteness", nor suggesting in any way that they are anti-white people but merely questioning its extreme vulnerability to misunderstanding. Anti-racists have made some progress in the UK at least in making anti-racism a mainstream rallying point, and this is reflected, in part, in legislation. Even if it were a good idea, the chances of making "the abolition of whiteness" a successful political unifier and rallying point against racism are virtually non-existent. The usage of "white supremacy" should be restricted to its everyday meaning. To describe and analyse contemporary racism we need a wide-ranging and fluid conception of racism. Only then can we fully understand its multiple manifestations and work towards its eradication.

3. Critical race theory alienates potential white allies.

Jeffrey J. Pyle, Boston College Law Review, 1999. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss3/6>

Second, despite their undeniable energy, the race-crits are remarkably unhelpful as legal and political advocates within the liberal system. Their wholesale rejection of the rule of law limits their persuasiveness as legal advocates, while their dismissal of America's guiding principles makes them politically ineffective. In the process, the race-crits' racialist, blame-game rhetoric does much to alienate potentially helpful whites.

4. Focus on white supremacy is counter-productive in the fight against racism.

Mike Cole (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) 2009. *ETHNICITIES*, 246.

Teaching against xeno-racism and xeno-racialization. Marxism most clearly connects old and new imperialisms with capitalism. It also provides an explanation for xeno-racism and xeno-racialization. While CRT certainly reminds us that racism is central in sustaining the current world order, and that we must listen to the voices of people oppressed on grounds of racism, it does not and cannot make the necessary connections to understand and challenge this racism. Indeed, as I have argued, its advocacy of 'white supremacy' as an explanatory factor

is counter-productive, particularly, as I have argued, in the school and university context, in the struggle against racism.

5. And there is virtually zero chance of their politics becoming an effective rallying cry—they both fail and block coalitional politics necessary to solve racism:

Mike Cole, 2009 (“Critical Race Theory comes to the UK : A Marxist response,” *Ethnicities*, <http://etn.sagepub.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/content/9/2/246.full.pdf+html>, DOI: 10.1177/1468796809103462) Anti-racists have made some progress, in the UK at least, after years of ‘establishment’ opposition, in making anti-racism a mainstream rallying point, and this is reflected, in part, in legislation (e.g. the 2000 Race Relations Amendment Act).<sup>11</sup> Even if it were a good idea, the chances of making ‘the abolition of whiteness’ a successful political unifier and rallying point against racism are virtually non-existent. And yet, for John Preston (2007: 13), ‘The abolition of whiteness is . . . not just an optional extra in terms of defeating capitalism (nor something which will be necessarily abolished post-capitalism) but fundamental to the Marxist educational project as praxis.’ Indeed, for Preston (2007: 196) ‘The abolition of capitalism and whiteness seem to be fundamentally connected in the current historical circumstances of Western capitalist development.’ From a Marxist perspective, coupling the ‘abolition of whiteness’ to the ‘abolition of capitalism’ is a worrying development that, if it gained ground in Marxist theory in any substantial way, would most certainly undermine the Marxist project, even more than it has been undermined already (for an analysis of the success of the Ruling Class in forging consensus to capitalism in the UK, see Cole, 2008c). Implications of bringing the ‘abolition of whiteness’ into schools are discussed later.

#### E. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL FAIL.

1. Lack of an alternative dooms critical race theory to failure.

Jeffrey J. Pyle, *Boston College Law Review*, 1999. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss3/6>

This Note criticizes CRT as an unprincipled, divisive and ultimately unhelpful attack on the liberal tradition in America." First, race-crits fail to offer replacements for liberalism's core values. • Rather, their postmodern rejection of all principles leaves them entirely "critical," while their narrow, interested stance renders them mere advocates within the liberal legal system, not theorists who might offer better alternatives.

2. The alternative fails—white supremacy authors give vague solutions that only splinter opposition.

Mike Cole (Bishop Grosseteste University) *POWER AND EDUCATION*, 2009, Retrieved May 21, 2013 from [http://www.words.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=power&vol=1&issue=1&year=2009&article=10\\_MIKE\\_Cole\\_POWER\\_1\\_1\\_web](http://www.words.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=power&vol=1&issue=1&year=2009&article=10_MIKE_Cole_POWER_1_1_web)

While critical race theorists share with Marxists a desire to rid the world of racism (although, as we have seen, they prefer the term ‘white supremacy’), they differ in their visions of the future. Writing from a Marxist perspective, Antonia Darder & Rodolfo Torres (2004, p. 98) observe, in the CRT view of education: “‘racial’ liberation [is] embraced as not only the primary but as the most significant objective of any emancipatory vision of education in the larger society’. According to Crenshaw et al (1995, p. xiii), critical race theorists also share ‘an ethical commitment to human liberation’ but ‘often disagree among [themselves], over its specific direction’. Thus often in CRT the solution is vague. To take an example, introducing their edited collection, *Critical Race Theory in Education*, Dixon & Rousseau (2006) talk about ‘the struggle’ (pp. 2-3); ‘a vision of hope for the future’ (p. 3); ‘social action toward liberation and the end of oppression’ (p. 3); ‘the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression’ (p. 4); and ‘the ultimate goal of CRT – social transformation’ (p. 7). To take another example, Dixon & Rousseau (2006, pp. 2-3) argue that ‘CRT scholars acknowledge the permanence of racism’ but that this should lead to ‘greater resolve in the struggle’. They also refer to a CRT focus on ‘praxis’, which incorporates ‘a commitment not only to scholarship but also to social action toward liberation and the end of oppression’ (p. 3). They talk of ‘eliminating racial oppression as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression’ (p. 4), and state that the ‘ultimate goal of CRT [is] social transformation’. However, no indication is given of what they are struggling towards, what liberation means to them, or what is envisioned by social transformation and the end of all forms of oppression.

3. The ivory tower of critical race theory prevents meaningful solutions.

Jeffrey J. Pyle, *Boston College Law Review*, 1999. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss3/6>

For all their talk of "realism," race-crits are strangely unrealistic in their proposals for reform. Most probably realize that radical measures like racial or ethnic reparations are not likely to be granted, especially by a court.

But even unrealistic proposals are rare, because race-crits generally prefer not to suggest solutions, but to "resist" the dominant legal thought, doctrine and policy, whatever that happens to be." As Derrick Bell has put it, "most critical race theorists are committed to a program of scholarly resistance, and most hope scholarly resistance will lay the groundwork for wide-scale resistance." How this ivory tower oppositionalism would foment grassroots revolt is unclear, because CRT professors rarely suggest anything practical. Rather, their exhortations are meant, as Bell says, to "harass white folks" and thereby "make life bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class."

4. White supremacy is an ineffective rallying cry against racism:

Mike Cole, (research professor in education and equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln) June 2009. THE JOURNAL FOR CRITICAL EDUCATION POLICY STUDIES, 30.

The fourth problem with 'white supremacy' is that it is totally counter-productive as a political unifier and rallying point against racism. Telling working class white people that they are 'white supremacist', for Marxists, totally undermines the unification of the working class which is necessary to challenge capitalism and imperialism. This is developed below [4].

5. The lack of an alternative dooms critical race theory to irrelevance.

Jeffrey J. Pyle, Boston College Law Review, 1999. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss3/6>

The race-crits' preference for "resistance" over democratic participation seems to flow from a fear of losing their status as "oppositional scholars" to the game of mainstream law and politics, which they regard as "an inevitably co-optive process?" Better to be radically opposed to the "dominant political discourse" and remain an outlier than to work within the current system and lose one's "authenticity?" In rejecting the realistic for the "authentic," however, race-crits begin to look like academic poseurs—ideological purists striking the correct radical stance, but doing little within the confines of the real world, so sure are they that nothing much can be done.

6. The utopianism of critical race theory prevents an effective alternative.

Jeffrey J. Pyle, Boston College Law Review, 1999. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol40/iss3/6>

Liberalism, on the other hand, distrusts grand unifying theories, preferring to emphasize process over ends. As a result, liberalism frustrates anyone, Left or Right, who would have governments embrace their ideologies. Because of the value liberals place on liberty, they tend to be wary of the sort of power concentrations that could mandate changes quickly." They prefer a more incremental approach to political change that depends on the consent of the governed, even when the governed are often ignorant, misguided and even bigoted. Liberalism is never utopian, by anyone's definition, but always procedural, because it presupposes a society of people who profoundly disagree with each other and whose interests, goals, stakes and stands, cannot easily, if ever, be fully reconciled." Because of these differences, liberals know there is no such thing as a "benevolent despot," and that utopias almost invariably turn out to be dystopias. Race-crits, on the other hand, are profoundly utopian and some times totalitarian. In their view, the law should ferret out and eliminate white racism at any cost" Richard Delgado, for example, complains that "[n]othing in the law requires any [white] to lend a helping hand, to try to help blacks find jobs, befriend them, speak to them, make eye contact with them, help them fix a flat when they are stranded on the highway, help them feel like 11111 persons. ... How can a system like that change anything?" The race-crits, in their preoccupation with power, forget that the power to persuade remains the principal way of achieving lasting change in a democratic political culture. A beneficial but controversial measure is much more likely to survive changes of the party in power if it can be said to carry out the will of "the people," from whom all power in the United States is said to derive." For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, controversial as it was," has remained a bulwark of civil rights protection for thirty-six years because of its democratic and constitutional legitimacy. On the other hand, if Malcolm X or the Black Panthers had attempted to set up a separate black state on American soil in the tradition of John Brown, their efforts would have been crushed immediately.

## PERSONALIZING DEBATE ANSWERS

### A. PERSONALIZING DEBATE TRADES-OFF WITH EFFECTIVE POLICY SOLUTIONS.

#### 1. Locating problems within individuals trades-off with policy formation.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of “healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment” tends to “encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration.

#### 2. Personalization of argument undermines public deliberation.

Matt Stannard (Dept. of Communication & Journalism at University of Wyoming) 2006. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from [http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006\\_04\\_01\\_archive.html](http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006_04_01_archive.html)

But the Academy is not only under attack from “outsiders,” and not merely because the post-September 11 world has given the nod to sterile and commodified forms of patriotic communication and safe, symbolic dissent. Both inside and outside college life, the value of discussion is increasingly under attack, under sabotage, sometimes unintentionally, sometimes violently, and the attackers are often not recognizable as such. We cower away from religious fanatics because we know they refuse to entertain the possibility of their incorrectness, but we fail to see our own failure to embrace the possibilities of our own incorrectness. We label other points of view “ideological” from vantage points we assume to be free of ideology, or we excuse our narrow-mindedness by telling ourselves that “ideology is inevitable.” Part of this weakening of our commitment to open debate is our recent, seemingly liberating embrace of personal conviction over public deliberation, the self-comfort of personal narrative over the clumsy, awkward, and fallible attempt to forge consensus across the lines of identity and politics. The fetishization of personal conviction is no less threatening to the public forum than violent authoritarianism—both seek to render disagreement impossible, close off deliberation, and take us closer towards eventual, unnatural silence.

#### 3. Privileging personal experience and personal opinion triggers the discounting of contrary, external evidence: no one wants to disagree with another’s personal experience.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Third, whereas in social and therapeutic talk, personal experience, opinion, and individual well-being reign supreme, the force of “opinion” in a democracy demands allegiance both to reasonableness and to the larger collective good. Unlike certain postmodern dialogic therapists, responsible public deliberators view neither facts as inescapably elusive nor appeals to the rational uniformly suspect. Rather, democratic arguers apply rigorous standards for evidence and, above all, writes Schudson, subscribe to “norms of reasonableness.” A key groupthink feature—uncritical, self-righteous faith in the group’s inherent morality and traditions—is nourished by privileging lived experiences and personal opinions, the primary content of social and therapeutic talk. As Donal Carbaugh points out, because the “self” becomes the “locus of conversational life,” conversationalists may “disprefer consensual truths, or standards of and for public judgment,” which they view to “unduly constrain ‘self.’” Such an egocentric focus can enable members of deliberative bodies to discount crucial, formal types of external evidence that counters existing personal and group assumptions, resulting in what Lisa M. Gring-Pemble characterizes as forming public policies such as welfare reform “by anecdote.”

#### 4. Personalized evidence overshadows facts and statistics:

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Such personal evidence overshadowed the “facts” and “realities” Clinton also had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence. Whereas Clinton had encouraged “honest dialogue” in the name of “responsibility” and “community,” Burke argues that “The Cathartic Principle” often produces the reverse. “[C]onfessional,” he writes, “contains in itself a kind of ‘personal irresponsibility,’ as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium.” More to the point, “a thoroughly ‘confessional’ art may enact a kind of ‘individual salvation’ at the expense of the group,” performing a “sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities.”

#### 5. Taking the perspective of others is necessary to solve for the interests of everyone.



Matt Stannard (Dept. of Communication & Journalism at University of Wyoming) 2006. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from [http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006\\_04\\_01\\_archive.html](http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006_04_01_archive.html)

Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted. In the course of successfully taken abstractions, the core of generalizable interests can then emerge step by step.

6. Putting politics through a personal lens encourages inaction.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside itself." Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, "[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling... Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign... [but] only the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."

7. A focus on the micro-political prevents challenges to material domination.

Matt Stannard (Dept. of Communication & Journalism at University of Wyoming) 2006. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from [http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006\\_04\\_01\\_archive.html](http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006_04_01_archive.html)

I prefer that interpretation to the second one: That the switch-side, research-driven "game" of debate is politically bankrupt and should give way to several simultaneous zones of speech activism, where speakers can and should only fight for their own beliefs. As Gordon Mitchell of the University of Pittsburgh has pointed out, such balkanized speech will break down into several enclaves of speaking, each with its own political criteria for entry. In such a collection of impassable and unpermeable communities, those power relations, those material power entities, that evade political speech will remain unaccountable, will be given a "free pass" by the speech community, who will be so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resources and true believers in the service of continued material domination. Habermas's defense of the unfinished Enlightenment is my defense of academic debate: Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, seek to expand this method of deliberation to those who will use it to liberate themselves, confront power, and create ethical, nonviolent patterns of problem resolution. If capitalism corrupts debate, well, then I say we save debate.

8. Focusing on the personal trades off with material solutions to problems.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

9. Focusing on the individual trades-off with collective solutions.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency. "Therapy," Cloud argues, "offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action." Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, "locates blame and responsibility for solutions in the private sphere."

10. Debating from personal conviction undermines participatory democracy.

Matt Stannard (Dept. of Communication & Journalism at University of Wyoming) 2006. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from [http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006\\_04\\_01\\_archive.html](http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006_04_01_archive.html)

Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe.

11. Performances of the self leave little room for productive public argument.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly aired personal experiences and perspectives during the various community dialogues. In keeping with their talk-show formats, the forums showcased what Orlando Patterson described as "performative 'race' talk," "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument.

12. A focus on the self creates a therapeutic dialogue.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Therapeutic dialogue is likewise highly personal, although such talk directly engages with some conflict or struggle: addiction, familial strife, grief, eating disorders, low self-esteem, or other personal or relational issues. Therapeutic discourse—be it in encounter groups, 12-step programs, or individual counseling—travels a course of self-discovery aimed ultimately at personal, not social, reform. In therapeutic talk, the self monopolizes; the individual is central subject, provider of evidence, and solution, even if the "problem" entails external structures such as work-related stress or navigating racism, sexism, or homophobia.

13. A therapeutic dialogue jeopardizes the lifeblood of democracy.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

14. Their rhetoric will be co-opted to serve group think goals.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Despite the valorization of public conversation and dialogue as egalitarian, various public endeavors packaged as conversations and dialogues reveal a coopting of the terms as a means to consolidate rather than neutralize power, a move accompanied by groupthink traits. Particularly conspicuous is Clinton's aforementioned Conversation on Race, an initiative purportedly designed to tackle vexing racial discord by engaging citizens of diverse opinions and racial backgrounds in open dialogue. In a speech inaugurating this "great and unprecedented conversation about race," Clinton broached the enduring controversy over affirmative action by invoking purported conversational tenets of tolerance and inclusion: "To those who oppose affirmative action, I ask you to come up with an alternative. I would embrace it if I could find a better way. And to those of us who support it, I say we should continue to stand for it, [but] we should reach out to those who disagree or are uncertain and talk about the practical impact of these issues, and we should never be unwilling to work with those who disagree with us." Yet, from the outset, Clinton's appointed seven-member advisory board on the Conversation on Race was noticeably insular, entirely composed, for example, of supporters of affirmative action.

B. CRITIQUING DEBATE PRACTICES TRADES-OFF WITH EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO OPPRESSION IN DEBATE.

1. Personalization of debate ignores deeper structural problems within the debate community.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

The purpose of this essay is to outline what I strongly believe is a fundamental problem with recent debate techniques – the personalizing of debating. The intent is not to isolate or overly criticize the arguments advanced by the University of Louisville specifically, but rather to locate their arguments as a case study for how debate rounds have become highly personalized. Even before Louisville's project (and certainly Louisville is not the only team that currently engages in this type of debating), individuals and groups alike were personalizing debate arguments, making it difficult for opponents and judges to decipher, understand, analyze and come to grips with such arguments in a forum meant for hypothetical policy-making. In essence, the personalizing of debating has emerged wrought with frustrations, anxiety, resistance and backlash. To be sure, many have embraced the idea to gain a strategic edge in competitive debate rounds as well as to be self-reflexive of their own participation in an activity that probably does need restructuring. However, the central problem of this new phenomenon – the personalizing of debating – is twofold: it victimizes debate, and it ignores deeper, perhaps more important structural problems within the debate community.

2. Personalizing debate trades-off with other structural solutions to oppression in the activity.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

The second major problem with this turn in contemporary policy debate is its deflection, if not downright rejection, of more fundamental or core problems which are the cause of marginalization. Dana Cloud (1998) poignantly argues that when focusing on the personalizing of "debating," society stifles dissent, which is probably more important and powerful at ushering-in social change than particularized attention to therapeutic, albeit victimized, perspectives. The will to engage in discourse about transgression is one of individualized therapy, as if the individual's psychological condition is at stake (e.g., arguments about "discursive violence" are often deployed to this end). Her argument is primarily one about key progressive change – should we focus on individual notions of psychological distress or the larger group's problem of resource-based scarcity and exploitation? If one is compelled by the argument that we should look self-reflexively and comprehensively at the nature of excluding debaters of color and other marginalized groups, then we might be tempted to agree with the outcome of piecemeal solutions and incoherent policies. On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded?

3. Personalizing debate displaces efforts at structural change.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

And this is what personalizing debating does. While projects such as Louisville's declare ambitions of "community change" and radical social transformation, what they are really doing is keeping such arguments in the closet by performing their therapeutic rhetoric of victimhood in private debate rounds. If revolutionary change is the intent, then revolutionary action should occur to change the structural and institutional barriers to more diverse involvement and success in debate (Cloud, 1998, p. 166). Personalizing debating, as competitive arguments, in a private debate round does nothing except breed frustration, victimage, and displacement of more lofty efforts.

4. There are three problems with personalized debating: time constraints, the strategic nature of debate, and the inability to reach structural conclusions.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to get at these questions during a collegiate debate round. Not only is the limited time in a round an impediment at answering these complex questions, but both debaters of a single team may advance different personalized arguments, creating a moving target of advocacy that the opposing team and judges have difficulty in specifically pinning down for thorough and productive examination. Or, as Cloud suggests, such therapeutic arguments "deflect [sic] the energy and radicalism of activists," essentially creating a shell-game during private discussions of much larger societal problems (1998, p. 34). In addition, these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition. While some critical self-reflection has undoubtedly occurred as a result of personalizing debate, the overwhelming majority of debaters and coaches spend less time thinking about the core problems of marginalization (and their solutions) than they do locating debate strategies to beat personalization arguments at the next tournament. During squad meetings and coaching sessions, one does not hear an opposing team sincerely talk about their privilege or the exclusion of women or people of color in the debate community. Instead, one hears about what topicality argument, framework argument, or counter-narrative will be deployed to win the judge's ballot. The problem of therapeutic rhetoric underscores how personalized debating prevents examination of more important factors such as resource disparity. Thus, the underlying therapeutic nature of personalized debate, coupled with the competitive component of trying to win debate rounds nullifies any chance at a fruitful and productive discussion about the problems of marginalization and their potential solutions. A focus on the personal – my experience, my narrative, my feelings, how I learn, how I can engage the community – is quite seductive; we all want to know how we fit into the larger structure of the community. And, given the intense nature of our activity, it is easy to get lost in how our feelings of hard work, emotional attachment, anxiety, despair, excitement, success, and so on become interfaced with larger community trends. Ultimately, however, a focus on the personal is a dead-end. The community's composition of multiple persons, who become focused on themselves, ignores the community at large. This can be seen with the move toward personalizing debating. Instead of examining problems of resource disparity (high costs of travel, scholarships, lack of novice tournaments, disparate coaching staffs, etc.) which plague debaters and debate programs throughout the country, the personalization arguments focus on different styles of debating (slow vs. fast, hip-hop vs. traditional evidence), individual identity (black vs. white, privileged vs. marginalized), and praxis (I'm doing something about the problem vs. you're not). Indeed, as Cloud argues, the "privatizing, normalizing, and marginalizing discourses of the therapeutic are incompatible with a public-, policy-, and change-oriented definition of politics" (1998, p. 7).

5. Community based discussions are superior to individual debate rounds at solving oppression.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

Given the therapeutic nature of personalized debate, such argumentative transactions almost become like disputes on a playground where one debater essentially says "my daddy can beat up your daddy," or translated it becomes "my oppression is worse than your oppression." And, because these arguments occur in a debate round, they are articulated precisely in this way. As I will argue below, a much more effective strategy is to engage, in the spirit of critical pedagogy, in a community-based discussion of structural issues regarding privilege, as opposed to competitive, albeit strategic, arguments in specific debates.

6. Other forums are superior to debate rounds at addressing issues of structural inequalities.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

Interjecting the personalized into debate rounds has become highly problematic. As discussions on eDebate demonstrate and my own discussions with folks who have judged teams like Louisville 1 suggest, these arguments have increased anxiety, frustration, anger and resentment. To be fair, these arguments have also facilitated much soul-searching and self-reflexivity in the community. However, except for the Urban Debate League (UDL) movement 2 little, if anything, is being done to correct for inadequacies and inequities in the community, contrary to the appeal of the personalized arguments. In fact, any benefits from the personalization of debate can be accrued from enhancing other strategies: larger community discussions (as evidenced by some messages on eDebate), 3 discussion fora at national tournaments, 4 special high school debate institutes, 5 clear directives and discussion during the CEDA and NDT business and roundtable meetings, 6 more sensitive topic selection, 7 etc.

7. Addressing structural issues in debate is the key to solving inequality.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

There is no question that individualized and personalized questions of debate style are important to examine – some debaters learn better through different styles and some styles are more exciting than others. And, if those are the questions the community wants to ask and deal with, then so be it. However, if we are serious about creating a climate of tolerance, respect and diversity, then much deeper, structural (i.e., not personalized) issues must be addressed first. We would do well to note Rogers et al., who argue: The forensic community has made significant progress over the past few years towards understanding the complexities of the differing presentational styles, argument forms and analysis of subdominant cultural groups hoping to bridge the gap between understanding, tolerance and both significant representation and participation in debate. None would argue against the goal of significant inclusiveness and its overall contribution to the pedagogy of a complete forensic experience resulting in education. In spite of our efforts, the participation and success rates for women and minorities within intercollegiate, competitive debate remain disparagingly low (2003, p. 2). As such, the problems of diversity and privilege in the debate community cannot be addressed in individual debate rounds, particularly through arguments about "non- traditional" evidence, argumentative style and cultural forms of learning. The highly personalized nature of such arguments creates feelings of victimhood. The competitive aspect of a debate round makes the therapeutic rhetoric of argumentative style displace the larger, structural impediments to a diverse and tolerant community. Again, if we refer to Cloud, we can translate her use of "private" for a "debate round," particularly if we juxtapose the private debate round to the community writ large: . . . the therapeutic is a rhetoric that encourages a reformist rather than revolutionary political stance . . . . It is dangerous . . . to allow the therapeutic to set the bounds of our political imagination to the extent that it becomes difficult even to conceive of revolutionary change . . . the therapeutic asks activists to retreat from the public struggle for even modest reforms in favor of private wound-licking (1998, pp. 159-160).

8. Diversity forums are superior to individual debate rounds at addressing exclusion issues.

Joseph P. Zompetti (prof. of communication studies at Illinois State) CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 2004, 26.

Many, if not most, of the complaints heard in debate rounds have merit. As a community, we must address the issues of exclusivity, tolerance, respect and diversity. However, when debaters make arguments about these issues in debate rounds, the arguments become personalized, often seen as attacks against specific individuals, namely the "other" team (in arguments such as "you don't address your privilege," or "you don't do anything or aren't doing enough for diversity"). The so-called "Other" that debaters refer to as being marginalized becomes transferred onto "other" individuals and teams as the competitive structure of a debate necessitates. The point, then, is not that these complaints and concerns should not be discussed, but that they should not be discussed in actual debate rounds. I should also add that since diversity is still an on-going concern, we must question the efficacy of personalized debating at generally improving diversity in our community. Even if other solutions fall short as well, they at least avoid the pitfalls of personalized debating that I now begin to explore.

C. RETREATING FROM PUBLIC CONCERNS PREVENTS SOLUTIONS TO WORLD PROBLEMS.

1. Retreating away from public concerns to private ones prevents solutions to myriad of world problems.

Carl Boggs, (National University, Los Angeles) THEORY AND SOCIETY, 1997. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved - perhaps even unrecognized - only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.<sup>74</sup> In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will

be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites - an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise - or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.<sup>75</sup>

2. Moving away from public deliberation prevents solutions to worldwide problems.

Jonathan Small & Meg Buckley, (former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition) 2006.

Retrieved May 22, 2013 from <http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.pdf>

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all solidarity - ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankind's next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We'll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal *Equity and Excellence in Education*. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. *Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap* Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead

on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality.

### 3. Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving social and political problems

Christian Lundberg (professor of communications @ UNC Chapel Hill)

Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century, 311-313

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to re-articulation, it is open to re-articulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in *The Public and Its Problems* place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63,154). Debate provides an indispensable form of education in the modern articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multi-mediated information environment (*ibid.*). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic ... that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned... students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so.... These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate] These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, research and information-skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction.

Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

4. Their privileging of personal dialogue entrenches exclusion and hierarchies.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Fall 2005, 405.

Indeed, rather than remedying exclusion, hierarchy, polarization, and inertia in civic life, the appropriation of conversation and dialogue into the public realm can foster and sustain such problems.

5. Democratic deliberation is necessary to solve a variety of world ills.

Matt Stannard (Dept. of Communication & Journalism at University of Wyoming) 2006. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from [http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006\\_04\\_01\\_archive.html](http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006_04_01_archive.html)

Apocalyptic scenarios are themselves rhetorical tools, but that doesn't mean they are bereft of material justification. The "flash-boom" of apocalyptic rhetoric isn't out of the question, but it is also no less threatening merely as a metaphor for the slow death of humanity (and all living beings) through environmental degradation, the irradiation of the planet, or the descent into political and ethical barbarism. Indeed, these slow, deliberate scenarios ring more true than the flashpoint of quick Armageddon, but in the end the "fire or ice" question is moot, because the answers to those looming threats are still the same: The complexities of threats to our collective well-being require unifying perspectives based on diverse viewpoints, in the same way that the survival of ecosystems is dependent upon biological diversity. In Habermas's language, we must fight the colonization of the lifeworld in order to survive at all, let alone to survive in a life with meaning. While certainly not the only way, the willingness to facilitate organized democratic deliberation, including encouraging participants to articulate views with which they may personally disagree, is one way to resist this colonization.



## NARRATIVES ANSWERS

### A. NARRATIVES TRADE-OFF WITH MORE EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS.

1. The privileging of emotional responses in narratives re-entrenches racial hegemony.  
Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) *RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS*. Fall 2005, 405.  
Furthermore, identification intrinsic in narrative experiences is double-edged; while identification can neutralize domination by creating empathy, identification also can fortify hegemony. As Cornell West warns, the privileging of emotional responses to racism and racial self-identities over other data can contribute to “racial reasoning,” which blacks employ to their peril. To illustrate, he points to the failure of black leadership to challenge the qualifications by typical measures of black Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, opting instead to submit to deceptive racial solidarity built upon premises of “black authenticity.”  
Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of “healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment” tends to “encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration.
2. The move toward individual examples moves away from statistical information.  
Lisa Gring-Pemble (Professor of Communication Studies @ George Mason University) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*. Nov. 2001, 359.  
A second contribution of this study is that it provides insight into a process currently overlooked in studies of public moral argument and policymaking, and that is the role of depictions in policy formation. In so doing, this study contributes to a clearer understanding of the role and function of depictions in public moral argument. In his study of American views on welfare reform, Martin Gilens demonstrates that the public’s perceptions “are influenced more by vivid examples than by statistical information, even if the evidentiary value of the statistical information is far higher” (1999, 206). Similarly, as this study on welfare reform suggests, social policy deliberations are anecdotal in nature because the depictions vivify problems that are difficult to quantify. Although they warn against the dangers inherent in basing public policy on depictions, FT7 legislators prefer the depictions as evidence to warrant public policy changes because the depictions tap into deep cultural reservoirs. FT8
3. Solutions to racism require data beyond personal narratives:  
Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) *RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS*. Fall 2005, 405.  
Because the problems plaguing contemporary black America, West writes, result from a complex amalgam of structural and behavioral factors, weaving solutions demands analysis of data beyond subjective personal narratives and performances of self-identity.
4. Individual micro-narratives discourage groups from finding common interests.  
Matt Stannard (Dept. of Communication & Journalism at University of Wyoming) 2006. Retrieved May 22, 2013 from [http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006\\_04\\_01\\_archive.html](http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006_04_01_archive.html)  
The complexity and interdependence of human society, combined with the control of political decisionmaking—and political conversation itself—in the hands of fewer and fewer technological “experts,” the gradual exhaustion of material resources and the organized circumvention of newer and more innovative resource development, places humanity, and perhaps all life on earth, in a precarious position. Where we need creativity and openness, we find rigid and closed non-solutions. Where we need masses of people to make concerned investments in their future, we find (understandable) alienation and even open hostility to political processes. The dominant classes manipulate ontology to their advantage: When humanity seeks meaning, the powerful offer up metaphysical hierarchies; when concerned masses come close to exposing the structural roots of systemic oppression, the powerful switch gears and promote localized, relativistic micronarratives that discourage different groups from finding common, perhaps “universal” interests.
5. Narrative stories facilitate elite discourse and lock out the views of the marginalized.  
Lisa Gring-Pemble (Professor of Communication Studies @ George Mason University) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*. Nov. 2001, 343.  
Ultimately, I show in this essay how depictions of welfare recipients and their families form the basis of the enacted welfare legislation. Although communication theorist Walter Fisher would contend that legislator reliance on depictions frees policymakers to evaluate the validity of the stories “inimical to elitist politics,” this

case study suggest otherwise (1984, 9). In contrast, I argue that the depictive forms facilitate elite discourse, discourage the inclusion of alternative public views, and delegitimize particular public voices. In making this argument, I first outline the theoretical approaches that inform this study. Next, I describe the historical context in which the welfare reform hearings and debates occurred. This background provides the framework within which I analyze representations of welfare recipients. I conclude with a discussion of the rhetorical implications of this study.

6. Failing to tie individual narratives to policy stymies productive solutions to problems.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) *RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS*. Fall 2005, 405.

Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual's voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects. First, because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although "[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of 'just talking.'"

**B. NARRATIVES ARE NOT LIBERATORY.**

1. Narratives are not liberatory—they can be used to suppress particular public voices.

Lisa Gring-Pemble (Professor of Communication Studies @ George Mason University) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*. Nov. 2001, 359.

First, this study challenges the liberatory and participatory functions of the narrative paradigm as conceived by Walter Fisher. Implying that audiences have the power to interpret and assess narratives, Fisher's narrative paradigm endows audiences with significant control in the creation of meaning. Fisher's insistence upon audience's ability to judge a text critically based on its narrative rationality, however, discounts the power of discourse to shape and position audiences' understanding of their world in particular ways. Thus, while Fisher claims that "The sort of hierarchy condemned by the narrative praxis is the sort that is marked by the will to power, the kind of system in which elites struggle to dominate and to use the people for their own ends," this study suggests otherwise (1984, 9). An analysis of the congressional hearings and debates that led to the passage of PRWORA points to the power of some depictions to facilitate elite discourse and to exclude and delegitimize particular public voices.

2. Narratives foster elitism.

Lisa Gring-Pemble (Professor of Communication Studies @ George Mason University) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*. Nov. 2001, 345.

In contrast to Fisher's theory, however, this case study questions the liberatory and participatory nature of narratives, arguing that some narrative forms foster elitism and discourage critical, self-reflexive analysis.

3. Narrative reasoning does not prevent people from choosing bad stories.

Barbara Warnick (Professor of Speech Communication at the University of Washington) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*, 1987, 181.

Second, Fisher promises to get us beyond consensus as a criterion for judging the values in a text, but he nevertheless insists that the public can and should judge texts based on their narrative features alone. Fisher fails to deal with the question of how we can assure that the public will not choose bad stories based on self delusion or rationalization. While acknowledging that a coherent narrative with bad values may lead the public astray, Fisher continues to insist that the narrative rationality somehow provides a guide for distinguishing the reliability, trustworthiness, and desirability of rhetorical narratives.

**C. COUNTER-NARRATIVES WILL RE-ENTRENCH OPPRESSION.**

1. Narratives will breed counter-narratives which will re-entrench oppressive structures.

Mari Boor Tonn (Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland) *RHETORIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS*. Fall 2005, 405.

Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress

women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 *The Feminist Mystique* argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.

2. People will agree with narratives that ring true to their own experiences—countering the liberatory potential of narratives.

Barbara Warnick (Professor of Speech Communication at the University of Washington) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*, 1987, 176.

As the example of *Mein Kampf* has shown us, however, a text's appeal to the particular audience does not prevent self-delusion. A rhetorical narrative may "ring true" in the lives of particular audience members, may resonate with their own experience and that of whom they admire, and nevertheless be a bad story. In fact, Fisher acknowledged that "no guarantee exists that one who uses narrative rationality will not adopt 'bad' stories, rationalizations....Stories satisfy the need for equilibrium and the demands of narrative probability and fidelity....It may be, however, that another observer would think otherwise, that the involved person was rationalizing" ("Elaboration," 349; emphasis mine). Fisher's equivocation here leaves the impression that the search for a reliable criterion for the critical assessment of texts has led us into another *cul-de-sac*. The only remaining criterion is the judgment of the critic who is the one apparently qualified to decide whether "the values the message offers....constitute the ideal basis for human conduct" ("Good Reasons," 380).

3. Narratives don't always lead to good results—narratives can also lead people to accept visions of evil.

Barbara Warnick (Professor of Speech Communication at the University of Washington) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*, 1987, 176.

The third and most serious problem of his rationality indictment results from Fisher's efforts to argue that narrativity is more comprehensible and accessible to the public and is therefore to be valued over rationality. Fisher has claimed that "one does not have to be taught narrative probability and narrative fidelity; one culturally acquires them through a universal faculty and experience" ("Narration," 15). Because the capability for using narrative rationality is universal, "the 'people' do judge stories that are told for and about them and...they have a rational capacity to make such judgments" (9). Fisher has argued that "narrative rationality is not an account of the 'laws of thought' and it is not normative in the sense that one must reason according to prescribed rules of calculation or inference making" (9). Nothing that the capacity for narrative rationality lies within everyone, Fisher has concluded that "the people have a natural tendency to prefer the true and the just" (9). Because we are all storytellers, we are all competent to judge the stories we hear. Contrary to Fisher's observation, the "people" do not always prefer the "true and just" view. Perhaps the most salient counterexample to this claim is the success of Nazi propaganda in persuading the German people that the source of evil in the world was the Jewish race. In *Mein Kampf*, the Aryan race was depicted as original, pure, self-sacrificing, and the source of all great art, culture, invention and true achievement in the world. Aryan efforts to advance civilization were undermined by the schemes of the "Prince of Evil," the international Jew who was involved in a worldwide conspiracy to live parasitically among Aryans, intermingling with them and sapping the strength of their ethnic purity. The German masses were to be wooed by a dominating male of great vision who would win them from the evil seduction of the Jew and restore the German race to the international dominance to which it was suited and entitled.

## IDENTITY POLITICS ANSWERS

### A. IDENTITY POLITICS UNDERMINES THE FIGHT AGAINST OPPRESSION.

#### 1. Identity politics isolates groups from fighting oppression.

James Petras (professor of sociology at Binghamton University) LINKS, Feb. 10, 1999. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/26/154.html>

Marxists have never denied the importance of racial, gender and ethnic divisions within classes. What they have emphasised, however, is the wider social system which generates these differences and the need to join class forces to eliminate these inequalities at every point: work, neighborhood, family. What most Marxists object to is the idea that gender and race inequalities can and should be analysed and solved outside of the class framework: that landowner women with servants and wealth have an essential "identity" with the peasant women who are employed at starvation wages; that Indian bureaucrats of neo-liberal governments have a common "identity" with peasant Indians who are displaced from their land by the free market economic policies. For example, Bolivia has an Indian vice-president presiding over the mass arrest of cocoa-growing Indian farmers.¶ Identity politics in the sense of consciousness of a particular form of oppression by an immediate group can be an appropriate point of departure. This understanding, however, will become an "identity" prison (race or gender) isolated from other exploited social groups unless it transcends the immediate points of oppression and confronts the social system in which it is embedded. And that requires a broader class analysis of the structure of social power which presides over and defines the conditions of general and specific inequalities.

#### 2. Identity politics cause fragmentation and a turn inward.

James Petras (professor of sociology at Binghamton University) LINKS, Feb. 10, 1999. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/26/154.html>

The post-Marxists, as managers of NGOs, have become skilled in designing projects and transmitting the new "identity" and "globalist" jargon into the popular movements. Their talk and writing about international cooperation and self-help micro-enterprises creates ideological bonds with the neo-liberals while forging dependency on external donors and their neo-liberal socio-economic agenda. It is no surprise that after a decade of NGO activity that the post-Marxist professionals have "depoliticised" and deradicalised whole areas of social life: women, neighborhood and youth organisations. The case of Peru and Chile is classic: where the NGOs have become firmly established, the radical social movements have retreated. Local struggles over immediate issues are the food and substance that nurture emerging movements. The crucial question is over their direction and dynamic: whether they raise the larger issues of the social system and link up with other local forces to confront the state and its imperial backers or whether it turns inward, looking to foreign donors and fragmenting into a series of competing supplicants for external subsidies. The ideology of post-Marxism promotes the latter; the Marxists the former.

#### 3. Dividing society into sectoral groupings prevents solutions to macro-level problems.

James Petras (professor of sociology at Binghamton University) LINKS, Feb. 10, 1999. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/26/154.html>

The same is true among the professionals: each sets up their NGO to solicit overseas funds. They compete by presenting proposals closer to the liking of the overseas donors for lower prices, while claiming to speak for more followers. The net effect is a proliferation of NGOs that fragment poor communities into sectoral and sub-sectoral groupings unable to see the larger social picture that afflicts them and even less able to unite in struggle against the system.

#### 4. Identity politics prevents solutions to oppression.

James Petras (professor of sociology at Binghamton University) LINKS, Feb. 10, 1999. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/26/154.html>

The essentialism of identity politics isolates groups into competing groups unable to transcend the politico-economic universe that defines and confines the poor, workers, peasants, employees. Class politics is the terrain within which to confront "identity politics" and to transform the institutions that sustain class and other inequalities.

### B. IDENTITY POLITICS CREATES US-THEM DICHOTOMIES.

#### 1. Identity politics creates us-them dichotomies.

Jerry Frug (professor of law @ Harvard University), UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, Spring, 1993. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

But there is no single group identity from an insider perspective either. Since everyone is a member of many groups, any particular group label falsifies to the extent it suggests a sameness within the group. A group identity has to be forged out of differences that divide the group; it never simply exists. Every group member recognizes the problem of uniting all Asian Americans or transvestites or Democrats or men or Texans behind any single cause. But the multiplicity of group identifications also allows some group members to dispute the legitimacy of others' claim to membership: to some Asian Americans, an American from Sri Lanka is not a "real" Asian American; to some Texans, an Asian American is not a "real" Texan; to some men, a transvestite is not a "real" man; to some Democrats, Paul Tsongas is not a "real" Democrat. As Barbara Johnson observes, "difference disliked is identity affirmed." n22

2. Us-them dichotomies re-entrench racism and risk genocide.

Jodi Dean (Hobart and William Smith Colleges, New York) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ZIZEK STUDIES, 2007, 21.

Zizek's account of the fantasmic organization of enjoyment provides compelling explanation for ethnic nationalism. Since at least the nineteen eighties, questions of race and ethnicity have coalesced into two opposing approaches. On one side are appeals to ethnic and racial identity. Groups argue for rights, such as rights to self-determination or for the preservation of their linguistic and cultural heritage, on the basis of a certain essential difference. Even as race has been exposed for its lack of a scientific or biological foundation, people who have been discriminated against on the basis of race find categories of racial and ethnic identity useful as grounds for claims for inclusion, recognition, and redress. For some, particularly those endeavoring to establish or maintain ethnically pure homelands, these efforts at ethnic preservation lead to ethnic cleansing and genocide. On the other side, many, particularly among left activists and academics, rightly reject racial essentialism, precisely because race has no biological basis (Appiah 1993). From this side, arguments that rely on the assertion of race risk reinstalling precisely the racial logic that anti-racism contests.

### C. IDENTITY POLITICS RISKS CO-OPTION.

1. Identity politics leads to a multitude of particular identities.

Slavoj Zizek (Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia) THE TICKLISH SUBJECT, 195-196)

The distinction between appearance and the postmodern notion of simulacrum as no longer clearly distinguishable from the Real is crucial here. The political as the domain of appearance (opposed to the social reality of class and other distinctions, that is, of society as the articulated social body) has nothing in common with the postmodern notion that we are entering the era of universalized simulacra in which reality itself becomes indistinguishable from its simulated double. The nostalgic long-ing for the authentic experience of being lost in the deluge of simulacra (detectable in Virilio), as well as the postmodern assertion of the Brave New World of universalized simulacra as the sign that we are finally getting rid of the metaphysical obsession with authentic Being (detectable in Vattimo), both miss the distinction between simulacrum and appearance: what gets lost in today's 'plague of simulations' is not the firm, true, non-simulated Real, but appearance itself. To put it in Lacanian terms: simulacrum is imaginary (illusion), while appearance is symbolic (fiction); when the specific dimension of symbolic appearance starts to disintegrate, the Imaginary and the Real become more and more indistinguishable. The key to today's universe of simulacra, in which the Real is less and less distinguishable from its imaginary simulation, lies in the retreat of 'symbolic efficiency'. In sociopolitical terms, this domain of appearance (of symbolic fiction) is none other than that of politics as distinct from the social body subdivided into parts. There is 'appearance' in so far as a part not included in the Whole of the Social Body (or included/excluded in a way against which it protests) symbolizes its position as that of a Wrong, claiming, against other parts, that it stands for the universality of egaliberte, here we are dealing with appearance in the contrast to the 'reality' of the structured social body. The old conservative motto of 'keeping up appearances' thus takes a new twist today: it no longer stands for the 'wisdom' according to which it is better not to disturb the rules of social etiquette too much, since social chaos might ensue. Today, the effort to 'keep up appearances' stands, rather, for the effort to maintain the properly political space against the onslaught of the postmodern all-embracing social body, with its multitude of particular identities.

2. This leads to right-wing co-option of the concept of fluid identities—it allows the Christian Right to proclaim to be oppressed—laying the foundation for Nazism.

Slavoj Zizek (Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia) THE TICKLISH SUBJECT, 198-201)

Here, however, one must fully endorse Badiou's point that these 'returns to the Substance' are themselves impotent in the face of the global march of Capital: they are its inherent supplement, the limit/condition of its functioning, since—as Deleuze emphasized years ago—capitalist 'deterritorialization' is always accompanied by re-emerging 'reterritorializations'. More precisely, there is an inherent split in the field of particular identities themselves caused by the onslaught of capitalist globalization: on the one hand, the so-called 'fundamentalisms', whose basic formula is that of the Identity of one's own group, implying the practice of excluding the threatening Other(s): France for the French (against Algerian immigrants), America for Americans (against the Hispanic invasion), Slovenia for Slovenians (against the excessive presence of 'Southerners', immigrants from the ex-Yugoslav republics); on the other hand, there is postmodern multiculturalist 'identity politics', aiming at the tolerant coexistence of ever-shifting, 'hybrid' lifestyle groups, divided into endless subgroups (Hispanic women, black gays, white male AIDS patients, lesbian mothers...). This ever-growing flowering of groups and subgroups in their hybrid and fluid, shifting identities, each insisting on the right to assert its specific way of life and/or culture, this incessant diversification, is possible and thinkable only against the background of capitalist globalization; it is the very way capitalist globalization affects our sense of ethnic and other forms of community belonging: the only link connecting these multiple groups is the link of Capital itself, always ready to satisfy the specific demands of each group and subgroup (gay tourism, Hispanic music...). Furthermore, the opposition between fundamentalism and postmodern pluralist identity politics is ultimately a fake, concealing a deeper solidarity (or, to put it in Hegelese, speculative identity): a multiculturalist can easily find even the most 'fundamentalist' ethnic identity attractive, but only in so far as it is the identity of the supposedly authentic Other (say, in the USA, Native American tribal identity); a fundamentalist group can easily adopt, in its social functioning, the postmodern strategies of identity politics, presenting itself as one of the threatened minorities, simply striving to maintain its specific way of life and cultural identity. The line of separation between multiculturalist identity politics and fundamentalist is thus purely formal; it often depends merely on the different perspective from which the observer views a movement for maintaining a group identity. Under these conditions, the Event in the guise of the 'return to roots' can be only a semblance that fits the capitalist circular movement perfectly or—in the worst case—leads to a catastrophe like Nazism. The sign of today's ideologico-political constellation is the fact that these kinds of pseudo-Events constitute the only appearances of Events which seem to pop up (it is only right-wing populism which today displays the authentic political passion of accepting the struggle, of openly admitting that, precisely in so far as one claims to speak from a universal standpoint, one does not aim to please everybody, but it ready to introduce a division of 'Us' versus 'Them').

## BLACK/WHITE BINARY ANSWERS

### A. THEIR METHODOLOGY ENTRENCHES THE BLACK/WHITE PARADIGM.

1. Assuming that racism happens only by whites against blacks re-entrenches the black-white paradigm. Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.  
Scholars of race/ethnic relations, and mainstream Americans in general, have focused almost exclusively on Black experiences in, and contributions to, civil rights struggles. The common thread of the Black/White paradigm is that race/ethnicity consists, either exclusively or primarily, of Whites and Blacks. n10 The Black/White paradigm limits the relevancy of race/ethnic relations to include only the experiences of Blacks; it omits the experiences of other minority communities. n11 This omission is not problematic in and of itself. After all, if Blacks were the only significant contributors to civil rights or public school desegregation, then scholarship utilizing the Black/White paradigm would accurately reflect those contributions. However, this is not the case. Despite common misconceptions, Mexicans/Mexican Americans have contributed significantly to general civil rights struggles and specifically to public school desegregation. n12
2. Discourse of the Civil Rights movement focuses on the Black/White paradigm. Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.  
A number of authors have noted the relative lack of attention Mexicans and Mexican Americans receive by academics and popular media alike. n1 Scholars, popular print and visual media that attract large audiences all ignore the experiences of Mexicans/Mexican Americans. n2 This lack of attention is apparent in virtually every realm of American society. Discussions concerning discrimination and race/ethnic relations in the United States are no exception. n3 Indeed, the Civil Rights Movement and discourse on race/ethnic relations are almost inextricably intertwined with, and exclusively focused on, the contributions and experiences of Blacks. Some [\*226] authors have termed this feature of race/ethnic relations the "Black/White paradigm." n4
3. The work of Cornell West exemplifies the Black/White paradigm. Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.  
As this Article will discuss, Mexicans/Mexican Americans have not only struggled to end segregation for their own community, but have also contributed to similar efforts to promote the civil rights of Blacks. n13 Furthermore, it is worth noting that Mexicans'/Mexican Americans' contributions were neither sporadic nor insignificant. Rather, these contributions have contributed to civil rights efforts generally, and desegregation specifically, for as long as their Black counterparts. n14 This fact is worth noting because it more completely describes the civil rights history of the United States. Lamentably, scholars all too often overlook this chapter in the book of legal history. Furthermore, discussion of Mexican/Mexican American contributions to civil rights is particularly important because some legal scholars, including several of the most eminent, have characterized non-Black minorities' contributions to civil rights as secondary to those of Blacks at best, and at worst, have omitted their contributions altogether. For instance, Cornell West describes non-Black minorities' contributions to civil rights as "slight though significant." n15; [\*228] West's description of Latino, Asian, and Native American contributions is important for a number of reasons. First, despite the context of West's characterization, a brief paragraph where he argues that "a prophetic framework encourages a coalition strategy," n16 his statement exemplifies the misconception that Latino civil rights struggles are minimal. Students of civil rights history read scholarship by renowned authors like West to guide them through their study of the subject. With this in mind, it is no mystery that students' understanding of the subject frequently mirrors the incomplete texts from which they read. If the history of civil rights is inaccurately written, then how can we expect students to understand it any differently? As long as civil rights scholarship is incompletely written, students and their scholarship will reflect the aforementioned flaws and fail to include the continuing civil rights struggles of Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other communities of color.
4. Toni Morrison's work exemplifies the Black/White paradigm. Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.  
Perea also critiques the work of celebrated Black author Toni Morrison as evidencing "excessive distrust of Latinas/os and other non-Whites." n53; Morrison describes the struggles of immigrants as, "persistently

framed as struggles between recent arrivals and blacks. In race talk the move into mainstream America always means buying into the notion of American blacks as the real aliens." n54 While there is some merit to Morrison's observations, her failure to differentiate between immigrant communities illustrates a general misunderstanding of Mexican/Mexican American immigrant experiences. Under the Black/White paradigm, such misunderstandings are all too common.

5. Frank Wilderson's central tenant is the black/white paradigm.

Malia Bruker (screenwriter and documentary filmmaker) *Journal of Film and Video*, Winter 2011, 66. Wilderson's central tenet is the impossibility of analogizing the suffering of black people with that of any other race or group of people since the continued gratuitous violence that characterizes black existence is found nowhere else in history. The structural, noncontingent violence on the black body and psyche has continued from the Middle Passage through slavery and the Jim Crow era and continuing on to today's ghettos and prison-industrial complex. So although the meaning of suffering for whites (or non-blacks), with few exceptions, is based on issues of exploitation and alienation, the ontology of suffering for blacks is based on issues of "accumulation and fungibility" (14, original quote Saidiya Hartman). In Wilderson's theory, this condition of being owned and traded is not simply an experience, like, for example, the experience of wage exploitation, but it is the essence and ontology of blackness. For Wilderson, this contrast in white and black essential positioning, and the white creation of and parasitism on the situation, is so polarizing that the relationship between whites and blacks, or "Masters and Slaves" (10), can only be considered an antagonism, as opposed to a negotiable, solvable conflict.

6. Wilderson perceives other minorities as junior partners.

Malia Bruker (screenwriter and documentary filmmaker) *Journal of Film and Video*, Winter 2011, 68. Although this section on Native American political theory is exhaustive and provides a new and interesting dynamic to the white/black antagonism, it is of note that Wilderson considers all other non-blacks "junior partners" (33) in civil society, staking some claim to the hegemonic power that whites wield. Although it may be true that no other racial group in the United States has the same ontological struggles, for some readers it may seem an oversight to describe groups such as undocumented immigrants as "junior partners" when they are currently facing what most liberatory activists would characterize as slave-like working conditions, mass roundups, inhumane Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facilities, and draconian legislation.

## B. THE BLACK/WHITE PARADIGM WORSENS RACISM AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION.

1. The false Black/White binary is what forms the very basis of the white supremacist structures they criticize. Francisco Valdes (Visiting Professor of Law @ University of Miami) *CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW*, October 1997, Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

Ignoring intermediate groups in Black/White analyses also tends to obscure the causes or effects of Latina/o or Asian-American racism against Blacks, or vice versa. 61 An "exclusive focus" on Black/White relations obscures color-on-color issues, reinforcing the marginalization of non-White identification. In short, this paradigm structures race, law, and society around White supremacy 62 and White privilege. 63 LatCrit and other outsider scholars therefore should not permit this paradigm to likewise structure our critiques of race, law, and society.

2. The black/white paradigm destroys the coalitional approaches necessary to solve racism.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) *Berkeley La Raza Law Journal*, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

For instance, as already mentioned, Cornel West described Latino, Asian and Native American contributions to civil rights as "slight though significant." n51 Perea critiques West's scholarship as, "expressing a degree of distrust regarding Latinas/os and Asian Americans that works against the coalitions that West knows are necessary to struggle successfully against racism[.]" n52

3. The Black/White paradigm does more harm than good for non-Black racial and ethnic minorities.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) *Berkeley La Raza Law Journal*, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

The challenges racial/ethnic communities confront vary. Utilizing the Black community as the standard by which to address all forms of discrimination may present more harm than good for non-Black racial/ethnic communities. Mexicans/Mexican Americans' efforts to desegregate schools for their community support such an assertion. If even highly regarded authors of race/ethnicity fail to recognize the discrimination from which Mexicans/Mexican Americans suffer, it is not surprising that their readers echo their incomplete analyses.



4. The Black/White paradigm fails to represent Latinos, Native Americans, and other non-Black minority groups adequately.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

[\*252] Scholars and popular media alike almost exclusively utilize the Black/White paradigm to conceptualize race/ethnicity. The paradigm promulgates Black experiences but fails to represent Latinos, Asians, Native Americans and other non-Black minority groups adequately. The coverage of the Los Angeles riots by news media supports such an assertion.

5. The Black/White paradigm marginalizes the voices of Latinos.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

The majority of the victims of early riot violence were Latinos. n187 A full third of the dead victims of the riots were Latinos. Between twenty and forty percent of the businesses damaged were Latino owned, n188 and Latinos comprised one half of all the arrested. n189 These statistics are far from surprising because Latinos, primarily Mexicans/Mexican Americans, comprise over half of South Central Los Angeles' population. n190 Considering these statistics, what should be surprising is the lack of attention visual and print media gave to Mexicans/Mexican Americans' perspectives concerning the riots. Media coverage and scholarly analyses of the Los Angeles riots provide a poignant example of how the Black/White paradigm distorts the lens through which we view racial/ethnic group dynamics in the United States. Under the Black/White paradigm, Mexicans/Mexican Americans are omitted from racial/ethnic [\*253] analyses, their harms and grievances are under-reported and their marginalization is exacerbated.¶ This Article was written almost ten years to the day after the Los Angeles riots. Recent visual and print news media have dedicated considerable attention to the aftermath of the riots. Despite ten years of hindsight, the journalistic commentary on racial/ethnic relations and the Los Angeles riots still almost completely omits the perspective of Mexicans/Mexican Americans. At most, the commentary notes the change in the racial/ethnic composition of Los Angeles since the riots. n191 However, if news commentary mentions Mexicans/Mexican Americans at all, it is still only in passing. Even ten years of retrospect has not been able to undo what the Black/White paradigm has done - to render Mexican/Mexican Americans invisible.

6. The Black/White paradigm renders Latinos invisible.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

This Article critiques the Black/White paradigm, which structures both scholarly and popular discourse on race relations in America. First, the Article demonstrates how the paradigm generally renders Latinos invisible in race/ethnicity discourse. In particular, the paradigm obscures Mexican/Mexican American contributions to civil rights struggles. Next, I argue that recent demographic shifts undermine conventional justifications for continued use of the paradigm. Contemporary demography demonstrates the severe marginalization of Mexicans/Mexican Americans in the United States. Hence, belief in the Black/White paradigm may now be based on outdated and dangerously inaccurate social facts.

7. Solving for Black discrimination will not solve for discrimination of other ethnic minority groups.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

It is widely assumed that Blacks suffer most from discrimination. n25 It is also widely assumed that by addressing the discrimination suffered by Blacks, other [\*230] racial/ethnic groups necessarily will benefit. The logic is as follows: ameliorating the plight of Blacks and eliminating the discrimination from which they suffer will necessarily eliminate the discrimination from which other communities suffer. As this Article will discuss, the history of public school desegregation indicates that nothing is further from the truth. True, Mexicans/Mexican Americans and Blacks suffer from some similar forms of discrimination. But, discrimination also exists that is unique to each community. As the Article will discuss in Part III, because courts utilize the Black/White paradigm to analyze illegal discrimination and to formulate legal remedies, in the remedy phase of civil rights litigation, courts frequently ignore discrimination from which Mexican/Mexican Americans uniquely suffer.

8. Discrimination harms Mexican Americans at least as much as Blacks.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

Among the common justifications scholars offer for deliberately omitting Mexican/Mexican American civil rights history is that Mexicans/Mexican Americans do not suffer from discrimination. If Mexicans/Mexican

Americans are not omitted completely, they are often only marginally covered as compared to the treatment afforded to Blacks. For instance, Andrew Hacker in his celebrated book *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal* describes Mexicans/Mexican Americans, Asians/Asian Americans and other immigrant groups as less affected by discrimination because, "none of the presumptions of inferiority associated with Africa and slavery are imposed on these other ethnicities." n19 [\*229] Hacker's assertion is flawed. True, immigrant communities do not have the same association with slavery that Blacks do, but a history of slavery exists nonetheless. n20 Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other immigrants do not suffer any less from discrimination than Blacks do. In fact, socioeconomic indicators suggest that racial/ethnic discrimination has currently waged a greater toll on Mexicans/Mexican Americans than Blacks.

9. The Black/white paradigm treats other minorities as foreign.

Arvin Luyag (J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law) *ASIAN LAW JOURNAL*, 2005, Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

These presumptions are manifestations of a long but unfortunate tradition in American law and society of "treating non-White immigrants and their descendants (including U.S. citizens) as permanently foreign and unassimilable." n1 The permanence of foreignness is a fundamental characteristic of those who have been racially categorized as neither white nor black in America. n2 Because of slavery, American racial consciousness has focused on the dichotomy between blacks and whites. n3 But this focus has led to confusion as to how to racially classify persons of non-European or non-African descent. n4 Since these persons do not enjoy the privileges of being white yet are not classified as black, scholars such as Neil Gotanda [\*210] have racially grouped these persons together under the term "other non-whites." n5 The term "other non-whites" captures the fundamental concept that "Whiteness is the racial norm in America, and race is largely defined as deviation from Whiteness." n6 The term "other non-whites" also reflects the fact that non-whiteness is primarily thought of as blackness and that "other non-whites" is a residual category made up of people who are neither white nor black. n7 "The subordinate racial category of Blackness served to justify the anomalous presence of enslaved Africans in America." n8 In contrast, the subordinate racial status of "other non-whites" has focused on questioning their presence in America rather than justifying it. n9 Emphasizing the "foreign" identity of those considered "other non-whites" serves this purpose. n10

## B. REPLACING THE BLACK/WHITE PARADIGM IS CRUCIAL TO SOLVE DISCRIMINATION.

1. Replacing the Black/White paradigm is necessary for more inclusive solutions to discrimination.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) *Berkeley La Raza Law Journal*, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

While the Black/White paradigm has reaped important gains for the Black community, this Article illustrates some of the negative consequences the paradigm bears for the Mexican/Mexican American community. I end the Article by illustrating how the Black/White paradigm obscures the civil rights struggles of the Mexican/Mexican American community to desegregate public education. While such efforts pre-date *Brown v. Board of Education*, n5 the Black/White paradigm renders Mexican/Mexican American struggles invisible. In place of the Black/White paradigm, I suggest that scholars of race/ethnicity construct a new, more inclusive, and consequently less inaccurate paradigm with which to understand, discuss and remedy racial/ethnic discrimination in the United States. If the Black/White paradigm remains dominant, we remain unable to understand or remedy the discrimination against Mexicans/Mexican Americans.

2. Creating a more inclusive paradigm creates a better understanding of racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States.

Eduardo Luna (J.D. University of California, Berkeley School of Law) *Berkeley La Raza Law Journal*, Fall 2003. Retrieved May 24, 2013 from Lexis/Nexis.

n64. The purpose of this Article is to illustrate the inefficacy of the Black/White paradigm. Contemporary racial/ethnic demographics render the paradigm outdated for analyzing the effects of racial/ethnic discrimination. My intention is not to engage in competition over which community has suffered most from racial/ethnic discrimination or win what some have termed the "oppression sweepstakes." Espinoza & Harris, *supra* note 24, at 1594, 1641 & 508, 555. Rather, this Article critiques how the Black/White paradigm renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and discrimination against them invisible. This Article is also intended to stimulate representation of non-Black racial/ethnic communities' experiences with the goal of constructing a new, more inclusive, and consequently less inaccurate paradigm with which to understand and discuss racial/ethnic discrimination in the United States.

## COERCION KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE IS CONSISTENT WITH A MINIMALIST VIEW OF THE STATE.

1. Transportation infrastructure is consistent with libertarians view of the state.

William Lind (staff writer) "Adam Smith Versus the Libertarians," May 16, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/cpt/2011/05/16/adam-smith-versus-the-libertarians/>

Libertarian ideology also departs from Adam Smith when it comes to infrastructure, including transportation and government's role in providing it. Libertarians demand that everything be left to the free market. Smith, in *The Wealth of Nations*, wrote: According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to . . . First, the duty of protecting the society from violence and invasion . . . secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it . . . and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit would never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society. That is a pretty good definition of infrastructure, including transportation infrastructure. In fact, Adam Smith goes on to discuss transportation infrastructure at some length. In his day, that meant roads, canals, and bridges.

2. Transportation infrastructure can be justified under libertarian ideology.

William Lind (staff writer) "Adam Smith Versus the Libertarians," May 16, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/cpt/2011/05/16/adam-smith-versus-the-libertarians/>

Adam Smith departed this world before the first train arrived. But it is not unreasonable to think that he might have seen passenger trains and public transportation as part of the public works the government should undertake. Smith did want those public works to pay for their own upkeep as much as possible. Again, in *The Wealth of Nations*, he wrote: The greater part of such public works may easily be so managed as to afford a particular revenue for defraying their own expenses, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society.

### B. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT FREEDOM.

1. The negative conception of liberty is flawed—government involvement protects freedoms.

George Monbiot, (staff writer), "This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression," Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree /2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression>

Rightwing libertarianism recognises few legitimate constraints on the power to act, regardless of the impact on the lives of others. In the UK it is forcefully promoted by groups like the TaxPayers' Alliance, the Adam Smith Institute, the Institute of Economic Affairs, and Policy Exchange. Their concept of freedom looks to me like nothing but a justification for greed. So why have we been so slow to challenge this concept of liberty? I believe that one of the reasons is as follows. The great political conflict of our age – between neocons and the millionaires and corporations they support on one side, and social justice campaigners and environmentalists on the other – has been mischaracterised as a clash between negative and positive freedoms. These freedoms were most clearly defined by Isaiah Berlin in his essay of 1958, *Two Concepts of Liberty*. It is a work of beauty: reading it is like listening to a gloriously crafted piece of music. I will try not to mangle it too badly. Put briefly and crudely, negative freedom is the freedom to be or to act without interference from other people. Positive freedom is freedom from inhibition: it's the power gained by transcending social or psychological constraints. Berlin explained how positive freedom had been abused by tyrannies, particularly by the Soviet Union. It portrayed its brutal governance as the empowerment of the people, who could achieve a higher freedom by subordinating themselves to a collective single will. Rightwing libertarians claim that greens and social justice campaigners are closet communists trying to resurrect Soviet conceptions of positive freedom. In reality, the battle mostly consists of a clash between negative freedoms. As Berlin noted: "No man's activity is so completely private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way. 'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows.'" So, he argued, some people's freedom must sometimes be curtailed "to secure the freedom of others". In other words, your freedom to swing your fist ends where my nose begins. The negative freedom not to have our noses punched is the freedom that green and social justice campaigns, exemplified by the Occupy movement, exist to defend.

2. The negative philosophical viewpoint is immoral—liberty should not depend on the suffering of others.

George Monbiot, (staff writer), "This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression," Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree /2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression>

Berlin also shows that freedom can intrude on other values, such as justice, equality or human happiness. "If the liberty of myself or my class or nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings, the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral." It follows that the state should impose legal restraints on freedoms that interfere with other people's freedoms – or on freedoms which conflict with justice and humanity.

C. OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON HUMAN FREEDOM EXIST.

1. State power necessary to prevent freedoms from being trampled by others.

George Monbiot, (staff writer), "This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression," Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression>

The landlord was exercising his freedom to cut the tree down. In doing so, he was intruding on Clare's freedom to delight in the tree, whose existence enhanced his life. The landlord justifies this destruction by characterising the tree as an impediment to freedom – his freedom, which he conflates with the general liberty of humankind. Without the involvement of the state (which today might take the form of a tree preservation order) the powerful [hu]man could trample the pleasures of the powerless [hu]man. Clare then compares the felling of the tree with further intrusions on his liberty. "Such was thy ruin, music-making elm; / The right of freedom was to injure thine: / As thou wert served, so would they overwhelm / In freedom's name the little that is mine."

2. Their simplistic philosophy ignores other constraints on freedom:

George Monbiot, (staff writer), "This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression," Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression>

Modern libertarianism is the disguise adopted by those who wish to exploit without restraint. It pretends that only the state intrudes on our liberties. It ignores the role of banks, corporations and the rich in making us less free. It denies the need for the state to curb them in order to protect the freedoms of weaker people. This bastardised, one-eyed philosophy is a con trick, whose promoters attempt to wrongfoot justice by pitching it against liberty. By this means they have turned "freedom" into an instrument of oppression.

D. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION.

1. They have their history wrong—the state is instrumental in the expansion of private property rights.

Gabriel Winant (graduate student in American history at Yale), "The lesson of Rand Paul: libertarianism is juvenile," May 21, 2010. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at [http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism\\_who\\_needs\\_it/](http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism_who_needs_it/)

There's the key — "the underlying realities of how the world works." Because never, and I mean never, has there been capitalist enterprise that wasn't ultimately underwritten by the state. This is true at an obvious level that even most libertarians would concede (though maybe not some of the Austrian economists whom Rand Paul adores): for the system to work, you need some kind of bare bones apparatus for enforcing contracts and protecting property. But it's also true in a more profound, historical sense. To summarize very briefly a long and complicated process, we got capitalism in the first place through a long process of flirtation between governments on the one hand, and bankers and merchants on the other, culminating in the Industrial Revolution. What libertarians revere as an eternal, holy truth is in fact, in the grand scheme of human history, quite young. And if they'd just stop worshiping for a minute, they'd notice the parents hovering in the background.

2. The permutation solves best—some public interferences in the market are necessary for the protection of private property.

Gabriel Winant (graduate student in American history at Yale), “The lesson of Rand Paul: libertarianism is juvenile,” May 21, 2010. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at [http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism\\_who\\_needs\\_it/](http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism_who_needs_it/)

Think about the New Deal. Although libertarian ingrates will never admit it, without the reforms of the 1930s, there might not be private property left for them to complain about the government infringing on. Not many capitalist democracies could survive 25 percent unemployment, and it doesn’t just happen by good luck. Or, take a couple more recent examples: savvy health insurance executives were quite aware during this past year that, if reform failed again, skyrocketing prices were likely to doom the whole scheme of private insurance (itself a freak accident of federal policy) and bring on single-payer. Here’s a fun sci-fi one: Imagine the moment in, say, twenty years, when the evidence of climate change has become undeniable, and there’s an urgent crackdown on carbon-intensive industries. Then coal companies and agribusiness will be wishing they’d gotten on board with the mild, slow-moving reform that is cap-and-trade.

#### D. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL FAIL.

1. The alternative will fail—we can’t just move back to the alleged free market utopia.

Gabriel Winant (graduate student in American history at Yale), “The lesson of Rand Paul: libertarianism is juvenile,” May 21, 2010. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at [http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism\\_who\\_needs\\_it/](http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism_who_needs_it/)

Libertarians like Paul are walking around with the idea that the world could just snap back to a naturally-occurring benign order if the government stopped interfering. As Paul implied, good people wouldn’t shop at the racist stores, so there wouldn’t be any. This is the belief system of people who have been the unwitting recipients of massive government backing for their entire lives. To borrow a phrase, they were born on third base, and think they hit a triple. We could fill a library with the details of the state underwriting enjoyed by American business — hell, we could fill a fair chunk of the Internet, if we weren’t using it all on Rand Paul already. And I don’t just mean modern corporate welfare, or centuries-ago agricultural changes. Most left-of-center policymaking can fit into this category in one way or another.

2. Coercion is necessary to protect against intolerant ideas.

Jonah Goldberg (staff writer) “The Libertarian Lie,” Dec. 18, 2001. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205102/libertarian-lie/jonah-goldberg#>

Kids are born barbarians, as Hannah Arendt noted. Without character-forming institutions which softly coerce (persuade) kids — and remind adults — to revere our open, free, and tolerant culture over others, we run the risk of having them embrace any old creed or ideology that they find most rewarding or exciting, including some value systems which take it on blind faith that America is evil and, say, Cuba or Osama bin Laden is wonderful. That’s precisely why campuses today are infested with so many silly radicals, and why libertarians in their own way encourage the dismantling of the soapboxes they stand on. For cultural libertarians this is all glorious, or at least worth the risks. I just wish more libertarians had the guts to admit it.

#### E. RIGHTS ARE NOT MORAL ABSOLUTES

Jonah Goldberg (staff writer) “The Libertarian Lie,” Dec. 18, 2001. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205102/libertarian-lie/jonah-goldberg#>

Look, the libertarian critique of the state is useful, valuable, important, and much needed. But, in my humble opinion, the libertarian critique of the culture — “established authority” — tends to be exactly what I’ve always said it was: a celebration of personal liberty over everything else, and in many (but certainly not all) respects indistinguishable from the more asinine prattle we hear from the Left. (The great compromise between libertarians and conservatives is, of course, federalism see “Among the Gender Benders”). Personal liberty is vitally important. But it isn’t everything. If you emphasize personal liberty over all else, you undermine the development of character and citizenship — a point Hayek certainly understood.

## NEO-LIBERALISM KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. NEO-LIBERALISM SOLVES WAR.

Eric Gartzke (associate professor of political science and a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, "The Capitalist Peace", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 1, January 2007, Pp. 166–191)

Second, substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of developed nations in the post–World War II period further limits the scope and scale of conflict. Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international system has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist in the next century is a question open to debate. Finally, the rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight. Separately, these processes influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. Together, they explain the absence of war among states in the developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace.

### B. NEO-LIBERALISM IS CRITICAL TO DEMOCRACY.

1. Neo-liberalism causes democracy by promoting self-determination.

Jagdish Bhagwati (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In *Defence of Globalization*, 2004 pg. 93)

Globalization promotes democracy both directly and indirectly. The direct link comes from the fact that rural farmers are now able to bypass the dominant classes and castes by taking their produce directly to the market thanks to modern information technology, thereby loosening the control of these traditionally hegemonic groups. In turn, this can start them on the way to becoming more-independent actors, with democratic aspirations, in the political arena. Globalization is at the source of this phenomenon in two ways: the computers themselves are available because of trade, and the markets accessed are foreign in many cases, not just domestic. Thus, a recent report from Kamalpur village in India by the Wall Street Journal reporter Cris Prystay documents how the villagers are now selling their crops by computer, cutting out the middlemen. Soybean farmer Mohammed Arif, 24 years old, says the computer allows farmers greater control over their own goods. Farmers often get cheated at markets, or get stuck with whatever price is offered that day. With the computer, he says, they can make a considered decision at home, holding crops until prices improve. 2

2. Democracy solves state collapse and saves millions of lives.

Mike Doyle (Development Studies at U Cambridge) "In Defense of Neoliberalism: Part III" Apr. 12, 2011 Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cambridgedevelopmentstudies.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/in-defense-of-neoliberalism-part-iii/>

We have had many discussions about one of the central tenets of liberalism: democracy. We have debated whether it causes or is the cause of development. We talked about how efficient it is and whether it adequately addresses the needs of the very poor. However, I think we have glossed over one of the chief strengths of democracy: its ability to create a marketplace of ideas. In a democracy, new ideas have the ability to come into being, propagate, and put into practice. Just as evolution works to select the best traits to suit a given environment, so does the market place of ideas allow the best ideas to come to the fore. To be sure, this is a slow process full of trial and error, but it does allow societies to adapt effectively to an ever-changing environment. At the beginning of the paper, I talked about the dangers of an ossifying ideology. This danger takes on new heights in an intellectual environment where criticisms and views cannot be freely expressed. I believe the USSR collapsed precisely because there was not a fair exchange of ideas, it was not able to adapt until it was far too late. The following vignette is an example of what can happen when there is no marketplace for ideas: After the reality of the devastation brought about by the Great Leap Forward came to Chairman Mao's attention, he issued a very interesting statement. To paraphrase, he said that the great Chinese famine would have never occurred in a democracy because the devastation caused by the agricultural reform would have been brought to attention much earlier. Because there was no free press and tolerance of criticism was low, Chinese bureaucrats were able to keep publishing inflated numbers about rice production even though production had been falling. The Chinese government continued to believe these inflated projections until the truth could no longer be ignored. Unfortunately, 20 million people died before this happened. What is more unfortunate is that Mao did not continue his brief flirtation with democracy.

B. NEO-LIBERALISM SAVES THE ENVIRONMENT.

1. Neo-liberal growth solves pollution—empirical evidence proves.

Jagdish Bhagwati (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In *Defence of Globalization*, 2004 pg. 138-139

As income rises, activities that cause more pollution may contract and those that cause less pollution may expand, so the sulfur dioxide concentration may fall instead of rise. In fact, as development occurs, economies typically shift from primary production, which is often pollution-intensive, to manufactures, which are often less so, and then to traded services, which are currently even less pollution-intensive. This natural evolution itself could then reduce the pollution-intensity of income as development proceeds. Then again, the available technology used, and technology newly invented, may become more environment-friendly over time. Both phenomena constitute an ongoing, observed process. The shift to environment-friendly technology can occur naturally as households, for example, become less poor and shift away from indoor cooking with smoke-causing coal-based fires to stoves using fuels that cause little smoke. 19 But this shift is often a result also of environment-friendly technological innovation prompted by regulation. Thus, restrictions on allowable fuel efficiency have promoted research by the car firms to produce engines that yield more miles per gallon. But these regulations are created by increased environmental consciousness, for which the environmental groups can take credit. And the rise of these environmental groups is, in turn, associated with increased incomes. Also, revelations about the astonishing environmental degradation in the Soviet Union and its satellites underline how the absence of democratic feedback and controls is a surefire recipe for environmental neglect. The fact that economic growth generally promotes democracy, as discussed in Chapter 8, is yet another way in which rising income creates a better environment. In all these ways, then, increasing incomes can reduce rather than increase pollution. In fact, for several pollutants, empirical studies have found a bell-shaped curve: pollution levels first rise with income but then fall with it. 20 The economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, who estimated the levels of different pollutants such as sulfur dioxide in several cities worldwide, were among the first to show this, estimating that for sulfur dioxide levels, the peak occurred in their sample at per capita incomes of \$5,000–6,000. 21 Several historical examples can also be adduced: the reduction in smog today compared to what the industrial revolution produced in European cities in the nineteenth century, and the reduced deforestation of United States compared to a century ago. 22

2. Pollution threatens all humanity.

Lourdes Salvador (founder of MCS America) “Human Extinction” Apr. 14, 2007. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/24238>

The most common pattern of macroevolutionary trends is extinction. In short “when a species is no longer adapted to a changed environment, it may die. Extinction seems, in fact, to be the ultimate fate of all species” (Relethford, 2005). One has to wonder the fate of the human race as the world becomes more and more toxic and people become more ill. Are 60% (Ray & Oakley, 2003) of Americans taking psychiatric medications because they are really mentally ill or is it our society that is sick and we the victims of trying to adapt to a bad environment? How can we justify that 60% is a MAJORITY of the population that is labeled as mentally ill? How long can we deny the damage of modern pollution to the human body before we take action? How long can we sustain reproductive damage before we can no longer reproduce and have children to share our tales of an earlier generation with? Occasionally I have heard statements such as “we will evolve to tolerate air pollution.” Such statements are absurdities. Natural selection only operates on variations that are present. If no genetic variation occurs to aid in breathing polluted air, natural selection will not help us. Even in cases where genetic variation is present, the environment may change too quickly for us to respond to natural selection. All we have to do is examine the fossil record to see how inaccurate this misconception is—that 99% of all past species are extinct shows us that natural selection obviously doesn't always work” (Relethford, 2005). If natural selection does not work and we will not evolve to handle the ever increasing toxic burden then what hope is there for us as the world becomes more and more toxic? How can we ensure our future survival as our bodies become laden with mercury, lead, fire retardants, PCB's, PBDE's, Pesticides, Dioxins, pFA's Phthalates, Bisphenols, and other chemicals of modern day living while the powers that be deny any connection in the name of profits?



3. Free trade alone can improve environmental quality—empirics prove.

Jagdish Bhagwati (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In *Defence of Globalization*, 2004 pg.138-139)

Thanks to the debates between free-traders and environmentalists, most sophisticated environmentalists no longer hold the view that if trade is freed without environmental policies being in place, not only will the environment be harmed but the country's economic welfare will be set back. But this misconception is still commonplace in the wider environmental community. That this may happen is surely correct. That it must happen is incorrect. I and my GATT colleagues Richard Blackhurst and Kym Anderson addressed this issue in 1991 when I was economic policy adviser to Arthur Dunkel, the director general. The GATT Secretariat was working on a special report on trade and the environment, and we took the occasion to clarify matters. 8 In particular, we provided examples from the real world that showed that, contrary to the environmentalists' pessimistic certainties, economic welfare increased with trade liberalization even though ideal environmental policies were not in place, and that the environment improved also. 9 The most compelling illustration came from agricultural trade liberalization contemplated in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Anderson calculated that such liberalization would shift agricultural production from higher-cost, pesticide-intensive European agriculture to lower-cost, manure-using agriculture in the poor countries, so that both income and welfare would increase in each set of countries, and total environmental quality would also improve. The GATT report also cited a study by Robert Feenstra that showed (as is illustrated in the following chart) that import quota protection had led, as economists had predicted, to increased imports of larger gasguzzling cars from Japan and reduced imports of smaller, higher-fuefficiency cars because the bigger cars carried more margin of profit than the smaller ones and it paid the Japanese car manufacturers to export more of the larger cars within a given quota. So the imposition of protectionist quotas had led to both lower economic welfare and to increased pollution.

4. Neoliberal globalization is the solution to global environmental problems, not the problem

Jeffrey Frankel (Professor at Harvard University) "Globalization: Why and How It Should Continue" 2000

Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jfrankel/GloblzttnF.pdf>

Environmental and social issues increasingly cut across national boundaries, in part because people care increasingly care about what goes on in other countries. These issues are of the sort that are impossible to address if each country goes its own way. A genuinely difficult question, on which reasonable people differ, is whether the category legitimately includes aspects of production processes, such as child labor, which have no effect on the importing country other than offending moral sensibilities. Global agreements to address these issues, for which countries voluntarily sign up, should be the ultimate objective. But this will not be easy, because of the sovereignty issue. Bottom line: Globalization need not be the enemy of the environment, and national sovereignty need not be its friend. Indeed, given the globalization of environmental concerns, national sovereignty will more likely be the enemy of efforts to protect the environment, because those efforts must increasingly be pursued through global agreements. (2) The other reason why global agreements will not be easily achieved is because there is wide disagreement even within a given country such as the United States on goals and priorities regarding, for example, environmental protection. The strongest opponents of the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change, for example, are US labor unions. [They fear a loss in US competitiveness.] The US has also been slow to ratify some ILO agreements, toothless as they are, because of states' rights issues and domestic disagreement. It is profoundly mistaken to blame such fundamental disagreements within the country on external factors -globalization or multilateral institutions.



## C. NEO-LIBERALISM SOLVES POVERTY.

## 1. Neo-liberalism eliminates poverty and increases wages.

Jagdish Bhagwati (professor of economics and law at Columbia) “Feeble Critiques: Capitalism’s Petty Detractors,” 2009. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/feeble-critiques-capitalisms-petty-detractors>)

We had enjoyed almost two decades in which the liberal reforms undertaken by China and India, with nearly half the world’s population between them, had produced an unprecedented prosperity that (and this must be emphasized) had finally made a significant impact on poverty, just as we reformers had asserted that it would. The rich countries, with a steady expansion of liberal policies during the 1950s and 1960s, had also registered substantial prosperity. (This was episodically interrupted by exogenous circumstances like the success of OPEC in 1971 and the Volcker-led purging of the 1980s, but generally always resumed with robust growth.) Meanwhile, an increasing number of the poor countries had turned to democracy, altering the status quo ante in which India had been the one “exceptional nation” to have embraced and retained democracy after independence. Some will object that economies have at times registered high growth rates for long periods despite bad economic policies. But we must ask: are such growth rates sustainable? I tell the story about how my radical Cambridge teacher, Joan Robinson, was once observed many years ago agreeing with the mainstream Yale developmental economist Gus Ranis on the subject of Korea’s phenomenal growth. The paradox was resolved when it turned out that she was talking about North Korea and he about South Korea. Now, more than three decades later, we know who was right. In a similar vein, Soviet growth rates were high for a long period, thanks to exceptionally high investment rates and despite the horrendous absence of incentives and embrace of autarky. But then the Soviet Union descended into a steady decline until a mismanaged transition with perestroika plunged the country into negative growth rates. The effort to make the anomalous into the universal is a polemical exercise. Some economists, such as Dani Rodrik, like to cite occasional high growth rates in countries without liberal—or, as some critics prefer because it sounds more sinister, “neoliberal”—policies as a refutation of liberal policies. This, however, misses both the point of the issue and the sweep of history. Other critics then shift ground, claiming that higher growth is beside the point and that we need to judge capitalism by whether it works for the poor. But slowly growing or stagnant economies cannot rescue the poor from their poverty on a sustained basis. In countries with massive poverty, such as India and China, economic success has had to come principally through rapid growth of incomes and jobs. This is, of course, common sense. Just as firms that make losses cannot finance corporate social responsibility policies, countries with stagnant economic performance cannot rescue the poor from their poverty. It was bad policy that kept China and India from growing in the first place. Only after liberal economic reforms did these countries register accelerated growth rates that, during the last 20 years, finally pulled nearly 500 million people above the poverty line. However grim the current crisis has been, it cannot be used to deny this elemental truth. Arguing the other side of the coin, the AFL-CIO and other labor unions in the United States claim that trade with poor countries has produced paupers in the richer countries by depressing real wages. But this dire conclusion is not supported by empirical findings. My own analysis, dating back at least a decade (and extended in my 2004 book, *In Defense of Globalization*), argued that, if anything, the fall in wages which labor-saving technical change and other domestic institutional factors would inevitably have brought about was actually moderated by trade with poor countries. This benign conclusion has since been reasserted by Robert Lawrence of Harvard’s Kennedy School (despite an unsuccessful attempt by Paul Krugman in a recent Brookings paper, commissioned by Lawrence Summers, to prove otherwise). Indeed, the same goes for the effect of unskilled immigration on the wages of our unskilled workers. Giovanni Peri of U.C. Davis has shown for unskilled immigration what I showed for trade with poor countries: that the effect is benign. Thus, we need not apologize for liberal policy in terms of its effects on overall prosperity, on poverty in poor countries, or on the wages of the poor in rich countries. To compare an interruption of this remarkable progress to the collapse of the Berlin Wall is like drawing a parallel between a tsunami and a summer storm that brings rain and a rich harvest to parched plains.

2. Ongoing poverty threatens millions of people each year.

Stephanie Spina (Ph.D. candidate in social/personality psychology at the Graduate School of the City University of New York) *Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society*, p. 201

This sad fact is not limited to the United States. Globally, 18 million deaths a year are caused by structural violence, compared to 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. That is, approximately every five years, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and the poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

3. China and India prove that neo-liberalism solves poverty

Jagdish Bhagwati (professor of economics and law at Columbia) *In Defence of Globalization*, 2004 pg.64-66)

So, with the usual caveat that in the social sciences one can rarely establish the degree of credibility for one's argument that one can aspire to in the physical sciences, one can conclude that freer trade is associated with higher growth and that higher growth is associated with reduced poverty. Hence, growth reduces poverty. The best way to see that is to focus on the two countries, India and China, that have the largest pool of world poverty. Both shifted to outward orientation roughly two decades ago, and this contributed to their higher growth in the 1980s and 1990s. China adopted aggressively outward-oriented economic policies in 1978. India also began opening its insular economy in a limited fashion in the 1980s and more systematically and boldly in the 1990s. According to World Bank estimates, real income (gross domestic product) grew at an annual average rate of 10 percent in China and 6 percent in India during the two decades ending in 2000. No country in the world had growth as rapid as China's, and fewer than ten countries (and, except for China, none with poverty rates and population size comparable to India's) had a growth rate exceeding India's during these years. What happened to their poverty? Just what common sense suggests: it declined. Thus, according to the Asian Development Bank, poverty declined from an estimated 28 percent in 1978 to 9 percent in 1998 in China. Official Indian estimates report that poverty fell from 51 percent in 1977-78 to 26 percent in 1999-2000. Contrast what happened in India during the quarter of a century prior to the economic reforms and the abysmally low annual growth rate of 3.5 percent. During that period, the poverty rate remained stagnant, fluctuating around 55 percent. China's track record on poverty reduction in the pre-reform period is dismal as well, but there were also major adverse effects from the huge famine during the Great Leap Forward of Chairman Mao and from the disruptive Cultural Revolution. This experience, showing how growth will in fact reduce poverty, just as I had predicted and prescribed at the Indian Planning Commission in the early 1960s, has been shown to be valid in other countries where Dollar and Kraay have examined the experience carefully, among them Vietnam and Uganda. More recent estimates by my Columbia colleague Xavier Sala-i-Martin have underlined the same conclusion dramatically. He has estimated poverty rates worldwide, using data for ninety-seven countries between 1970 and 1998. His conclusion on the relationship of growth to poverty reduction is as strong a corroboration as I can find of my 1960s conjecture that growth must be reckoned to be the principal force in alleviating poverty: [T]he last three decades saw a reversal of roles between Africa and Asia: in the 1970s, 11% of the world's poor were in Africa and 76% in Asia. By 1998, Africa hosted 66% of the poor and Asia's share had declined to 15%. Clearly, this reversal was caused by the very different aggregate growth performances. Poverty reduced remarkably in Asia because Asian countries grew. Poverty increased dramatically in Africa because African countries did not grow. As a result, perhaps the most important lesson to be learned . . . is that a central question economists interested in human welfare should ask, therefore, is how to make Africa grow. 36 So when we have moved away from the anti-globalization rhetoric and looked at the fears, even convictions, dispassionately with the available empirical evidence, we can conclude that globalization (in shape of trade and, I will argue later in Chapter 12, direct equity investment as well) helps, not harms, the cause of poverty reduction in the poor countries.

D. NEO-LIBERALISM IS KEY TO US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS.

1. Continued neo-liberalism is crucial to US-European relations.

Alan Cafruny (International Relations professor) , “The ‘Imperial Turn’ and the Future of US Hegemony: ‘Terminal’ Decline or Retrenchment?.” Mar. 25, 2008. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/2/5/2/1/0/pages252105/p252105-3.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/2/1/0/pages252105/p252105-3.php)

By proclaiming the limited utility of military force and the advantages of “soft power” in the contemporary era proponents of this concept seek to rescue the thesis of a “European challenge.” (Nye, 2003, 2004; McCormick, 2007). Yet, the dual track enlargements of NATO and the EU have entrenched the position of political elites and transnational business interests across Europe linked to the United States and to neoliberalism. Indeed, even if one grants the limited utility arising from “soft power,” the bargaining position that might, in principle, derive from the sheer weight of the European economy is compromised by the neoliberal context in which a (self-limiting) socio-economic project demands adherence to Washington and Wall Street. Europe’s geopolitical predicament precludes attempts to establish an autonomous EU power and marginalizes forces in “core Europe” that favor alternatives to U.S.-led neoliberalism.

2. Strong European relations key to sustainable multilateralism

Romano Prodi and Guy Verhofstadt (co-chairs of Notre Europe, a think tank, former prime minister of Italy and former prime minister of Belgium) “Reshaping EU-US Relations: A Topic Paper,” 2010. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at [http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx\\_publication/Etude75-EU-US\\_Relations-en.pdf](http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etude75-EU-US_Relations-en.pdf)

On the contrary: the United States and the European Union are in a position to guide the process, and as leading players they have a special responsibility to do so: their policies, agendas and decisions will be as crucial to the course of globalization as those of the other players – Asia, international financial institutions, the private sector and civil society – if not more so. There is thus no more important goal for the Euro-American partnership, at the start of the 21st century, than to agree on the best possible way to manage globalisation. The US and the EU must cooperate to make it a success and achieve positive outcomes... In its 2003 Security Strategy, the European Union cited “effective multilateralism” as one of the vital prerequisites for future world security and prosperity. The challenges facing the planet and the simultaneous occurrence of three major crises – the financial crisis, the environmental crisis and the geopolitical crisis in the Middle East – at the start of this century make the invention of multilateral governance urgent and necessary. In his speeches and in his diplomatic overtures, President Barack Obama has indicated that recourse to multilateral forums such as the G20 (on the economic crisis) and the UN (on the Iranian issue) is in the interest of the United States. The time has therefore come to make the promotion of a multilateral world order a primary goal of the Euro-American partnership.

E. NEO-LIBERALISM CHECKS WAR.

Daniel Griswold (director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies @ CATO Institute) “, Peace on earth? Try free trade among men,” 2006. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.freetrade.org/node/282>

First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home.

## F. NEO-LIBERALISM STOPS PATRIARCHY.

Jagdish Bhagwati (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In *Defence of Globalization*, 2004 pg. 74-76)

That globalization can help rather than harm women emerges dramatically when one examines how globalization has affected the women of Japan. In the aftermath of the great outward expansion of Japan's multinationals in the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese men executives were sent to the United States, England, France, and other Western nations (Japanese women then rarely made it through a very low glass ceiling). These men brought with them their Japanese wives and children. In New York, they lived in Scarsdale, Riverdale, and Manhattan. And the wives saw at first hand that Western women, though they have some way to go, were treated better. So did the young children become not docile Japanese who are taught the value of social conformity and harmony but rambunctious little Americans who value instead the individualism that every immigrant parent confronts when the children return home from school and say, "That is the way I want to do it." Schools are where cultural conditioning occurs subliminally, even explicitly. The women and children who then returned to Japan became agents for change. They would never be the same again. Feminism, women's rights, other human rights, due process for citizens and immigrants, and a host of other attributes of a modern society began slowly to replace the traditional ways of Japanese culture, and globalization in the shape of Japanese corporations' expansion abroad had played a critical role. That influence has also come, of course, from other (non-economic) forms of globalization such as the vast increase in Japanese students in Western universities in recent years. Just a decade ago at Columbia, where I teach, the largest nationality in an entering class of over four hundred in the School of International and Public Affairs was Japanese. Many of these students steadily adapted themselves to American ways. Instead of bowing low to the "revered teacher," the sensei, they learned to put their feet on the table, even crudely blow bubble gum, in class. And as they returned to Japan (though now a few began to stay on, like students from most other countries) they brought American responses to the increasing trade feuds with the United States. Thus, when the Hosokawa-Clinton summit in Washington failed in 1993, the Japanese prime minister's staff essentially said, "If you object to our trade practices, see you in court!" But President Clinton's staff thought we could still deal with the Japanese in the old ways, through bilateral confrontations and deals. As I explained in an article in *Foreign Affairs* at the time, we thought we were fighting the samurai, but we were fighting GIs. 2 But the favorable effect on women's issues in Japan because of globalization in the form of extensive outward flow of Japanese multinationals to the West is not the only example one can find. My favorite example is the study of globalization in trade on the gender wage gap between 1976 and 1993 in the United States by the economists Sandra Black and Elizabeth Brainerd. 3 Such wage discrimination can be explained in alternative ways. One persuasive theory, due to the Nobel laureate Gary Becker, is that men are paid more than women by employers, even though they have no greater merit and productivity within the firm, simply because of prejudice. 4 But this prejudice has its price: any firm that indulges it is going to be at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis firms that hire without this prejudice and pay men no more than they pay women. Now, if we have a closed economy and all domestic firms share this prejudice, it will not make any one firm less competitive: all firms will be equally handicapped. But when we introduce foreign competition, the foreign firms that do not share this prejudice will be able to gain in competitiveness over domestic firms that indulge the prejudice. Liberalized trade, which enables foreign firms to compete with the domestic firms in open markets, therefore puts pressure on domestic firms to shed their prejudice. The gender wage gap will then narrow in the industries that must compete with imports produced by unprejudiced firms elsewhere. But consider a related but different and more potent argument. If markets open to trade, competition will intensify, whatever the reason that enables foreign firms to compete with our firms in our domestic and international markets. Faced with increased competition, firms that were happy to indulge their prejudice will now find that survival requires that any and all fat be removed from the firm; cost cutting will mean that the price paid for prejudice will become unaffordable. Again, the gender wage gap will narrow. The remarkable thing is that Black and Brainerd find that this did actually happen, confirming the predictive power of sophisticated economic reasoning. Firms in the United States that had been subject to relatively less competitive pressure but which then experienced competitive pressure due to openness to trade showed a more rapid reduction in their gender wage gap.

## G. ALTERNATIVES TO NEO-LIBERALISM FAIL.

1. Neo-liberal globalization causes universal growth and solves poverty—no alternative comes close.

Gary Hufbauer and Kati Suominen (Reginald Jones senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington) “The Return of Globalization,” 2010. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/21/The\\_Return\\_of\\_Globalization?page=0,1](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/21/The_Return_of_Globalization?page=0,1)

Such policies may have short-term political benefits, but there are no good alternatives that come close to generating the benefits that emanate from freer economic exchange. A Peterson Institute study shows that the U.S. economy alone has gained \$1 trillion annually due to globalization in the postwar era and stands to score another \$500 billion per year from future policy liberalization. Matthew Slaughter of Dartmouth College's Tuck School of Business has found that for every job outsourced from the United States, almost two are created in America, and that the prime globalizers -- U.S. multinational companies -- pay up to 24 percent higher wages in the United States than do non-globalized firms. The oft-demonized globalized capital markets are a force of great good, inspiring financial development and entrepreneurship the world over. Peterson Institute fellow William Cline's survey of the literature concludes that general financial openness boosts growth by about 1 percent annually for industrial countries, and 0.5 percent annually for emerging countries. Openness to foreign direct investment contributes about 1 percent annually to growth in industrialized countries and 1.4 percent annually to growth in emerging countries. Globalization has also been among the best foreign-aid programs the world has ever known: The World Bank has found that when it comes to stimulating growth, globalization has a direct, one-to-one relationship with poverty reduction.

2. The best studies prove that alternatives to neo-liberalism won't bolster the economy.

Jagdish Bhagwati (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In Defence of Globalization, 2004 pg.61-63)

At the same time, the modern evidence against an inward-looking or import substitution trade strategy is really quite overwhelming. In the 1960s and 1970s, several full-length studies of the trade and industrialization strategies of over a dozen major developing countries, including India, Ghana, Egypt, South Korea, the Philippines, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, were undertaken at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the National Bureau of Economic Research, the leading research institution in the United States. 29 These studies were very substantial and examined several complexities that would be ignored in a simplistic regression analysis across a multitude of nations. Thus, for instance, in examining whether the 1966 trade liberalization in India worked, T. N. Srinivasan and I wrote a whole chapter assessing whether, after making allowance for a severe drought that blighted exports, the liberalization could be considered to have been beneficial compared to a decision to avoid it. Only after systematic examination of the actual details of these countries' experience could we judge whether trade liberalization had truly occurred and when; only then we could shift meaningfully to a limited regression analysis that stood on the shoulders of this sophisticated analysis. The result was to overturn decisively the prevailing wisdom in favor of autarkic policies. 30 Indeed, many of us had started with the presumption that inward-looking policies would be seen to be welfare-enhancing, but the results were strikingly in the opposite direction, supportive of outward orientation in trade and direct foreign investment instead. Why? 31 • The outward-oriented economies were better able to gain from trade. The layman finds it hard to appreciate this because, as the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson has remarked, perhaps the most counterintuitive but true proposition in economics has to be that one can specialize and do better. • Economists today also appreciate that there are scale economies in production that can be exploited when trade expands markets. This is particularly the case for small countries. For this reason, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, which had protected themselves with high tariffs against imports in the 1960s, found that the cost of their protection was excessively high, with each country producing a few units of several items. They decided in the 1970s therefore to have an East African Common Market so that they could specialize among themselves and each could produce at lower cost for the larger combined market. • Then there are the gains from increased competition. Restriction of trade often is the chief cause of domestic monopolies. Freer trade produces enhanced competition and gains therefrom.

## COMPLEXITY KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. EMPIRICAL REASONING SHOULD BE USED IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

1. Empirical reasoning should be preferred over complex kritiks of international relations.

David Owen (Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton) *Millennium* Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.<sup>4</sup> However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’<sup>xx</sup> in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.<sup>5</sup> The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

2. Empirical, evidence-based debate is crucial to prevent politics of ideology and serial policy failure from taking over international relations theory.

Lisa Anderson (Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia) "Scholarship, Policy, Debate and Conflict: Why We Study the Middle East and Why It Matters, 2003. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871>

Yet, there is far more that we must do, as an institution and as individuals. We have a special responsibility, in fostering intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship, enhancing education and encouraging public awareness of the Middle East to ensure that our academic collaborators and colleagues are not treated like enemy aliens, their religions maligned and motives impugned. Scientific and scholarly exchange should not be impeded and dissemination of ideas must be respected without regard to the national origin, political persuasion or disciplinary loyalty of their authors. We need to be able to acknowledge the failings of our work without embarrassment--remember that no bench scientist is afraid to report negative experimental results--but we must also assertively deploy our unparalleled expertise to provide unique insight and understanding of the Middle East. The Middle East Studies Association is, in fact, where people congregate who speak the languages, fathom the economies, know the histories (and the debates about the histories), appreciate the jokes, understand the insults, and recognize the aspirations in the Middle East today. What does that unique insight and understanding mean, and what relationship might it have to policy? This question is worth reflecting on carefully, for the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible. Certainly, scholars are often dismissive of the lack of analytical rigor that typifies the conduct of public policy--the need to act before all the answers are known--while policy practitioners are bemused by the theoretical pretensions of scholars--the reluctance to act in the absence of all the answers.<sup>[20]</sup> Yet we have already seen how policy can shape the arena in which scholarship takes place, for good and for ill, and there is a widespread presumption that scholarship should also shape policy. On the part of policymakers, for example, Representative Pete Hoekstra in his press release announcing that the authorization of Title VI has passed the House subcommittee describes the purposes of the Title VI centers: "to advance knowledge of world regions, encourage the study of foreign languages, and train Americans to have the international expertise and understanding to fulfill pressing national security needs."<sup>[21]</sup> From the scholar's perspective, just last year, my predecessor as MESA President, Joel Beinin, while acknowledging that "we cannot and should not speak with one voice as authorities whose academic expertise give us exact knowledge of the best way to protect Americans from acts of terror, to remove Saddam Husayn from power, to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other desirable goals" nonetheless argued that "we should speak publicly about such topics because our opinions are likely to be much better informed than most citizens."<sup>[22]</sup> Clearly we all believe that knowledge, understanding and issues of public moment should somehow be linked. And, in fact, ever since the creation of research universities in the United States, more than a century ago, academic research, particularly but not exclusively scientific and social scientific research, has been presumed to serve important purposes for policy and policy-makers. Probably since the rise of the early modern state, and certainly since the development of the modern welfare state, it has been assumed that policy should be based on empirical, scientifically developed evidence--as opposed to religious conviction, ideology, personal whims or merely guesswork. This search for evidence in the formulation and conduct of policy led quite naturally to scholars. During the Second World War, for example, as Alexander Stille tells us,



## B. SOLID, EVEN IF SLIGHTLY IMPERFECT PREDICTIONS ARE GOOD ENOUGH.

1. Trying to factor in every possible cause is an impossible task and risks paralysis, a good prediction is good enough.

Erich Loewy (associate professor of medicine at the University of Illinois and associate professor of humanities), "Suffering and the Beneficent Community: Beyond Libertarianism," 1991, p. 17-21.

All of our judgments and decisions ultimately must be grounded in nonverifiable assumptions. The fundamentalist may deny this; but the fundamentalist grounds her judgments and decisions either in a religious belief based on revealed truth or, at least, on the assumption that "somewhere out there" truth exists and that we, in the human condition, can know it. Ultimately, or at least up to this point in time, absolute verification eludes man. At the extreme of this point of view, there are those who claim that truth is not only knowable, but is in fact, known and only the stubborn recalcitrance of the uninitiated prevents it from being generally accepted. This point of view claims not only that morality exists as a discoverable truth, an absolute not fashioned by men but unchanging and immutable, but also that truth has in fact been discovered. Rights and wrongs exist quite apart from the stage on which their application is played out. Situations may differ but, at most, such differences force us to reinterpret old and forever valid principles in a new light. Those who believe themselves to know the truth, furthermore, oftentimes feel compelled not only to persuade others to their point of view but feel morally justified in using considerable force to do so. On the other hand, some of us would deny the existence of immutable truth or, what is not quite the same thing, deny at least that it is knowable in the human condition. Those who flatly deny the existence of unalterable truth find themselves in much the same pickle as do those who flatly assert it: Both lack a standard of truth to which their affirmations can be appealed. Those who concede the possibility that truth exists but not the possibility that man in the human condition can be privy to it, have modified the position without greatly improving it. Their affirmation that man in the human condition can never know absolute truth seems more reasonable but is, once again, not verifiable. Who can know with certainty that tomorrow someone will not discover a way of "getting at" absolute truth and, in addition, be able to provide a simple and brilliant proof which other mortals to date have missed? Only an absolutist could deny such a possibility! That leaves us with a more pragmatic answer: Holding that, in the human condition, truth is not—or at least is not currently—accessible to us leaves more options open and does not fly in the face of the undeniable fact that, unlikely as it seems, our knowing absolute truth may be just around the corner. Outside the religious sphere, no one has ever convinced most thinking people that they are the possessors of absolute truth. Truth, whenever accepted at least for daily use, is invariably hedged. If we accept the fact that absolute truth (at least so far) is unknown to us and accept as an axiom that it may well be unknowable, we are left with a truth which for everyday use is fashioned rather than discovered. What is and what is not true or what is and what is not morally acceptable, therefore, varies with the culture in which we live. This claim (the claim on which, as we shall see, cultural relativism relies) rests on the assertion that there are many ways of looking at truths and that such truths are fashioned by people. Depending on our vantage point, there are many visions of reality,<sup>1</sup> a fact which the defenders of this doctrine hold to be valid in dealing with the concrete, scientific reality of chemistry and physics.<sup>2</sup> Such a claim, it would seem, is even more forceful when dealing with morals. As Engelhardt puts it so very well: "Our construals of reality exist within the embrace of cultural expectations."<sup>3</sup> And our "construals of reality" include our vision of the moral life. Furthermore, not only do our "visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations," the limits of what we as humans can and what we cannot culturally (or otherwise) expect are biologically framed by the totality of our bodies and their capacities as well as (and inseparable from the rest of the body of which it is a part) by our minds. All human judgments and decisions, then are inevitably grounded to prior assumptions which we accept and do not question for now. There is a story about William James which illustrates the point. James was giving a lecture dealing with the universe at a Chautauqua: one of those events so popular at the turn of the century, which has, regrettably, been replaced by talk shows. At the end of his well-received lecture, a little old lady came up to him and said: "I enjoyed your talk, Mr. James, but you know you are making an error: The universe rests on the back of a tortoise!" "Very well," James said, "I can accept that. But tell me, what in turn does that other tortoise rest upon?" "It's no use, Mr. James, it's tortoises all the way down." And so it goes: Every assumption rests on the back of another assumption and if we are to examine all before proceeding with our everyday judgments and decisions we would get hopelessly mired in mud. The quest is necessarily endless



2. Predictions don't have to be perfect, just good enough

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA (Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University), "FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS," July 18th, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at [http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29)

It is hard to say which is more surprising, that anyone still argues that we can predict very little or that anyone believes expertise conveys reliable judgment. Each reflects a bad habit of mind that we should overcome. It is certainly true that predictive efforts, by whatever means, are far from perfect and so we can always come up with examples of failure. But a proper assessment of progress in predictive accuracy, as Gardner and Tetlock surely agree, requires that we compare the rate of success and failure across methods of prediction rather than picking only examples of failure (or success). How often, for instance, has *The Economist* been wrong or right in its annual forecasts compared to other forecasters? Knowing that they did poorly in 2011 or that they did well in some other selected year doesn't help answer that question. That is why, as Gardner and Tetlock emphasize, predictive methods can best be evaluated through comparative tournaments.

Reliable prediction is so much a part of our daily lives that we don't even notice it. Consider the insurance industry. At least since Johan de Witt (1625–1672) exploited the mathematics of probability and uncertainty, insurance companies have generally been profitable. Similarly, polling and other statistical methods for predicting elections are sufficiently accurate most of the time that we forget that these methods supplanted expert judgment decades ago. Models have replaced pundits as the means by which elections are predicted exactly because various (imperfect) statistical approaches routinely outperform expert prognostications. More recently, sophisticated game theory models have proven sufficiently predictive that they have become a mainstay of high-stakes government and business auctions such as bandwidth auctions. Game theory models have also found extensive use and well-documented predictive success on both sides of the Atlantic in helping to resolve major national security issues, labor-management disputes, and complex business problems. Are these methods perfect or omniscient? Certainly not! Are the marginal returns to knowledge over naïve methods (expert opinion; predicting that tomorrow will be just like today) substantial? I believe the evidence warrants an enthusiastic "Yes!" Nevertheless, despite the numerous successes in designing predictive methods, we appropriately focus on failures. After all, by studying failure methodically we are likely to make progress in eliminating some errors in the future.

3. Rigorous, evidence based debate is critical for effective international relations scholarship.

Lisa Anderson (Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia) "Scholarship, Policy, Debate and Conflict: Why We Study the Middle East and Why It Matters, 2003. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871>

In the wars on terror and on Iraq, evidence has been scarce and little regarded. From the questions about "sexed-up" intelligence reports; the suggestion that claims about Weapons of Mass Destruction were really rationales of bureaucratic convenience in creating constituents for the war on Iraq; the cavalier willingness to lock up terror suspects for months or years without any verifiable evidence of wrongdoing; to the deliberate efforts to create popular perceptions of links between Saddam Husayn and al-Qa'ida, we have been living in an era in which evidence plays little or no part in policymaking. Robert Reischauer reflected earlier this year on the importance of evidence in policy in a very different arena--domestic social programs--but his observations are worth pondering for a moment: Public policy in the United States in recent years has increasingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses of politics and ideology--policies are Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance or impact of the policy. The fundamental question--will the policy work?--too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether. As Reischauer points out, the evidence produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives--but in its absence, policies are, as he put it, "likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem....Politically acceptable doesn't necessarily mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable."<sup>[24]</sup> Informing policy debates with the sort of evidence scholars bring to bear is an essential part of responsible policymaking in the modern world.

C. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL FAIL.

1. Understanding all the factors at play doesn't necessarily lead to good predictions.

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA (Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University), "FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS," July 18th, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at [http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29) feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29

Experts are an easy, although eminently justified, target for critiquing predictive accuracy. Their failure to outperform simple statistical algorithms should come as no surprise. Expertise has nothing to do with judgment or foresight. What makes an expert is the accumulation of an exceptional quantity of facts about some place or time. The idea that such expertise translates into reliable judgment rests on the false belief that knowing "the facts" is all that is necessary to draw correct inferences. This is but one form of the erroneous linkage of correlation to causation; a linkage at the heart of current data mining methods. It is even more so an example of confusing data (the facts) with a method for drawing inferences. Reliance on expert judgment ignores their personal beliefs as a noisy filter applied to the selection and utilization of facts. Consider, for instance, that Republicans, Democrats, and libertarians all know the same essential facts about the U.S. economy and all probably desire the same outcomes: low unemployment, low inflation, and high growth. The facts, however, do not lead experts to the same judgment about what to do to achieve the desired outcomes. That requires a theory and balanced evidence about what gets us from a distressed economy to a well-functioning one. Of course, lacking a common theory and biased by personal beliefs, the experts' predictions will be widely scattered. Good prediction—and this is my belief—comes from dependence on logic and evidence to draw inferences about the causal path from facts to outcomes. Unfortunately, government, business, and the media assume that expertise—knowing the history, culture, mores, and language of a place, for instance—is sufficient to anticipate the unfolding of events. Indeed, too often many of us dismiss approaches to prediction that require knowledge of statistical methods, mathematics, and systematic research design. We seem to prefer "wisdom" over science, even though the evidence shows that the application of the scientific method, with all of its demands, outperforms experts (remember Johan de Witt). The belief that area expertise, for instance, is sufficient to anticipate the future is, as Tetlock convincingly demonstrated, just plain false. If we hope to build reliable predictions about human behavior, whether in China, Cameroon, or Connecticut, then probably we must first harness facts to the systematic, repeated, transparent application of the same logic across connected families of problems. By doing so we can test alternative ways of thinking to uncover what works and what doesn't in different circumstances. Here Gardner, Tetlock, and I could not agree more. Prediction tournaments are an essential ingredient to work out what the current limits are to improved knowledge and predictive accuracy. Of course, improvements in knowledge and accuracy will always be a moving target because technology, ideas, and subject adaptation will be ongoing.

2. Gathering information from a wide variety of experts can lead to good predictions.

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA (Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University), "FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS," July 18th, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at [http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29)

How can game theory be harnessed to achieve reliable prediction? Acting like a fox, I gather information from a wide variety of experts. They are asked only for specific current information (Who wants to influence a decision? What outcome do they currently advocate? How focused are they on the issue compared to other questions on their plate? How flexible are they about getting the outcome they advocate? And how much clout could they exert?). They are not asked to make judgments about what will happen. Then, acting as a hedgehog, I use that information as data with which to seed a dynamic applied game theory model. The model's logic then produces not only specific predictions about the issues in question, but also a probability distribution around the predictions. The predictions are detailed and nuanced. They address not only what outcome is likely to arise, but also how each "player" will act, how they are likely to relate to other players over time, what they believe about each other, and much more. Methods like this are credited by the CIA, academic specialists and others, as being accurate about 90 percent of the time based on large-sample assessments. These methods have been subjected to peer review with predictions published well ahead of the outcome being known and with the issues forecast being important questions of their time with much controversy over how they were expected to be resolved. This is not so much a testament to any insight I may have had but rather to the virtue of combining the focus of the hedgehog with the breadth of the fox. When facts are harnessed by logic and evaluated through replicable tests of evidence, we progress toward better prediction.

#### D. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION.

The best middle ground is to analyze probabilities based on evidence and then draw rational conclusions

Michael Fitzsimmons "The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning", *Survival*, Winter 06/07

Much has been made about the defining role of uncertainty in strategic planning since the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolar competition, so the argument goes, and the accelerating pace of change in technology and international political and economic relations, forecasting world events even a few years into the future has become exceedingly difficult. Indeed, few in the year 2000 would have described with much accuracy the current conditions facing national-security decision-makers. Moreover, history offers ample evidence, from the Schlieffen Plan to the Soviet economy, that rigid planning creates risks of catastrophic failure. Clearly, uncertainty demands an appreciation for the importance of flexibility in strategic planning. For all of its importance, however, recognition of uncertainty poses a dilemma for strategists: in predicting the future, they are likely to be wrong; but in resisting prediction, they risk clouding the rational bases for making strategic choices. Over-confidence in prediction may lead to good preparation for the wrong future, but wholesale dismissal of prediction may lead a strategist to spread his resources too thinly. In pursuit of flexibility, he ends up well prepared for nothing. A natural compromise is to build strategies that are robust across multiple alternative future events but are still tailored to meet the challenges of the most likely future events. Recent US national security strategy, especially in the Department of Defense, has veered from this middle course and placed too much emphasis on the role of uncertainty. This emphasis, paradoxically, illustrates the hazards of both too much allowance for uncertainty and too little. Current policies on nuclear-force planning and the results of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are examples of overreaching for strategic flexibility. The record of planning for post-war operations in Iraq, by contrast, indicates that decision-makers, in enlisting uncertainty as a rationale for discounting one set of predictions, have fallen prey to overconfidence in their own alternative set of predictions. A more balanced approach to accounting for uncertainty in strategic planning would address a wide range of potential threats and security challenges, but would also incorporate explicit, transparent, probabilistic reasoning into planning processes. The main benefit of such an approach would not necessarily be more precise predictions of the future, but rather greater clarity and discipline applied to the difficult judgements about the future upon which strategy depends.

## SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. ENLIGHTENMENT VALUES SOLVE SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE.

1. Sophisticated data shows that the values of the Enlightenment bolster the quality of life across factors.

Francis Heylighen & Jan Bernheim (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) "Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life," 2000. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf>

5 . S u m m a r y a n d C o n c l u s i o n . Cultural relativism has led post-modernist thinkers to argue that the 18th century concept of progress has become meaningless. At the same time, the emphasis by the media on social and environmental problems has fostered an atmosphere of gloom and doom. This paper set out to show that both the relativist and the pessimist positions are flawed. This means that we had to: 1) define progress in a universally acceptable, culture-independent manner; 2) show that progress defined in this way effectively occurs. We have attempted to update the concept of progress by replacing the materialistic and reductionistic assumptions underlying the philosophy of the Enlightenment by a more evolutionary and holistic framework. The resulting holistic concept of progress had to be operationalized, so as to make it empirically testable. Our definition of progress as increase in global quality of life led us to study the different indicators of quality of life. The extensive data from the World Database of Happiness allowed us to determine which objective social, economic and psychological variables have a significant correlation with QOL. The results confirm the values that most people intuitively hold: health, wealth, security, knowledge, freedom, honesty and equality all seem to contribute to our feelings of well-being. These factors together explain between 63% and 81% (depending on the size of the country sample) of the variance in QOL for the 50-odd countries for which data are available (Veenhoven, 1996b, 1997). We then checked to what extent each of these factors has increased for the world population as a whole. Representative data for roughly the last half century seem to indicate that all these factors have indeed progressed. This makes a strong case for the objective existence of progress. Yet, in the absence of longitudinal, direct measurements of QOL, it can always be argued that however extensive the list of indicators that we have considered, it lacks some important factors (e.g. amount of pollution). If these factors would show deterioration, then our thesis of global progress could again be put into question. Because our conception of QOL is holistic, we can of course never discuss all possible factors that contribute to it. Therefore, we must analyse progress in the most general, most abstract way. This will be attempted in part II of this paper (Heylighen & Bernheim, 2000). The resulting theoretical framework will be connected back to reality<sup>17</sup> HEYLIGHEN & BERNHEIM by considering those factors that are most often associated with pessimistic prognoses: pollution, global change, population growth, acceleration of change, and information overload

2. Society is solving violence in multiple factors—the world is getting better and not worse.

Francis Heylighen & Jan Bernheim (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) "Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life," 2000. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf>

The same progress appears if we use the most reliable of the "objective" indicators, the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1999): the percentage of the world's population ranked "low" in terms of human development has shrunk from 73% in 1960 to 35% by 1990. Between 1975 and 1997, most countries have made substantial progress in human development (UNDP, 1999), while only one (Zambia) among those for which full data are available experienced a decrease in HDI value (mostly because of the AIDS epidemic). This general trend may be exemplified by the probability of accidental death (Holen, 1995). This factor is both strongly correlated with QOL, and consistently decreasing. Unlike the increases in some more ideologically-loaded factors, such as wealth, equality, or freedom, nobody would deny that decrease in accident rates constitutes an objective improvement. Yet, there is not any single, obvious cause for this decline. It is rather a combined effect of a multitude of small improvements in the most diverse domains, from seat belts in cars to better fire detection, more reliable technologies, higher awareness of objective risks, more stringent regulations for dangerous work, and more responsible behavior by better educated citizens. The only thing these diverse developments have in common is that they decrease the probability of serious misfortune, and thereby improve the control people have over their fate.

3. Modern day economic and political systems are not the root cause of systemic violence.

Richard Aberdeen (Author & Philanthropist), *Uncommon Sense*. 2003. Accessed May 31, 2012 via google books.

A view shared by many modern activists is that capitalism, free enterprise, multi-national corporations and globalization are the primary cause of the current global Human Rights problem and that by striving to change or eliminate these, the root problem of what ills the modern world is being addressed. This is a rather unfortunate and historically myopic view, reminiscent of early “class struggle” Marxists who soon resorted to violence as a means to achieve rather questionable ends. And like these often brutal early Marxists, modern anarchists who resort to violence to solve the problem are walking upside down and backwards, adding to rather than correcting, both the immediate and long-term Human Rights problem. Violent revolution, including our own American revolution, becomes a breeding ground for poverty, disease, starvation and often mass oppression leading to future violence. Large, publicly traded corporations are created by individuals or groups of individuals, operated by individuals and made up of individual and/or group investors. These business enterprises are deliberately structured to be empowered by individual (or group) investor greed. For example, a theorized ‘need’ for offering salaries much higher than is necessary to secure competent leadership (often resulting in corrupt and entirely incompetent leadership), lowering wages more than is fair and equitable and scaling back of often hard fought for benefits, is sold to stockholders as being in the best interest of the bottom-line market value and thus, in the best economic interests of individual investors. Likewise, major political and corporate exploitation of third-world nations is rooted in the individual and joint greed of corporate investors and others who stand to profit from such exploitation. More than just investor greed, corporations are driven by the greed of all those involved, including individuals outside the enterprise itself who profit indirectly from it. If one examines “the course of human events” closely, it can correctly be surmised that the “root” cause of humanity’s problems comes from individual human greed and similar negative individual motivation. The Marx/Engles view of history being a “class” struggle<sup>1</sup> does not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see for more details). So-called “classes” of people, unions, corporations and political groups are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their own individual needs, greed and desires and thus, an apparent “class struggle” in reality, is an extension of individual motivation. Likewise, nations engage in wars of aggression, not because capitalism or classes of society are at root cause, but because individual members of a society are individually convinced that it is in their own economic survival best interest. War, poverty, starvation and lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before the rise of modern capitalism, free enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this.

4. Life expectancy is increasing around the world now—the kritik has got its logic backwards.

Francis Heylighen & Jan Bernheim (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” 2000. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf>

4.1. Physical progress Fig. 1 shows the increases in life expectancy for the world as a whole, the developed and the less developed countries. It turns out that life expectancy for the world is increasing with over 3 years every 10 years, while in the developed countries it has slowed down to little over 1 year, showing that the poor countries are quickly catching up with the rich ones in this respect. Yet, further medical advances and more healthy life styles promise a continuing increase even in the richest countries for the foreseeable future. Life expectancy is probably the most reliable measure of the physical component of QOL. Other physical indicators such as the amount of calories available for nutrition per head of the population, or the average height of individuals also show a steady increase for practically every country for which data are available. The most spectacular improvement is perhaps the steep decline in child mortality, which appeared first in the most developed countries, and now has reached even the poorest countries. Needless to say, these mortality statistics also indicate an immense decrease in the emotional suffering caused by the loss of loved ones.

5. Industrial society has advanced human well-being across variables.

Indur Goklany (policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU), “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)”, April 24, 2010. Accessed May 31, 2012 at <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194>

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview, human well-being has advanced globally since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide emissions. In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US. Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions 8-fold. Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand. For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. As in the rest of the world, today’s U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred — crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs. The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy. And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.

6. Cognitive bias causes them to overlook the beneficial changes taking place in society.

Francis Heylighen & Jan Bernheim (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) "Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life," 2000. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf>

Why cannot society fully enjoy its undeniable successes? One factor is that negative events simply receive much more attention. Psychological research has shown that there is an asymmetry between positive and negative emotions: neutral situations produce a mildly positive feeling, the positivity offset, while unpleasant or potentially dangerous situations elicit a strong negative reaction, the negativity bias (Ito, Berntson & Cacioppo, 1999). This can be explained straightforwardly through evolutionary mechanisms: the positivity offset helps the organism to explore its environment and thus discover opportunities, while the negativity bias helps it to avoid dangers. Since much more can be lost by ignoring a danger than by ignoring an opportunity, the strength of the negative reaction tends to be much larger than the strength of the positive reaction. Thus, our brains are programmed to get much more aroused by negative than by positive or neutral stimuli. This psychological mechanism influences our perception of progress in society. A phenomenon will only attract attention if it deviates from the default expectation of no change. Negative developments are usually the result of a sudden, unexpected disturbance: an error, an accident, a conflict, or a natural disaster. Such situations require quick action, and they arouse the immediate and full attention of the people involved. Positive developments, on the other hand, are usually the accumulated result of the sustained efforts of many people. They merely require further continuation of the activities, without much emotion. Thus, because of the asymmetry between positivity offset and negativity bias, negative changes are much more likely to be noticed and remembered than on-going progress. Although this negativity bias has always existed, the present problem is its amplification by the media. Something is deemed newsworthy only if it is likely to grab the attention of many people. This excludes most of the slow, predictable processes of improvement, while favoring negative events such as murders, wars, famines or kidnappings. Marshall MacLuhan summarized this phenomenon as "good news is no news". Simon (1999) called it the "bad news bias", discussing many examples of how it works in practice. One of these concerned data about the catastrophic loss of farmland in the USA that had been making the headlines. When Simon investigated the situation, he found that the statistics were simply wrong. He even managed to make the authorities admit that they had made a mistake. Yet, no newspaper seemed interested in publishing the corrected—but less spectacular—statement that farmland was actually increasing. The irony of the situation is that on-going progress increases the bad news bias. As communication technologies improve, and journalists and investigators become more competent, they will be able to gather and publish more news. As people's access to information and general education level increase, they will be subjected to more news. Given a growing amount of news about all possible events, a stable proportion of negative events, and a stable tendency to publicize only the negative events, the overall amount of bad news is bound to grow. The effect on the public's mood can be illustrated most simply by contrasting people's appreciation of their own situation with the appreciation they have of society at large. Eckersley (2000) calls the former "personal QOL", the latter "social QOL". He notes that personal QOL is typically positive, while social QOL is typically negative. In other words, people tend to judge the state of society to be much worse than their own situation. But this is paradoxical: if most people are quite happy, how can society as a whole then be so bad? The positivity offset explains why people on the average tend to be rather satisfied: if they haven't experienced any major problems themselves, they will feel good. The bad news bias explains why they tend to believe that other people are so much worse off: as they are constantly bombarded by warnings about crime, corruption, poverty, drug abuse, etc., they naturally, but incorrectly, infer that these problems are the rule rather than the exception. The more worrying phenomenon is that, according to Eckersley's survey data, a sizeable percentage of people admit that their personal QOL is affected by their worries about society at large. Thus, although the negativity bias and the increasing reach of the media are intrinsically positive phenomena, that help us to tackle problems at an early stage, together they may have created a bad news bias strong enough to reduce our QOL, thus providing another example of overshoot.



7. Poverty is on the decline worldwide—present day assumptions are working.

Francis Heylighen & Jan Bernheim (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” 2000. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf>

4.2. Economic progress The average increase in wealth for most countries is well-documented. Poverty on the world level has decreased from over 70% in 1960 to 30% at present. Averaged over the different decades, a yearly increase in GNP of about 2% seems normal for the developed countries. This increase is primarily due to an increase in productivity of about the same amount. Although more difficult to measure, the underlying increase in productivity is more stable or reliable, as it is less dependent on the "boom and bust" cycles of the economy than GNP, where periods of stagnation or recession are followed by increases of 6% or more. The increased productivity means that less resources and labor are needed to produce the same amount of goods. Buckminster Fuller (1969) called this on-going trend to do more with less "ephemeralization". Perhaps the most spectacular illustration of the underlying technological progress is Moore's Law, the observation that the speed of microprocessors doubles every 18 months, while the price halves. This improvement results mainly from miniaturization, so that more (processing power) is achieved with less (materials). Ephemeralization explains the stable or declining prices (corrected for inflation) of physical resources and energy. The decline is particularly evident if the value of a resource is expressed as a percentage of the average income (Simon, 1995). The richer people become, the less they need to spend on basic resources such as food, energy and materials. This refutes the widely quoted pessimistic predictions (Ehrlich, 1976a) according to which our resources are near to exhaustion. This was illustrated by a famous 1980 bet (Tierney, 1990) between the economist Julian Simon, who wagered that the price of \$1000 worth of 5 natural resources would decrease, and the ecologist<sup>13</sup> HEYLIGHEN & BERNHEIM Paul Ehrlich who betted that they would increase. In 1990, ten years later, all five resources chosen by Ehrlich as being near to exhaustion, had in fact become cheaper, providing Simon with a handsome \$600 gain.

8. Sexual and political equality is increasing now.

Francis Heylighen & Jan Bernheim (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” 2000. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf>

4.3. Social progress For the social variables, somewhat less clear statistics are available, although Estes (1984) has developed a comprehensive International Index of Social Progress which includes such diverse variables as number of years since introducing unemployment compensations, violations of civic liberties and female primary school enrolment as per cent of males. Over the longer term, there does seem to be a clear increase in equality between the sexes (world-wide) and a less pronounced increase in equality in income (although this trend presently seems to be reversed in the developed countries). Even though the wealth gap between rich and poor countries does not seem to decrease, the gap in other QOL indicators such as life expectancy, child mortality and literacy has definitely been reduced (cf. Easterly, 1998). With the collapse of the communist block and the gradual disappearance of right wing dictatorships (Spain, Portugal, Philippines, Latin America, etc.), the last decades have witnessed a quite spectacular increase in democracy and general freedom of expression. The number of countries that can be broadly called "democratic" has risen from 6 (out of 43) in 1900, to 37 (out of 121) in 1980, and 117 (out of 193) in 1998 (Emmott, 1999).



## B. WAR CAUSES STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE.

War causes structural violence—not the other way around.

Douglas Bulloch(IR Department, London School of Economics and Political Science) *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595

But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

## C. ALTERNATIVES TO WESTERN VALUES WILL FAIL TO SOLVE SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE.

1. Post-modern alternatives will fail to solve the conditions of inequality and violence—data is firmly on the side of Western style governments.

Francis Heylighen & Jan Bernheim (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” 2000. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://clearmc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf>

is also worth noting that the basic values which come out of this correlation analysis largely correspond to those formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although human rights discussions tend to focus on the violations of the rights to freedom and to physical security, the Declaration also includes the rights to equal treatment, adequate standard of living, social security, health care, and education. The emphasis of Western governments and media on the freedom-related rights often leads to the accusation that the declaration is culturally biased. However, if the other rights are taken into due account, the World Database of Happiness data can be taken as empirical evidence that the Universal Declaration provides a pretty accurate, culture-independent inventory of the basic conditions for happiness. In conclusion, although we started by defining the basic value of QOL through people's subjective feeling of happiness or satisfaction, a review of statistical correlates brought us to a set of objective indicators that seem largely independent of subject or culture. This indicates that the postmodernist focus on the relativity of values, although a valuable reminder that there are many different contexts or points of view from which to consider a statement, is misguided if it is used to deny the possibility of progress.

2. History proves—the alternative will become corrupted and make society worse.

Richard Aberdeen (Author & Philanthropist), *Uncommon Sense*. 2003. Accessed May 31, 2012 via google books.

Lenin and the Communist party overthrew a very oppressive capitalist Czarist system. It did not take long for one corrupt system to be replaced by another, where even without capitalism and free enterprise to aggravate the Human Rights problem, people of power within the Communist political structure began, similar to their counterparts of capitalistic excess in Europe and America, exploiting the mass population for their own individual benefit, comfort and excess. Thus the root problem is exposed as going deeper than simply changing an oppressive capitalist or other system. Quite obviously, changing a corrupt system does not by itself, change the corrupt people who invented and supported it, neither does it change negative individual motivation leading to group oppression based on irrational disparagement of others regarding sex, color, intelligence or other perceived difference and neither does it prevent waste, laziness, murder, theft and rape by individuals within a perceived economic “class”.

3. Neither revolution nor pointing out the flaws in a society will cause a new society to come about.

Andrew Kliman (professor of economics @ Pace University) “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens After the Revolution?” 2004. Retrieved June 1, 2012 at <http://akliman.squarespace.com/writings/>

I. Concretizing the Vision of a New Human Society We live at a moment in which it is harder than ever to articulate a liberatory alternative to capitalism. As we all know, the collapse of state-capitalist regimes that called themselves “Communist,” as well as the widespread failures of social democracy to remake society, have given rise to a widespread acceptance of Margaret Thatcher’s TINA – the belief that “there is no alternative.” Yet the difficulty in articulating a liberatory alternative is not mostly the product of these events. It is an inheritance from the past. To what extent has such an alternative ever been articulated? There has been a lot of progress – in theory and especially in practice – on the problem of forms of organization – but new organizational forms by themselves are not yet an alternative. A great many leftists, even revolutionaries, did of course regard nationalized property and the State Plan, under the control of the “vanguard” Party, as socialism, or at least as the basis for a transition to socialism. But even before events refuted this notion, it represented, at best, an evasion of the problem. It was largely a matter of leftists with authoritarian personalities subordinating themselves and others to institutions and power with a blind faith that substituted for thought. How such institutions and such power would result in human liberation was never made clear. Vague references to “transition” were used to wave the problem away. Yet as Marxist-Humanism has stressed for more than a decade, the anti-Stalinist left is also partly responsible for the crisis in thought. It, too, failed to articulate a liberatory alternative, offering in place of private- and state-capitalism little more than what Hegel (*Science of Logic*, Miller trans., pp. 841-42) called “the empty negative ... a presumed absolute”: The impatience that insists merely on getting beyond the determinate ... and finding itself immediately in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words, a presumed absolute, that is presumed because it is not posited, not grasped; grasped it can only be through the mediation of cognition ... . The question that confronts us nowadays is whether we can do better. Is it possible to make the vision of a new human society more concrete and determinate than it now is, through the mediation of cognition? According to a long-standing view in the movement, it is not possible. The character of the new society can only be concretized by practice alone, in the course of trying to remake society. Yet if this is true, we are faced with a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape, because acceptance of TINA is creating barriers in practice. In the perceived absence of an alternative, practical struggles have proven to be self-limiting at best. They stop short of even trying to remake society totally – and for good reason. As Bertell Ollman has noted (*Introduction to Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists*, Routledge, 1998, p. 1), “People who believe [that there is no alternative] will put up with almost any degree of suffering. Why bother to struggle for a change that cannot be? ... people [need to] have a good reason for choosing one path into the future rather than another.” Thus the reason of the masses is posing a new challenge to the movement from theory. When masses of people require reasons before they act, a new human society surely cannot arise through spontaneous action alone. And exposing the ills of existing society does not provide sufficient reason for action when what is at issue is the very possibility of an alternative.

4. Their understanding of violence cannot possibly be solved

Brian Martin, (professor of science, technology, and society – University of Wollongong) Uprooting War. 1990. Accessed June 1, 2012 at <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw13.html>

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an inadequate political practice. The 'revolution' may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.

5. Total rejection will only fragment resistance.

J.K. Gibson-Graham, (feminist economist) *The End Of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy*, 1996. Retrieved June 1, 2012 through google books

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can't the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could begin to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there's no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there's no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

## SECURITIZATION KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. SECURITIZATION IS GOOD.

1. Securitization of threats is good—it allows us to anticipate and prevent danger.

Joseph Berke (Found. And Dir. Arbours Crisis Centre), , Even Paranoids Have Enemies, p. 5-6

Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms which serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization. Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination (Segal 1994); when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization, for instance, a certain degree of paranoid potential can be a useful resource, as opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader from becoming aware of the situations of activation of aggression in the group, or regression to primitive levels of functioning. Where the leader can be aware of, and apprehend risk and danger, there is the possibility of preparation for the group to face them and cope with them.

2. Confronting threats early prevents escalation—WWII proves.  
Young-Kwan Yoon (Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea) “Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8)

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.



3. The security dilemma doesn't apply to situations where states pose genuine threats. Randall Schweller, (professor of political science at Ohio State) *Security Studies*, Spring 1996 p. 117-118) The crucial point is that the security dilemma is always apparent, not real. If states are arming for something other than security; that is, if aggressors do in fact exist, then it is no longer a security dilemma but rather an example of a state or a coalition mobilizing for the purpose of expansion and the targets of that aggression responding and forming alliances to defend themselves. Indeed, Glenn Snyder makes this very important point (disclaimer?) in his discussion of the security dilemma and alliance politics: "Uncertainty about the aims of others is inherent in structural anarchy. If a state clearly reveals itself as an expansionist, however, the alliance that forms against it is not self-defeating as in the prisoners' dilemma (security dilemma) model" 89 That is, if an expansionist state exists, there is no security dilemma/spiral model effect. Moreover, if all states are relatively sure that none seeks expansion, then the security dilemma similarly fades away. It is only the misplaced fear that others harbor aggressive designs that drive the security dilemma.

4. Most wars are caused by deliberate threats, not spiraling insecurities.

Randall Schweller, (professor of political science at Ohio State) *Security Studies*, Spring 1996 p. 120) War is almost always intended by someone. Throughout history it has been decided upon in cold blood not for reasons of self-preservation but for the purpose of greedy expansion at the expense of others' security, prestige, and power. "What was so often unintentional about war," Blainey points out, "was not the decision to fight but the outcome of the fighting." 98

5. War preparation deters aggression, the kritik prevents these efforts.

Edward Luttwak (Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies), *BOSTON REVIEW*, October 1997, p.11.

More generally, war-preparation by those actually willing to fight (not just ritualistic preparations, as is mostly the case in advanced countries nowadays) may avert war by dissuading others' hopes of easy victories -- even Bosnia might have done it, had it raised a good army before declaring independence -- whereas wishing for peace, marching for peace, etc., is as relevant as wishing and marching for good weather -- *except if it interferes with concrete war-preparations, when it may be counterproductive.*

## B. CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES DOESN'T CAUSE WARS.

1. Securitization doesn't cause wars.

Stuart Kaufman, (Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware) "Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case," 2009 *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.<sup>17</sup> War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

2. Aggressive states, not security concerns, are the root of conflict  
Andrew Kydd (Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside,) SECURITY STUDIES, Autumn 1997, p.154.

In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionist states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.

3. Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship

Matthew Sharpe, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies Deakin University, 2010

Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth-century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies. In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English-speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also always in danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, *différance*, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifically does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be sufficient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom today pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

C. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION.

1. The permutation solves for securitization

Richard Youngs (Co-ordinator of the Democratisation programme at FRIDE, and lecturer at the University of Warwick in the UK), “Democracy and Security in the Middle East” March 2006

While many of the doubts raised against democracy are convincing, the conceptual groundings from which they are argued commonly lead critics to be overly dismissive of democracy’s potential merit. One shortcoming, witnessed especially in the United States, is the tendency implicitly to assume that the situation is one of the West/ US deciding whether democracy is a good thing or not in the face of a passive Middle East. In reality, of course, democracy’s fate is unlikely to be the West’s to decide. Western policy is more a reactive than independent variable, and security calculations must be made with this in mind. Even if the sceptics’ concerns are fully acknowledged, what can perhaps be argued with some certainty is that as and when the Middle East’s political plates begin to shift it would breed resentment if the West sought actively to discourage change. It is particularly irritating – for those both in the Middle East and in other Western states – that debates over democracy promotion are so often couched in a discourse of ‘US values’. Both the enthusiasts and the sceptics regularly conflate – or seem constantly a hair’s breadth away from conflating – their respective views on democracy with their position on the US seeking to spread its values. Democracy must, rather, be carefully judged on its own merits. Presenting the argument in terms of ‘our security’ being served by spreading ‘our values’ – in fact a favourite formulation not only of president Bush but also of British prime- minister, Tony Blair – could hardly be better designed to engender counter-productive responses to democracy promotion efforts. Where democracy support is aimed at ensuring that Arabs’ own values and aspirations are not hindered from outside, a more comprehensive approach to political change is invited. Such a starting point offers greater possibility of teasing out democracy’s potential, linking support for political reform organically to a broader range of change in the region. A truly holistic approach would be attentive to the pitfalls of political rupture unsynchronised with underlying structural adaptation of economy and social life. A strategy that fully contextualised political reform within ongoing processes of social, religious and economic change in the Arab world might not magic away strategic threats, but it would go some way to preparing the foundations for the kind of comprehensive transformation that would render containment-based security less necessary. The value of support for democracy should not be discounted, but must be made to mesh with issues of a structural nature - and certainly not merely take the form of backing easily-accessible pro-Western democracy activists.



## D. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL FAIL TO SOLVE SECURITIZATION

1. Lack of a blueprint means the alternative will fail to solve securitization.

Alastair Murray (Professor Politics at the University of Wales) *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, 1997 p. 188-9

His disagreement with realism depends on a highly contestable claim - based on Herz's argument that, with the development of global threats, the conditions which might produce some universal consensus have arisen - that its 'impossibility theorem' is empirically problematic, that a universal consensus is achievable, and that its practical strategy is obstructing its realisation. In much the same way, in 'The poverty of neorealism', realism's practical strategy is illegitimate only because Ashley's agenda is inclusionary. His central disagreement with realism arises out of his belief that its strategy reproduces a world order organised around sovereign states, preventing exploration of the indeterminate number of - potentially less exclusionary - alternative world orders. Realists, however, would be unlikely to be troubled by such charges. Ashley needs to do rather more than merely assert that the development of global threats will produce some universal consensus, or that any number of less exclusionary world orders are possible, to convince them. A universal threat does not imply a universal consensus, merely the existence of a universal threat faced by particularistic actors. And the assertion that indeterminate numbers of potentially less exclusionary orders exist carries little weight unless we can specify exactly what these alternatives are and just how they might be achieved. **As such**, realists would seem to be justified in regarding such potentialities as currently unrealizable ideals and in seeking a more proximate good in the fostering of mutual understanding and, in particular, of a stable balance of power. Despite the adverse side-effects that such a balance of power implies, it at least offers us something tangible rather than ephemeral promises lacking a shred of support. Ultimately, Ashley's demand that a new, critical approach be adopted in order to free us from the grip of such 'false conceptions depends upon ideas about the prospects for the development of a universal consensus which are little more than wishful thinking, and ideas about the existence of potentially less exclusionary orders which are little more than mere assertion. Hence his attempts, in 'Political realism and human interests', to conceal these ideas from view by claiming that the technical base of realism serves only to identify, and yet not to reform, the practical, and then, in 'The poverty of neorealism', by removing the technical from investigation altogether by an exclusive reliance on a problem of hermeneutic circularity. In the final analysis, then, Ashley's post-structuralist approach boils down to little more than a critique which fails. It is predicated on the assumption that the constraints upon us are simply restrictive knowledge practices, such that it presumes that the entirety of the solution to our problems is little more than the removal of such false ways of thinking. It offers nothing by way, of alternative - no strategies, no proximate goals, indeed, little by way of goals at all. If, in constructivism, the progressive purpose leads to strategies divorced from an awareness of the problems confronting transformatory efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, it produces strategies divorced from international politics in their entirety, in post-structuralism it generates a complete absence of strategies altogether. Critique serves to fill the void, yet this critique ultimately proves unsustainable. With its defeat, post-structuralism is left with nothing. Once one peels away the layers of misconstruction, it simply fades away. If realism is, as Ashley puts it, 'a tradition forever immersed in the expectation of political tragedy'. it at least offers us a concrete vision of objectives and ways in which to achieve them which his own position. forever immersed in the expectation of deliverance- is manifestly unable to provide."

2. The alternative fails - nationalism is inevitable and reinforced by dominant states - you are utopians  
Stephen Walt 11 (Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, "Nationalism Rules," July 15, 2011. Retrieved June 1, 2012 at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/15/the\\_enduring\\_power\\_of\\_nationalism?page=0.1](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/15/the_enduring_power_of_nationalism?page=0.1))

What's the most powerful political force in the world? Some of you might say it's the bond market. Others might nominate the resurgence of religion or the advance of democracy or human rights. Or maybe it's digital technology, as symbolized by the Internet and all that comes with it. Or perhaps you think it's nuclear weapons and the manifold effects they have had on how states think about security and the use of force. Those are all worthy nominees (no doubt readers here will have their own favorites), but my personal choice for the Strongest Force in the World would be [is] nationalism. The belief that humanity is comprised of many different cultures -- i.e., groups that share a common language, symbols, and a narrative about their past (invariably self-serving and full of myths) -- and that those groups ought to have their own state has been an overwhelmingly powerful force in the world over the past two centuries. It was nationalism that cemented most of the European powers in the modern era, turning them from dynastic states into nation-states, and it was the spread of nationalist ideology that helped destroy the British, French, Ottoman, Dutch, Portuguese, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian/Soviet empires. Nationalism is the main reason the United Nations had fifty-one members immediately after its founding in 1945 and has nearly 200 members today. It is why the Zionists wanted a state for the Jewish people and why Palestinians want a state of their own today. It is what enabled the Vietnamese to defeat both the French and the American armies during the Cold War. It is also why Kurds and Chechens still aspire to statehood; why Scots have pressed for greater autonomy within the United Kingdom, and it is why we now have a Republic of South Sudan. Understanding the power of nationalism also tells you a lot about what is happening today in the European Union. During the Cold War, European integration flourished because it took place inside the hot-house bubble provided by American protection. Today, however, the United States is losing interest in European security, the Europeans themselves face few external threats, and the EU project itself has expanded too far and badly overreached by creating an ill-advised monetary union. What we are seeing today, therefore, is a gradual renationalization of European foreign policy, fueled in part by incompatible economic preferences and in part by recurring fears that local (i.e., national) identities are being threatened. When Danes worry about Islam, Catalans demand autonomy, Flemish and Walloons contend in Belgium, Germans refuse to bail out Greeks, and nobody wants to let Turkey into the EU, you are watching nationalism at work. The power of nationalism is easy for realists to appreciate and understand, as my sometime collaborator John Mearsheimer makes clear in an important new paper. Nations -- because they operate in a competitive and sometimes dangerous world -- seek to preserve their identities and cultural values. In many cases, the best way for them to do that is to have their own state, because ethnic or national groups that lack their own state are usually more vulnerable to conquest, absorption, and assimilation. Similarly, modern states also have a powerful incentive to promote national unity -- in other words, to foster nationalism -- because having a loyal and united population that is willing to sacrifice (and in extreme cases, to fight and die) for the state increases its power and thus its ability to deal with external threats. In the competitive world of international politics, in short, nations have incentives to obtain their own state and states have incentives to foster a common national identity in their populations. Taken together, these twin dynamics create a long-term trend in the direction of more and more independent nation-states.

3. Opening up space for new ways of knowing won't affect international violence.

Terry O'Callaghan (lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia), *International Relations and the third debate*, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 80-81

Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana. More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, ctory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the omeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing. What George's treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the "backward discipline" for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from "incarceration and closure" to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George's postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.

4. The alternative isn't real world and only increases the threat of war.

John Norton Moore (Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia), *Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace*, 2004, pages 41-2.

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.<sup>11</sup> Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.

## SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. SPACE EXPLORATION IS NECESSARY TO SAVE THE EARTH'S ENVIRONMENT.

1. Space exploration is crucial to solve multiple environmental threats which risk human extinction.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 123.

Over 12,000 television channels are provided worldwide by communications satellites, along with extensive Internet connections to much of the world. Our knowledge about the critical functions of the ozone layer and the Van Allen belts in protecting humans from extinction only comes from space programs. Knowledge about the climatic conditions on Venus and Mars may help to save us from the worst ravages of global warming or from the next ice age. Today space programs divide their investments between broad categories of space exploration, space transportation systems, space applications, new technology developments, new products and services, "spin-offs," educational development and research, and space sciences.

2. Space Exploration Solves Global Warming.

Peter Marshall, (Former President, Society of Satellite Professionals, International), *LICENSE TO ORBIT: THE FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL*, 2009, 148.

Space planes and space tourism may eventually lead us to a wealth of new technologies. The future of commercial space is about far more than better rockets. New materials, space elevators, new cheap and clean energy sources, environmental solutions to global warming and much more could come from innovative new space systems. Commercial innovations in space may ultimately allow us to establish permanent colonies on the Moon and Mars. In time we might even seek to "terraform" Mars or perhaps even Venus or the Moon to create a new extraterrestrial biosphere where humans can live and breed a new generation of Martians, Venusians or Selenians.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 127. \*Space systems not only alert us to dangers and tell us the speed with which global warming is occurring; atmospheric models based on observations of other planets and the Sun's interactions tell us of longer-term consequences. Finally, if it becomes necessary to create some sort of heat irradiator that allows the effects of excess greenhouse gases to escape into the void of space, it will be space systems that have truly become our saviors.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 20.

Economic studies have shown that, in several areas, money invested in space applications has yielded a twenty-fold return on investment in terms of new goods, products, services and improved economic output. Today as we face significant peril from coming climate change, space technology in its many dimensions will be critical in saving our planet from the destructive path followed by Venus when greenhouse gases trapped in its atmosphere destroyed all possibility of life on our sister planet.

3. Warming risks human extinction:

Oliver Tickell, 2008 (Climate Researcher, The Guardian, "On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction", August 11, 2008 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange>)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way.

4. Space Exploration solves Ozone Depletion.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 14.

Space applications can provide vital knowledge to deal with life and death issues such as global warming, worldwide drought, and holes in the ozone layer that could lead to genetic mutations that may ultimately endanger life on Earth. A well-conceived international program of human space exploration, space science and space applications can advance discovery, understanding, and cooperation. It can lift our sights, and fuel our dreams.

Eligar Sadeh, (Prof., Space Studies, U. North Dakota), *SPACE EXPLORATION AND HUMANITY*, 2010, 986.

As scientists have explored and studied the planets, they have learned more about Earth. Comparative planetology (the study of Earth in comparison to other planets) is instrumental in identifying global environmental problems. NASA scientists trying to understand why the surface temperature of Venus is warm enough to melt lead have proven the validity of the "greenhouse-warming" phenomenon and its potentially devastating effects. Likewise, planetary scientists studying why materials on Mars instantly oxidize due to ultraviolet light exposure identified the cause of ozone depletion on Earth.

5. A healthy ozone layer is critical to avoid human extinction.

Peter Marshall, (Former President, Society of Satellite Professionals, International), *LICENSE TO ORBIT: THE FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL*, 2009, 123.

The flights of the supersonic Concorde into the high stratosphere were a serious concern in terms of its potential damage to the ozone layer. Many breathed easier when the SST was grounded. The prospect of potentially thousands of flights by space planes into stratosphere raises anew these environmental concerns. Likewise the near-term development of supersonic commercial executive jets as a parallel industry raises similar questions with even greater concern. The truth is that damage to the ozone layer may be a more urgent concern than global warming. Genetic damage could kill off the human race much faster than rising temperatures. This may seem like a quibble to some, but survival of the species seems deserving of some serious thought.

6. Space travel allows us to expand our population infinitely.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

Indeed, the last necessary additions to this body of knowledge - nuclear fission and space travel and rapid computation - occurred decades ago. Even if no new knowledge were ever invented after those past advances, we would be able to go on increasing our numbers forever, while improving our standard of living and our control over our environment. The discovery of genetic manipulation certainly enhances our powers greatly, but even without it we could have continued our progress forever.

7. Space exploration solves resource depletion problems.

Charles Kennel, (Chair, Space Studies Board of the National Research Council), AMERICA'S FUTURE IN SPACE: ALIGNING THE CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM, 2009, 36.

Ultimately, if humans are to travel far from Earth they will have to solve many key problems: how to generate water over extended periods of time, provide and store energy in a compact space, and grow food in a harsh environment. It is noteworthy that generating fresh water, creating efficient energy sources, and developing food sources are also among the top priorities of an ever more resource-constrained Earth.

8. Space exploration is key to environmental and human survival.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE, 2010, 20.

When someone asks: "Why do we need to spend money on space?" There is a really good and short answer. We need space systems, space science and space applications if we humans -- and indeed all flora and fauna on the planet -- are going to survive another century or two.

9. Space exploration is key to solving Earth's environmental problems:

Kim Robinson, (Science Writer), WASHINGTON POST, July 19, 2009, B1.

It has been said that space science is an Earth science, and that is no paradox. Our climate crisis is very much a matter of interactions between our planet and our sun. That being the case, our understanding is vastly enhanced by going into space and looking down at the Earth, learning things we cannot learn when we stay on the ground. Studying other planets helps as well. The two closest planets have very different histories, with a runaway greenhouse effect on Venus and the freezing of an atmosphere on Mars. Beyond them spin planets and moons of various kinds, including several that might harbor life. Comparative planetology is useful in our role as Earth's stewards; we discovered the holes in our ozone layer by studying similar chemical interactions in the atmosphere of Venus. This kind of unexpected insight could easily happen again.

10. Space exploration protects Earth's environment.

Charles Kennel, (Chair, Space Studies Board of the National Research Council), AMERICA'S FUTURE IN SPACE: ALIGNING THE CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM, 2009, 3.

The key global perspective enabled by space observations is critical to monitoring climate change and testing climate models, managing Earth resources, and mitigating risks associated with natural phenomena such as severe weather and asteroids.

11. Observation from space is essential to protect the Earth's environment.

Rustam Rustamov, (Analyst, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs), SPACE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT OF HUMAN SOCIETY AND EARTH, 2009, 101-102.

Remote sensing is a useful method in several modes of oil spill control, including a large scale area of surveillance ability, specific site monitoring and advantages of technical and technological assistance in emergency cases. There is a significant capacity of providing essential information to enhance strategic and tactical decision-making, decreasing response costs by facilitating rapid oil recovery and ultimately minimizing impacts. Observation can be undertaken visually or by using remote sensing systems. In remote sensing, a sensor other than human vision or conventional photography is used to detect or map oil spills.

12. The global perspective of space is necessary to protect the Earth's environment.

Pat Norris, (Former Scientist, NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center), SPIES IN THE SKY: SURVEILLANCE SATELLITES IN WAR AND PEACE, 2008, 21.

Satellites are also telling us new things about the earth itself. From space a satellite can monitor global change, well, globally. Deforestation in the Amazon, shrinkage of the polar ice caps, spreading deserts, and other large-scale phenomena are hard to measure on the ground it's a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. But space makes these changes clear.

13. Orbital imaging is key to protect the planet's environment.

Philip Harris, (Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics), SPACE ENTERPRISE: LIVING AND WORKING OFFWORLD IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY, 2009, 526.

The satellite industry not only turned our world into a global village by its communication capabilities, but demonstrated that it could be a profitable enterprise. Furthermore, orbital imaging and sensing has shown myriad practical applications on Earth, even in protecting our planet's environment.

14. Space exploration protects the biosphere.

David Schrunk, (Aerospace Engineer & Medical Doctor), SPACE ENTERPRISE: LIVING AND WORKING OFFWORLD IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY, 2009, xiv. \*Permanent stations, outposts, bases and eventually cities in that orbital environment provide an unparalleled vantage point for scanning the cosmos and understanding the universe. Already both manned and unmanned spacecraft transmit to earthlings, information and images about other planets and galaxies within our Solar System. Space satellites have proven most persuasively their value for improving our global communication and agriculture, for predicting the weather and tracking human activities, for studying the Earth's topography and oceans, for understanding our own fragile biosphere, in terms of both problems and resources.

## B. SPACE EXPLORATION IS NECESSARY TO SAVE THE EARTH FROM PLANETARY DESTRUCTION.

1. Space programs are necessary to save the Earth from destruction by asteroids.

Peter Marshall, (Former President, Society of Satellite Professionals, International), LICENSE TO ORBIT: THE FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL, 2009, 150. The truth is that our space programs are essential to saving the earth from destruction by comets, asteroids or other near earth objects (NEOs). Our "smart" satellites provide us with the tools needed to cope with the many hazards. Space programs have given us much more than Teflon, Tang and new kinds of plastics. Without weather and communications satellites, GPS navigation systems, remote sensing and surveillance devices modern society would be under-informed, our educational and health care systems weaker and human civilization would be much more at risk. The next time someone asks what is the good of space programs and satellites; you might respond that "survival of the species" is a pretty fair reason.

2. Space exploration is necessary to solve the biggest threats to life on Earth.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE, 2010, 127. \*The biggest threats to Earth right now may be a depleted ozone layer that can result in massive mutations in all animal and plant life, including humans, and rampant global warming that peer-reviewed scientific evidence shows has already elevated the Earth's mean temperature by almost 1 degree Centigrade (approaching 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit) since the 1850s. It should be noted that, as far as animal life is concerned, a global temperature rise of only a few degrees is already threatening our ecosystems and several species. With increasing global warming, the human species will ultimately be threatened as well. It is only space-based systems like remote sensing devices, radar systems, multi-spectral sensors, meteorological imaging and ozone detectors that allow us to monitor the health of the planet. Space systems have shown us that our rain forests have been greatly depleted, thus lessening the amount of oxygen pumped into the atmosphere. Space systems allow us to monitor the pollution of the oceans, the decreased vegetation, and the melting of glaciers and the ice cap.



3. Space exploration is key to human survival:

Michael Griffin, (Former NASA Administrator), *LEADERSHIP IN SPACE*, 2008, 56.

In the end, space exploration is fundamentally about the survival of the species, about ensuring better odds for our survival through the promulgation of the human species. But as we do it, we will also ensure the prosperity of our species in the economic sense, in a thousand ways. Some of these we can foresee, and some we cannot. Who could claim that he or she would have envisioned the Boeing 777 after seeing the first Wright Flyer? And yet one followed the other in the blink of an historical eye.

C. SPACE EXPLORATION LEADS TO CONSCIOUSNESS SHIFTS WHICH PROMOTES HARMONIOUS LIVING WITH THE EARTH'S ENVIRONMENT.

1. Space exploration causes consciousness shifting that leads to harmonious living with the earth's environment.

Philip Harris, (Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics), *SPACE ENTERPRISE: LIVING AND WORKING OFFWORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY*, 2009, 98. \*David Cummings, executive director for the Universities Space Research Association, wrote: "Human exploration of space, for example, is an extension of the great exploration mythologies of the past, giving cultural guidance about the importance of courage and the spirit of adventure in our lives. The famous view of Earth from lunar orbit gave us another lesson about the importance of living harmoniously with the Earth's environment, as did the exploration of Mars and Venus."

2. Space exploration encourages environmental stewardship.

Al Globus, (Board Member, National Space Society), *AD ASTRA*, Winter 2009/2010, 43.

Space development has been good for the environment. It was a satellite that detected the ozone hole in the atmosphere, and today that hole is shrinking. It was satellite photos of the massive destruction of the Brazilian rain forest that convinced their government to pass laws to protect the Amazon Basin. A fleet of dozens of Earth-observing satellites are filling data archives with the information needed to understand the land, sea, air, and ecosystems of the only place in the universe that we know life exists: a thin layer on the outside of the third planet circling the Sun, just one of hundreds of billions of stars in the Milky Way, which is just one of 80 billion galaxies in the observable universe.

3. Exploring space leads to greater environmental ethic.

Steven Dick, (Dir., NASA History Division), *NASA'S FIRST 50 YEARS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES*, 2010, 649.

In *Rocket Dreams: How the Space Age Shaped Our Vision of a World Beyond*, Marina Benjamin argues that "The impact of seeing the Earth from space focused our energies on the home planet in unprecedented ways, dramatically affecting our relationship to the natural world and our appreciation of the greater community of mankind, and prompting a revolution in our understanding of the Earth as a living system." She finds it no coincidence that the first Earth Day on 20 April 1970 occurred in the midst of the Apollo program, or that one of the astronauts developed a new school of spiritualism.

4. The ban on ozone depleting chemicals proves—space exploration leads to shifts in environmental consciousness.

Berndt Feuerbacher, (Scientist, German Aerospace Center), *HANDBOOK OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY*, 2009, 520. Weather maps and forecasts based on satellite data have become a part of the modern news scene. Weather forecasts of up to two weeks are inconceivable without meteorological satellites. A look at the Earth's atmosphere from low Earth orbit also provides new insights, since it enables us to monitor our planet's gaseous envelope from its lowest to its highest density, which makes possible measurements with improved resolution. Along with such a global view, climate effects can also be detected and reasons for changes identified. One example is the discovery of the ozone hole, which initiated a reversal in anthropogenic influences through a worldwide ban on chlorofluorocarbons.

5. Space travel promotes an environmental ethic—people desire to protect the Earth.  
Meghan Baker, (Analyst, National Space Society), AD ASTRA, Summer 2010, 14.  
"When most people return from space they come back with a changed perspective and reverence for our planet. They have a new appreciation for the Earth and feel an overwhelming desire to protect its fragile beauty. Gone are race, religion, and political boundaries. I think this perspective offers that chance for people to really see what is at stake." [Sara] Poirier [of the Ontario Science Centre] said.
6. Space exploration shapes world views and alters cultural consciousness.  
Steven Dick, (Dir., NASA History Division), NASA'S FIRST 50 YEARS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, 2010, 650. The discovery of our place in the universe made possible by studies of cosmic evolution and the search for extraterrestrial life, and the embodiment of these and other themes in literature and the arts, is surely an important effect of space exploration not yet fully realized. Exploration shapes world views and changes cultures in unexpected ways, and so does lack of exploration. The full extent of the intellectual impact of the Space Age remains to be seen.
7. Space exploration bolsters an environmental ethic.  
Steven Dick, (Dir., NASA History Division), NASA'S FIRST 50 YEARS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, 2010, 650. Along with human and robotic missions, the late 20th century will be remembered collectively as the time when humans not only saw Earth as a fragile planet against the backdrop of space, but also utilized near-Earth space to study the planet's resources, to provide essential information about weather, and to provide means for navigation that both were life-saving and had enormous economic implications.
8. Space exploration leads to cosmic consciousness.  
Steven Dick, (Dir., NASA History Division), NASA'S FIRST 50 YEARS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, 2010, 652-653.  
Such studies remind us that, like it or not, the idea of space exploration has been woven into the fabric of society over the last 50 years, even as exploration has raised our cosmic consciousness. The historical analysis of that transformation, in ways large and small, should help justify space exploration as an integral part of society rather than a burden on it as sometimes perceived by the public.
9. Space promotes environmental awareness.  
Michael Meltzen, (Environmental Scientist, Formerly at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), NASA'S FIRST 50 YEARS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, 2010, 475.  
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has compared the ethics of outer space exploration with those of terrestrial environmental ethics, believing that respect for Earth's environment also applies to respect of other celestial bodies.
10. Space exploration alters consciousness.  
Steven Dick, (Dir., NASA History Division), NASA'S FIRST 50 YEARS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, 2010, 648-649.  
Perhaps the most profound, and as yet largely unrealized, effect of the Space Age is the intellectual impact. As the story of the Space Age demonstrates, the science returned from spaceborne instruments over the last 50 years has been truly transformational, most immediately for scientists, but also for our general worldview. Although not everyone has yet absorbed the impact, that worldview has been altered or completely transformed by the images of "Earthrise" and the "Blue Marble" from space, with consequences that have affected, or will eventually affect, philosophy, theology, and the view of our place in nature.

D. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION.

1. The permutation is the best option—individual efforts at radical environmentalism will fail unless matched at the governmental level.

Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, 2007 (JD, Boston College Law School, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Fall/Winter, 2007, Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

Unfortunately, localized efforts, though well intentioned, have not managed to curb climate change. In part, the efforts of individuals to alter their own practices or those of local communities have had limited effect because such efforts have not been met by similar action at the federal level. n24 Most notably, Congress has not ratified the Kyoto Treaty. n25 In addition, skeptics of global warming remain in highly influential governmental positions; significantly, one of these positions is the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. n26 Moreover, consumption of fossil fuels and emission of carbon into the atmosphere remain disproportionately high in the USA compared to the nation's percentage of the world's human population. n27

2. The permutation is the best option—combining technological solutions with deep ecology buys time for the mindset shift to occur.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

I have analogized geoengineering to trying to treat lung cancer instead of trying to quit smoking. A deep environmentalist, one who cares about root causes and philosophical underpinnings rather than just the effects thereof, would want to find and eliminate the factors behind the desire to smoke. But is it trivial in forming policy to take into account that the world really likes to smoke? I think not: politics and policymaking are largely a world of competing preferences, not an academic forum where the ideal theoretical answer is the right answer. Of course, it is sad that the world's smoker would rather suffer serious illness than kick the habit. Thus, it is right for leaders to preach sensibility from their bully pulpits. We should teach "living lightly," simple frugality, and critical thinking to our children. We should try to soften the blow of consumerism and advocate sustainable development in place of rapacious deforestation and biodiversity loss. But while we do all of that, what do we do about climate change? While the preacher is at the bully pulpit, the deacons should be working to solve the problem. Were the planet a teenager trying her first cigarette, it surely would be smarter to address 'root causes' to prevent her from smoking at all. But in the case of climate change, the smoker has been at it for many years, and the addiction is firmly in place. In such a situation, focusing on the "real problem" simply may not work. Strong interests anchor the status quo, and they are not easily condemned "black hats," but a wide range of actors with motives that are not necessarily selfish or shortsighted.

3. The permutation solves best for human being's dilemma regarding nature:

Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

IV. The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality The crux of the modern nature problem is the need to find an appropriate human role in nature. Human beings are both of nature, having evolved through the same processes that govern other creatures, and outside nature, having developed the ability to modify and control the environment on a scale far beyond any other creature. The nature problem, therefore, is as much about people as it is about nature. Instead of focusing on how to divide the world between humanity and nature, as we have done so far, we must consider how best to combine the two.

4. Environmental management is justified to compensate for the effects of past environmental mismanagement: Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, *Washington & Lee Law Review*, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

Besides potentially inhibiting the creation of large reserves, a strict hands-off strategy is inconsistent with the protection of species, ecosystems, or natural processes. No place in the United States remains entirely unaffected by human actions. Ongoing management efforts are often necessary to compensate for the effect of past actions, or current actions outside the designated reserves. Competition with or predation by alien species, for example, is one of the leading threats to domestic biodiversity. n259 Once introduced, alien species often spread rapidly and are difficult, if not impossible to remove. Protecting native species from the threat of such exotics requires ongoing management. n260 Intensive management may also be required to substitute for [\*57] changes in historic fire regimes, n261 predation levels, n262 and other elements of the biophysical environment. Given the extensive changes in background conditions, ecologists tell us that most areas dedicated to the preservation of nature cannot simply be left to their own devices, but will require active human management. n263

5. Technological solutions aren't inconsistent with deep ecology.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, *Stanford Environmental Law Journal*, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis) Part V insists that it is time for environmentalists to reclaim the Big Fix, that holists and deep ecologists must, in a Rawlsian vein, learn to speak the pragmatic language of political discourse. If for no other reason, they must do this because geoengineering offers hope for solving climate change beyond the too-little, too-lates of Kyoto - essentially if you are one of the people who care about climate change, you should support geoengineering, because most people still do not care enough. But on a deeper level, geoengineering asks environmentalists how much they value their private philosophies, and how much they value the estuaries, islands, and trees that are threatened by climate change.

6. The permutation gives breathing room for the mindset shift to occur.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, *Stanford Environmental Law Journal*, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis) On the practical side, this debate echoes in many quarters of the environmental movement. Should we try to force reduced levels of consumption, or settle for "green fees?" Should we attempt to revalue "living lightly" or try to develop "no-regrets" environmentally-friendly technologies? Should an environmentalist tell McDonald's to "shut its doors" or work to package its unsustainable product in more sustainable containers? n233 Ultimately, it may be that the only way to a sustainable future is for McDonald's to shut its doors, but this will not happen today, or next year. Likewise, other engines of industry will continue to run for a long time. In the meantime, ought we not do what we can to address the climate change problem itself?

7. Holistic approaches should be kept in mind while creating incremental solutions.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, *Stanford Environmental Law Journal*, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis) Finally, holism is flawed because it tries to take the "big picture" into account without necessarily knowing how to frame the picture. Holism multiplies uncertainty. It requires large-scale guessing regarding both present conditions, causes for present conditions, and likely future conditions, with each guess clouded in uncertainties and information costs. Acting holistically makes sense if we know exactly where we are, why we are here, and where we are headed, but in an uncertainty-riddled context such as global climate change, n239 wholesale, holistic alterations radically amplify the risks of making mistakes. Of course, holism remains important; only a fool would not look at causes, contexts, and consequences for points of leverage in battling climate change. In some cases, however, holistic policy prescriptions actually lessen the opportunity for consensus-building and may magnify the uncertainties and information costs associated with environmental policy.

8. Even if the permutation contradicts deep ecology—it is the best solution.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

On the political-philosophical side, the question becomes a Rawlsian one: how to maintain "private" philosophical beliefs and yet also engage in "public" political discourse. n234 I suggest that, in this vein, geoengineering may be a type of "principled self-contradiction" for a deep environmentalist. Even setting aside the practical arguments just advanced - that it is unwise to bet the planet on changing people's deeply held practices - a deep environmentalist ought in principle to advocate policies that are based not on private philosophical ideas, potentially incommensurate with public discourse, but on the limited shared values of a Rawlsian liberalism. n235 Repairing the climate does not reflect deep environmental ideology as does preventive regulation - hence the Rawlsian "contradiction" - but it may be more in accord with values a deep environmentalist shares, in a liberal state, with a non-environmentalist. As such, it is the Rawlsian choice.

9. Lack of coalitions will doom holistic environmental solutions.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Clearly, this is an oversimplified example, but the point should be clear: holism is not always effective. Treating the Earth system's problem of climate change, while separately addressing deforestation, fossil fuel consumption, habitat loss, population growth, and so on, may well be the overall best strategy. Different coalitions may be assembled to reach a consensus on each individual issue where no one coalition could be assembled to tackle it all together. n238

10. Deep ecological approaches risk delaying measures to solve environmental problems.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

D. Summary What the deep environmentalist, holist, and political environmentalist all have in common is an agenda wider than climate change, and the Big Fix lets them down every time. Yet these factions cast a long shadow on the intellectual ambiance of contemporary environmentalism. n243 The desire to "take everything into account" is admirable. It is grounded in good science, respectable philosophy, and seasoned political savvy. Yet the practical, philosophical, and political motivations behind doing so often act at cross-purposes with the need to protect the Earth's climate from potentially devastating change.

#### E. LIFE IS THE PRE-EMINENT VALUE.

1. Existence precedes ontology: their metaphysical arguments are meaningless in the face of our arguments.

Paul Wapner, 2003 (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University. Leftist Criticism of. Accessed at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539>)

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

2. The role of the ballot is to maximize the lives saved.

David Cummins 1996 (professor of philosophy at Bates College, *Kantian Consequentialism*, pg. 145)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake for others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value ( GMM 436)., but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapter 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, the equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

3. Consequences should precede method.

Jeffrey Issac, 2002 (professor of political science at Indiana University, *Dissent*, Spring 2002, accessed via ebsco)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

4. The judge should evaluate consequentialist impacts.

Sissela Bok 1988 (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988)

The same argument can be made for Kant's other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: "So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means"; and "So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends." No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one's conscience would be, as Rawls said, "irrational, crazy." And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

5. Existence outweighs other impacts.

Michael Gelven 1994 (Prof. Phil. – Northern Illinois U., "War and Existence: A Philosophical Inquiry", p. 136-137)

One of the things that the authentic I can do, of course, is to concern itself with moral questions. Whether from a deontological sense of obligation or from a utilitarian projection of possible happiness, an I that considers these matters nevertheless is presupposed by them. Although authenticity and morality are distinct, a sense of who one is must precede a decision about how to act. Thus, the question of authenticity comes before the question of obligation. And since the worth of the I is generated from the prior worth of the we, it follows there can be no moral judgment that cancels out the worth of the I or the We. This is not to say that anything that benefits the we is therefore more important than what ought to be done. It is merely to say that any proper moral judgment will in fact be consistent with the integrity of the we. Thus, I would be morally prohibited from offending someone else merely for my own advantage, but no moral law would ever require me to forgo my existential integrity. This is true not only for moral questions but for any question of value whatsoever: all legitimate value claims must be consistent with the worth of the I and the We. It is only because my existence matters that I can care about such things as morality, aesthetics, or even happiness. Pleasure, of course, would still be preferable to pain, but to argue that one ought to have pleasure or even that it is good to have pleasure would simply reduce itself to a tautology: if I define pleasure as the satisfaction of my wants, then to say I want pleasure is tautological, for I am merely saying that I want what I want, which may be true but is not very illuminating. The existential worth of existing is therefore fundamental and cannot be outranked by any other consideration. Unless I am first meaningful, I cannot be good; unless I first care about who I am, I cannot genuinely care about anything else, even my conduct. To threaten this ground of all values, the worth of my own being, then becomes the supreme assault against me. To defend it and protect it is simply without peer. It is beyond human appeal or persuasion.

6. Ethics shouldn't be used in political decisionmaking.

Ben Minteer et al, 2004 (Ben, *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, 17: 131-156, ebsco)

In this paper, we have attempted to provide the outlines of a pragmatic contextualist alternative to principle-ism in environmental ethics. We believe that this project, drawn from the ethical theory of John Dewey and bolstered by our sociological study of public environmental ethics and wildlife management attitudes, offers a more empirically valid and productive method of inquiry that can link environmental ethics to the concrete problems of environmental practice. We recognize, however, that in calling for this contextualist and processual/experimental approach to moral argument in environmental ethics, we may be accused, especially by those with principle-ist leanings, of effectively changing the subject with respect to ethical theorizing in the field. For in the final analysis, what is environmental ethics if it is not primarily about the construction of general moral principles to guide specific environmental policy and management decisions? But we believe such a response simply begs the question of the range of methodological options available to practical ethicists. It assumes that the enterprise of moral inquiry must be preoccupied with the identification of fixed principles, rules, and standards, and that, once these concepts and claims are secured, those specific environmental decisions and actions will flow logically from them. Instead, we argue for another approach within the ethical tradition – one rooted in a pragmatic moral methodology – that we believe will render environmental ethics more useful in contributing to public deliberations and that we believe ultimately offers a more accurate reflection of real moral experience. Finally, while in this paper we have been fairly critical of what we see as the dominant methodological approach in environmental ethics, our criticisms should be understood in the correct manner, and in the proper spirit. Mainly, we should not be read as suggesting in this paper that an environmental ethics without principle is desirable, even if it were somehow possible. The contextual approach we are advocating here certainly does not entail the adoption of “principle nihilism” in environmental ethics, nor does it ignore the important work in substantive ethical theory conducted in the field over the past three decades. But we do believe that the field now needs to press beyond its traditionally dominant defenses of principle alone. This is especially true if environmental ethics seeks to understand the complex normative structure of concrete decision-making and policy deliberations, not to mention if it wishes to make meaningful and enduring contributions to these critical public processes.

F. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOLSTER LEFTIST SOCIAL POLITICS.

1. Embracing science and objective reason is critical to a progressive social politics—we can't combat AIDS or warming without it.

Alan Sokal, 1996 (Professor of Physics at New York University), “A PHYSICIST EXPERIMENTS WITH CULTURAL STUDIES” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9605/sokal.html>  
POLITICALLY, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful--not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many "progressive" or "leftist" academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about "the social construction of reality" won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics, and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

2. Scientific reasoning bolsters democracy while checking authoritarianism.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” *Central European History*, vol. 37, no. 1, March)  
Second, I would argue that there is also a causal fit between cultures of expertise, or “scientism,” and democracy. Of course, “scientism” subverted the real, historical ideological underpinnings of authoritarian polities in Europe in the nineteenth century. It also in a sense replaced them. Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask “why”; and in a democratic system there is therefore a bias toward pragmatic, “objective” or naturalized answers— since values are often regarded as matters of opinion, with which any citizen has a right to differ. Scientific “fact” is democracy's substitute for revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority. The age of democracy is the age of professionalization, of technocracy; there is a deeper connection between the two, this is not merely a matter of historical coincidence.



3. Evidence, empiricism, and logic bolster a leftist political agenda—they cede these tools to the right wing.

Alan Sokal, 1996 (Professor of Physics at New York University), “A PHYSICIST EXPERIMENTS WITH CULTURAL STUDIES” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9605/sokal.html>

I say this not in glee but in sadness. After all, I'm a leftist too (under the Sandinista government I taught mathematics at the National University of Nicaragua). On nearly all practical political issues--including many concerning science and technology--I'm on the same side as the Social Text editors. But I'm a leftist (and a feminist) because of evidence and logic, not in spite of it. Why should the right wing be allowed to monopolize the intellectual high ground? And why should self-indulgent nonsense--whatever its professed political orientation--be lauded as the height of scholarly achievement?

G. ALTERNATIVES TO TECHNOLOGY WILL FAIL TO SOLVE EARTH'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS.

1. Technological progress is necessary to save the environment—radical environmentalism will fail.

Frank B. Cross, 2002 (Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Winter, 2002, 53 Case W. Res. 477; Lexis)

An equally critical question is: When we discover a serious environmental problem, what should we do about it? The essence of Lomborg's book is the claim that radical action is not required to deal with environmental problems, that the growth of the economy and technology will itself help to address the problems, with some supplementary government regulation. In the past, the doomsayers have called for a variety of radical responses, such as zero or negative population growth, a halt to economic development or even de-development, and the prohibition of various technological advances, such as genetic modification. While such proposals may have declined in number, they are still heard today. n93 This is the more severe flaw in the environmental movement. They have identified real problems in the past, even as they exaggerated them. Pollution was a serious problem in the twentieth century. But the radical solutions were unnecessary to solve the pollution problem; in fact, they probably would have exacerbated pollution. The world does face a number of serious environmental problems in the developing world. The more developed nations, affluent, with well-developed technology, have gone far toward curing their internal environmental problems. This observation would suggest that the answer to our greatest problems lies not in stopping [\*492] growth or new technologies, but advancing them. A plenitude of evidence supports that suggestion.

2. The alternative is too radical: Radical environmentalism will not be embraced by the majority of the population.

Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, 2007 (JD, Boston College Law School, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Fall/Winter, 2007, Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

The federal government's inaction regarding climate change, ostensibly based in a belief that more environmentally protective policies would adversely affect the nation's economy, is reflected at the individual level. n28 While many people are willing to engage in limited actions to reduce their environmental "footprint," few are willing or able to drastically restructure their daily affairs to protect the environment. n29 Recently, such strategies as carbon offsets--a market-based approach that allows individuals to "pay to have their greenhouse gas emissions . . . cancelled out by a corresponding emissions reduction elsewhere"--have enabled individuals to limit their own contribution to environmental devastation while only mildly altering their lifestyle. n30

3. The alternative is too time-consuming and likely to fail—interim steps like the plan are the best we can hope for.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis) Perhaps, if regulation is unlikely to succeed in any serious way given the current institutional, economic, and social contexts, we might try to change the deep, underlying causes of climate change--a market economy driven by growth in goods and populations, and the productive capability to meet consumer demand. n119 Although most of the discussion of this point will be deferred to part V, it should be clear that such changes are very costly and contentious ones. To say there is a lack of agreement on whether (and how) to remake the world's economic and social structure is surely an understatement. Of course, progress can take place [\*103] through evolution rather than revolution, and the role of environmental education, in both shallow and deep modes, should not be minimized. n120 Indeed, it is probably the case that - given the variety of environmental and other issues facing the world - some form of "deep reorientation," however gradual, will eventually be necessary, absent radically new technologies to overcome our current concerns. Unfortunately, in the meantime, several billion people remain committed to consumption-based lifestyles and modes of self-definition. Changing deep structures is likely to be a difficult, time consuming, and potentially divisive process that, while it would alter the fundamental assumptions of present cost-benefit curves and consequently yield some kind of "efficient" result, hardly seems like the policy recommendation for a more urgent problem such as global climate change. Again, though a more thorough treatment of this issue must be postponed to the end of this Article, it is clear for present purposes that a "deep structural" approach would be at least as difficult to achieve and as "costly" as ordinary climate change regulation.

4. Consumption habits are deeply entrenched—the alternative will fail.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis) Moreover, an environmentalist's distaste for the materialistic ideals that undergird the root causes of climate change does not make attempting to thwart those ideals either practical or morally [\*133] justified. Conspicuous consumption is deeply entrenched in American self-conceptions, and in conceptions of Americans by people in the developing world who want to be like them. n231

5. Deep environmentalism can't overcome ideas deeply ingrained in Western culture.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis) I suggest it is both unwise and counter-democratic to tell billions of consumers that "We Know Better," and set about changing deep structures without regard to the life-defining goals of the consumers themselves. Such action is unwise because it pins the biosphere's integrity on the hope of overcoming something deeply ingrained in Western culture. And it is counter-democratic because, until the members of that culture change its constitutive forces, overcoming them in the name of a paternalistic deep environmentalism thwarts their clearly expressed preferences. n232

6. We must have advanced industry and technology to support Earth's current population.

William Reville, (Prof., Biochemistry, UCC), IRISH TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, 17.

Quoting Princeton physicist, Freeman Dyson: People who view industrialization as a source of the earth's troubles, its pollution, and the desecration of its surface, can only advocate that we give it up. This is something that we can't do; we have the tiger by the tail. We have 4.5 billion people on earth. We can't support that many unless we're industrialized and technologically advanced. So, the idea is not to get rid of industrialization but to move it somewhere else.

7. Solutions to the energy crisis require advanced technologies:

Martin W. Lewis, 1995 (Green Delusions, assistant professor in the school of the environment @ Duke, pg. 139-140)

The solution to the energy bind lies, as most members of the environmental community realize, in a combination of solar power and conservation. What eco-radicals fail to recognize, however, is that both effective conservation and the commercialization of solar energy demand highly sophisticated technologies. The modern frontiers of energy conservation may be found in such areas as low emissivity windows, energy-sparing fluorescent light bulbs, and computer-integrated sensor systems (Fickett et al, 1990; Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990). Due to a wide variety of such advances, the energy intensity of American industry in fact declined at a rate of 1.5-2 percent per year between 1971 and 1986, allowing industrial production to increase substantially while energy consumption actually fell (Ross and Steinmeyer 1990).

8. Alternative energy sources can go a long way to controlling climate change.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Of course, deep ecologists may not be completely right: some consumption-friendly steps, such as zero-emission vehicles or alternative energy sources, may go a long way toward controlling climate change without requiring intrusive regulation or geoengineering marvels. n82 Even these policies, however, necessitate substitutions for environmentally favored goods that have not been at all popular in recent years. n83 Any policy which requires us to change our attitudes must consider whether the cost of doing so is prohibitive.

9. Deep environmentalism blinds adherents to practical solutions to environmental problems.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, "Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project" Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

To paraphrase a famous film subtitle, it is time for environmentalists to learn to stop worrying and love the Big Fix. In the following discussion, I identify three environmental constituencies that are likely to be offended by geoengineering: "deep" environmentalists, holists, and "political" environmentalists. Each of these tendencies within contemporary environmental thinking has merit, but - I argue - each can also blind its adherents to real solutions outside their paradigm. [\*132]

10. Ecologically benign power sources require significant technological advances.

Martin W. Lewis, 1995 (Green Delusions, assistant professor in the school of the environment @ Duke, pg. 140)

When it comes to harnessing solar power, technological achievements are even more vital. Admittedly, several important solar applications demand little technical sophistication. Simply by placing windows properly a significant power savings can be realized. But in order to do something slightly more complicated—such as heat water—certain high-tech applications are essential. The simplest passive solar water heating systems usually rely on components made of plastic, a substance many eco-radicals would like to ban. But to address our needs for an ecologically benign power source, solar-generated electricity must be commercialized on a massive scale. No matter how this is done, significant technological advances will be necessary.

H. THE TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH WILL NOT LEAD TO HUMAN EXTINCTION.

1. We'll never run out of resources—technology allows us to create substitute resources to fulfill basic needs.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

If the family starts with a given plot of land and an additional child is born, it would seem as if the result would be less land per child to be inherited. But the family can increase its "effective" land by irrigation and multiple cropping and even hydroponics, and some families respond by opening up whole new tracts of previously uncultivated land. Hence an additional child need not increase the scarcity of land and other natural resources, as appears to be inevitable when one looks at the earth as a closed resource system; instead, there is an increase in total resources. But, you ask, how long can this go on? Surely not forever? In fact there is no logical or physical reason why the process cannot indeed go on forever. Let's return to copper as an example. Given substitute materials, development of improved methods of extraction, and discoveries of new lodes in the U.S. and in other countries and in the sea and perhaps on other planets, there is no logical reason why additional people should not increase the availability of copper or copper equivalents indefinitely. To make the logical case more binding, the possibility of recycling copper at a faster rate due to population growth also improves the supply of the services we now get from it. To illustrate, consider a copper jug that one rubs to obtain the services of a genie. If only the single jug exists, and there are two families at opposite ends of the earth, each of them can obtain the genie very infrequently. But if the earth is populated densely, the jug can be passed rapidly from hand to hand, and all families might then have a chance to obtain the recycled jug and its genie more often than with a less dense population. So it could be with copper pots, or whatever. The apparent reason that this process cannot continue - the seeming finitude of copper in the solid earth - is invalid, as we have seen in chapter 3.

2. Resources aren't finite—the concept of spaceship Earth is flawed.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

Of course, it is logically possible that the cost of the services we get now from copper and other minerals will be relatively higher in the future than now if there are more people in the future. But all past history suggests that the better guess is that cost and price will fall, just as scarcity historically has diminished along with the increase in population. Either way, however, the concept of mineral resources as "finite" is unnecessary, confusing, and misleading. And the notion of our planet as "spaceship earth," launched with a countable amount of each resource and hence having less minerals per passenger as the number of passengers is greater, is dramatic but irrelevant.

3. Human history disproves their argument—substitution and innovation solves resource scarcity.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

Chapters 1-11 showed that all natural resources - minerals, food, and energy - have become less rather than more scarce throughout human history. But it is counter-intuitive, against all common sense, for more people to result in more rather than less natural resources. So here is the theory again: More people, and increased income, cause problems of increased scarcity of resources in the short run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity, and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail, at cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the long run the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen. That is, prices end up lower than before the increased scarcity occurred.

4. Innovation and technology will solve resource scarcity:

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

The outcome will depend on the net effect of increased demand on the current supplies of energy as of a given moment, together with increases in potential supplies through discoveries and technological advances that will be induced by the increase in demand. In the past, increased demand for energy has been associated with reduced scarcity and cost. There is no statistical reason to doubt the continuation of this trend. More particularly, there seems to be no reason to believe that we are now at a turning point in energy history, and no such turning point is visible in the future. This implies a trend toward lower energy prices and increased supplies.

5. We'll never run out of energy—multiple different technological solutions solve energy supply shortages:

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

It is important to recognize that in the context of population policy, who is "right" about the present state of energy supplies really does not matter. Yes, we will care in the years 2000 and 2010 whether there will be large or small supplies of oil and gas and coal at prices relatively high or low compared to now, and even more so if government intervention in the market worsens the situation (as it usually does) and forces us to wait in line at the service station. And it matters to the State Department and the Department of Defense whether our national policies about energy pricing and development lead to large or small proportions of our energy supply being imported from abroad. But from the standpoint of our national standard of living it will matter very little even if energy prices are at the highest end of the range of possibilities as a result of relatively unfruitful technological progress and of maximum increases in demand due to maximum rises in GNP and population. At a very unlikely high price of energy equivalent to, say, \$50 per barrel of oil (1992 dollars) there should be enough energy from coal, shale oil, solar power, natural gas, and fossil oil plus oil from biomass - buttressed by the virtually inexhaustible supply of nuclear power - to last so many hundreds or thousands of years into the future, or millions if we include nuclear energy, that it simply does not matter enough to estimate how many hundreds or millions of years. And even if energy would sell at such a most-unlikely high price, rather than the actual 1993 oil price of (say) \$15 per barrel, the difference in our standard of living would hardly be noticeable.

6. Resource supply shortages will be solved by new technologies.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

But population growth does not constitute a Ponzi scheme: there is no reason to expect resources to run out. Instead, as Part I of this book demonstrates (on the basis of the history of long-run price declines in all natural resources, plus theory that fits the data), resources may be expected to become more available rather than more scarce. Hence there is no reason to think that consumption in the present is at the expense of future consumers, or that more consumers now imply less for consumers in the future. Rather, it is reasonable to expect that more consumption now implies more resources in the future because of induced discoveries of new ways to supply resources, which eventually leave resources cheaper and more available than if there were less pressure on resources in the present.

7. Notions of finite resources are false.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

There is no persuasive reason to believe that the relatively larger use of natural resources that would occur with a larger population would have any special deleterious effects upon the economy in the future. For the foreseeable future, even if the extrapolation of past trends is badly in error, the cost of energy is not an important consideration in evaluating the impact of population growth. Other natural resources may be treated in a manner just like any other physical capital when considering the economic effect of different rates of population growth. Depletion of mineral resources is not a special danger for the long run or the short run. Rather, the availability of mineral resources, as measured by their prices, may be expected to increase - that is, costs may be expected to decrease - despite all notions about "finiteness."

8. No risk of running out of resources—five reasons.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

You might wonder: Even if the prospect of running out of energy and minerals is small, is it safe to depend on the continuation of technical progress? Can we be sure that technological progress will continue to forestall growing scarcity and even increase the availability of natural resources? Would it not be prudent to avoid even a small possibility of a major scarcity disaster? Would it not be less risky to curb population growth to avoid the mere possibility of natural-resource scarcities even if the chances really are good that higher population will lead to lower costs? A reasonable person may be "risk averse." The matter of risk aversion was considered at length in the discussion of nuclear energy in chapter 13; it will also be considered in the context of population and pollution in chapter 30, where risk is more crucial to the argument and to policy decisions. The reader interested in this topic should turn to those discussions. Risk aversion is not, however, very relevant for natural resources, for several reasons. First, the consequences of a growing shortage of any mineral - that is, of a rise in relative price - are not dangerous to life or even to the standard of living, as noted above with respect to energy. Second, a relative scarcity of one material engenders the substitution of other materials - say, aluminum for steel - and hence mitigates the scarcity. Third, a scarcity of any mineral would manifest itself only very slowly, giving plenty of opportunity to alter social and economic policies appropriately. Fourth, just as greater affluence and larger population contribute to the demand for more natural resources, they also contribute to our capacity to alleviate shortages and broaden our technological and economic capacity, which makes any particular material ever less crucial. Fifth and perhaps most important, we already have technology in hand - nuclear fission - to supply our energy needs at constant or declining cost forever.

9. Empirically, technology solves resource shortages.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

Some ask: can we know that there will be discoveries of new materials and of productivity-enhancing techniques in the future? Behind the question lies the implicit belief that the production of new technology does not follow predictable patterns of the same sort as the patterns of production of other products such as cheese and opera. But there seems to me no warrant for belief in such a difference, either in logic or in empirical experience. When we add more capital and labor, we get more cheese; we have no logical assurance of this, but such has been our experience, and therefore we are prepared to rely upon it. The same is true concerning knowledge about how to increase the yield of grain, cows, milk and cheese from given amounts of capital and labor. If you pay engineers to find ways to solve a general enough problem - for example, how to milk cows faster, or with less labor - the engineers predictably will do so. There may well be diminishing returns to additional inventive effort spent on the same problem, just as there are diminishing returns to the use of fertilizer and labor on a given farm in a given year. But as entirely new forms of technology arise and are brought to bear on the old problems, the old diminishing-returns functions then no longer apply.

10. Technology will continue to create new resources.

Julian Simon, 1998 (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, "POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS." Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate\\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ultimate_Resource/TCHAR28.txt))

This point of view is not limited to economists. A technologist writing on minerals put it this way: "In effect, technology keeps creating new resources." The major constraint upon the human capacity to enjoy unlimited minerals, energy, and other raw materials at acceptable prices is knowledge. And the source of knowledge is the human mind. Ultimately, then, the key constraint is human imagination acting together with educated skills. This is why an increase of human beings, along with causing an additional consumption of resources, constitutes a crucial addition to the stock of natural resources.

I. THE HARMS THE AFFIRMATIVE IDENTIFIES ARE TRUE—THE WORLD IS NOT MERELY FULL OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS.

Alan Sokal, 1996 (Professor of Physics at New York University), "A PHYSICIST EXPERIMENTS WITH CULTURAL STUDIES" Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9605/sokal.html>

In short, my concern about the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths.

J. LEGAL SOLUTIONS CAN BOLSTER ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.

1. The permutation which combines environmental law and representations is the most powerful way to change societal attitudes toward the environment.

Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, *Washington & Lee Law Review*, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

But political stories can be double-edged swords. They surely can capture the imagination of the political community and build support for policy changes. But their power does not end with passage of the laws that solidify those changes. In order to be politically effective, stories must be widely distributed and often repeated. Those that appeal to the public are readily absorbed into the collective subconscious, framing assumptions that are then accepted without further principled justification. n204 Those stories inevitably shape future attitudes and behavior. n205 Adoption of law that rests on and expresses those stories magnifies their power to mold cultural attitudes because the law itself plays an important role in defining the community and [\*45] its core assumptions. n206 The law, like our most fundamental societal stories, reminds us not only of what we are, but of what we aspire to be. n207 Stories that become embedded in law are thus powerful forces in shaping society and social attitudes. They can point us toward the future, or chain us to the past.

2. Governmental measures are superior to radical environmentalism at protecting the environment.

Frank B. Cross, 2002 (Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin, *Case Western Reserve Law Review*, Winter, 2002, 53 *Case W. Res.* 477; Lexis)

This democratic political action for the environment does not take the form of the highly dramatic anti-growth proposals of the jeremiahs, however. Even conservatives agree that the effective operation of the Kuznets curve requires government action. n114 [\*495] However, they argue that the proper policies would take the form of the elimination of government subsidies, creation of more secure property rights, and market-based controls, rather than regulation. n115 Others may reasonably argue that more traditional forms of command-and-control regulation have been most effective in controlling pollution while the economy grew. If environmental progress is to be made, the focus must be on the sorts of government measures that best facilitate the incentives associated with the Kuznets curve and environmental protection during economic growth. The jeremiahs are a distraction, at best. And those who attacked Lomborg did not advance this necessary analysis.

## K. ECOLOGICAL CRISIS RHETORIC IS GOOD

## 1. Ecological crisis rhetoric mobilizes action—the history of endangered species legislation proves.

Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

George Perkins Marsh suggested in his 1864 book that unbridled human exploitation of nature could threaten human survival. n45 After lying dormant for nearly a century, that suggestion surfaced at the dawn of the modern era in a powerful new form I call the ecological horror story. Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, a book credited with inspiring the modern environmental movement, contains the prototypical example of this story. Carson began her book with a chapter called "A Fable for Tomorrow." n46 In her fable, tragedy struck a bucolic village that was once alive with flowers, crops, wildlife, songbirds, and fish. People sickened, livestock died, flowers withered, and streams became lifeless. The disappearance of the songbirds gave spring a [\*20] strange stillness. By the end of the brief fable, overuse of chemical pesticides had transformed the village into a biotic wasteland. n47 Nearly twenty years later, Paul and Anne Ehrlich conveyed their version of this story through another brief tale. They put the reader in the position of a horrified airline passenger watching a worker pry rivets out of the plane's wings. n48 They characterized species as the rivets holding together the earth, a plane on which we are all passengers. Removing too many species, or perhaps just a single critical one, could disable the plane, precipitating an ecological catastrophe. n49 Environmentalists repeated the ecological horror story in various forms through the 1960s and 1970s. n50 Growing recognition of both the power of human technology, brought home by nuclear weapons programs, and the fragility of the earth, brought home by photographs of the earth from space, encouraged apocalyptic visions of the potential for human destruction of the biotic world. n51 This story contributed to the passage of early federal endangered species legislation. In 1966, when the Endangered Species Preservation Act n52 was under consideration, the *New York Times* editorialized that "[i]f man refuses to follow wise conservation practices in controlling his economic affairs, the ultimate victim may be not natural beauty or birds and fish but man himself." n53 In a 1968 report, Secretary of the Interior Udall characterized extinction as a sign of dangerously declining environmental health. Extinction, he wrote, was not important because of the anguish of the conservationists, but because bluebirds, Indian paintbrush, cardinals, and grizzly bears should be present - because there is something wrong with an environment in which bluebirds cannot live but where rat populations flourish. An environment [\*21] that threatens these wild creatures is symptomatic of an environment which is going downhill - and taking man with it. n54 Witnesses who testified in favor of the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, n55 which extended the reach of the Endangered Species Preservation Act, emphasized the ecological horror story. n56 Some legislators explicitly indicated that they found this story a compelling justification for the legislation. n57 In its formal report on the bill, the Senate Committee on Commerce did not directly endorse this apocalyptic approach, but did focus on the importance of nature as material resource. Explaining why species should be protected, the Committee noted that even species without known commercial value might in the future "prove invaluable to mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or environmental contaminants." n58 In 1973, the ecological horror story encouraged Congress to pass the Endangered Species Act. n59 Legislators and witnesses warned against disrupting the balance of nature; many speculated that human survival was at risk. n60 [\*22] They also emphasized the potential economic costs of extinctions, even short of ecological collapse. The House Report noted that as species disappeared, so did potential cures for cancer. n61 "Sheer self interest," it argued, compelled caution. n62 Several legislators sounded the same theme. n63 The ecological horror story remains a favorite theme of environmentalists today. n64 In particular, advocates of biodiversity protection commonly emphasize the possibility that *Homo sapiens* will fall victim to the current wave of extinctions, though few rely entirely on that argument. n65 The story also retains [\*23] political currency as a justification for endangered species protection. A few years ago, for example, Interior Secretary Babbitt told Congress, "[t]he Endangered Species is a warning light. When one species in an ecosystem's web of life starts to die out, all species may be in peril." n66



2. Aesthetic arguments in favor of nature carry less political weight than pragmatic ones:

Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, *Washington & Lee Law Review*, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

Nonetheless, many others during this era were less willing to rest their political arguments for preservation on esthetic grounds. According to historian Bob Pepperman Taylor, even Gifford Pinchot was sensitive to the esthetic pull of nature but thought material arguments would carry more political weight. n88 Bird lovers who believed sincerely that song and plumage birds should be protected for their beauty alone felt compelled to find economic arguments for regulation of market hunting. n89

3. Aesthetic arguments on behalf of nature are politically weak and won't justify protection of nature.

Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, *Washington & Lee Law Review*, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

Because it limited potential parks to a small number of places, most not suitable for agricultural use, and allowed extensive economic development of those sites provided the scenery was preserved, n97 this esthetic made it relatively easy to gain political support. But the limitations of this esthetic argument quickly became apparent. In the debate over conversion of the Hetch Hetchy Valley, within the boundaries of Yosemite National Park, to a reservoir for San Francisco, John Muir described the valley's beauty as second only to that of Yosemite Valley itself. n98 Reservoir proponents answered that [\*28] Hetch Hetchy, although lovely, was not unique. They also asserted that the reservoir project would improve an ordinary meadow by turning it into a beautiful lake. n99 With those arguments buttressing the materialist claim that the valley should serve San Francisco's material needs, Hetch Hetchy disappeared under water.

4. Moves away from aesthetic rhetoric in protection of the environment yields better political results.

Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, *Washington & Lee Law Review*, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

Stung by the loss of Hetch Hetchy, park advocates campaigned for the creation of a government agency dedicated specifically to park management. In 1916 they achieved that goal, in part by converting their esthetic argument into an economic one. Park proponents asserted that the parks would improve the economy directly, by attracting tourists who would otherwise spend their vacations overseas, and indirectly, by providing healthy recreation that would improve worker productivity. n100 Indeed, park advocates were at some pains to explain that their goal was economic prosperity rather than esthetic pleasure. J. Horace McFarland, a leading advocate for parks, characterized the parks idea to Congress as "the idea of service and efficiency, and not an idea of pleasure and ornamentation at all." n101 This tactical change brought results. The House Committee on Public Lands, recommending passage of the bill creating the National Park Service, explained: "The growing appreciation of the national assets found in the national parks and monuments is evidenced by the vast increase of visitors. The great trend toward the parks means retaining in this country the millions expended by our tourists in foreign travel previously spent abroad." n102 This economic value depended upon the esthetic attractions of the parks. Accordingly, Congress directed the new National Park Service to protect those attractions, managing the parks so as to conserve their scenery, natural and historic objects, and wildlife unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. n103 Despite the materialist focus of the political debate, the House report [\*29] distinguished between the national parks, which were "set apart for the public enjoyment and entertainment," and for the "preservation of nature as it exist[ed]," and the national forests, which were "devoted strictly to utilitarian purposes." n104

5. Material arguments are superior to aesthetic arguments in mobilizing environmental protection.

Holly Doremus, 2000 (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, *Washington & Lee Law Review*, Winter 2000, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse." Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

During this era, the esthetic discourse also contributed to the passage of laws limiting market hunting. Sport hunting treated nature as an esthetic rather than a material resource. The experience of the hunt, rather than the prize, was primary. Sport hunters arguing for game regulation emphasized the character-building qualities of their chosen recreation, claiming it could imbue men of the industrial age with frontier virtues. n105 They found political allies among women newly attuned to nature appreciation. n106 But material arguments seemed to carry the day. n107

## HEGEMONIC IMPERIALISM KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. SPACE EXPLORATION CHECKS IMPERIALISM.

1. Space exploration unites Earth and leads to a reduction of military strife.

Heinz-Hermann Koelle, (Chair, International Academy of Astronautics Subcommittee on Lunar Development), *TURNING DUST TO GOLD: BUILDING A FUTURE ON THE MOON AND MARS*, 2010, 65.

Nearly 1,000 billion dollars are currently spent annually on defense matters. Space research and development is supported by national budgets on the order of about 50 billion dollars annually. This is certainly not enough to solve all the problems on Earth, i.e., that is not a realistic alternative. It must be recognized that development of space travel is an international endeavor, requiring less than one percent of defense expenditures. This enterprise will unite people on Earth and lead to a reduction of military strife on Earth and thus reduce defense expenditures accordingly.

2. Space exploration checks imperialism and decreases violent confrontations.

George Robinson, (Attorney, Commercial Space Law), *SPACE ENTERPRISE: LIVING AND WORKING OFFWORLD IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY*, 2009, 535. \*In the 21st century, human exploration of space, as well as human migration into and settlement of near and deep space, will offer an extraordinarily rare opportunity to sever the endless cycle in human history of economic and religious imperialism, colonialism, denial of basic human and humankind rights, and the subsequent violent confrontations that inevitably follow those practices.

3. Space exploration bolsters interconnectedness of people:

Michael Griffin, (Former NASA Administrator), *LEADERSHIP IN SPACE*, 2008, 187.

I'd like to start by recalling a congressional hearing with the late Physicist Robert Wilson, co-discoverer of the 3 degree kelvin microwave background radiation that is the remnant of the 14 billion year old Big Bang. When asked before a committee about what value a new particle accelerator would have in promoting the national security of our country, he responded: "Nothing at all. It only has to do with the respect with which we regard one another, the dignity of men, our love of culture. ... It has to do with are we good painters, good sculptors, great poets? I mean all the things we really venerate in our country and are patriotic about. ... It has nothing to do directly with defending our country except to make it worth defending."

4. Space exploration opens new windows of consciousness for people:

Charles Kennel, (Chair, Space Studies Board of the National Research Council), *AMERICA'S FUTURE IN SPACE: ALIGNING THE CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM*, 2009, 15. \*In the 21st century, civil space activities affect our daily lives and also advance the national interest in a variety of ways. Space systems play integral roles in government, business, and personal communications, positioning, and navigation; in weather monitoring and forecasting; in producing remote-sensing information for agriculture, urban land-use planning, and natural resources management; in commercial enterprises that are becoming increasingly significant factors in global economic competitiveness; and in opening new windows on humanity's place in the cosmos.

5. Overview effect causes people to understand the interconnectedness of all life on Earth:

Philip Harris, (Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics), *SPACE ENTERPRISE: LIVING AND WORKING OFFWORLD IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY*, 2009, 74. \*We make tremendous advances in science as a result of the exploration of space. While much of this knowledge is about outer space, it has a deeper, inner significance. After looking down on our planet from orbit, some astronauts have reported a deeper understanding of the interconnectedness of all life on Earth: it's one planet, one people!

### B. THE HARMS OF EXPANSION TO THE FRONTIERS WILL NOT BE REPLICATED IN SPACE.

1. Turn: Failure to find a new frontier to explore causes war:

Ralph Nansen, (Former Program Manager, Boeing Solar Power Satellite Program), *ENERGY CRISIS: SOLUTION FROM SPACE*, 2009, 143.

As we look back in history, we find that humanity is always searching for a new frontier to explore and develop. If we do not find one, we become restless and try to take one from our neighbor, which often results in war.

2. Space defies historical analogies with regard to the dangers of expansion.

John Hickman, (Prof., Political Science, Berry College), REOPENING THE SPACE FRONTIER, 2010, 185. Few of the problems caused by the opening of terrestrial frontiers are likely with the reopening of the space frontier. From the extinction of all of the several species of Moa at the hands of the Maori in the twelfth century to the burning of the Mayan texts by the Spanish in the early sixteenth century to the killing of millions in the Congo Delta by Leopold II's Congo Free State Force Publique in the late nineteenth century, expansion across frontiers of Earth all too frequently has been accompanied by the immense destruction of fauna, culture and people. What distinguishes the space frontier is that it is empty of complex life forms, sentient or otherwise. The Moon appears to be entirely barren of life, the asteroids even more likely so, and if Mars harbors any life it is microbial, rare and deeply buried.

3. Lack of sentient life in space denies harms of space imperialism.

John Hickman, (Prof., Political Science, Berry College), REOPENING THE SPACE FRONTIER, 2010, 186. The apparent absence of complex life or sentient life elsewhere in our solar system means that the worst of the horrors associated with frontier expansion on Earth would be impossible to repeat in space. There are no native societies to plunder. If natural habitats exist that might be threatened by development and settlement, then they would deserve vigorous protection but at this point there is no evidence even of microbial extraterrestrial life.

C. SPACE EXPLORATION LEADS TO BENIGN US LEADERSHIP.

1. Space exploration leads to innovation and growth based leadership.

Charles Kennel, (Chair, Space Studies Board of the National Research Council), AMERICA'S FUTURE IN SPACE: ALIGNING THE CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM, 2009, 12.

Basic scientific research in space will plant the seeds of another generation of knowledge-based growth. Incubating new technologies for space activities, demonstrating their utility, and disseminating them broadly, will help spur the innovation and economic growth on which U.S. leadership must now be based.

2. U.S. leadership is superior to other alternatives to solve nuclear conflict.

Zalmay Khalilzad, former US ambassador to Afghanistan, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

D. SPACE EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES DISCRIMINATION.

Marc Cohen, (Space Architect), TURNING DUST TO GOLD: BUILDING A FUTURE ON THE MOON AND MARS, 2010, 94.

Usually, the "Earth-firsters," the people who raise the "first fix the problems here on Earth" banner, are coming from the perspective of social and economic justice for up to now disenfranchised and disempowered communities. I understand that worldview deeply because, like my grandparents and parents, I have long been involved in progressive causes. My answer to them is that I believe there is less discrimination in employment in aerospace and all the closely allied high technology areas than in most other economic sectors. The reason is that, in this design and engineering work environment, more objective criteria exist to evaluate the quality and forward-leading character of an individual's work than in many other economic sectors subjective criteria dominate, such as superficial appearances, who is in the "old boys' club," and how well someone can exchange the correct social cues. Basically, a component, a subsystem, or a system either works according to the requirements or it does not, and it is eminently feasible to evaluate an employee on the relevant objective criteria.

## BIOWEAPON/SURVEILLANCE KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. SURVEILLANCE OF THE EARTH FROM SPACE IS NECESSARY TO SOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS.

1. Surveillance of the Earth from space is necessary to solve global warming.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 19-20.

Today the exploration of space, plus space science and applications, has spread to a dizzying array of activities. Whilst we now know that our space systems are imperiled by magnetic storms, we use space as a vantage point for making key observations to understand more about environmental issues such as global warming or the holes in the protective ozone layer. We now use space for astronomy, telecommunications and broadcasting, navigation and surveying, education and medical training, new developments in materials, and a growing array of business services. Technology transfer from space generates new applications in sports, medical care, ground transportation, urban planning and construction.

2. Global warming threatens all life on the planet.

Edward Goldsmith and Caspar Henderson, 2003 (founder and publisher of *The Ecologist*, & a journalist and consultant specializing in environment, security, and development, *Is global warming a threat?* Mary E. Williams, book editor.; Greenhaven Press: San Diego, Ca; pg 69-70)

Industrialists who still insist on opposing and preventing any action from being taken, on the grounds that it would cost too much, should enter the real world and wake up to the fact that the costs inflicted upon them through inaction will be enormous. If greenhouse gas emissions are allowed to continue to rise and global warming run its course, we will be facing by far and away the greatest catastrophe that our species has ever faced. Whatever may happen to the economy, what is absolutely certain is that we cannot live without a relatively stable climate and in particular one to which we and all the other forms of life with which we share this planet have been adapted by their co-evolution. To continue, therefore, to destabilise climate in order to satisfy what are referred to as economic requirements (but which in effect are those particular economic requirements needed to satisfy the immediate interests of the large transnational corporations that have come to dominate the economy), is at once an absurdity and a crime. Those who control these corporations, the governments, and the public at large, must recreate an economy that can function satisfactorily without disrupting our climate and indeed without continuing to pillage the natural world on whose integrity a stable climate ultimately depends.

3. Surveillance of the Earth from space is necessary to solve ozone depletion.

Roger Maurice-Bonnet, (Director, International Space Science Institute), *SURVIVING 1,000 CENTURIES*, 2008, 315.

In the past decades, the use of space has given us unprecedented views of the oceans, of the continents and of the poles across all geopolitical or national barriers. With them, we have been able to observe the degradation and recovery of the ozone layer since the 1970s and to separate the respective importance of anthropogenic and natural degradations. With satellites, we dispose of the most complete and most precise spectrum of information on the short- and long-term evolution of the Earth. It is now impossible for any nation to hide either the effects of these hazards or the way they cope with them to limit their consequences on the global environment and for avoiding their recurrence.

4. A healthy ozone layer is crucial for survival.

Life Science, 2011. "Elite Clean Energy, Two Ozone Layers?" April 13, 2011. Accessed April 13, 2011 at <http://globalwarmingwars.net/elite-clean-energy-two-ozone-layers.html>.

The Ozone layer in the stratosphere is very crucial to survival. It absorbs ultraviolet radiation, and allows for survival. Ultraviolet radiation is linked with skin cancer, premature skin aging, and cataracts. It is also known to hurt crops, and kill modest organisms such as plankton. As a matter of fact, in the 1970s scientist claimed that this ozone layer was becoming depleted. Scientist believed that the ozone layer was becoming destroyed by chlorofluorocarbons. A compound that was utilised in air conditioners, solvents and aerosol spray bottles.

B. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION—ENDORISING BOTH STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE CREATES SPACE FOR ACTIVIST POLITICS.

Sankaran Krishna, 1993 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa, *Alternatives*, Summer, p. 400-401)

Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy' choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is compromised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling- reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialism in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

C. BIOPOWER WILL NOT TRIGGER EXTINCTION--ELITES AND NON-ELITES NEED EACH OTHER.

Zygmunt Bauman, 2001 (Emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of Leeds, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*, pg. 33-34)

The era of great transformation was, to put it in a nutshell, an era of engagement. The ruled were dependent upon the rulers, but the rulers no less depended on the ruled. For better or worse, the two sides were tied to each other and neither could easily opt out of the wedlock—however cumbersome and repulsive it might feel. Divorce was not a realistic option for either side. When in a flash of inspiration Henry Ford made his historic decision to double his workers' wages, what he was after was a double bind which would tie them to his factories more strongly and more securely than the mere need of livelihood, which could be met by other employers as well. Ford's power and wealth were no more extensive and no more solid than his immense factories, heavy machines and massive labour force; he could not afford to lose either. It took some time before both sides, by many trials and more errors still, learned that truth. But once the truth had been learned, the inconvenience and the high and rising cost of panoptical power (and more generally, of domination-through-engagement) became apparent. A marriage where both sides know that it has been tied together for a long time to come, and neither of the partners is free to take it apart, is by necessity a site of perpetual conflict. The chances that the partners will be of the same mind on all matters that may arise in the unforeseeable future are as small as the probability that one of the partners will in all matters give way to the will of the other, making no attempt to win a better deal. And so there will be numerous confrontations, head-on battles and guerrilla sallies. Only in extreme cases, though, are the war actions likely to lead to the ultimate attrition of one or both partners: an awareness that such attrition can happen and the wish that it preferably should not will in all probability be enough to cut the 'schismogenetic chain' just before the ultimate happens ('since we are bound to stay together whatever happens, let's rather try to make our togetherness liveable'). So alongside the internecine war there will also be long periods of truce, and between them bouts of bargaining and negotiation. And there will be renewed attempts to compromise on a shared set of rules acceptable to all.

D. DEMOCRATIC REGIMES WILL CHECK THE IMPACT OF BIOPOWER.

1. It isn't power but how you use it—democratic societies won't use biopower in a malignant fashion.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March, pg. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault's ideas have "fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its 'microphysics.'"<sup>48</sup> The "broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus" on "technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science" was the focus of his interest.<sup>49</sup> But the "power-producing effects in Foucault's 'microphysical' sense" (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of "an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice" (Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.<sup>50</sup> The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the *völkisch* state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass "eugenic" abortion and murder of the "defective." Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

2. Democracies check the impact of biopolitics.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economic population management to mass murder.

## 3. Democratic regimes check the impact of biopolitics.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can—and historically does—create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.<sup>90</sup>

## E. BIOWATER WON'T CAUSE GENOCIDE.

## 1. Biopolitics isn't the root cause of genocide.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

And yet, it is clear that anti-Semitism and eugenics did not imply, presuppose, or necessitate each other. The Nazi variant of biopolitical modernity was in fact quite idiosyncratic. It is very difficult to assess the place of explicitly ethnic racist thinking in the development of eugenics; but despite a resurgence of interest in the differing "character" and fate of ethnic groups after about 1927, on the whole ethnic racism appears to have become gradually less interesting to eugenicists from the late imperial period forward. The Nazis shifted the balance quite suddenly and forcibly in favor of ethnic racial thought after 1933. It may be that the growing influence of eugenics made National Socialist thinking more plausible for many people in the early 1930s; but it seems equally likely that the moderation of eugenics in the 1920s may have increased the appeal of the Social Democratic Party (as the strongest advocate, among the non-Nazi political parties, of eugenic policies) while actually discrediting the Nazis' more dated ideas.<sup>53</sup>

## 2. Nazi totalitarianism, not biopolitics, created genocide in Nazi Germany.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

How do we sort out the elements of continuity and discontinuity in this pattern? While debate will no doubt continue, there is now something approaching a plausible consensus on this question. The development of eugenic thought since the 1890s—or for that matter of Darwinian thought since the 1850s—was, as Geoff Eley put it in 1996, a "condition of possibility" for Nazi eugenic policy.<sup>44</sup> What made mass murder a reality, however, was not the inheritance of eugenic thinking, but the emergence of a "Massnahmenstaat" — a political system that operated by administrative fiat rather than by law. The massively radicalized sterilization policy adopted by the Nazis — which eventually effected some 400,000 persons— could only be implemented by a regime that had effectively silenced open discussion among eugenic experts and among the broader public; and the murder of some 70,000 in the Nazis' euthanasia program, and some tens of thousands in less organized fashion later, could only be implemented as a conspiracy by a regime that abhorred legality and silenced critique. This is a conclusion that was common already in the seminal works on eugenics in the 1980s, and was stated with particular vehemence by Hans-Walter Schmuhl in 1987; it is now virtually unchallenged.<sup>45</sup> Detlev Peukert pointed out in 1989 that the silencing of public dissent and the abrogation of legality were the key steps toward mass murder in the Third Reich; the "vital factor" leading to mass murder was "the character of the Nazi dictatorship." <sup>46</sup> Jochen-Christoph Kaiser, Kurt Nowak, and Michael Schwartz stated this view with particular clarity in 1992, arguing that: Without the context of the . . . growing erosion of the state of law in favor of the Massnahmenstaat, the National Socialist "euthanasia" could not have been implemented. Even then, it still required the state of emergency of the war and extensive, if not very effective secrecy to put it into motion. Whatever the long-term preconditions may have been, this specific "solution" to the problem, the "extermination of life unworthy of life," became possible only under the conditions of the "Third Reich."<sup>47</sup> In short, the development of the science of human heredity and the ambition of total social "renovation" (Fritzsche) made Nazi policies theoretically possible, made them imaginable. What made them real was the creation of a totalitarian dictatorship. To put it in few words: no dictatorship, no catastrophe.

3. Political factors outweigh biopolitics as the internal link to genocide.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

This, then, is the transformation created by the Nazis. Here too, just as in the literature on eugenics, it has become clear that it was not so much a rupture at the level of goals or biopolitical discourse, as a rupture at the level of strategy—of political principle, political organization, and political practice. The decisive differences are to be found not so much in biopolitical discourse as in issues of institutional structure, regime form, and citizenship.

4. Their impacts are empirically denied—the absence of mass murder and genocide in the modern world denies the link to biopolitics.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

What I want to suggest here is that the function of the rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding our conception of modernity seems to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of modern biopolitics has enabled new understandings of National Socialism; now we need to take care that our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment of modern biopolitics. Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not happening is just that: a place where something is not—yet—happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to exclusion, scientific study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination campaigns. Mass murder, in short, is the historical problem; the absence of mass murder is not a problem, it does not need to be investigated or explained.

5. Biopolitics doesn't lead to eugenics.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

By the onset of the Great Depression, then, eugenics advocates in Germany appear to have accomplished strikingly little in concrete terms. In fact, if we compare the successes of eugenicists in Germany with those of their counterparts in the United States or the United Kingdom, what is impressive is how vanishingly little practical influence eugenics had in Germany even at the end of the 1920s. As the above summary suggests and as subsequent events would show, at least among a limited number of ministerial bureaucrats and within key nongovernmental organizations eugenics had effectively established itself as a credible science and a credible basis for an alternative—or more accurately a supplementary—policy structure, should the existing biopolitical policy framework (public health, social insurance, social welfare) fail. That was an impressive and historically important achievement; but it hardly makes eugenics the keystone of the broader biopolitical discourse. In fact, it now seems evident that eugenics was still essentially a very small and somewhat isolated part of that discourse. While the institutional framework of social welfare, public health, and social insurance had been under construction for well over half a century by 1930, eugenics was still not really politikfähig—not really a viable basis for actual policies.

6. Biopolitics doesn't lead to eugenics—they have the history of Germany wrong.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

We may draw some brief conclusions from this story. First, there clearly was no especially convincing fit between eugenic ideas and totalitarian politics. Second, the Nazis adopted and supported one particular variety of eugenic thought. They were not driven by "the" logic of eugenics; rather, they pursued "a" logic of eugenics. Third, the Nazis imposed this particular variety of eugenics on a biopolitical "establishment"—a complex of institutions, disciplines, practices, and policies—that was not very excited about eugenics of any variety, much less the racist negative eugenics the Nazis favored.



## F. BIOPOLITICS WON'T LEAD TO FASCISM.

## 1. Biopolitics actually bolsters democracies.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible. Historically speaking, however, the further conjecture that this "micropolitical" dynamic creates authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very tenable. Historically, it appears that the greatest advocates of political democracy—in Germany leftliberals and Social Democrats—have been also the greatest advocates of every kind of biopolitical social engineering, from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning and, yes, even eugenics.<sup>102</sup> The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently) ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies; the production of scientific and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic pace. And yet, from the perspective of the first years of the millennium, the second half of the twentieth century appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen—including those who were stigmatized and persecuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an ever more restrictive "iron cage" of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there is no necessary correlation between rationalization and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in fact to be at least equally true.

## 2. Biopolitics isn't the root cause of totalitarianism—it can also be used to bolster progressive liberalism.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Like Fritzsche's essay, Eley's accurately reflected the tone of most of those it introduced. In the body of the volume, Elizabeth Domansky, for example, pointed out that biopolitics "did not 'automatically' or 'naturally' lead to the rise of National Socialism," but rather "provided . . . the political Right in Weimar with the opportunity to capitalize on a discursive strategy that could successfully compete with liberal and socialist strategies."<sup>63</sup> This is correct; but the language of biopolitics was demonstrably one on which liberals, socialists, and advocates of a democratic welfare state could also capitalize, and did. Or again, Jean Quataert remarked—quite rightly, I believe—that "the most progressive achievements of the Weimar welfare state were completely embedded" in biopolitical discourse. She also commented that Nazi policy was "continuous with what passed as the ruling knowledge of the time" and was a product of "an extreme form of technocratic reason" and "early twentieth-century modernity's dark side." The implication seems to be that "progressive" welfare policy was fundamentally "dark"; but it seems more accurate to conclude that biopolitics had a variety of potentials.<sup>64</sup>

3. Biopolitics is just as likely to lead to democracy as fascism.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March, pg. 1)

IN recent years the outlines of a new master narrative of modern German history have begun to emerge in a wide range of publications. This narrative draws heavily on the theoretical and historical works of Michel Foucault and Detlev J. K. Peukert, and on the earlier work of the Frankfurt School, Max Weber, and the French theorists of postmodernism. In it, rationalization and science, and specifically the extended discursive field of "biopolitics" (the whole complex of disciplines and practices addressing issues of health, reproduction, and welfare) play a key role as the marker and most important content of modernization. Increasingly, this model has a function in German historiography similar to that long virtually monopolized by the "Sonderweg thesis": it serves as a broad theoretical or interpretive framework that can guide the construction of meaning in "smaller" studies, which are legitimated by their function in concerning or countering this broader argument. This article seeks to critique this model in two ways. First, there is a strong tendency to see in the elaboration of biopolitical discourse in Germany a drift toward totalitarianism. I will argue that the more recent literature suggests that we need to expand our interpretive framework, placing biopolitics in modern Germany in the context of a history that "explains" not only 1933, 1939, 1942, or 1945, but also the democratic welfare states of the 1920s and 1960s. Second, I will argue that it is now increasingly evident that we need to understand "biopolitics" not only as a project of elites and experts, but as a complex social and cultural transformation, a discourse—a set of ideas and practices—that shaped not merely the machinations of social engineers, but patterns of social behavior much more broadly.

4. Biopower can also lead to democracy—other factors outweigh its influence.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In this system health, professional competence, or active citizenship were constructed as a set of "needs," and those needs as the origin of a set of "rights" to have them met. In the Weimar model, then, the rights of the individual, guaranteed formally by the constitution and substantively by the welfare system, were the central element of the dominant program for the management of social problems. Almost no one in this period advocated expanding social provision out of the goodness of their hearts. This was a strategy of social management, of social engineering. The mainstream of social reform in Germany believed that guaranteeing basic social rights—the substantive or positive freedom of all citizens—was the best way to turn people into power, prosperity, and profit. In that sense, the democratic welfare state was—and is—democratic not despite of its pursuit of biopower, but because of it.

5. Biopolitics does not lead to totalitarianism.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

6. Other factors outweigh biopolitics in the creation of oppression or liberation.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Uncoupling "technocracy" from "discourse" is not yet enough, however. We should also be alive to the ways in which new social practices, institutions, and knowledge generated new choices — a limited range of them, constrained by all kinds of discursive and social frameworks, but nonetheless historically new and significant. Modern biopolitics did create, in a real sense, not only new constraints but also new degrees of freedom— new levers that increased people's power to move their own worlds, to shape their own lives. Our understanding of modern biopolitics will be more realistic and more fruitful if we reconceptualize its development as a complex process in which the implications of those new choices were negotiated out in the social and discursive context. Again, in the early twentieth century many more conservative biopolitical "experts" devoted much of their energy precisely to trying— without any discernable success— to control those new degrees of freedom. For most social liberals and Social Democrats, however, those new choices were a potential source of greater social efficiency and social dynamism. State policy reflected the constant negotiation and tension between these perspectives.

7. Regime type determines the nature of biopolitics, not the inverse.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

We know that eugenics, public health, and welfare all appealed across the political, religious, and ideological spectrum, and around the world, in the early twentieth century. We know that strategies of biopolitical management that were in important ways fundamentally similar were adopted throughout the European world—in Sweden, Italy, France, England, the United States, even arguably in the Soviet Union— in this period, and in the German Empire, the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and the two postwar German states. "The social" as a discursive field is modern, it is not a peculiarity of any national history. National Socialist racial policy was an extreme case of a general phenomenon. These patterns pose a simple but important question: what was the relationship between biopolitics and regime form? One answer might be to argue— as Michael Schwartz and Peter Fritzsche have suggested— that regimes that arise for reasons having little to do with this aspect of modernity "choose" their biopolitics to suit their needs and principles. Victoria de Grazia, for example, has suggested that differing class coalitions determine regime forms, and that regime forms determine the "shape" of biopolitics.<sup>111</sup> This is obviously not the approach that has predominated in the literature on Germany, however, which has explored in great depth the positive contribution that modern biopolitics made to the construction of National Socialism. This approach may well exaggerate the importance of biopolitics; but, in purely heuristic terms, it has been extremely fruitful. I want to suggest that it might be equally fruitful to stand it on its head, so to speak. One could easily conclude from this literature that modern biopolitics "fits" primarily authoritarian, totalitarian, technocratic, or otherwise undemocratic regimes, and that democracy has prevailed in Europe in the teeth of the development of technocratic biopolitics. Again, however, the history of twentieth-century Germany, including the five decades after World War II, suggests that this is a fundamentally implausible idea. A more productive conclusion might be that we need to begin to work out the extent and nature of the positive contribution biopolitics has made to the construction also of democratic regimes.

D. THE KRITIK ALTERNATIVE WILL FAIL TO EFFECTIVELY CHALLENGE BIOPOWER.

1. Challenges to biopower will be ineffective.

Steven V. Hicks, 2003 (Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, Foucault and Heidegger: critical encounters, edited by Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg Pg. 102-103)

Hence, the only “ethico-political choice” we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is “the main danger” and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the “nexus” of opposing forces. “Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril.” But this ceaseless Foucauldian “recoil” from the ubiquitous power perils of “normalization” precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault’s distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the “twists” and “recoils” that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethico-political sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.

2. Foucault’s alternatives to biopower prevent positive solutions.

Steven V. Hicks, 2003 (Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, Foucault and Heidegger: critical encounters, edited by Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg Pg. 101-102)

At this juncture we should ask whether the lessons that Foucault would have us draw from Heidegger’s account of technology also hark back to another “incomplete” form of nihilism that Nietzsche equally feared: the “nihilism of negativity.” Certain passages in Foucault would suggest as much. In one of the later interviews, Foucault refers to himself as “a hyperactive pessimist” who avoids apathy by seeing everything as “dangerous” precisely because all systems of power, all forms of social and political organization, can inhibit struggle and militate against their contestation. And in a manner reminiscent of the Russian nihilism Nietzsche rejects, Foucault says: “Writing interests me only in the measure that it incorporates the reality of combat, as an instrument, a tactic, a spotlight. I would like my books to be like surgeons’ knives, Molotov cocktails, or galleries in a mine, and like fireworks, to be carbonized after use.” In underscoring the agonal nature of his work, Foucault shares with Nietzsche an almost tragic glorification of struggle of struggle in the face of overwhelming forces (of nihilism). Yet contra Nietzsche, much of Foucault’s analysis of the mechanisms and arrangements of “power-knowledge” undercuts the possibility of formulating positive, alternative ideals for a better future. As one commentator points out, Foucault’s understanding of modern power, as “ubiquitous, inescapable, stemming from [micro-levels] below, and productive of our very identity,” rules out any “opiate belief in absolute emancipation”: In the modern world the most insidious forms of power are shown to be productive forces engaged in the subjectification of their participant victims. Modern power not only restricts, it incites—and does so by means of administering over the self-definition of its subjects....[A]n escape from [such] subjectification is impossible. Resistance to forces remains the only alternative....[T]here is no realm of freedom in which we may escape power to assert our nature: we might change our positions on the web [like a captured fly], but there is no jumping off.

## **EARTH TRADE-OFF KRITIK ANSWERS**

### **A. SPACE COMMITMENT DOES NOT TRADE OFF WITH EARTH PROBLEMS.**

1. No tradeoff—space exploration actually solves multiple scenarios for extinction on Earth.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 388.

When people say that space programs are a waste of taxpayers' money, especially when there are so many vital unmet needs here on Earth, it is important to correct the record. Each year our "eyes in the skies" save tens of thousands of lives, or even more, by warning people of the need to flee from the paths of oncoming hurricanes, typhoons, tropical storms and other natural disasters. Each year satellite search and rescue systems allow hundreds of stranded pilots, fishermen and explorers to be rescued. Without Earth observation satellites we would not know enough about the ozone layer in the stratosphere that protects all animal and plant life on our planet from extinction by radiation from the Sun and the cosmos. Of even more practical importance are our satellites that monitor pollution, husband water resources, locate key resources, spot crop disease and forest fires, carry out "smart farming," and combat the most troublesome aspects of global warming.

2. Turn: space is key to checking species extinction.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 185. \*Space telemetry systems, such as the ARGOS environmental positioning and telemetry system, transmit routine environmental data from marine buoys around the world's oceans, provide remote environmental monitoring, and track endangered species and hazardous materials. Satellite search and rescue systems like the international COSPAS-SARSAT system have saved thousands of lives each year, and have made the worldwide search and rescue process both more efficient and safer.

3. Species extinction risks human extinction.

Biodiversity Resource Center, 2001 (Accessed May 23, 2011 at [http://researcharchive.calacademy.org/research/library/biodiv/biodiversity\\_defined.html](http://researcharchive.calacademy.org/research/library/biodiv/biodiversity_defined.html))

Currently, more than 10,000 species become extinct each year. While precise calculation is difficult, it is certain that this rate has increased alarmingly in recent years. The central cause of species extinction is destruction of natural habitats by humans. Human survival itself may depend upon reversing this accelerating threat to species diversity. Among the millions of undescribed species are important new sources of food, medicine, and other products. When a species vanishes, we lose access to the survival strategies encoded in its genes through millions of years of evolution. We lose the opportunity to understand those strategies which may hold absolutely essential options for our own survival as a species. And we lose not only this unique evolutionary experience but, emotionally, we lose the unique beauty and the unique spirit which mankind has associated with that life form. Many indigenous human cultures have also been driven to extinction by the same forces that have destroyed and continue to threaten non-human species. It is estimated that since 1900, more than 90 tribes of aboriginal peoples have become extinct in the Amazon Basin.

4. No trade-off between a commitment to space and a commitment to Earth.

James Logan, (Former Chief of Medical Operations, NASA), *TURNING DUST TO GOLD: BUILDING A FUTURE ON THE MOON AND MARS*, 2010, 265.

The argument that we must solve numerous problems on Earth first before going into space is ludicrous. If we had waited to solve pressing problems before participating in any frontier, mankind would still be living exclusively in Africa.

5. Space bolsters life on Earth.

Peter Marshall, (Former President, Society of Satellite Professionals, International), LICENSE TO ORBIT: THE FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL, 2009, 150. Some people, with a very limited vision of the problems besetting modern human civilization, may ask what is the purpose and value of having a space program? In fact, many even say the space program is a waste. They complain that space exploration and space expenditures take away valuable resources needed for education and health care. These people do not realize that space programs have allowed us to save tens of thousands of lives by predicting the paths of hurricanes, monsoons and typhoons. Our daily and weekly weather forecasts really start with weather satellites. The "Weather Channel" on television would be worthless without these eyes in the sky. Satellites have also saved stranded pilots and allowed communications to remote areas to provide relief to earthquake victims. Other satellites have allowed us to locate scarce resources from oil to iron as well as spot remote forest fires, diseased trees and blights on agricultural crops. Our servants in the sky help us follow rising ocean levels, spot tidal waves or volcanic eruptions, and to monitor the holes in the ozone layer. This layer protects us from the possible destruction of the species due to massive radiation-induced genetic mutation.

B. CURRENT EFFORTS WILL NOT SOLVE THE EARTH'S PROBLEMS—WE SHOULD TURN TO SPACE.

Jack Crenshaw, (Editor, Embedded Space Systems), TURNING DUST TO GOLD: BUILDING A FUTURE ON THE MOON AND MARS, 2010, 74.

For all practical purposes, we ended the manned space program. We declared a War on Poverty and a War on Drugs. Have we ended poverty? Have we stopped using drugs? Have we cured cancer? Instead of achieving great things, we've used our billions to build bridges to nowhere, build ever-bigger SUVs, and pay CEOs' hundred-million-dollar bonuses. How is that better? Fact is, if you wait around until you have no bills to pay or problems to solve, you will be frozen into immobility. Columbus discovered America during the height of the Spanish Inquisition. During the Apollo effort, this country was fighting a war in Vietnam and dealing with hippies, anti-war activists, the Symbionese Liberation Army, and the Weather Underground. If we had waited to solve such problems, we would still be waiting, and the problems would only have gotten worse.

C. SPACE EXPLORATION SOLVES POVERTY ON EARTH.

1. Space exploration solves poverty.

David Schrunk, (Aerospace Engineer & Medical Doctor), SPACE ENTERPRISE: LIVING AND WORKING OFFWORLD IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY, 2009, xiv.

Relatively few appreciate how these are truly "giant steps for mankind" as we fly into the real new world, one free from gravity and population limitations, as well as atmospheric impurity and endless energy. Outer space is an ideal realm for experimentation and production that is impossible on Earth. Its multitude of assets can enrich the human family, possibly eliminating poverty on this planet.

2. Poverty is the equivalent to a thermonuclear war between Russia and the US – this systemic impact is bigger and more probable than any war.

James Gilligan, Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, 2000 edition, Violence: Reflections on Our Deadliest Epidemic, p. 195-196

The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide--or about eight million per year, 1935-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-1966 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other word, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

D. THE NEGATIVE REASONING LEADS TO INFINITE INACTION.

1. The fact that problems on Earth exist is no excuse for inaction in space.

Brent Sherwood, (Dir., Strategic Planning, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory), *TURNING DUST TO GOLD: BUILDING A FUTURE ON THE MOON AND MARS*, 2010, 161.

The argument that Earth's numerous problems need to be fixed first is specious, because it presumes that great challenges must be approached serially, and that Earth's numerous problems are in fact solvable in any final way. As an argument for inaction, it makes no sense.

2. Their excuse is an excuse for infinite inaction.

NASA Aerospace Technology Working Group, *ENERGY CRISIS: SOLUTION FROM SPACE*, 2009, 138.

Many of us believe that mankind must solve all our crises on earth before expanding into space can be achieved successfully and peacefully. In fact, humanity isn't going to solve all its problems here on earth, ever. While resolving some of our crises, humanity always creates more.

E. THE FUTURE OF SPACE AND EARTH ARE INTERTWINED.

Joseph Pelton, (Dir., Emeritus, The Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington U.), *THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE*, 2010, 23.

The future of humankind and the future of space are inherently intertwined. We need to use space systems to understand weather, escape the full fury of hurricanes and monsoons, cope with global warming, and to understand how the Earth, the solar system, and indeed the entire cosmos came into being. We need satellites to aid us when communicating, broadcasting, navigating, and remote sensing; we rely on space telescopes and observatories to unlock the mysteries of the Universe.

## FEMINISM KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. FEMINIST ALTERNATIVES WILL FAIL TO DISRUPT POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

Laura T. Kessler, 2011 (professor of law @ University of Utah, Seattle University Law Review, Spring 2011, "CROWDSOURCING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: A COLLOQUY," Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 26, 2011)

Since the rise of conservatism in America, there has been much discussion on the Left about progressives' alleged failure to offer robust alternatives to free-market and religious fundamentalist ideologies, n130 as well as calls for "courage to open the door of political and legal thought as if the wolves were not there." n131 The result has been some uncomfortable conversations among progressives and tensions in critical left intellectual movements. n132 For example, Janet Halley has written against the idea that feminism is an indispensable element of any adequate theory of sexuality and gender. She suggests that those interested in developing new insights about power and sexuality might benefit from "tak[ing] a break from feminism." n133

### B. FEMINIST ALTERNATIVES IGNORE CLASS AND RACE.

#### 1. Focusing on gender distracts from a class-based focus—a superior means of challenging oppression.

Laura T. Kessler, 2011 (professor of law @ University of Utah, Seattle University Law Review, Spring 2011, "CROWDSOURCING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: A COLLOQUY," Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 26, 2011)

Finally, Williams suggests that we need to shift away from a focus on gender and pay more attention to class dynamics if we are to make any headway in reshaping America's system of family supports. This shift will require us to understand class in new ways. Williams offers two innovations in this regard. First, she suggests that we need to focus not just on the poor, but also on the "Missing Middle" n34--Americans who are "one sick child away from being fired." n35 Second, Williams asks us to see class divisions as a cultural problem as much as an economic one. She sees a gaping cultural rift between white working-class and professional-managerial class Americans that needs to be addressed, and she describes the rift in poignant detail. She argues that in order to recreate the New Deal coalition between workers, African Americans, and professional elites, we need to change the dynamics of everyday politics [\*685] through cross-class cultural understanding and gestures of mutual respect.

#### 2. The alternative's exclusive focus on gender undermines efforts to challenge racism.

KIMBERLE CRENSHAW, 1992 (Professor of Law at Columbia University, Southern California Law Review, March 1992. Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 26, 2011)

There are other political dilemmas, that await the women's movement if it does not undertake the difficult task of constructing a political program that addresses these intersections. A central problem that was revealed during the Hearings is that women's issues are often seen by the public as representing the selected concerns of a few well placed, overly influential white women. One of the most troubling manifestations of this attitude is represented by those who claim that any Black woman who raises a gender related issue is simply acting on the white women's agenda and not on that of the Black community. Apparently a Black woman who has been harassed, or raped, or battered cannot conclude on her own that this behavior is damaging to her as a Black woman. Of course, Black feminists and other feminists of color have rejected these claims and have labored to uncover the many ways that nonwhite communities are affected by sexism. However, white feminist politicians and other activists must do their part to address some of the reasons why this perception persists. Organized women must affirmatively act to make women's issues relevant to communities of color as well of to working class and poor women. This effort requires that they go beyond the usual practice of incorporating only those aspects of women's lives that appear to be familiar as "gender" while marginalizing those issues that seem to relate solely to class or to race.



3. Mainstream feminist approaches unwittingly entrench racism.

KIMBERLE CRENSHAW, 1992 (Professor of Law at Columbia University, Southern California Law Review, March 1992. Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 26, 2011)

I would like to build upon both those metaphors as a means to uncover the particular ways in which Black women are silenced between the rocks and the hard places of racism and sexism. One way of beginning to think about this space is suggested by the concept of intersectionality. African-American women by virtue of our race and gender are [\*1468] situated within at least two systems of subordination: racism and sexism. This dual vulnerability does not simply mean that our burdens are doubled but instead, that the dynamics of racism and sexism intersect in our lives to create experiences that are sometimes unique to us. In other words, our experiences of racism are shaped by our gender, and our experiences of sexism are often shaped by our race. The rocks and hard places that make it so difficult for Black women to articulate these experiences, however, are not simply racism and sexism, but instead, the oppositional politics of mainstream feminism and antiracism. Because each movement focuses on gender or race exclusive of the other, issues reflecting the intersections of race and gender are alien to both movements. Consequently, although Black women are formally constituents of both, their intersectional interests are addressed by neither.

## MODERNITY/GROWTH BAD KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. MODERNITY DOESN'T LEAD TO WIDESPREAD HARMES.

1. The world is getting better and better on almost every measurable indicator—their indictment of modern society is bankrupt.

Frank B. Cross, 2002 (Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Winter, 2002, 53 Case W. Res. 477; Lexis)

Of course, if the goal is to attack Lomborg's book, the critics had no other alternative. They cannot realistically dispute that the world population with access to safe water has more than doubled over recent decades. n53 There is no denying that rates of death from infectious disease have been cut more than in half. n54 Nor can one really debate that the daily intake of calories in developing nations has increased steadily over recent decades. n55 It is indubitable that ambient levels of the most hazardous air pollutants (such as lead, particulates, and ozone) have declined as the West grew. n56 Nor could the critics deny that environmental concentrations of hazardous chemicals have dropped precipitously over recent years. n57

2. Modernity didn't trigger the Holocaust—the particular practices of Nazi Germany did.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In a particularly provocative passage, Michael Schwartz has suggested that, "each political system in Germany between 1890 and 1945 produced that variant of eugenic science which it 'needed.'"55 In 1996, Peter Fritzsche, similarly, posed the rhetorical question, "Doesn't politics choose its own science at least as much as science prefigures political regimes?"56 Both, I think, are making explicit a conclusion that is broadly present, though not often forcefully stated, in the more recent literature: that the realization of the potentials of modernity is a product of choices between alternative possible ideas, and alternative possible policies. To make this kind of suggestion is not to argue that Nazism "perverted" a modern science that was itself value-free and "innocent." The point is rather that politicians, like scientists themselves, choose from among a broad range of ideas (of greater or lesser credibility) generated by the intellectual and institutional complex of modern science. They also choose what policy conclusions to draw from those ideas. Of course, as Richard Wetzell has remarked, this interpretation has implications for our understanding of the moral significance of National Socialism, as well.57 Modernity and science were not responsible for the crimes of the Nazis. The Nazis were.

3. Modernity doesn't lead to genocide—political and historical factors outweigh the role of modernity.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Again, Peukert was very aware that he was writing the history of only one kind of modernity, and that the most destructive potentials of modern social engineering discourse were only to be realized in a very specific historical context. The "Final Solution" was, as he remarked, "one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization," and one possible only in the context of the concatenation of economic, social, and political disasters through which Germany passed in the two decades before 1933. The fact that Nazism was "one of the pathological developmental forms of modernity does not imply that barbarism is the inevitable logical outcome of modernization," which also created "opportunities for human emancipation." And yet, again, the history that Peukert actually wrote was the history of disaster— a disaster that, frequently, does seem at least highly likely. The "fatal racist dynamic in the human and social sciences," which consists in their assignment of greater or lesser value to human characteristics, does "inevitably become fixated on the utopian dream of the gradual elimination of death," which is "unfailingly" frustrated by lived reality. In periods of fiscal crisis the frustration of these "fantasies of omnipotence" generates a concern with "identifying, segregating, and disposing of" those judged less valuable.68

4. Modernity can lead either to democracy or totalitarianism—illustrating the importance of other factors.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” *Central European History*, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

As Fritzsche’s review makes clear, then, much of the recent literature seems to imply that National Socialism was a product of the “success” of a modernity that ends in 1945; but it could just as easily be seen as a temporary “failure” of modernity, the “success” of which would only come in the 1950s and 1960s. As Paul Betts recently remarked, we should not present the postwar period as a “redemptive tale of modernism triumphant” and cast Nazism as merely a “regressive interlude.” But neither should we dismiss the fact that such a narrative would be, so to speak, half true— that the democratic welfare state is no less a product of modernity than is totalitarianism.<sup>61</sup>

5. Modernity doesn’t lead to oppression—it can also lead to liberation.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” *Central European History*, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In short: is the microphysics of modern power/knowledge always the microphysics of oppression, exploitation, and manipulation? Are technocratic elites always in charge of the imperatives of discourse — or do discourses have their own logic, which technocrats can define, escape or direct no more (or less) than can anyone else? Discourse may or may not be a locomotive, driving down a predetermined track and dictating individual decisions and fates by its own internal logic; but even if it is, the technocrats aren’t driving it, and in fact their schemes may get flattened just as effectively as the autonomy of the average citizen. Biopolitical policy as a field of state activity was often the product of technocratic “readings” of biopolitical discourse. But it was only one small part of a much broader process by which a large proportion of the German population came to define their needs and aspirations in new ways. We need not exaggerate the degrees of freedom that process generated to be able to appreciate that in some cases, to some extent, and sometimes willy-nilly, discourse and policy were actually a response to that broader process of redefinition — in short, to “demand-side” pressures.

**B. ECONOMIC GROWTH BEST PROTECTS THE ENVIRONMENT.**

Frank B. Cross, 2002 (Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin, *Case Western Reserve Law Review*, Winter, 2002, 53 *Case W. Res.* 477; Lexis)

When the economy is strong, people demand greater environmental protection, but when the economy struggles, environmental protection measures are sacrificed. <sup>n94</sup> Moreover, economic and technological growth create the resources necessary to combat environmental threats. <sup>n95</sup> During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. economy grew by around seventy percent, yet during this same time period, virtually all forms of domestic pollution decreased, some by over ninety percent. <sup>n96</sup> Among developed nations, the wealthier countries tend to adopt stronger environmental protection laws and have greater success in reducing air pollution. <sup>n97</sup>

**\*\*\*\*\*ANSWERS TO KRITIKS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\*\*\*\*\***

**CONSEQUENCES KRITIK ANSWERS: IT IS POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO EVALUATE CONSEQUENCES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**A. WE CAN PREDICT CONSEQUENCES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.**

1. Even if strategizing is uncertain: we should plan for the MOST LIKELY future events by looking at a robust range of evidence.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. Much has been made about the defining role of uncertainty in strategic planning since the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolar competition, so the argument goes, and the accelerating pace of change in technology and international political and economic relations, forecasting world events even a few years into the future has become exceedingly difficult. Indeed, few in the year 2000 would have described with much accuracy the current conditions facing national-security decision-makers. Moreover, history offers ample evidence, from the Schlieffen Plan to the Soviet economy, that rigid planning creates risks of catastrophic failure. Clearly, uncertainty demands an appreciation for the importance of flexibility in strategic planning. For all of its importance, however, recognition of uncertainty poses a dilemma for strategists: in predicting the future, they are likely to be wrong; but in resisting prediction, they risk clouding the rational bases for making strategic choices. Over-confidence in prediction may lead to good preparation for the wrong future, but wholesale dismissal of prediction may lead a strategist to spread his resources too thinly. In pursuit of flexibility, he ends up well prepared for nothing. A natural compromise is to build strategies that are robust across multiple alternative future events but are still tailored to meet the challenges of the most likely future events.

2. The future is not shrouded in mystery—we can make some predictions about future events in international relations.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. Additionally, the notion that today's future is less certain than yesterday's is overdrawn. There is more nostalgia than truth behind the characterisation of the Cold War as 'a time of reasonable predictability'. Presidents from Harry Truman to George H.W. Bush might have taken exception to that description, as might soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines deployed to Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Panama and Iraq, among other places, while Pentagon strategists refined plans for war in Central Europe. By the same token, today's future may not be shrouded in complete mystery. Indeed, much of recent official rhetoric surrounding the 'war on terror' echoes that of the Cold War, identifying the emergence of a mortal enemy, in the form of violent radical Islam, and the prospects for a generational struggle against that enemy.<sup>11</sup> This rhetoric contrasts sharply with claims that uncertainty is central to strategic planning. The 2006 QDR flirts with a little logical tension when it introduces the term 'the long war' and the notion of 'an era of surprise and uncertainty' within one page of each other.<sup>12</sup> In sum, the justification for emphasising uncertainty in strategic planning is questionable. Strategic uncertainty is neither novel to the current security environment nor overwhelming in the face of some clear challenges facing US national security.

3. We do know certain things about the security environment.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. In spite of its intuitive appeal, applying uncertainty to strategic planning quickly becomes problematic and can even inhibit the flexibility it was meant to deliver. The first question we must ask here is: granting the inevitability of surprise, can we learn anything about the future from the current security environment? We do know a great deal about that. We know, for example, that transnational terrorist networks are actively targeting US interests and allies throughout the world. Also, Iran, a nation with a track record of xenophobic foreign policy and support for terrorism, is building nuclear weapons. The paranoid, totalitarian regime in North Korea continues to threaten its neighbours with nuclear weapons, sophisticated missile systems, a million-man army, and thousands of artillery tubes within range of Seoul, the heart of one of Asia's largest economies. None of these conditions is likely to disappear in the near future.

4. The impossibility of absolute truth doesn't deny the possibility of productive discourse and action.

Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach 2002 (profs. of international relations at Rutgers & Iowa State) *Reconstructing theory in global politics: Beyond the postmodern challenge*. In *International Relations and the "Third Debate"* edited by Darryl Jarvis. The task is daunting, as the historian Fernandez-Armesto readily acknowledges: "Historians like me know, at least as well as practitioners of any other discipline, how elusive objectivity is. Even if we perform miracles of self-immolation, we are left with sources which derive from other hands and bear the imprint of other subjects—witnesses, reporters, compilers of data and hearsay" (1997:227). However, to stand paralyzed and utterly ignore history because of the magnitude of the challenge would be absurd. It is nonetheless important to admit that historical research is inevitably to some extent theory-dependent and subjective, to look at as many sources as possible, to get a firm notion of the range of interpretations, and then to make one's own informed judgment as to which interpretation(s) appear(s) to be the most plausible. The result is few givens—only probabilities, likelihoods, and sometimes only possibilities. We have to live with that ambiguity and proceed as best we can. If our investigations seem to provide a more convincing view of political reality than other constructions, then that may be the most we can hope for. The more varied the cases we consider, the less chance there is that errors of fact or interpretation will completely invalidate our conclusions.

5. Knowledge about the future is possible. The fact that it is difficult only demands careful scrutiny of the situations at hand.

Fuyuki Kurasawa 2004 (Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University). *Cautionary tales: The global culture of prevention and the work of foresight*. *Constellations*, 11:4, p. 458-459

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientific futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter's total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

6. Making careful efforts to predict consequences can be effective, especially compared to any alternative which risks randomness.

Fred Chernoff 2005 (Prof. of Political Science at Colgate) *The Power Of International Theory*, p. 215

Experience does seem to support (non-point) predictions of human behaviour. For example, there seems to be little problem with predictions of the behaviour of individual humans such as: the hungry baby will cry some time during the night; or of states such as: France will not invade China in the coming year. Any theory that prohibits prediction will, like the metaphysics of Parmenides and Zeno, require an extraordinarily high standard of proof, because the alternative appears to be so well confirmed. The examination of anti-predictive arguments drawn from a variety of sources (such as non-linearities, social complexity, the absence of governing regularities) showed that there is no conclusive argument against the possibility of predictive theory. And prediction indeed seems possible in international relations, albeit with certain qualifications. The foregoing has acknowledged qualifications on the predictiveness of social science theory. Predictions are probabilistic and their strength is limited by the value of observed empirical associations and by the future temporal frame (since they are less reliable as the time-frame is extended, which follows from the axioms of the probability calculus). However, the calculations produce better results than randomly chosen policies. And random policies are the alternative if one rejects belief in rational calculation and causation on which it is based. The review of the attacks on prediction showed the arguments to be fundamentally flawed. Either they derive their conclusions by means of a straw man (an uncommonly narrow definition of 'prediction' that presupposes many unreasonable conditions) or the accounts supposedly inconsistent with prediction in fact allow, on closer inspection, room for prediction.

7. Predictions are essential to international relations policy, even accounting for any imperfections.

Fred Chernoff 2005 (Prof. of Political Science at Colgate) *The Power Of International Theory*, p. 169-170

This chapter has thus sought to show that the arguments against prediction offered by each author are flawed and that the sound elements of the foundational positions sketched out by the various authors (especially Bohman and Bernstein et al.) can consistently be brought into line with some notion of 'prediction', when that notion is founded on probabilistic rather than deterministic generalisations. Bernstein et al. attempt to discredit 'prediction' by arguing that IR is much more similar to evolutionary theory than to physical sciences like classical mechanics. Is IR very like classical mechanics or evolutionary biology? It shares many features with both but also has many dissimilarities to both and consequently is 'very like' neither. A major part of the strategy of the critique of Bernstein et al. has been to show that a further probing of the character of physical science reveals that the dissimilarities that Bernstein et al. claim do not hold. This is not to say that an unrestricted naturalism is justified. Far from it. Comprehensive theories like those of the physical sciences are not likely to emerge in IR. Nevertheless, theoretical and scientific-style investigation in IR has great value and holds out the possibility, at least within tightly circumscribed domains, to achieve natural-science-like consensus and well-founded prediction. Indeed, prediction is necessary for good policy-making, even though there are limitations due to hermeneutic interpretation, lack of governing regularities and non-linearities. These considerations lead to the conclusion that there are limitations on the types of predictions one might propose and the confidence that should be displayed in them but not to conclude that policy-makers should avoid prediction. While prediction is necessary for policy-making, prediction alone is not sufficient, since normative considerations must always be addressed. Probabilistic predictions may inform one of things like 'socialist states go to war with non-socialist states less often than democratic states go to war with non-democracies'. But normative analysis is clearly required in order to determine whether this is a good or bad thing and what policy initiatives should be pursued.

8. Philip Tetlock's "monkeys make better predictions than experts" theory is flawed.

Bryan Caplan 2005 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, Tackling Tetlock, EconLog, [http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling\\_tetloc\\_1.html](http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling_tetloc_1.html)) And that's tough for me to admit, because it would be easy to interpret Tetlock's work as a great refutation of my own. Most of my research highlights the systematic belief differences between economists and the general public, and defends the simple "The experts are right, the public is wrong," interpretation of the facts. But Tetlock finds that the average expert is an embarrassingly bad forecaster. In fact, experts barely beat what Tetlock calls the "chimp" strategy of random guessing. Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. Tetlock's sample suffers from severe selection bias. He deliberately asked relatively difficult and controversial questions. As his methodological appendix explains, questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me too often with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who? The implicit answer is "Dumb according to the typical expert in the field." What Tetlock really shows is that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached a solid consensus. This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to hijack it: "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what Tetlock really shows is that experts can raise their credibility if they stop overreaching.

Bryan Caplan 2005 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, Tackling Tetlock, EconLog, [http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling\\_tetloc\\_1.html](http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling_tetloc_1.html))

Tyler Cowen 2005 (Professor of Economics at George Mason). Marginal revolution. December 5, 2005. Accessed at , [http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2005/12/dont\\_trust\\_expe.html](http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2005/12/dont_trust_expe.html))

And yes Tetlock has data, drawing upon twenty years of observation of 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also finds that "foxes" forecast better than "hedgehogs" and that only the forecasts of foxes have positive value. This is one of the (few) must-read social science books of 2005. My caveat: Assume that the experts are usually wrong in their novel predictions. The consensus views of a science still might be worth listening to. Economists cannot forecast business cycles very well, but you should listen when they tell you that a deflationary shock is bad news. Each new forecast or new theory is an example of individual hubris and in expected value terms it is stupid. But the body of experts as a whole, over time, absorbs what is correct. A large number of predictions creates a Hayekian discovery process with increasing returns to scale. Social knowledge still comes out ahead, and in part because of the self-deceiving vanities put forward every day. You can find that point in Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels.

B. ANY ALTERNATIVE TO PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS DISASTROUS.

1. Conservatives will fill in the gap created by the belief of strategic uncertainty: this will justify arms build-ups to confront the unknown.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. While the NPR is classified, the extent to which its policy is underpinned by the strategic importance of uncertainty is made very clear in a private report published in January 2001 by several strategists who, only months later, were writing nuclear policy in the Pentagon.<sup>18</sup> The report, published by the National Institute for Public Policy, identifies a variety of plausible ways in which the future security environment might change from the status quo, especially in dangerous directions, and evaluates the potential utility of nuclear weapons in adapting to those changes. It does not attempt to assess the likelihoods of any of those alternative futures and, indeed, dismisses the utility of any such assessment, concluding that 'there can be no logical integrity in the confident assertion that any given force level, even if judged to be appropriate today, will continue to be so in the future'.<sup>19</sup> The problem with this logic, while laudably cautious, is that it does not leave a great deal of scope for deciding on or justifying any course of action whatsoever about weapons deployment. If there were no trade-offs involved with having large numbers of nuclear weapons on high alert, this might be a minor problem. But, of course, this is not the case. Beyond the resources they consume, large numbers of nuclear weapons on alert may be unnecessarily provocative in crises, may hamper non-proliferation efforts, and may raise the risk of accidental launch by other nuclear powers prompted to maintain high alert levels themselves. The risks of being underprepared for unexpected warfighting contingencies must be weighed against these. A 1997 National Academy of Sciences report summarised this trade-off: 'During the Cold War, reducing the risk of a surprise attack appeared to be more important than the risks generated by maintaining nuclear forces in a continuous state of alert. With the end of that era, the opposite view is now more credible.'<sup>20</sup>

2. Rejection of problem solving is elitist and locks in oppression of the marginalized.

Darryl Jarvis, 2000. Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline*. pg. 128-9. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of those theorists and these theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.



3. The alternative fails: Rejection of theories of causality would cripple social change—there would be no point in studying language or society if we rejected causality.

Milja Kurki 2007 (Lecturer, Department of Int'l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online. Indeed, collaboration with critical realists on causation does not endanger the logic of post-positivist explanations. For example, accepting discourses as causal in that they shape, constrain and condition the possibility of agential actions does not downgrade poststructuralist arguments on the political consequentiality of discourses – rather (nonpositivist, non-deterministic) causality can be seen as an implicit claim within their theorisations.<sup>50</sup> Also, accepting reasons as a type of cause on a critical realist basis does not downgrade Fierke's constructivist arguments on world politics. While her argument against the use of causal language is persuasive against the positivist conception of causality, it does not refute the critical realist account of causation, which does not entail a 'when A, then B' notion of causality, nor does it refute the critical realist argument that reasons must be causal in some sense for agents to possess intentionality.<sup>51</sup> Fierke's account, it seems, is also dependent on a non-positivist conception of causality in that Fierke seems to emphasise 'justificatory reasons' agents give precisely because these reasons have consequences for public language and debate on legitimate actions – and hence on the critical realist basis can be conceived to condition identities and actions causally. Recognising language of causality does not downgrade post-positivist arguments: it simply denies the validity of the positivist meaning of the concept of cause in talking about these kinds of complex conditioning situations and, in fact, opens up the usefulness of the wider causal language developed by the critical realists, such as recognising differences between agential causation, intentional causation, and conditioning causation. Beyond these theoretical defences of the critical realist position there might also be an important further reason for critical realists to maintain their belief in causal language and science, a reason that post-positivist critics, but also many critical realists themselves, have overlooked. Critical realism seems, albeit implicitly, to affirm the political consequences of applying the notion of causation in social analysis. Social science for critical realists is an inherently evaluative process, as it is for many other critical social theorists, but critical realists reinforce the link between causal analysis and critical evaluation of social structures and discourses. Critical realists argue that when social scientists study causation they inevitably form ethical judgements, positive or negative, regarding the causal powers of social structures and discourses they study. It follows that in the light of critical realism, the arguments of critical social theorists – for example the Critical Theorists' analyses of capitalism or poststructuralists' analyses of discourses of terrorism – can be seen as forms of causal analysis that seek to identify structures and discourses that enable and constrain actors within them in such ways that are adversely consequential on certain groups of people. If certain structures, ideas or discourses were not causally consequential on the world and in an adverse way for some actors, why would these theorists 'waste their breath' in criticising them?<sup>52</sup> Implicit in the very notion of critical theorising seems to be an acceptance of causality: it seems that accepting social causation, although in a non-positivist way, is not only consistent with the aims of critical theorising (generally conceived) but also provides something of a justification for the underlying political drive of critical theorising. This political justification of talking about causation, even if a possible point of disagreement (for poststructuralists for example), has been ignored by most post-positivist critics. It follows that the 'politics of causal analysis' have not really been engaged with in IR as well as many post-positivists would like to think. This is a shame since it seems that the convergences of critical realism and post-positivism are significant: they both share a critique of positivist science, both emphasise methodological openness in social inquiry, both recognise inherent politics of social analysis and both seek critical engagements with social forces in world politics. Yet so far critical realism has not been engaged with seriously by the post-positivists and adequate engagement with critical realist justifications for their position has not been achieved. Through a more constructive appreciation of the critical realist justifications for their position it is possible that more constructive alliances can be formed in the discipline between critical realists and existing IR theorists.

4. Rejection of prediction dooms all policymaking, including the implementation of their alternative.

Fred Chernoff 2005 (Professor of political science at Colgate). *The power of international theory*. p. 9.

Various IR theorists have also argued against prediction. For example, Donald Puchala contends that IR theory 'does not, because it cannot in the absence of laws...invite us to deduce, and it does not permit us to predict' (Puchala 1991: 79). Interpretivist and reflectivist IR theorists like Ashley (1986), Onuf (1989), Walker (1993) and others, following the lead of critical theorists and prediction-sceptic philosophers of social science, argue that IR theory (discussed in Chapter 3) is able to facilitate an interpretive understanding of events and deny that IR theory is capable of prediction or scientific-style explanation. Even though many of these authors hope that IR theory can lead to 'human emancipation', their meta-theory undercuts its ability to do so. This trend in the theoretical literature in IR severs the link between IR theory and any significant ability to aid policy-makers to bring about emancipation or any other foreign policy goal. If they do not leave room for rationally grounded expectations about the future, that is, scientific-style prediction, then it will be impossible to formulate policies that can be expected to achieve various aims, including the emancipation of oppressed groups. Without the ability to say that a given action option has a higher probability than any of the other options of achieving the objective, e.g., a greater degree of emancipation of the target group, these theorists cannot recommend courses of action to achieve their desired goals. The loss of this essential capability has been largely overlooked by constructivists and reflectivists in the IR literature. All policy decisions are attempts to influence or bring about some future state of affairs. Policy-making requires some beliefs about the future, whether they are called 'expectations', 'predictions', 'forecasts' or 'prognostications'. The next step in the argument is to show how such beliefs can be justified.

5. Acting on our best guesses is preferable to endless criticism and relativism.

Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach 2008 (profs. of international relations at Rutgers & Iowa State) *A world of politics: Essays in global politics*. Pg. 59. Yet in truth (pun intended), both the positivists and extreme relativists fail to convince us, although the latter would insist that that is proof positive of the validity of their arguments. As a gesture of goodwill, we similarly suggest that one familiar criticism of postmodernists does more to affirm the position of the extreme relativists than to refute them, to wit: with no standards for evidence, why should an observer accept their perspective more than any other? Or, as Roger Scruton (cited in Fernandez-Arnesto, 1997: 203) put it: "The man who tells you truth doesn't exist is asking you not to believe him. So don't." Ah yes, but why then should we believe Roger Scruton? Martin Hollis (1994: 241) sums up: "All interpretations become defensible but at the price that none is more justifiable than the rest. If this is indeed the upshot, the circle turns vicious and the hermeneutic imperative to understand from within leads to disaster." It is precisely this disaster that is unacceptable, especially when there would appear to be more constructive alternatives. Can we not discuss and debate ideas as well as we can, given our personal biases, weasel language, and imperfect information? For instance, we hope the readers of this chapter would agree that, whether or not they accept the arguments we are making, they understand what we are saying well enough—and that there are only a limited number of counterarguments worthy of admission to the dialogue. To be sure, we may all be wrong, but we are not all normally engaged in tales told by idiots or nonsense games.

6. A belief in uncertainty in the international arena will justify nuclear weapons build-ups to deter the unknown. Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) *The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning*. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. If the effects of stressing uncertainty were limited to contradictory statements in strategic-planning documents and speeches, the harm would be small and redress would be of largely academic interest. But there is strong circumstantial evidence that these effects extend beyond the rhetorical domain. Three examples illustrate problems arising from an aversion to prediction in strategic planning. Current nuclear-weapons policy and posture illustrate the strategic costs that uncertainty can exact in the form of keeping options open. The 2006 QDR shows how uncertainty can inhibit clear strategic choice in the allocation of resources. Finally, the use of intelligence and expert advice in planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq shows how uncertainty can actually serve to privilege pre-conceptions over analysis and thereby undermine strategic flexibility. Uncertainty in the future security environment has been a key organising principle for the posture and planning of the US nuclear arsenal. In an effort to leave Cold War nuclear-force-sizing logic behind, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) adopted from the 2001 QDR a 'capabilities-based approach' to establishing requirements for US nuclear weapons. The premise of the capabilities-based approach is that threats cannot be predicted reliably. As a result, in the words of then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, 'instead of our past primary reliance on nuclear forces for deterrence, we will need a broad array of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities for an era of uncertainty and surprise'.<sup>17</sup> In practical terms, this meant that the numbers and alert levels of deployed nuclear weapons would need to be considerably higher than would be necessary simply to deter Russia and China.
7. Dismissing predictive models locks in the status quo—turning the kritik. Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) *The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning*. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. Moreover, this style of decision-making is self-reinforcing. A strategist dismissive of explicit models of prediction or cause and effect is likely to have a much higher threshold of resistance to adjusting strategy in the face of changing circumstances. It is much harder to be proven wrong if changing or emerging information is systematically discounted on the grounds that the strategic environment is inherently unpredictable. The result may be a bias toward momentum in the current direction, toward the status quo. This is the antithesis of flexibility. Facts on the ground change faster than belief systems, so the extent to which a strategy is based on the latter rather than the former may be a reasonable measure of strategic rigidity. In this way, undue emphasis in planning on uncertainty creates an intellectual temptation to cognitive dissonance on the one hand, and confirmatory bias on the other. And the effect, both insidious and ironic, is that the appreciation for uncertainty subverts exactly the value that it professes to serve: flexibility.
8. Rejecting prediction won't usher in a utopian alternative—it will merely lock in the status quo. Fuyuki Kurasawa 2004 (Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University) *Cautionary tales: The global culture of prevention and the work of foresight*. *Constellations*, 11:4, p. 454. But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian pictures of an alternative world order. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian 'Not-Yet' remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring how a dystopian imaginary can lay the foundations for a constructive engagement with the future.

9. Strategic decision-making is inevitable—the failure to use empirical standards of analysis causes dogmatic personal beliefs of policymakers to fill the void.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic surprise, in 'an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation hellip The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.'<sup>16</sup> The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and 'rigorous assessment' can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

10. Reliance on predictive tests requires decision-makers to expose their beliefs—this makes them easier to challenge.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, *Thinking in Time*. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others' presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not 'what is your inferred causation, General?' Above all, not, 'what are your values, Mr. Secretary?'hellip If someone says 'a fair chance'hellip ask, 'if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?' If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differenceshellip Once differing odds have been quoted, the question 'why?' can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert's basis for linking 'if' with 'then' gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.'<sup>35</sup>

11. Emphasizing strategic uncertainty re-entrenches bureaucratic political power.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. Admittedly, the role played by strategic uncertainty in the decision-making processes at the highest levels in this case is speculative. And, to be fair, neither of the two previous QDRs was notable for codification of difficult choices either. There are considerable inertial political forces, both inside and outside the Pentagon, that slow efforts to implement major programmatic change. Nevertheless, the gap between the QDR's aspiration and its achievement in terms of driving transformational change raises the questions: might different choices have been made if advocates for change could have mustered stronger arguments about the potential bases for making controversial trade-offs? And on what grounds might advocates of paring back procurement of expensive weapon systems have justified their views, if not the diminishing likelihood of conventional conflict with peer or near-peer military competitors? But, if claims about differential likelihoods of various types of major military contingencies are drowned out by the noise of uncertainty, then the intellectual grounds for debating strategic choice become quite slippery. In the process, strategic choice becomes more susceptible than it would otherwise be to the dynamics of bureaucratic political power.

12. Denying strategic predictions precludes strategy altogether.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in planning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the distinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome - that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.<sup>36</sup> Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy.

13. Skepticism toward the validity of prediction marginalizes analysis.

Michael Fitzsimmons, 2006 (defence analyst in Washington DC) The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz's 'standard of judgment' for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.

## **DEONTOLOGY KRITIK ANSWERS: ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING REQUIRES LOOKING AT CONSEQUENCES**

### **A. WE MUST ASSESS CONSEQUENCES: FAILURE TO DO SO LEADS TO MORAL BLINDNESS—IT IS MORALLY IRRESPONSIBLE TO NOT ASSESS CONSEQUENCES:**

Jeffrey Issac 2002 (professor of political science @ Indiana University) *Dissent*, Spring 2002, 49: 2, p. 32. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make commoncause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics — as opposed to religion— pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### **B. PREDICTION IS KEY TO ETHICS. ETHICAL ASSESSMENT AND CHANGE DEPEND ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE OUTCOMES**

Fred Chernoff 2005 (Prof. of Political Science at Colgate) *The power of international theory*. p. 18-19. Indeed, moral principles, imperatives and theories require both descriptive and predictive theories, since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. One must know what is possible and probable in order to make or appraise foreign policy decisions. One may not morally condemn the lifeguard for rescuing only one of the two drowning swimmers if it was physically impossible to save both. Similarly, in international politics one may not blame a state dedicated to just and egalitarian democratic rule for not creating a just and egalitarian order throughout the system, if that state does not have the resources to do so. One must have causal and descriptive theories in order to understand what the state has the capacity to do, even when it comes to appraising how well it lives up to its moral obligations. Policy-making unavoidably requires both theories that are primarily moral and theories that are primarily empirical. This book endorses a proper role for normative theory in world politics in appraising past decisions and in choosing the best future courses of action, though it focuses on the primarily empirical form of theory. Theories of IR inspired by critical theory and postmodernism are on stronger ground when they offer strictly normative arguments. One might object that the emphasis here on the need for empirical theories and the need to know consequences would be vulnerable to charges that it endorses ethical consequentialism, which some philosophers reject. But the position here is clearly not that actions are to be evaluated as morally good or bad in terms of their consequences. Even anti-consequentialist positions generally recognise that a moral agent must have knowledge of conditions to perform moral deeds, even if those actions are appraised on the basis of the agent's motivations rather than the actions' consequences.

C. DEONTOLOGY IS SEVERELY FLAWED IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC POLICY.

Gary Woller, 1997 (professor of economics @ BYU). Policy Currents, June 1997. Accessed at [http://apsapolicysection.org/vol7\\_2/72.pdf](http://apsapolicysection.org/vol7_2/72.pdf), p. 11) At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse. For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse outcomes of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of values typically involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.

D. ENCOURAGING A DISCUSSION OF CONSEQUENCES ENCOURAGES ACTION – IT'S NECESSARY TO CHECK GLOBAL DESTRUCTION AND GENOCIDE

Fuyuki Kurasawa 2004 (assistant professor of sociology @ york university) Cautionary tales: The global culture of prevention and the work of foresight. Constellations. 11:4, p. 458-459. In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of 'older' ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, 'ethnic cleansing,' and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community's unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring.

E. AN ETHIC OF CONSEQUENCES ENABLES POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FREEDOM—

Michael Williams, 2005 (professor of international politics @ University of Wales) *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, p. 174-176. A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.<sup>7</sup> Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.<sup>8</sup> But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.



F. DEONTOLOGY IS ABSOLUTIST AND CONCERNED WITH DOING *SOMETHING* RATHER THAN WHAT IS *GOOD*

Gerald Gaus (Prof. of Philosophy @ Tulane), THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY, 2001. Number 35, p.179-193. Online. Internet. Accessed May 29, 06. <http://www.springerlink.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>. To maintain that we have a reason to act in some way just because so acting instantiates a rule, principle, or maxim that instructs us to do so implies that our reason to act does not depend simply on our goals, values, or desires. As Prichard stressed, deontic reasons are imperatival rather than attractive: they instruct us to perform our duties because performance is required, not because we find the action attractive. It is relevant that “[t]he term ‘deontology’ derives from the Greek words *deon* (duty) and *logos* (science).” In the broadest sense, then, an ethical theory is deontological if it constitutes a science of duty and obligations. As Charles Fried says, “the whole domain of the obligatory, the domain of duty, [is] the domain of deontology as opposed to the domain of the good.” Thus whereas teleology is the science of what is good and worthy, deontology is the science of duty and obligation. Charles Larmore has argued that in this expansive sense deontological ethics is the distinctively modern view of ethics: deontologists understand ethics as juristic, issuing demands or imperatives regarding what we *must* do.

G. DEONTOLOGY IS NEVER CONCERNED WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY; ONLY WHETHER IT IS “GOOD” IN THE ABSTRACT

Gerald Gaus (Prof. of Philosophy @ Tulane), THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY, 2001. Number 35, p.179-193. Online. Internet. Accessed May 29, 06. <http://www.springerlink.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>. Apart from revealing the striking diversity in understandings of deontology, our examination also shows the manifest error of the current conviction among many philosophers that consequentialism or teleological ethics is obviously rational and suitable to modern society, while deontological ethics is obviously irrational. A deontic, imperatival, morality is the morality of modernity and, as Prichard convincingly argued, teleologists have great difficulty showing how their attractive conception of ethics, that we desire the good, can yield an imperatival “ought.” Deontological rule-following involves no more irrationality than speaking a language, playing a game, or having good manners; it is to let our actions be guided by rules and principles rather than solely by outcomes. The really interesting question, perhaps, is why so many modern moral philosophers remain committed to the one-sided view of reason and morality that we call consequentialism.

H. THE “INTERVENING ACTORS” POSITION IS MORALLY IRRESPONSIBLE.

1. The intention to result in certain consequences is morally irrelevant—we must look at what is actually caused.

James Rule, 2005 (professor of sociology @ SUNY) ‘Above all, do no harm’ The war in Iraq and dissent. *Dissent*, Summer, 2005, accessed at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/mentest/archives/2005/su05/rule.htm> The least inspiring figures of all are those who have tried to have it both ways—supporting the invasion of Iraq in advance, while dissociating themselves (also in advance) from the atrocities. In the run-up to the onslaught, Thomas L. Friedman praised Bush’s “audacious” war plan as “a job worth doing,” but only “if we can do it right.” Only Friedman could believe that the war then being readied would be carried out to his specifications. In fact, as for other commentators, his only real choice was to endorse what was clearly in store or to count himself out. Once that or any other war began, no one could claim to know its ultimate directions. But its immediate conduct would clearly be in the hands of a political and military establishment that had already amply displayed its colors. Those who supported the invasion signed over their political power of attorney to these figures. Perhaps—I am not sure—some of the intellectual apologists for the Iraq invasion really did understand that it would be as horrific as it has proved to be. Perhaps they were thoughtful enough to realize that the nature of the oppositions involved, the complexity of the objectives, the ruthlessness of the figures on both sides would guarantee the massive death and repression of civilians, the destruction of vast cityscapes, and the institutionalization of torture. Perhaps this was what Paul Berman had in mind when he characterized the Baath Party as “nearly a classic fascist movement” and (for good measure) “so is the radical Islamist movement, in a somewhat different fashion—two strands of a single impulse, which happens to be Europe’s fascist and totalitarian legacy to the modern Muslim world.” (“A Friendly Drink in a Time of War,” *Dissent*, Winter 2004, p. 57). Any response short of military assault on these influences, Berman seems to feel, involves “clinging to attitudes that can only be regarded as racist against Arabs.” When the stakes are so high—liberation of the Muslim world from both godly and godless fascism—even the greatest costs en route are acceptable. This is a page from the apocalyptic scriptures of the neoconservatives. We of the democratic left should be first to decry this reasoning. It is much akin to what horrified Karl Popper half a century ago, when he inveighed against what he called historicism. This is the certain conviction that wished-for historical outcomes warrant any and all measures to hasten their arrival. We must always fear those convinced of the certainty and moral superiority of the world they think they are making, Popper held, since they are willing to countenance any degree of human suffering, if only it appears to lead to that invaluable prize. His key target, of course, was Marxist visions that condoned everything from political assassination to mass murder, if such actions could be portrayed as speeding the day when the evils of capitalism were definitively swept away—and with them, presumably, the roots of all human suffering. Popper’s doctrine can be abused, developed into a doctrinaire ideology in its own right. But properly qualified, it provides what ought to be a key tenet of the democratic left. Hypothetical goals of sweeping and definitive cures for political ills can rarely be regarded as certain outcomes of any political action. Political programs favoring massive human costs in the short run in the interest of revolutionary progress later on warrant searing skepticism. Given a measure of humility about our ability to predict the consequences of massive interventions, we do better to favor moderate steps toward incremental improvement than sweeping and costly measures whose consequences, we must admit, we cannot be sure of.

2. The intervening actors position is morally hollow.

Des Gasper, 1999 (Institute of Social Studies @ The Hague). *European Journal of Development Research*, 11:2, p. 98-99. The ‘mission-bounded’ approach claims ‘it’s not our problem’ how others use the resources provided. Evaluation of relief aid stops at the Purpose level, or below, and is restricted to intended effects. Disastrous unintended effects, especially at the higher Goal level, become someone else’s problem, even when foreseeable and foreseen. By declaring a narrow set of intentions, one escapes responsibility for other effects. This is a version of ‘the doctrine of double effect’” ‘Where one course of action is likely to have two quite different effects, one licit or mandatory and the other illicit, it may be permissible to take that course intending the [former] one but not the other’ [Pan, 1979]. This handy tool could equally support non-supply to the Rwandese camps, since harm to the non-combatant camp residents is not intended. Pushed hard, as a way of living with the deontological proscriptions in Roman Catholicism, the doctrine has generated much casuistry (such as ‘Contraceptive slot machines labeled “For the prevention of disease only”’ (ibid.) and corresponding criticism. For if some effects of one’s actions are the reactions of other actors, and some of their reactions are considered forced.

### EPISTEMOLOGY KRITIK ANSWERS

A. THE LACK OF ABSOLUTE TRUTHS DOESN'T DENY THE NECESSITY OF LOGIC AND DATA. LIMITED TRUTHS ARE POSSIBLE, AND INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE IS STILL USEFUL.

Rudra Sil 2000 (assistant professor of political science @ university of pennsylvania) beyond boundaries? disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in international studies, ed. rudra sil & eileen m doherty, p. 161 accessed via google books. In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements—whether we call it “data” or “narrative”—for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation *more plausible* than the audience would allow at the outset. In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and interpretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of “logically consistent” hypotheses “supported by data” and the ordering of facts in a “thick” narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others. Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate and refine *general* inferences—be they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretations—in order to render them more “sensible” or “plausible” to a particular audience. In the absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible. This does not require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme epistemological positions.

B. EPISTEMOLOGICAL INDICTMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IGNORE THE SPECIFIC CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE AFFIRMATIVE OPERATES—WE SHOULD PRIVILEGE SPECIFICITY OVER SWEEPING INDICTMENTS.

Gearoid Tuathail, 1996 (Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. *Political Geography*, 15: 6-7, p. 663-4. Dalby’s third point builds upon what he suggests earlier about discourses of IR as a powerful part of the Cold War, an argument he inflates even further in pointing to their importance in ‘policing the global order and maintaining injustice, poverty and violence’. The crucial point that I apparently miss is ‘the function of the discipline’s knowledges as practices of hegemony’. There are two points to be made in response to these exceedingly general claims. First, I would argue that evocations of ‘hegemony’ and ‘power’ often function in decontextualizing ways in some poststructuralist writing. Pronouncing something as hegemonic does not tell us very much about the nature and mechanisms of hegemony; in fact, it seems to substitute for the necessity of documenting the precise nature of hegemony in many instances. I recognize that this is not always possible but, in this case at least, the claim is so broad as to be meaningless. Certainly, the concept of hegemony needs to be carefully considered within critical geopolitics. Second, if we get more precise and examine the specific case of IR, there is an argument to be made that this subfield was actually not as powerful a discursive support for Cold War policies as Dalby claims. The number of top-level US foreign-policy decision-makers with PhDs in international relations is actually quite tiny. Most have backgrounds in industry, finance, law, diplomatic service and the military. The disciplining significance of IR and of academia in general is overestimated by Dalby.

C. THE PERMUTATION IS BEST: EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM CREATES THE BEST CHANCE FOR DIALOGUE AND ACCURATE KNOWLEDGE

Rudra Sil 2000 (assistant professor of political science @ university of pennsylvania) beyond boundaries? disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in international studies, ed. rudra sil & eileen m doherty, p. 166 accessed via google books. In the final analysis, it may be best to regard the entire process of social research as an ongoing collective search for meanings by a community of scholars. This search may not result in any definitive answers to theoretical or practical questions given the diverse foundations informing the puzzles, texts, and models that preoccupy members of this community. Nevertheless, thanks to the mediating role played by those subscribing to a pragmatic epistemological middle-ground, the process can still yield valuable insights, partial explanations, and even modest “lessons” and that can be judged as *more or less* convincing in the eyes of one’s audience whether this audience consists of academic peers, the lay public at large, or the policy-making community. In an era of increasingly divided disciplines, scholars adopting a more pragmatic epistemological “middle ground,” by virtue of their agnosticism, are likely to make the most critical contributions to whatever cumulation of knowledge is possible in the social sciences. These scholars are in a better position than those at the extreme ends for the purpose of generating and sustaining greater dialogue across different disciplines, theoretical approaches and intellectual movements precisely because their assumptions prevent them from hastily dismissing a study on grounds that are only meaningful to a subgroup within the wider community of scholars. In the absence of meaningful dialogue across different intellectual communities—whether delimited by disciplines, paradigms or methodological schools—the social sciences risk becoming permanently “balkanized,” with scholars passing up opportunities to glean valuable insights from intellectual products developed on the basis of different foundational assumptions.

D. THE PERMUTATION SOLVES BEST: ENDORSING MULTIPLE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS CAN CORRECT THE BLINDSPOTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

Paul Stern & Daniel Druckman (National Research Council & Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University) 2000. Evaluating interventions in history: The case of international conflict resolution. *International Studies Review*, Spring, p. 62-63, accessed via EBSCO Host

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under

52 Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985); Reilly and Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies*. 62 Stern and Druckman what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called “critical multiplism.”<sup>53</sup> That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as partial correctives for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

E. RADICAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED. OUR KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS HAVE VALUE EVEN IF THEY ARE IMPERFECT, AND ARE SUPERIOR TO THE ALTERNATIVE.

Dmitri Niarguinen (professor of International Relations at Central European University). 2001 Transforming realism: Irreducible core gives life to new interpretations and flexible incarnations. Rubikon E-Journal, December, accessed online at <http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/dmitri.htm> For the genuine link between constructivism and Realism to be taken seriously, certain elaborations are in order. It is tempting, and, indeed, has been common practice to polarize and dichotomize two grand standpoints: positivism and reflectivism. While positivism has been a dominant notion for at least two centuries now, reflectivism seems to be increasingly gaining momentum and may, over time, switch the pendulum to the other extreme. The tendency is out there: under the banner of reflectivism, scholars receive an opportunity to criticize everything which has a grain of rationality. This might lead to either 'Sokal-hoax' type incidents[50] or to a new dogma. In the light of strict positivist/reflectivist dichotomy, hard-core rigid Realism is rightly accused of being blind and stumble. To the same degree may hyper-reflectivism [may] be accused of being chaotic, utopian and irrelevant[51]. Instead of this black-and-white division, we are much more flexible to view things in the shades of gray. To operate on the rationalist/reflectivist continuum then would rather be a virtue than a vice. It is thus important to move from instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitaet) to value-rationality (Wertrationalitaet).[52] Equally is it important to stay away from pure ideas of reflectivism, which like Sirens in Homer's Odyssey are luring scholars onto the rocks. As Alexander Wendt has indicated, ideas, after all, are not all the way down. To counter an argument that reflectivism and positivism are epistemologically incompatible, it is plausible to say that much cooperation is possible on the ontological basis alone. Indeed, neither positivism, nor reflectivism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. The state of the social sciences of international relations is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature[53].

F. PRIVILEGING CONCEPTS LIKE EPISTEMOLOGY HIDES FLAWS IN POST-MODERN APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Darryl Jarvis, 2000. Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 138.

First, I must acknowledge that any theoretical critique of Ashley's project, including this one, is destined to failure, at least in its ability to affect the course of debate within postmodernism. This problem is not endemic to the nature of the critique(s), but reflects the fact that postmodern theory is as much driven by ideological commitment as by theoretical innovation. Moreover, within international relations theory the postmodernist perspective exists independently of contending approaches, hermetically isolated if only because of its specialized nomenclature and distinctive ideological hue that encloses participants in a select and self-absorbed theoretical-ideological discourse. Membership to this discourse is exclusive and limited to those who promise to take up the faith and propagate it, not question it critically. Thus, regardless of how erudite critiques might be, or how serendipitous critical analysis proves, we can scarcely expect Ashley to be convinced by intellectual mustings when they are contrary to his political ambitions. For in Ashley's writings we are confronted as much by ideological intransigence as we debate over ontological and epistemological issues. The postmodernist/modernist divide is more ideological than theoretical, a battle not between contending ontologies so much as between political loyalties. The façade of ontological and epistemological debate has thus been used deceptively to shield the underlying ideological axis upon which these debates ultimately rest. For this reason, we should not be surprised that postmodernists remain unconvinced by modernist theory, or vice versa, or that each is largely uninterested in the others perspective, theory, or arguments. Those views, theories, or paradigms not in accord with one's own worldview or basic values are rarely considered, let alone studied. And while Ashley would have us believe that these failings are the exclusive preserve of modernist/positivist theory, postmodernist theory too is just as guilty, having evolved in isolation, cocooned by technical nomenclature, reticent to engage contending perspectives in useful dialogue, and trigger happy in rejecting opposing perspectives without first understanding them.

## **ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY IS POSSIBLE**

### **1. ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY IS POSSIBLE IF WE FOCUS ON MAKING PRACTICAL DECISIONS THAT PRODUCE EQUITABLE CONSEQUENCES**

David Condrón (special technical advisor in the Department of Defense), *JOURNAL OF POWER AND ETHICS*, July 2000. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. So how could a humanitarian foreign policy be formulated? It must focus on what people have in common. This commonality can be found in the area proscribed by our natural moral sense. By focusing attention to the common plight of people very much like us, while reinforcing it with government programs directed at building relationship with people around the globe, a popular humanitarian foreign policy could be justified. The sympathy, fairness, self-control, and duty of the public can be directed at people who are very distant geographically. The communications and transportation revolutions which enabled the global economy also make ethical foreign policy possible. Understanding the natural moral sense and how it develops is the cornerstone of such a foreign policy, however. What would be the major components of such a foreign policy? While promotion of global markets may seem self-serving, it actually promotes fairness. This is because commercial life requires trust in business dealings and a good reputation for the marketing of products. Practicing fairness yields predictable economic results. Such fairness is necessary even with people of different ethnic heritage for strictly economic reasons. This builds a relationship between people who might otherwise have none and thus promotes extension of the moral sense to those people. Fairness is also promoted by pursuing women's rights. Some cultures may not currently value women as fully deserving of completely fair treatment, but this is only a symptom of a larger problem: in such societies, equality before the law is withheld from other groups as well. This is because those empowered by the society have not yet seen the relationship between themselves and the groups denied equality. Thus they naturally apply the moral sense only to those with whom they identify most closely.

### **2. THE AFFIRMATIVE GIVES VOICE TO AN ETHICAL VERSION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON GLOBAL COOPERATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

David Condrón (special technical advisor in the Department of Defense), *JOURNAL OF POWER AND ETHICS*, July 2000. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. In the same way, long-term commitment internationally reinforces moral behavior among nations. Thus, an ethical foreign policy would stress long-term commitment in order to further the moral behavior and “character development” of nations. An ethical foreign policy would also promote international order by establishing a forum for discussion of issues and actively utilizing that forum to reach consensus on potentially divisive issues. This helps expand the natural localism of the moral sense toward the universals prevalent in Western ideals. It does this by allowing participation in the process of conflict resolution. While individual nations may still act according to raw self-interest, the point is that they will find it increasingly more difficult to do so when confronted with people on which they depend. International law and order may be inconvenient in many cases, but proves to be in the long-term interest of every nation by allowing them to assess with common standards what is expected of them and what they can expect from others with whom they have a continuing relationship. To further foster international relationship, ethical foreign policy would promote cultural exchanges. This increases sympathy among peoples, developing and maintaining organic relationships, which are so important for application of the moral sense to people who are very different. The planks of an ethical foreign policy are summarized in Table 1 with their corresponding application to the moral sense. Many of these are elements of current U.S. foreign policy. What is provided in this article is a basis for why they should be important parts of U.S. foreign policy. Unless an adequate case is formulated and communicated repeatedly to the American public and influential persons in society, these policy goals will continue to be pursued on an ad hoc basis. By providing a coherent framework for ethical foreign policy, it will be possible to maintain a consistent U.S. foreign policy based on national consensus and validated by universal biological principles. Such is an urgent need in these turbulent times of change.

3. THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY CAN BE METHODOLOGICALLY JUSTIFIED; IT FUNCTIONS AS A SITE FOR ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICS

Christopher Hill, *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*, March 2003. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://weblinks3.epnet.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>. Foreign policy is a concept that has been neglected academically in recent years. Politically it has been given more attention, but mostly as a vehicle for ethical projects. This is a pity given that the content of foreign policy has expanded, through domestic and foreign affairs becoming more intertwined, that public interest is growing and that the area always involves multiple goals and complex trade-offs. It is argued here that foreign policy is in fact a crucial site for political argument and choice in the modern world, especially for democratic states, and that it is not enough to take a systemic view of international relations, such as those provided by neo-realism or globalization. Foreign policy provides us with a focal point for the debate about political agency—that is, how we may act on the world, and with what effects—which we avoid at our peril.

4. INTERNATIONAL POSITIVISM IS GOOD; USE OF THE STATE AND TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS KEY TO SOLVING GLOBAL PROBLEMS

Harold Koh (Professor Emeritus @ Harvard), *YALE LAW JOURNAL*, June 1997. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 1, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). In the wake of the Allied victory in World War II, the architects of the postwar system replaced the preexisting loose customary web of state-centric rules with an ambitious **positivistic order**, built on institutions and constitutions: international institutions governed by multilateral treaties organizing proactive assaults on all manner of global problems. These global “constitutions” sought both to allocate institutional responsibility and to declare particular rules of international law. Political conflict, for example, was to be regulated by the United Nations and its constituent organs - the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the World Court - under the aegis of a United Nations Charter premised on abstinence from unilateral uses of force. The United Nations system was supplemented by an alphabet soup of specialized, functional political organs and regional political and defense pacts based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. Destructive economic conflicts, by contrast, were to be mitigated through the Bretton Woods system, which provided that the World Bank would supervise international reconstruction and development, the International Monetary Fund would monitor balance of payments, and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would manage international principles of economic liberalism and market capitalism. These global economic institutions were buttressed by regional economic communities such as the European Economic Community, each governed by its own constitution-like treaty. This complex positive law framework reconceptualized international law as a creative medium for organizing the activities and relations of numerous transnational players, a category that now included intergovernmental organizations with independent decisionmaking capacity.

5. FOLLOWING THE “RULES” OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROMOTES GLOBAL COMMUNALISM

Harold Koh (Professor Emeritus @ Harvard), *YALE LAW JOURNAL*, June 1997. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 1, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). European theorists, perhaps less emotionally driven by a need to support American hegemony, never fully accepted a schism between international law and international relations. English scholars such as Martin Wight (1913-1972) and Hedley Bull (1932-1985) developed the notion of a common consciousness among states. Building upon the “solidaristic” strand identified by Brierly and Verdross, they expressly invoked the Grotian notion of “international society.” Within this international society, they reasoned, nations comply with international law for essentially communitarian reasons: not solely because of cost-benefit calculations about particular transactions, but because particular rules are nested within a much broader fabric of ongoing communal relations.

## FEMINIST KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. FEMINIST THEORIES REIFY GENDER DIFFERENCES.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 61. As many have pointed out, arguments against male dominance simultaneously reify a distinction between men and women; they operate to essentialize gender as a factual difference. Similarly, as various criticisms are couched in the language of racial conflict, the concept of essential differences between races is sustained; to speak against upper-class domination is to engender the reality of class differences. Once reality has been struck in terms of the binary, the contours of the world are fixed.

### B. THE NEGATIVE'S ASSOCIATIONS OF WOMEN WITH PEACE AND PATRIARCHY IS ESSENTIALIST AND DISEMPOWERING

J. Ann Tickner (Associate professor of political science at the College of the Holy Cross) GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1992, 59. Such a notion of citizenship cannot come about, however, until myths that perpetuate views of women as victims rather than agents are eliminated. One such myth is the association of women with peace, an association that has been invalidated through considerable evidence of women's support for men's wars in many societies. 79 In spite of a gender gap, a plurality of women rally support war and national security policies; Bernice Carroll suggests that the association of women and peace is that has been imposed on women by their disarmed condition. In the West, this association grew out of the Victorian ideology of women's moral superiority and the glorification of motherhood. This ideal was expressed by feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman whose book Herland was serialized in The Forerunner in 1915. Gilman glorified women as caring and nurturing mothers whose private sphere skills could benefit the world at large.<sup>81</sup> Most turn-of-the-century feminists shared Gilman's ideas. But if the implication of this view was that women were disqualified from participating in the corrupt world of political and economic power by virtue of their moral superiority, the result could be the perpetuation of male dominance. Many contemporary feminists see dangers in the continuation of these essentializing myths that can only result in the perpetuation men's subordination and reinforce dualisms that serve to make men more powerful. The association of femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naive in matters relating to international politics. An enriched, less militarized notion of citizenship cannot be built on such a weak foundation.

### C. ESSENTIALIST FEMINISM REINFORCES GENDER STEREOTYPES THROUGH VALORIZATION OF WOMEN'S DIFFERENCES, PREVENTING EFFORTS TO END OPPRESSION, KILLING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THEIR CRITIQUE, AND HARMING OURSELVES AND OUR LISTENERS.

Iris Young (Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh) THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY, 1990, 89-90. Within the context of antifeminist backlash, the effect of gynocentric feminism may be accommodating to the existing structure. Gynocentric feminism relies on and reinforces gender stereotypes at just the time when the dominant culture has put new emphasis on marks of gender difference. It does so, moreover, by relying on many of those aspects of women's traditional sphere that traditional patriarchal ideology has most exploited and that humanist feminists such as Beauvoir found most oppressive--reproductive biology, motherhood, domestic concerns. Even though its intentions are subversive, such renewed attention to traditional femininity can have a reactionary effect on both ourselves and our listeners because it may echo the dominant claim that women belong in a separate sphere. Humanist feminism calls upon patriarchal society to open places for women within those spheres of human activity that have been considered the most creative, powerful, and prestigious. Gynocentric feminism replies that wanting such things for women implies a recognition that such activities are the most humanly valuable. It argues that in fact, militarism, bureaucratic hierarchy, competition for recognition, and the instrumentalization of nature and people entailed by these activities are basic disvalues.<sup>24</sup> Yet in contemporary society, men still have most institutionalized power, and gynocentric feminism shows why they do not use it well. If feminism turns its back on the centers of power, privilege, and individual achievement that men have monopolized, those men will continue to monopolize them, and nothing significant will change.



Iris Young (Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh) *THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY*, 1990, 89-90. Feminists cannot undermine masculinist values without entering some of the centers of power that foster them, but the attainment of such power itself requires at least appearing to foster those values. Still, without being willing to risk such co-optation, feminism can be only a moral position of critique rather than a force for institutional change. Despite its intention, I fear that gynocentric feminism may have the same consequence as the stance of moral motherhood that grew out of nineteenth century feminism a resegregation of women to a specifically women's sphere, outside the sites of power, privilege, and recognition. For me the symptom here is what the dominant culture finds more threatening. Within the dominant culture a middle-aged assertive woman's claim to co-anchor the news alongside a man appears considerably more threatening than women's claim to have a different voice that exposes masculinist values as body-denying and selfish. The claim of women to have a right to the positions and benefits that have hitherto been reserved for men, and that male dominated institutions should serve women's needs, is a direct threat to male privilege. While the claim that these positions of power themselves should be eliminated and the institutions eliminated or restructured is indeed more radical, when asserted from the gynocentric feminist position it can be an objective retreat. Gynocentrism's focus on values and language as the primary target of its critique contributes to this blunting of its political force. Without doubt, social change requires changing the subject, which in turn means developing new ways of speaking, writing, and imagining. Equally indubitable is the gynocentric feminist claim that masculinist values in Western culture deny the body, sensuality, and rootedness in nature and that such denial nurtures fascism, pollution, and nuclear games. Given these facts, however, what shall we do? To this gynocentrism has little concrete answer. Because its criticism of existing society is so global and abstract, gynocentric critique of values, language, and culture of masculinism can remove feminist theory from analysis of specific institutions and practices, and how they might be concretely structurally changed in directions more consonant with our visions.

#### D. THE LACK OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WILL COLLAPSE THE FEMINISM MOVEMENT

Barbara Epstein (Professor of History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz) *MONTHLY REVIEW*, 2001. Accessed online from [monthlyreview.org](http://monthlyreview.org). The anarchist sensibility has made important contributions to the radical tradition in U.S. history. It has brought an insistence on equality and democracy, a resistance to compromise of principle for the sake of political expediency. Anarchism has been associated with efforts to put the values of the movement into practice and to create communities governed by these values. Anarchism has also been associated with political theater and art, with creativity as an element of political practice. It has insisted that radical politics need not be dreary. But the anarchist mindset also has its doctrinaire side, a tendency to insist on principle to the point of disregarding the context or likely results of political action. In this regard the anarchist sensibility has something in common with the outlook of Christian radicals who believe in acting on their consciences and leaving the consequences to God. The moral absolutism of the anarchist approach to politics is difficult to sustain in the context of a social movement. Absolute internal equality is hard to sustain. Movements need leaders. Anti-leadership ideology cannot eliminate leaders, but it can lead a movement to deny that it has leaders, thus undermining democratic constraints on those who assume the roles of leadership, and also preventing the formation of vehicles for recruiting new leaders when the existing ones become too tired to continue. Within radical feminism a view of all hierarchies as oppressive led to attacks on those who took on the responsibilities of leadership. This led to considerable internal conflict, and created a reluctance to take on leadership roles, which weakened the movement. Movements dominated by an anarchist mindset are prone to burning out early.

## ONTOLOGY KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. EXISTENCE IS A PRE-REQUISITE TO ONTOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION—IF WE WIN OUR WAR IMPACTS THEN THEY TRUMP THE NEED FOR ONTOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION.

Paul Wapner, 2003. (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University) *Leftist Criticism of*. Accessed at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539>

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions—except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world—in all its diverse embodiments—must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

### B. AN ONTOLOGICAL FOCUS WILL FOREVER DELAY POLITICAL ACTION.

Darryl Jarvis, 2000. Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline*. pg. 139-140.

This we might interpret as faceless description without meaning, commitment without purpose, and theory without reason. As William Connolly notes, Ashley creates a poststructuralism bereft of logic, direction, or mission, where “theory does not ‘impose’ a general interpretation; it does not offer ‘a guide’ to the ‘transformation’ of life ‘on a global scale.’” Well might we ask then, what does it do? After all, is this not the purpose of theory? Apparently not. It is enough for Ashley that we simply fret against transcendental grounds, universal projects, and grand designs. But, as Connolly observes, by imposing “this set of interwoven self-restrictions, Ashley may have reduced ‘poststructuralism’ to one perpetual assignment to ‘invert the hierarchies’ maintained in other theories. One might call this recipe for theoretical self-restriction ‘post-ponism.’ It links the inability to establish secure ontological ground for a theory with the obligation to defer indefinitely the construction of general theories of global politics. And it does so during a time when the greatest danger and contingencies in the world are global in character.

C. PLACING ONTOLOGY FIRST NEGLECTS IMPORTANT EMPIRICAL AND CAUSAL INSIGHTS.

Alexander Wendt, 1999 (Professor of Int'l Security, Dept of Political Science at Ohio State University). Theory and structure in international political economy. Edited by Charles Lipson and Benjamin Cohen. pg. 109. Accessed via google books. I have argued that the proponents of strong liberalism and the constructivists can and should join forces in contributing to a process-oriented international theory. Each group has characteristic weaknesses that are complemented by the other's strengths. In part because of the decision to adopt a choice-theoretic approach to theory-construction, neoliberals have been unable to translate their work on institution-building and complex learning into a systemic theory that escapes the explanatory priority of realism's concern with structure. Their weakness, in other words, is a lingering unwillingness to transcend, at the level of systemic theory, the individualist assumption that identities and interests are exogenously given. Constructivists bring to this lack of resolution a systematic communitarian ontology in which intersubjective knowledge constitutes identities and interests. For their part, however, constructivists have often devoted too much effort to questions of ontology and construction and not enough to the causal and empirical questions of how identities and interests are produced by practice in anarchic conditions. As a result, they have not taken on board neoliberal insights into learning and social cognition.

D. PLACING ONTOLOGY FIRST WOULD FREEZE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.

Fred Chernoff, 2007 ( Professor in the Department of Political Science at Colgate University) Millennium— Journal of International Studies. 35: 406. Accessed via Sage Publications. Wight opposes 'unnecessary closure' that could result from the specification of methodological criteria in advance of ontology. It is, however, difficult to see how, on his view, he can explain the development of theories that postulate entities which do not seem at all plausible, given our previous background knowledge and theories, such as the quantum concept of the atom or relativistic character of the physical universe. The requirement that we must start by specifying the theoretical ontology would restrict all theories that postulate entities that are extremely unfamiliar; those theories could not be considered no matter how much more fully, simply and clearly they explain the observable world and no matter how much better they produce correct predictions of the outcomes of experiments. SR, if understood as requiring a specification of the theoretical ontology before competing theories are tested, would be the approach that leads to closure. It is important to be clear about what commitments investigators must make at various stages of inquiry. In my view, the only possible ontological commitments we should have to start with are commitments to common-sense objects (dogs, cats) and pre-theoretical objects (wars, chess matches). We then formulate precise questions about the observable world and devise theories to answer those questions. The theory that answers the questions best, based on specifiable criteria and available evidence, is accepted. If we are supporters of SR we may include the theoretically postulated entities in our ontology; if we reject SR, we will not. Real-world scientists who endorse SR infer the reality of the entities that the best theories postulate only after the theories are shown, on the basis of available evidence and the accepted criteria of scientific theory choice, to be superior to their rivals. Scientists do not specify a theoretical ontology in advance of inquiry. The key point is that the theoretical entities we include in our ontology are given by our best theory and cannot be specified in advance. There is an interactive process of developing a theoretical ontology out of a common-sense ontology, observations, and a set of methodological and epistemological principles. We have no grounds on which to accept a hegemonic trade regime in nineteenth-century Europe or quarks other than the fact that they play a role in a theory that we value.

E. AN ONTOLOGICAL FOCUS WOULD KILL POLICY ANALYSIS WHICH IS NEEDED TO CONFRONT GLOBAL CHALLENGES.

Darryl Jarvis, 2000. Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 2.

While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of “theory” which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looking and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront people around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination. These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorist of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the “manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed.” To be concerned with the latter is to be “on the cutting edge,” where novelty has itself become an “appropriate form of scholarship”

F. IT IS GOOD TO BASE POLICY DECISIONS ON RESULTS AND OUTCOMES RATHER THAN ON PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATION

Nikolas Gyosdev (Executive Editor of *The National Interest*), *SAIS REVIEW*, Winter-Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. [http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/sais\\_review/v025/25.1gyosdev.pdf](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/sais_review/v025/25.1gyosdev.pdf). Realism accepts the reality of imperfect compromises. It does not dismiss as immoral the need to adjudicate conflicts between various preferences and assign priorities consistent with available resources, even if it means that some tasks are left unaddressed. There is no doubt that an emotional idealism—reinforced by horrific television images broadcast on 24-hour news channels—seems much more appealing. Having a policy or “taking a stand” that appears to be “doing something” in the face of violence or suffering is a temptation few officials can resist, even if the end results worsen the situation. In assessing the track record of humanitarian interventions in Africa during the 1990s, J. Peter Pham concluded: Intervention can exacerbate, rather than reduce, the humanitarian crisis. In fact, an ill-timed humanitarian military intervention can cause the very tragedies it was supposed to prevent, intensifying the level of violence. Idealists and moralists were forced into all sorts of intellectual contortions to explain how Kosovo Albanians differed from Kurds, Chechens, Rwandans, and Timorese. within a conflict and thus increasing the domestic security threat and spreading regional instability.<sup>27</sup> Idealists dismiss many of these concerns. If only the United States would deploy more troops, commit more resources, muster the “will” to act, then there would be no need for setting priorities and making choices. They argue that it is better to have “tried and failed” than not to have tried at all. But with regard to foreign policy, it is difficult to make moral judgments without the benefit of hindsight. This is why realists insist on a morality of results rather than one of intentions in assessing policy. Morgenthau concluded: We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired? This ought to be our guide.

G. NOTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING ARE GOOD—THIS CREATES PROGRESS ON REAL GLOBAL ISSUES

Harold Koh (Professor Emeritus @ Harvard), *YALE LAW JOURNAL*, June 1997. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 1, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). The question now forced upon international relations scholars was why, despite the bipolarity of the Cold War regime, had interstate cooperation persisted? These scholars could not ignore the remarkable growth of formal and informal, public and nonpublic regimes, which promoted the evolution of norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures in such “transnational issue areas” as international human rights, arms control, international economic law, and international environmental law. In response, liberal institutionalists and international political economists developed “regime theory,” the study of principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures that converge in given issue areas. In so doing, they shifted the focus of inquiry from the functioning of international organizations per se to the broader phenomenon of international cooperation, as exemplified by the regimes of “international peacekeeping” or “debt management” as they transpire both within and without institutional settings. In one fell swoop, this analysis created new theoretical space for international law within international relations theory, as political scientists came to recognize that legal rules do, in fact, foster compliance with regime norms by providing channels for dispute-settlement, signaling and triggering retaliatory actions, and requiring states to furnish information regarding compliance.

## **PERMUTATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS KRITIKS SOLVE BEST**

### **A. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION: REALISM OPERATES AS A BRIDGE TO UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD THAT IS NECESSARY FOR THEIR KRITIK TO FUNCTION.**

Dmitri Niarguinen (professor of International Relations at Central European University). 2001 Transforming realism: Irreducible core gives life to new interpretations and flexible incarnations. Rubikon E-Journal, December, accessed online at <http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/dmitri.htm> Has, indeed, Realism become anachronistic? If it were a monolithic rigid theory, the answer would probably be 'yes.' I have argued, however, that Realism is not homogeneous; rather, it has an irreducible core which is able to create flexible incarnations. At minimum, Realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook[64]. This is true even if Realism stays on the extreme polar of positivism. However, positivism/rationalism in a pure form is of little value. In the words of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, "the approach of 'rational behavior,' as it is typically interpreted, leads to a remarkably mute theory..."[65]. Realism needs not be predestined to remain stagnant[66]. At maximum, thus, when Realism operates in the shades of gray between positivism and reflectivism, its strength is paramount. Consequently, there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a Realist century[67]. Once again I want to stress that Realism should not be perceived as dogmatic. And this is why we do need reflectivist approaches to problematize what is self-evident, and thus to counterbalance naive Realism[68]. In doing so, however, we are more flexible in keeping the 'middle ground' and not in sliding to the other extreme. As Wendt believes, in the medium run, sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system[69]. While this contention is arguable, it is hardly possible to challenge his psychological observation, "...Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure – structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices – the more that states think like "Realist" the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy[70]. Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is "a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics"[71].

### **B. THE PERMUTATION OF TRADITIONAL, POSITIVIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES OFFERS THE BEST HOPE FOR SOLUTIONS TO IR DILEMMAS:**

Milja Kurki 2007 (Lecturer, Department of Int'l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online. There are a number of defences that critical realism would resort to against the positivist criticisms. However, need the relationship between critical realism and positivism be acrimonious? While critical realists disagree with the positivist legacies that inform much of contemporary social science, they do not think that positivist knowledge is 'useless' in IR, but simply that it does not exhaust the analysis of complex causes in world politics and needs to be complemented by more holistic ontological and methodological avenues. Critical realism emphasises that positivists need to open their minds to different ways of doing causal analysis in IR and engage with alternative causal methodologies and questions in a more serious manner. Yet much room for dialogue with the positivists also remains: both views recognise the importance of science and causal analysis in shaping our understandings of the world around us, value critical evaluation of existing explanations and emphasise importance of empirical evidence gathering (though with different methodological emphasis). Critical realism, as an anti-positivist philosophy, does not support a positivist view of science of IR; however, it can understand the partial relevance of positivist knowledge claims, provide tools for complementing these claims with more pluralistic methods and introduce positivists to the possibility of a more open and reflective model of science.

## **REALISM BEST EXPLAINS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

### **A. REALISM IS THE MOST ACCURATE WAY TO EXPLAIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

1. Studies and pragmatism illustrate that nations act in a realist manner.

John Mearsheimer, 2001 (professor of international relations at the University of Chicago) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Accessed at <http://www.irchina.org/xueke/fangfa/view.asp?id=114> The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy—the driving force behind great-power behavior—did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

2. Realism is empirically valid—the reason why the state and balance of power are analyzed is because the analysis of contemporary empirically conditions indicate this is the best strategy for accuracy and defense of moral principles.

Alastair Murray, 1997 (lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea) *Reconstructing Realism*, pp. 187-188 Realism does not cease to consider the empirical; rather, its continued analysis of it is vital to its identification of the appropriate mode of practice and to its continued defence of it. Consequently, we arrive back at our starting point with a viable external standard against which the continued appropriateness of the balance of power as a practical scheme can be assessed. If realism does contain the potential to address changes in base conditions, the central argument with which Ashley is left is that it actively seeks to avoid doing so. He suggests that, because the balance of power scheme involves what is effectively an acceptance of the traditional 'rules of the game', it actively reproduces, by its very success, the traditional statist terms of the game, such that realism becomes complicit in a conservative perpetuation of an iniquitous statist order by its endorsement of it.<sup>46</sup> Ashley would, of course, like to treat this as design, and end the matter there. Yet this is to equate implication with purpose. If the balance of power scheme implies the reproduction of the state, this does not prove its dedication to this objective. Realism advocated a scheme for an interstate balance of power not because of any concern to reproduce the state, but because its analysis of contemporary empirical conditions indicated that such a strategy offered the best available fulfilment of moral principles: if states represent the principal receptacles of power in the modern environment, the best level of justice can be achieved by establishing some equilibrium of power between states.<sup>47</sup> Consequently, its position not only moves beyond the state, de-privileges it, and demands its compliance in principles which privilege the individual, but, furthermore, this position is open to the possibility of progress beyond it towards some more universal order. If the state must be employed as the principal agent of international justice and international change, it is only because of its current centrality to international politics.

3. Realism is the best way to describe how leaders act.

Robert Lieber (Professor of Government @ Georgetown Univ), WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 1993. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. As a consequence of the anarchy problem, states find that they dwell in a kind of self-help system. They either must be prepared to defend their own interests and those of their people, or to seek means of doing so through alliances. These realities of existential realism do not yield iron laws, but they do create a series of propensities shaping state behavior. Recognition of these propensities, and appreciation that they are not rigidly deterministic but that they condition the environment in which states and their leaders act, is crucial to an understanding of international relations.

4. Postmodern and critical theories of international relations are flawed compared to realism.

Hussein Solomon (Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy), AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, 1996. Online. Internet. Accessed June 8, 06. Although ridiculed by critics wearing the mantle of post-modernism and critical theory, it is argued that realism — both the classical realism of Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr, and the structural or neo-realism of Waltz and Krasner — are best suited as tools to understand the turbulent world in which we live. At all times, the interface between theory and practice is exposed.

B. ALTERNATIVES TO REALISM RISK DISASTER.

1. Alternatives to realism risk fascism by locking in models of non-prediction.

John J. Mearsheimer, (professor of international relations at the University of Chicago) 1994.

The false promise of international institutions. Winter 1994. Accessed via Academic OneFile. There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act...such expectations are almost never realized in practice." (160) Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse.

2. Realism is inevitable, and is the best explanation of state behavior.

Hussein Solomon (Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy), AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, 1996. Online. Internet. These cases illustrate the fact that power, or the lack of it, is the central organising principle of international politics, not international law or organisation; and that international law and world bodies like the UN are cynically used and abused by the powerful to further their own interests - as it has been done for centuries. Even more prosaically, it underlines the correctness of the realist paradigm which views the structure of the international system as a hierarchy based on power capabilities; where the principle of equality between states is non-existent since states have different power capabilities; and where weak states are at the mercy of more powerful states.

3. Realist approaches to state policymaking are justified and the key to solving real problems.

Robert Lieber (Professor of Government @ Georgetown Univ), WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 1993. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. As a means of making sense of the external world and the requirements of foreign policy, realism provides no iron laws of human behavior, but it does offer an approach to reality in which both theory and policy can be grounded. In the post-cold war world, **patterns of interdependence** and significant areas of cooperation among states are of fundamental importance. But a continuing realm for power politics exists simultaneously as an enduring feature of the same world, and international relations remain subject to the basic existential problems identified by realism: states exist in an international system without an overall authority to provide order; this "self-help" system creates imperatives that shape foreign policy behavior, especially in security matters, and sometimes in other realms; conflicts, which are inevitable in human affairs, and for which externally devised solutions are unavailable, have the potential for erupting into violence and war. Recognition of these realities is a precondition both for understanding the dynamics of international affairs and for developing policies that are to have any hope of achieving peace and protecting the national interest.



4. Critics of realism fail to offer a better alternative to realism.

John J. Mearscheimer (Professor of Political Science @ Univ. of Chicago), *INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*, Summer 1995. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 6, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. For realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the international system. Individuals are free to adopt non-realist discourses, but in the final analysis, the system forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction. Critical theorists, on the other hand, focus on the social structure of the international system. They believe that “world politics is socially constructed,” which is another way of saying that shared discourse, or how communities of individuals think and talk about the world, largely shapes the world. Wendt recognizes that “material resources like gold and tanks exist,” but he argues that “such capabilities . . . only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” Significantly for critical theorists, discourse can change, which means that realism is not forever, and that therefore it might be possible to move beyond realism to a world where institutionalized norms cause states to behave in more communitarian and peaceful ways. The most revealing aspect of Wendt's discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charges leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant, and others fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised this question in “False Promise.” Moreover, he sheds no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions.

5. Even assuming the rise of new movements, realism is still the best way to describe international relations.

Robert Lieber (Professor of Government @ Georgetown Univ), *WASHINGTON QUARTERLY*, Winter 1993. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). Together, these factors (the global economy, international institutions, democratization, transnational and subnational forces, nuclear weapons, and learning) have been significant either in eroding the ability of states to act autonomously, or in shaping state behavior. Frequently, they have the effect of mitigating or even precluding conflict and war, although they are not always necessarily conducive to cooperation. Nevertheless, authority still resides with the state, hence the propensities described by existential realism continue to condition state behavior. Moreover, subnational regional and ethnic groups typically speak in the language of statehood and often see this as the goal for which they strive.

C. REALISM IS NOT IMMORAL.

1. The state can act morally in the international relations sphere.

Neta Crawford, *NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW*, Autumn 2004. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Research Database. Liberals have criticized realist views of morality in world politics on several grounds. First, they argue that morality is already woven throughout the foreign policy behavior of states and that this can be seen in, for example, the (admittedly imperfect) adherence of states to laws of war, as well as in the provision of foreign aid. Second, liberals hold that the realist objections to ethics in international politics are unconvincing. Specifically, in this view, the structure of world politics is not so anarchic as realists suppose; actors, including powerful states, have moral interests as well as material ones; and morality is prudent. To do good brings its own reward — people trust you. You do not have to spend your resources coercing others; they will want to work with you. (12) Because foreign policy is thoroughly imbued with morality in this view, the liberal list of the moral responsibilities of states would be large. Emphasizing the poverty, disease, and lack of educational opportunity in the poor areas of the world, liberals would put foreign assistance, the principles of just war, and the promotion of democratic values and human rights at the top of their foreign agenda. They argue that to help others is not only right but increases one's own security.

2. The global spread of democracy will check the negative aspects of realism.

Robert Lieber (Professor of Government @ Georgetown Univ), WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 1993. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. Third, democratization can operate to mitigate the anarchic nature of the international system. In this case, genuinely democratic states have had a laudable record of not making war against one another. Why this should be so is a matter of conjecture, but one evident factor is that by making policy processes more transparent, democracy eases some of the uncertainty about state intentions that drives the security dilemma. The spread of democratization thus holds the potential for very significantly reducing the level of interstate violence. Indeed, at a conceptual level, democratization may represent a profound challenge to the assumptions on which existential realism is based. At the same time, however, it is essential to note that democratic states do continue to find themselves in conflict and sometimes at war with nondemocratic states. Moreover, the idea of democratization implies the adoption of a genuinely effective constitutional democracy as widely understood in the West, and not the kind of plebiscitary charade that authoritarian systems sometimes adopt in a bid to provide their rulers with greater legitimacy. Nor does the concept of democracy really include instances when elections are no more than a means by which a group or movement consolidates power and then closes off the process against other competing groups ("one man, one vote, one time").

3. Realism is the optimal way to view international relations.

Hussein Solomon (Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy), AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, 1996. Online. Internet. Accessed June 8, 06. We are living in a dynamic and turbulent period of world history, fecund with seeming contradictions. In an era which has witnessed the end of some of the most intractable conflicts of the twentieth century - the Cold War and apartheid - and therefore seemingly to herald a new era of peace, Russian forces brutally attack the break-away republic of Chechnya and Peru and Ecuador go to war.<sup>1</sup> In an era where the winds of democracy has ostensibly signified the end of the one-party state, authoritarianism and human rights abuses are still the order of the day in much of Eastern Europe and Africa: the Mobutus and the Abachas still reign and the Abiolas languish in prison. Moreover in Eastern Europe, ultra-nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky are gaining ground, while the apparatchiks of the former communist regimes are being returned to power under the banner of the 'Reconstituted Left' like a warped rendition of the 'Star Wars Trilogy'! In an era where one hears increasing talk of a global economy, the possibility of several trade wars occurring is a reality. In an era where there is talk of a global culture, various types of insular cultural chauvinisms are expressed. In an era where there is increasing talk of a harmonious global polity, the world is wracked by conflict generated by secessionist movements wearing the mantle of ethnicity, nationalism or religious fundamentalism. To make sense of the confusing world we inhabit, we need theory. Theory, according to Kenneth Waltz, "...is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret them."<sup>2</sup> However, theory, especially in the social sciences, as can be inferred from the above definition, cannot be objective.<sup>3</sup> This then creates the basis for competing theories to develop. In international relations, one finds the dominant realist/neo-realist paradigm coming under fire from critics wearing the garb of post-modernism and critical theory.

4. Realism is not amoral: this is merely a false dilemma set up by critics.

Hussein Solomon (Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy), AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, 1996. Online. Internet. It has been argued by Walker that realism's concentration on power-politics results in the development of a dichotomy between power and morality. He also asserts that realism negates the usefulness, or indeed, the relevance of ethics in the international arena. Vale<sup>65</sup> makes a similar point on the power *versus* morality issue. He even goes further by implying a link between realism and immoral apartheid. Is this true? Does realism, both as theory and as practice, separate power from ethics? Does realism advocate immorality in international politics? On the theoretical side one could repudiate this challenge by simply turning to Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919 -1939 which is one of the chief scrolls in the realist faith. It is generally regarded that this text effectively repudiated the tenets of Wilsonian idealism and set the basic principles of power politics on which Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Reynolds and others had built. However, a closer examination of the book itself provides a more tempered view of the role of power and an appreciation of morality in international politics. For instance, Carr puts forward the notion of a combination of power and morality, basing thoughts on elements of both utopia and reality, and he describes politics and law as a 'meeting place' for ethics and power.

## REPRESENTATIONS KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL, AND GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS TRUMP REPRESENTATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY:

Gearoid Tuathail, 1996 (Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. *Political Geography*, 15: 6-7, p. 664. While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decisionmakers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problemsolving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby's fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement- 'Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought'-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby's reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby's fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby's book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby's interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev's reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly selfinterested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies 'poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

### B. PERMUTATION: DO THE PLAN AND REJECT THE REPRESENTATIONS THEY INDICT:

Darryl Jarvis, 2000. Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline*. Accessed via google books. Pointing out silences and omissions from the dominant discourse is always fruitful and necessary, but, arguably, also accomplished under theories and paradigms and from critical quarters that are not necessarily postmodern and which do not seek to "undo" all knowledge simply on the basis of imperfection. Modernist discourse is not unreflective, can make autonomous corrections, engage in revisionist history, identify injustices, crimes of exclusion, and extend representation to groups that were otherwise not previously represented (think of liberalism or socialism for example!). This, after all, is why we understand modernity to be progressive and history a forward-moving narrative that is self-effusive. More importantly, given the self-defeating con-tradictions endemic to subversive-deconstructive postmodernism, especially its specious relativism, it requires no great mind to postulate that the use of modernist/rationalist/Enlightenment discourse will better make the case for a progressive politics of ever greater inclusion, representation, and justice for all than will sloganistic calls for us to "think otherwise." The simple and myopic assumption that social change can be engineered through linguistic policing of politically incorrect words, concepts and opinions, is surely one of the more politically lame (idealist) suggestions to come from armchair theorists in the last fifty years.

C. REPRESENTATIONS AREN'T KEY TO POLICY MAKING: DESCRIBING THE RHETORICAL FORMATION OF POLICIES DOESN'T PREDICT SPECIFIC OUTCOMES.

Jennifer Milliken '99 (Graduate Institute of International Studies) *The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), p. 240-241*

In contrast to International Relations theory studies, foreign policy and diplomacy/organization studies are directly concerned with explaining how a discourse articulated by elites produces policy practices (individual or joint). These types of discourse analysis also share an understanding of what it means to explain the production of policy practices, namely to take the significant system which they have analysed, and to argue for that system as structuring and limiting the policy options (joint policies, norms of state practice) that policy-makers find reasonable.<sup>9</sup> This approach is an appropriate one, and one which I too have followed. But like the treatment of common sense, it also deserves to be re-examined and refined as a way to explain policy production. The current approach's main weakness (or puzzle, in another idiom) is that it leaves out what happens after a policy is promulgated among high-level officials, i.e. the implementation of policy as actions directed towards those objectified as targets of international practices. Analysing how policies are implemented (and not just formulated) means studying the operationalization of discursive categories in the activities of governments and international organizations, and the 'regular effects' on their targets of interventions taken on this basis (Ferguson, 1994: xiv). The operationalization practices of these entities is a subject rarely taken up in mainstream International Relations, as attested to by the general lack of discussion of implementation in most theories and studies of foreign policy or of international regimes. When implementation is considered, the discussion is usually couched in very general terms, outlined as a stylized type of act or policy (e.g. 'land redistribution', 'intervention', 'foreign aid') but not as explanation of how the actions putatively covered by the term were organized and enacted in particular circumstances. Governments and international organizations do document and record implementation practices and take measures of their effects, but in an arcane language that, for public consumption, usually involves the use of vague and general labels (e.g. 'measures taken to improve debt servicing' to describe IMF demands to Indonesia). Discourse studies which include the implementation of policy practices can potentially problematize such labels and expose readers to the 'micro-physics of power' in International Relations (Foucault, 1980: 27). This exposure might in turn give readers a basis with which to 'question' and 'enquire about' the workings of states and international organizations, a critical goal that discourse studies share (Edkins, 1996a: 575).

D. AN INDIVIDUAL TEXT TELLS US NOTHING ABOUT OVERALL DISCOURSE—DENYING THEIR IMPACT CLAIMS.

Jennifer Milliken '99 (Graduate Institute of International Studies) *The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), p. 233*

I have referred to a text in the singular in my illustration, and research based on predicate analysis would certainly entail systematic analysis of a text's object space, drawing up lists of predications attaching to the subjects the text constructs and clarifying how these subjects are distinguished from and related to one another. Discourses, though, are background capabilities that are used socially, at least by a small group of officials if not more broadly in a society or among different elites and societies. Also, the concern in discursive analysis is not only with particular distinctions (that made in a text between Japan and the United States), but also with the structuring of relational distinctions, posited to be a 'center that organizes and makes them [particular distinctions] coherent' (Doty, 1997: 378). Since discourses are social systems of signification, it will not do (as sometimes appears to be the case) to base a discursive analysis only on one text, even some 'key' document (e.g. NSC-68, the Caribbean Basin Report). A single text cannot be claimed to support empirically arguments about discourse as a social background, used regularly by different individuals and groups. Instead, if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (according to the research focus) to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse or to think and act within alternative discourses. In order to address issues of selection bias — and to enable better theorization — one might also more narrowly select texts by whether they take different positions on a relevant issue (e.g. whether or not NATO should intervene in Kosovo), and so could provide evidence of a discourse as a social background for meaningful disputes among speakers of the discourse.

**SINGULAR ROOT CAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED**

**A. MONO-CAUSAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE WORLD ARE PROBLEMATIC—WE SHOULD PREFER CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS THAT ACCOUNT FOR INTERACTIONS IN A SPECIFIC INSTANCE:**

Milja Kurki 2007 (Lecturer, Department of Int'l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online. However, as a consequence of its ontological, epistemological and methodological leanings critical realism tends to prefer certain kinds of substantive explanations of world political processes over others. Critical realists tend to criticise mono-causal understandings of world politics: whether singularly materialist (characteristic of some realist thought) or singularly normative (characteristic of some constructivist thought). Instead, they prefer those causal explanations that account for the interactions of sets of social relations and normative structures in historically situated causal complexes.

**B. EXPLANATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THAT RELY UPON INDIVIDUAL CAUSAL FORCES SHOULD BE REJECTED IN FAVOR OF EXPLANATIONS THAT ARE NUANCED AND SPECIFIC TO THE SITUATION:**

Milja Kurki 2007 (Lecturer, Department of Int'l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online. While in some natural sciences laboratory experiments can be conducted to isolate individual causal forces, this is not what defines science in natural sciences: this is an unrealistic and unnecessary expectation in the social sciences, with dynamic ontological objects. It is true that parsimonious accounts can be helpful in some contexts and that all approaches must engage in some simplification. Yet it does not mean that parsimony should be prioritised: oversimplification entails important weaknesses in social explanations. Simplified analyses of complex social processes do not necessarily provide the most interesting, nor sufficiently nuanced, causal explanations to facilitate adequate understanding of social issues. As critics have pointed out it is not insignificant theoretically or politically that positivist democratic peace theory, for example, has tended to lack appreciation of the complex historical conditioning of democratic politics within states and actions of democratic states within global economic, political and cultural relations.<sup>41</sup>

**C. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS COMPLEX AND CONTEXT SPECIFIC—THE JUDGE SHOULD REWARD SPECIFICITY OF THE SITUATION OVER GRAND THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.**

Robert Jervis, 1999 (Professor of International Politics at Columbia University) Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation. *International Security* 24: 1. Accessed via Academic OneFile. Often more fine-grained distinctions about preferences are required to understand what needs to change to increase cooperation. Because states have ladders of means-ends beliefs, some preferences over outcomes are, from a broader perspective, preferences over strategies. Thus many conflicts can be seen as both an avoidable security dilemma and the product of irreconcilable differences. For example, it can be argued that at bottom what Japan sought in the 1930s was security: dominance over the East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere was desired not as an ultimate value or even for national wealth but as a source of strength and security. This in turn was needed not because Japan was under immediate Western pressure - this was an effect not a cause of Japan's policy - but rather because of the expectation that eventually the West would menace Japan. Cooperation would have been possible if the United States and Great Britain had been able to reassure Japan of their continuing goodwill (assuming that Japan did not engage in military adventures), but this was difficult if not impossible for states in anarchy. Although Japan's ultimate goals would not have to have changed to produce cooperation, "mere" alterations in images of the other side and the deployment of conflict-reduction strategies could not have kept the peace. Similarly, even if the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately sought security during the Cold War, deep internal changes were a prerequisite for far-reaching cooperation because each believed that the other would be a menace as long as its domestic system was in place.

## **SPECIFICITY SHOULD BE PRIVILEGED IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

### **A. POSTMODERN CRITICISMS MUST BE CONTEXTUALIZED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES—SPECIFICITY SHOULD BE PRIVILEGED OVER SWEEPING GENERALIZATIONS:**

Gearoid Tuathail, 1996 (Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. *Political Geography*, 15: 6-7, p. 661. In so doing, I hope to illustrate some of my earlier concerns about postmodern narratives and historical complexity using his very comment as an example. If I must state our positions as a divide, I would characterize this divide as one between an approach that skims history to illustrate certain sweeping poststructuralist narratives and an approach that seeks to move beyond the generality of these narratives into a genuine dialogue with what Michael Mann has termed the 'patterned mess' of history (Mann, 1986, 1993).

### **B. ACADEMICS MUST ENGAGE WITH THE SPECIFICITIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:**

Gearoid Tuathail, 1996 (Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. *Political Geography*, 15: 6-7, p. 663. Dalby's second point about the importance of disciplinary context merely reinforces my own caution about the utility of certain metatheoretical forms of early dissident IR within the distinct disciplinary context of political geography. I accept his point that these deconstructions may have been necessary within the context of IR's canon, but the method of these deconstructions inevitably reproduced even as they challenged the very project of 'theories of international relations'. This is why I found David Campbell's attempt to move beyond metatheoretical interrogations of elite theorists to engage histories of the practice of foreign policy so welcome and worthy of note within political geography (and also why I prefer Walker 119881 over Walker 119931).

### **C. HYPOTHESIZING ABOUT THE COMPLEX INNER WORKING OF GOVERNMENT IS KEY TO CREATING SPACE FOR RADICAL POLITICS**

David McClean 2001 "The cultural left and the limits of Social Hope," AM Phil Conf, [www.Americanphilosophy.org/archives/pass\\_conference\\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\\_mcclean.htm](http://www.Americanphilosophy.org/archives/pass_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm) We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

## STATISM KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. STATES ARE STILL THE CENTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SYSTEM: EFFORTS TO REGULATE VIOLENCE MUST FOCUS ON THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE.

Alexander Wendt, 1999 (Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago) *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 9. Accessed via google books. It should be emphasized that “state-centrism” in this sense does not preclude the possibility that non-state actors, whether domestic or transnational, have important, even decisive, effects on the frequency and/or manner in which states engage in organized violence. “State-centrism” does not mean that the causal chain in explaining war and peace stops with states, or even that states are the “most important” links in that chain, whatever that might mean. Particularly with the spread of liberalism in the twentieth century this is clearly not the case, since liberal states are heavily constrained by non-state actors in both civil society and the economy. The point is merely that states are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled into the world system. It may be that non-state actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately happens *through* states. In that sense states still are at the center of the international system, and as such it makes no more sense to criticize a theory of international politics as “state-centric” than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being “tree-centric.”

### B. REFORMING THE STATE IS A STRATEGIC NECESSITY—NON-STATE ALTERNATIVES WILL EITHER BE CRUSHED BY THE STATE OR RESULT IN LESS ACCOUNTABLE TYRANNIES.

Noam Chomsky 1998 (Professor of Linguistics at MIT) *The Common Good: Noam Chomsky Interviewed by David Barsamian*, p. 84-85 So Argentina is “minimizing the state”—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn't popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you're simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is “expanding the floor of the cage.” They understand that they're trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it's under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they're so vulnerable, they'll get murdered. That's something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don't understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we're not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

### C. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION: FOCUSING ON THE STATE DOES NOT BLOCK OUT THE POTENTIAL FOR RADICAL CHANGE.

Alexander Wendt, 1999 (Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago) *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 10. Accessed via google books. This state-centric focus is not politically innocent. Critics might argue that its insights are inherently conservative, good only for “problem-solving” rather than radical change. That is not my view. Neorealism might not be able to explain structural change, but I think there is potential in IR to develop state-centric theories that can. A key first step in developing such theory is to accept the assumption that states are actors with more or less human qualities: intentionality, rationality, interests, etc. This is a debatable assumption. Many scholars see talk of state “actors” as an illegitimate reification or anthropomorphization of what are in fact structures or institutions. On their view the idea of state agency is at most a useful fiction or metaphor. I shall argue that states *really are* agents. Decision-makers routinely speak in terms of national “interests,” “needs,” “responsibilities,” “rationality,” and so on, and it is through such talk that states constitute themselves and each other as agents. International politics as we know it today would be impossible without attributions of corporate agency, a fact recognized by international law, which explicitly grants legal “personality” to states. The assumption of real corporate agency enables states actively to participate in structural transformation.

D. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION: THE STATE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN LARGER PROGRESSIVE AGENDAS IN WORLD POLITICS.

Alexander Wendt, 1999 (Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago) *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 10. Accessed via google books. In sum, for critical IR theorists to eschew state-centric theorizing is to concede much of international politics to Neorealism. I show that state-centric IR theory can generate insights that might help move the international system from the law of the jungle toward the rule of law. It is true that knowledge always is more useful for some purposes than for others, and knowledge gained from an analysis of states and organized violence might do little to empower non-state actors interested in trade or human rights. But that simply means that state-centered IR theory can only be one element of a larger progressive agenda in world politics, not that it cannot be an element at all.

E. POWER AND OPPRESSION CIRCULATE THROUGH INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE STATE—WE MUST FIGHT WITHIN THESE STRUCTURES IN ORDER TO CHALLENGE DOMINATION.

Lawrence Grossberg, 1992 (Professor of Communication Studies @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) *We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture*, p. 390-391.

But this would mean that the Left could not remain outside the systems of governance. It has sometimes to work with, against, and within bureaucratic systems of governance. Consider the case of Amnesty International, an immensely effective organization when its major strategy was (similar to that of the Right) exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years (marked by the recent rock tour), it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; membership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose) and public visibility. In stark contrast, the most effective struggle on the Left in recent times has been the dramatic (and, one hopes, continuing) dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. It was accomplished by mobilizing popular pressure on the institutions and bureaucracies of economic and governmental institutions, and it depended upon a highly sophisticated organizational structure. The Left too often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing people's attitudes and everyday practices (e.g., the 1990 Black boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, while such struggles may be extremely visible, they are often less effective than attempts to move the institutions (e.g., banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic relations of Black and immigrant populations in place and which condition people's everyday practices. The Left needs institutions which can operate within the systems of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged. The Left has assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range or apparatuses of decision making and power. Otherwise, the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act within organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as the moral responsibility) to fight them.

F. EVEN ABOLISHING THE STATE WON'T SOLVE PATRIARCHY, CLASS OPPRESSION, AND RACISM.

Chris Dixon, 2005 (author) "Reflection of Privilege Reformism, and Activism" Accessed at: [http://www.geocities.com/kk\\_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html](http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html) Meanwhile, the opposing 'liberatory' vision offered is no better. Take, for instance, sasha's version of an "anarchist ethics": "an affirmation of the creativity, desire and power of the individual; it is an affirmation of the ability of individuals to come together and decide their own fate without the need of any imposed decision coming in from the outside whether in 'totalitarian' or 'democratic' form." Again, a noble sentiment, but what about culture, gender, class, sexuality, race, and the so many other differences and ties between us? Whether we are generalized as the "exploited and excluded" or abstracted as one-dimensional "individuals," the systems of power that differentiate and exploit us don't disappear; and neither does resistance firmly situated in marginalization and difference, from the Lesbian Avengers to the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria.



G. COLLAPSE OF THE NATION-STATE WILL CAUSE LINGUISTIC TRIBALISM CULMINATING IN OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY:

Adeno Addis (Professor of Law @ Tulane Univ.), ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2001. Online. Nexis. Accessed May 16, 06. www.nexis.com. It is not quite clear what the institutional response of the cosmopolitan liberal is other than to rejoice in the **demise of the nation-state**, which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. What institutional structures replace the nation-state and how do those institutions precisely resolve the language problem of minorities? There are perhaps two alternative institutional consequences of the **demise of the nation-state**. One consequence may be the ultimate in decentralization. Nation-states fragment into the lowest possible linguistic components. Each linguistic group will be allowed to form its own political community. This is what Professor Thomas Franck has called "postmodern tribalism." Of course, this would resolve the question of linguistic minorities, but at a higher price of political chaos. Given the fact that there are thousands of linguistic minorities in the world this voluntary separation is likely to lead us to political chaos and instability, precisely the problems that dealing with linguistic minorities is supposed to solve. True, there is a chance that after being allowed to separate, these linguistic groups could actually reconstitute themselves voluntarily as larger multilingual and politically viable communities. But in that case we are back to the question of which language is to be chosen as a national or official language, the very issue that the cosmopolitan liberal claims would be resolved (or would be irrelevant) with the process of decentralization. In any case, it appears that decentralization may in fact make it harder, not easier, to treat all individuals with equal moral concern. Decentralization intensifies and multiplies divisions and boundaries. This is not exactly the structure one would want to put in place if one were trying to ensure that individuals have a global moral stature and are treated equally as units of moral concern.

H. THE NATION-STATE IS THE CORNERSTONE OF CIVILIZATION

Michael Kelly (Director of Legal Research @ Detroit College of Law), DRAKE LAW REVIEW, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed May 17, 06. www.nexis.com. Consequently, it is premature to announce the **demise of the nation-state** as the pre-eminent creature in the international arena. Indeed, while seeking to redefine and defend the continued relevancy of the nation-state, publicists noting that "there are indications that could suggest that the nation-state, the universally realized form of political organization of societies (people), may become obsolete" conclude that it is still the nation-state that is both the primary actor on the international plane and the organizing principle around which civilizations are built.

I. THE NATION-STATE IS KEY TO FACILITATE GLOBAL FREE TRADE, WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO GLOBAL LIBERATION

James Bacchus, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Summer 2003. Online. Nexis. Accessed May 17, 06. www.nexis.com. The **demise of the nation-state** has been much exaggerated. For the most part, the Westphalia System still prevails. The WTO is not by any means alone among international institutions in being member-driven by nation-states. The future of the WTO will be shaped by the shared will of the nation-states and other customs territories that comprise the members of the WTO. Their combined will to achieve a multilateral consensus is the key to the future of the WTO as both an engine for the trading system and an exemplar for the international rule of law. Their will is the key to unlocking the way to freedom.

J. STATES CAN FUNCTION AS RATIONAL ACTORS

Harold Koh (Professor Emeritus @ Harvard), YALE LAW JOURNAL, June 1997. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 1, 06. www.nexis.com. A close reading of Henkin's discussion of the "politics of law observance" shows that his defense of international law rests largely on utilitarian, rationalistic premises. Starting with the assumption "that nations act deliberately and rationally, after mustering carefully and weighing precisely all the relevant facts and factors," Henkin posited "that barring an infrequent non-rational act, nations will observe international obligations unless violation promises an important balance of advantage over cost."

## **THREAT CONSTRUCTION KRITIK ANSWERS**

### **A. REAL THREATS EXIST: AGGRESSOR STATES ARE COMMON AND CAN CAUSE CONFLICT.**

Robert Jervis, 1999 (Professor of International Politics at Columbia University) Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation. *International Security* 24: 1. Accessed via Academic OneFile. In many cases, it is the interactive process among states that generates conflict rather than merely reveals or enacts the preexisting differences in goals. Both sides would be satisfied with mutual security; international politics represents tragedy rather than evil as the actions of states make it even harder for them to be secure. This is not true in all cases, however. Aggressor states are common; security and other interests often create differences that are irreconcilable. In these and only these instances, defensive realists see conflict as unavoidable.

### **B. SOME ENEMIES ARE REAL AND POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO OTHER GROUPS.**

Alexander Wendt, 1999 (Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago) *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.261-2. Accessed via google books. Enemy images have a long pedigree, and some states continue to position each other in such terms today. The Greeks represented the Persians as “barbarians” the Crusaders perceived the Turks as “infidels”; medieval Europeans feared their defeat at Liegnitz at the hands of the Mongols heralded Armageddon; later Europeans treated the peoples of the Americas as savages; conservatives though civilization was threatened by the French Revolution; and in our own century, we have the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, the early Cold War, Northern Ireland, Pol Pot, Palestinian and Israeli fundamentalists, the Bosnian Civil War, Hutus and Tutsis—all based on representations of the Other as intent on destroying or enslaving the Self. It is important to emphasize that this concept implies nothing about whether enemy images are justified. Some enemies are “real,” in that the Other really does existentially threaten the Self, as the Nazis did the Jews, and others are “chimeras,” as the Jews were to the Nazis. This difference may affect the dynamic of enmity and whether it can be overcome, but it does not affect the reality of Hobbesian cultures. Real or imagined, if actors think enemies are real then they are real in their consequences.

### **C. THREAT CONSTRUCTION IS GOOD – IT ALLOWS US TO ANTICIPATE AND PREVENT DANGER**

Joseph Berke, 1998 (Founder and director of the Arbours Crisis Centre) *Even Paranoids Have Enemies*, p. 5-6 Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms which serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization. Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination (Segal 1994); when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization, for instance, a certain degree of paranoid potential can be a useful resource, as opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader from becoming aware of the situations of activation of aggression in the group, or regression to primitive levels of functioning. Where the leader can be aware of, and apprehend risk and danger, there is the possibility of preparation for the group to face them and cope with them.

## D. THREATS ARE REAL—DEBATING THEM IS KEY TO SURVIVAL IN THE MODERN WORLD.

Louis Rene Beres, 2003 (professor of international law at Purdue) Anarchy and international law on an endangered planet. June 5, 2003. Accessed via Lexis/Nexis. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

E. THE FACT THAT THREATS ARE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS DOESN'T MEAN WE CAN WISH THEM AWAY: WE STILL MUST ACT WITHIN THE ALREADY EXISTING SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Alexander Wendt, 2000 (Professor of International Security, Dept. of Political Science at Ohio State University) *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, edited by Andrew Linklater, p. 629. Let us assume that processes of identity- and interest-formation have created a world in which states do not recognize rights to territory or existence-a war of all against all. In this world, anarchy has a "realist" meaning for state action: be insecure and concerned with relative power. Anarchy has this meaning only in virtue of collective, insecurity-producing practices, but if those practices are relatively stable, they do constitute a system that may resist change. The fact that worlds of power politics are socially constructed, in other words, does not guarantee they are malleable, for at least two reasons. The first reason is that once constituted, any social system confronts each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others. Self-help systems, for example, tend to reward competition and punish altruism. The possibility of change depends on whether the exigencies of such competition leave room for actions that deviate from the prescribed script. If they do not, the system will be reproduced and deviant actors will not. The second reason is that systemic change may also be inhibited by actors' interests in maintaining relatively stable role identities. Such interests are rooted not only in the desire to minimize uncertainty and anxiety, manifested in efforts to confirm existing beliefs about the social world, but also in the desire to avoid the expected costs of breaking commitments made to others-notably domestic constituencies and foreign allies in the case of states-as part of past practices. The level of resistance that these commitments induce will depend on the "salience" of particular role identities to the actor. The United States, for example, is more likely to resist threats to its identity as "leader of anticommunist crusades" than to its identity as "promoter of human rights." But for almost any role identity, practices and information that challenge it are likely to create cognitive dissonance and even perceptions of threat, and these may cause resistance to transformations of the self and thus to social change. For both systemic and "psychological" reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend. This does not change the fact that through practice agents are continuously producing and reproducing identities and interests, continuously "choosing now the preferences [they] will have later." But it does mean that choices may not be experienced with meaningful degrees of freedom. This could be a constructivist justification for the realist position that only simple learning is possible in self-help systems. The realist might concede that such systems are socially constructed and still argue that after the corresponding identities and interests have become institutionalized, they are almost impossible to transform.

F. CONSEQUENCES MUST BE ASSESSED. CONSTRUCTED IMPACTS ARE STILL REAL.

Michael Williams 2005 (Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales) *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, p. 151-152

The epistemic dilemmas of Mearsheimer's position again reflect the deleterious consequences of misunderstanding the historical genesis of the rationalist position. However, his questioning of the relationship between theory and practice does pose fundamental challenges to the constructivist stance, and gestures clearly in the direction of concerns at the heart of willful Realism. Seen from the perspective of the willful Realist tradition, it is not enough simply to show how social constructions function, or to view the issue solely within the terms of social scientific method. The principle of social construction brings with it an inescapable ethic and practical imperative: constructions must not just be understood, they must be appraised and evaluated in terms of their ethical claims and practical consequences. While it is clear, as Wendt argues, that no necessary assumptions about the functioning of a given system follow from the adoption of a constructivist position, this view begs the question of responsibility—the concern with the practical and consequential entailments of different constructions—that was crucial to the willful Realist tradition. In this sense, Wendt's otherwise useful claim that constructivism be viewed solely as a "method" rather than as a substantive claim about the nature of international politics risks being seriously misleading.

## VALUE TO LIFE KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. MAXIMIZING ALL LIVES IS THE ONLY WAY TO AFFIRM EQUAL AND UNCONDITIONAL HUMAN DIGNITY.

David Cummiskey 1996 (Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College) Kantian Consequentialism. Pp. 145-146.

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

### B. DECIDING THAT OTHER PEOPLE’S LIVES ARE NOT WORTH LIVING ENSLAVES THE WORLD

Jerzy Szacki, 1996 (Professor of Sociology at Warsaw University) *Liberalism After Communism*, p. 197.

Liberalism does not say which of these different moralities is better than others. It is neutral on this question and regards its neutrality as a virtue. Liberalism as a political doctrine assumes that – as Joseph Raz wrote – ‘there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which are mutually incompatible’ It recognizes that—as John Rawls put it—‘a modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’. What is more, for a liberal this is not only a fact to take note of; he or she is ready to acknowledge that ‘now this variety of conceptions of the good is itself a good thing, that is, it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want their plans to be different’. Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or is attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement of society in the name of some one conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, ‘political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.’

C. EXISTENCE AND CHOICE COME FIRST. PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE AND REVISE THEIR OWN VALUE TO LIFE

Will Kymlicka, 2003 (professor of philosophy @ Queens University) *Contemporary Political Thought: A Reader And Guide*. Edited by Alan Finlayson, pp. 496-498. The defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life. Why should people be free to choose their own plan of life? After all, we know that some people will make imprudent decisions, wasting their time on hopeless or trivial pursuits. Why then should the government not intervene to protect us from making mistakes, and to compel us to lead the truly good life? There are a variety of reasons why this is not a good idea: governments may not be trustworthy; Some individuals have idiosyncratic needs which are difficult for even a well-intentioned government to take into account; supporting controversial conceptions of the good may lead to civil strife. Moreover, paternalistic restrictions on liberty often simply do not work — lives do not go better by being led from the outside, in accordance with values the person does not endorse. Dworkin calls this the ‘endorsement constraint’, and argues that ‘no component contributes to the value of a life without endorsement ... it is implausible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain of his profound ethical convictions than at peace with them’ (Dworkin 1989: 486). However, the fact that we can get it wrong is important, because (paradoxically) it provides another argument for liberty. Since we can be wrong about the worth or value of what we are currently doing, and since no one wants to lead a life based on false beliefs about its worth, it is of fundamental importance that we be able rationally to assess our conceptions of the good in the light of new information or experiences, and to revise them if they are not worthy of our continued allegiance. This assumption that our beliefs about the good life are fallible and revisable is widely endorsed in the liberal tradition — from John Stuart Mill to the most prominent contemporary American liberals, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. (Because of their prominence, I will rely heavily on the works of Rawls and Dworkin in the rest of this chapter.) As Rawls puts it, individuals ‘do not view themselves as inevitable tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good and its final ends which they espouse at any given time’. Instead, they are ‘capable of revising and changing this conception’. They can ‘stand back’ from their current ends to ‘survey and assess’ their worthiness (Rawls 1980: 544; cf. Mill 1912: 122; Dworkin 1913). So we have two preconditions for leading a good life. The first is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life. Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment. Hence the traditional liberal concern with individual privacy, and opposition to ‘the enforcement of morals’. The second precondition is that we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide. Individuals must therefore have the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the good life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently. Hence the equally traditional liberal concern for education, and freedom of expression and association. These liberties enable us to judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of life.

D. CHOICE IS FUNDAMENTAL—DECIDING SOME LIVES HAVE NO VALUE NEGATES THE VALUE OF LIFE.

Carol Gould 1995 (Professor of Philosophy and Government @ George Mason University) *Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society*, p. 130. Acts of choice are, however, not merely the ground or source of those values with which the things chosen are endowed. In addition, they are reflexive affirmations of the agent's capacity of choice as characteristic of his or her mode of activity or mode of being. The act of choice thus necessarily affirms its own value in the act of choosing. The objective ground of freedom is thus the exercise of this freedom itself. And since the exercise of choice is, as I argued earlier, the characteristic mode of being human, this freedom has its objective ground in the nature of human activity as such. One may say further that this freedom as the characteristic mode of life activity of human beings is of primary value in the sense that it is a necessary condition for the possibility of any other value and is moreover valued in itself. Freedom is thus necessarily affirmed in the mode of being of human beings. As I argued earlier, the exercise of this freedom, however, is not merely a repetition of this bare capacity of choice in one instance after another but rather involves the development of the individual through the activities that such choices engender. It also involves the development of a world created by the activities of these individuals, a world which embodies the values that they have given it. Thus the capacity for choice becomes concretely realized in the self-development of individuals which thus constitutes the meaning and the value of freedom in the full sense. Self-development may therefore be seen as the highest value to which a process of individual acts of choice tends.

E. CONSEQUENTIALISM AFFIRMS THE EQUAL, UNCONDITIONAL VALUE OF EVERYONE

David Cummiskey 1996 (Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College) *Kantian Consequentialism*. Pp. 150-151. Consequentialism thus provides an indirect justification for our intuitive conviction that we should not demand that the innocent sacrifice themselves, and also that we should not sacrifice the innocent. Kant's moral theory, however, simply does not provide a more direct and indefeasible justification for deontological constraints. In principle, a conscientious Kantian moral agent may be required to kill one in order to save two. Nonetheless, if someone is unable to do so, this may well not be grounds for reproach. Similarly, if I cannot amputate a leg to save a life—either my own or that of another—I may not be blameworthy for my failure, although it is true that I should have done the nasty deed. Still, in such a situation I must try to force my attention on the good I am doing and thereby enable myself to act. Similarly, in the highly unusual case where it would truly be best to kill some to save others, a good person should also try to focus on the lives to be saved rather than becoming fixated exclusively on those who will be killed. Nonetheless, even though sacrificing some to save others is sometimes the right thing to do, one should still feel regret and mourn the people who are lost. After all, the goal is to save each and every person; thus, one should indeed feel the loss of even one. According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that in deciding what to do, one must give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings leads to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices that a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

**THE KRITIK OFFERS AN INSUFFICIENT REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

A. The Kritik subverts real solutions by engaging in talk about talk.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, 2. This new philosophical "system" implied no resolution, no synthesis, no expectation of salvation, no promise of a struggle in the name of unity—aspects that, for instance, Christianity and Marxism did share to a certain extent. Because it didn't really promise a way out of the suffering, the new "discourse" seemed to abandon the world to its own confusion and insolvency. The best one could do, so went the advice, was to resist stubbornly the established powers of oppression and attempt to subvert them always by joining nuclei of guerrilla warfare, which maneuvered from the margins of society.

B. Intellectual indifference in the face of tragedy is morally indefensible.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xiv. My concern is that at a certain point postmodernism's hostility towards "reason" and "truth" is intellectually untenable and politically debilitating. Often its mistrust of logic and argumentation are so extreme that its practitioners are left dazed and disoriented—morally and politically defenseless. When, in keeping with the practice of a neo-Nietzschean "hermeneutic of suspicion," reason and democracy are reduced to objects of mistrust, one invites political impotence: one risks surrendering the capacity for effective action in the world. Esoteric theorizing—theory tailored to an audience of initiates and acolytes—threatens to become an ersatz praxis and an end in itself.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xiii-xiv. Hence, the current disaffection with postmodernism is in no small measure attributable to recent political circumstances. Humanism's return spells postmodernism's demise. Totalitarianism was the twentieth century's defining political experience. Its aftermath has left us with a new categorical imperative: no more Auschwitzes or Gulags. We now know that an inefaceable difference separates democratic and totalitarian regimes. Despite their manifest empirical failings, democratic polities possess a capacity for internal political change that totalitarian societies do not. A discourse such as postmodernism that celebrates the virtues of cultural relativism and that remains ambivalent, at best, vis-à-vis democratic norms is inadequate to the moral and political demands of the contemporary hour.

C. **ATTACKS ON THE USE OF ROLEPLAYING AND "FIAT" ARE MISGUIDED; ROLEPLAYING IS A WORTHWHILE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISE.**

Alan Coverstone (Teacher of Government and Economics & Academic Dean at Montgomery Bell Academy), *AN INWARD GLANCE: A RESPONSE TO MITCHELL'S OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN*, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>. [Gordon] Mitchell underestimates the value of debate as it is currently practiced. There is greater value in the somewhat insular nature of our present activity than he assumes. Debate's inward focus creates an unusual space for training and practice with the tools of modern political discourse. Such space is largely unavailable elsewhere in American society.



**CHOOSE HOPE: OUR VIEW IS THAT YOU WILL BE OFFERED IN THIS ROUND A CHOICE BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR.**

- A. WE ADVOCATE THE VIEW THAT ASSIGNMENT OF BLAME IS NOTHING BUT A DIVERSION; WE CAN AND SHOULD GET ON WITH THE TASK OF SOLVING IMPORTANT SOCIETAL PROBLEMS.

Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, (Co-Founders, The Breakthrough Institute), *BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY*, 07, 239-240. The ecological crises are not our fault — we were born into them. Nor were they the fault of past generations — they were doing what they could to create a better future for us. And the future is hardly hopeless. Humans are the most powerful, creative, and adaptive species ever to roam this remarkable planet. We have overcome hunger, disease, and oppression — we can overcome ecological crises. When we called on environmentalists to stop giving the "I have a nightmare" speech, we did not mean that we should close our eyes to our increasingly hot planet, the destruction of the Amazon, or continued human suffering.

- B. THE CRITIQUE IS INDIFFERENT TO REAL WORLD HARM AND SUFFERING.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 113-114. Postmodernism, which tends to both anti-elitism and anti-universalism, thus lives a certain tension between its political and philosophical values. It seeks to resolve this by short-circuiting universality and returning in a sense of premodern particularism, but now to a particularism without privilege, which is to say to a difference without hierarchy. Its problem is how a difference without hierarchy is not to collapse into pure indifference, so becoming a kind of inverted mirror-image of the universalism it repudiates.

- C. THE CRITIQUE SERVES ONLY TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO BY DESTROYING GROUNDS FOR ACTION.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 17-18. The cult of the text would thus fulfill the ambivalent function of all utopia: to provide us with a frail image of a freedom we might otherwise fail to commemorate, but in doing so to confiscate some of the energies which we might have invested in its actual realization.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 13. It would come as no surprise, then, to find the political left obsessed in such an era by epistemology, though it would take rather less than a cynic to suspect that some of this morbid fascination might well be a form of political displacement. Talk of whether the signifier produces the signified or vice versa, valuable though it doubtless is, is not quite what stormed the Winter Palace or brought down the Heath government.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 14. Everything would become an interpretation, including that claim itself, in which case the idea of interpretation would cancel all the way through and leave everything exactly as it was. A radical epistemology would issue, conveniently enough, in a conservative politics.

- D. THE CRITIQUE ACTUALLY ENABLES RACISM AND PATRIARCHY BECAUSE OF ITS INSISTENCE ON MORAL RELATIVISM.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 67. The point, anyway, is that some postmodern radicals detest the idea of closure so cordially that they would wish to exclude nobody whatsoever from their desired social order, which sounds touchingly generous-hearted but is clearly absurd. Closure and exclusion, for radical thought, are by no means to be unequivocally censured in some sentimental liberal spirit. There can by definition be no place for racists, exploiters or patriarchs in a free society, which is not to suggest that they should be hung by their heels from the church towers. A genuinely pluralist society can only be achieved by a resolute opposition to its antagonists.

- E. BY CLAIMING THAT ALL REALITY IS SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED, THE CRITIQUE ACTUALLY PRESERVES EXISTING WESTERN VALUES.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 15. Postmodernism emerges as a worldview conjured from the pathological necessity of the west to define reality and truth as its reality and truth. Now that the west itself doubts the validity of its own reality and truth it seeks to maintain the status quo and continue unchecked on its trajectory of expansion and domination by undermining all criteria of reality and truth. Western oppression of Other cultures seems to move in endless spirals, each ushered in with the promise of infinite freedom and expansion of civilisation.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 26. Unable morally to justify its ceaseless oppression, the western world now postulates that no moral stance is possible. Since all moral positions are equally valid or equally absurd, none is possible, and one might as well learn to enjoy the status quo. From the patently sensible assertion that culture cannot be grasped as a true or false representation of reality — as Marxists have argued for decades — postmodernism manufactures the absurd theses that the real is no longer real, that reality is but an illusion, that there is nothing but a perpetual and endless reconstruction of realities as Anderson would have us believe, or truth and arguments are little more than free-floating language-games, as Baudrillard would argue. From here the next step, that of taking oppressive political and economic actions as representation of social reality and proving them to be totally unreal, is a short one. Postmodernism is the ultimate justification, the master alibi, for the continued exploitation and oppression of nonwestern cultures.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 124. Cultural relativism at its most embattled imagines that different cultures are wholly self-validating and mutually incommensurable. Even if there were some sort of rationality in common between them, it would first have to be translated into both cultures' entirely different terms and so, presuming that they could identify it at all, would instantly cease to offer common ground. Hardly anyone actually responds like this when they run into someone from another culture; nobody actually behaves as though there was nothing in common between them, whatever the daunting difficulties of mutual dialogue. But the case has stubbornly survived its empirical implausibility. If cultures are internally self-validating, then it would be sheer imperial arrogance for our own culture to seek to pass judgement on any other. But by the same token these other cultures could not pass judgement on ours. The corollary of not being able to tell someone anything is that they can tell you nothing either. Postmodern 'anti-ethnocentrism' thus leaves our own culture conveniently insulated from anyone else's critique. All those anti-Western bleatings from the so-called third world may safely be ignored, since they are interpreting our conduct in terms quite irrelevant to us.

**F. THE CRITIQUE ACTIVELY SUPPORTS CONSERVATIVE POLITICS BY DISABLING THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE.**

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, xiv. The United States is held hostage to the influence of two pernicious forces: a worship of violence embodied by the traditional Right, and a frantic materialism of the postmodern sort, which has impeached active dissent and opposition to the patent oligarchic deviancy of modern so-called Liberal democracies. Thereby, the postmodernism of the Left has corroborated the Right.

**G. THE CRITIQUE ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT OUR ATTENTION FROM REAL WORLD PROBLEMS BY PULLING US INTO ITS WORLD OF TEXTUAL ANALYSIS.**

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 28. Despite its claims to be a revolutionary departure from the past, postmodernism is in fact a continuation and further expansion of the essential dynamic of western culture. It is 'revolutionary' in that, in the Baudrillardian terminology, it has created a world of pure 'simulacra'.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 127. A great deal of postmodern politics is based on an opposition between identity and otherness: what is to be fundamentally rejected, 'absolutely' one might be tempted to say, is the dominion of self-identity over otherness and difference. This political ethic has spoken with impressive eloquence to certain kinds of contemporary political conflict; but taken overall it is drastically partial and simplistic. Is all violent exclusion of the other to be upbraided? Kicking the British out of India, or the Portuguese out of Angola? How does it address itself to exploitative situations — the office labour of Birmingham, for example, or the sweatshops of South East Asia — where there is no particularly dramatic confrontation between identity and otherness? Or is postmodernism once more modelling all political situations on its own most privileged ones, in violation of its own pluralist tenets? The chief contradiction of postmodernism is a little like that of old-fashioned structuralism. Was structuralism radical or conservative? It is easy enough to see the ways in which it behaved as a kind of technocracy of the spirit, the final penetration of the rationalizing impulse of modernity into the inner sanctum of the subject. With its rigorous codings, universal schemas and hard-nosed reductionism, it reflected in the sphere of Geist a reification already apparent in reality. But this is only one side of the story. For in extending the logic of technocracy into the mind, structuralism scandalized the liberal humanism whose task was to preserve the life of the mind from any such vulgar reduction. And this liberal humanism was one of the dominant ideologies of technocratic society itself. In this sense, structuralism was radical and conservative at the same time, colluding with the strategies of modern capitalism in a way deeply at odds with its own sovereign values. It is as though by pressing a sort of technological determinism all the way through to the mind itself, treating individuals as the mere empty locus of impersonal codes, it imitated the way modern society actually treats them but pretends it does not, thus endorsing its logic while unmasking its ideals. 'System', writes Roland Barthes, 'is the enemy of Man' — meaning, no doubt, that for humanism the subject is always that which is radically irreducible, that which will seep through the cracks of your categories and play havoc with your structures.

#### H. THE CRITIQUE ATTEMPTS TO LOCK US INTO HELPLESSNESS IN THE FACE OF EVIL.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 43. Western radicals and radical movements need to realize that postmodernism perpetuates oppression by foreclosing the possibility of discovering alternative visions of society. It is designed to instill a state of total helplessness in those who buy its credo.

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 26-27. Politics is also about closure, and power about exclusion. We still need moral criteria to make and measure actions and decisions. Whose discourse and which moral criteria shall we use? Does not postmodern social theory relativize any possible moral political practice? And is not such relativism therefore an 'ideology of helpless surrender'.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 25. For a world that claims that all reality is socially constructed, that promotes simulation as the norm, the pain, suffering and the death of the Other is particularly unreal. Postmodern simulacra serve as an insulating space, which isolates those who live in a world of countless choices from those whose only choice is to be their unwilling victims — the Others.

#### I. THE CRITIQUE CAN ONLY SUBVERT; IT IS UNABLE TO TRANSFORM.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 91. If we were really able to divest ourselves of the centred ego, rather than merely enjoy the act of theorizing about it, then there is surely no doubt that a great power for political good would be unleashed. But we are trapped in this respect between two epochs, the one dying and the other powerless to be born. The old 'liberal humanist' self, which chalked up some remarkable achievements in its time, was able to transform the world, but only at the price of a self-violence which at times made it seem hardly worth the cost. The deconstructed self which followed on its heels has still to demonstrate that the non-identical can transform as well as subvert, and the omens so far have not been auspicious.

J. THE CRITIQUE CREATES A DIVERSION, ALLOWING THE REAL SOURCES OF POWER TO CONTINUE UNABATED.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, 4. Ten times out of ten the pupils are trained to take aim and fire at the privileged pet-peeves of postmodernism. These are: patriarchy, phallocracy, paternalism, racism, sexism, machismo, racist industrial pollution (that is, only that pollution that is putatively caused by the white elites and discharged on "minorities"), Europe, Eurocentrism, the white European male, the male in general, Columbus and the Catholics, religion, God, transcendence, metaphysics, the spirit, colonization and early imperialism, and sometimes, ever more infrequently, "capitalism," preferably singled out as a vague synonym for economic oppression. Never, though, are the students made to visit the polemic upon the concrete working of the hierarchies of real power: say, to investigate the effective composition, functioning, and history of the political and financial establishments of the West.

K. THE CRITIQUE IS A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF HOW ACADEMIC INFIGHTING CAN DESTROY THE POSSIBILITY OF MEANINGFUL CHANGE.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 122. This would be just another depressing instance of the way that much radical academia in the United States has managed to translate urgent political issues into its own blandly professional terms, so that conflicts beyond the campuses become transposed in unseemly fashion into tussles over defending or promoting academic patches, fighting off radical competitors in the intellectual marketplace, securing funds for this rather than that avant-garde enterprise. The left has always had an infallible knack of tearing itself apart before the political enemy could lay a glove on it.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 132. The political ambivalences of postmodernism match this contradiction exactly. One might venture, in a first crude approximation, that a lot of postmodernism is politically oppositional but economically complicit.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 46. The authority of postmodernism is based on this moral — and hence political ambivalence — 'this ability to see all sides, to defer judgement and to refuse agency'. It suggests, writes Diana Brydon, 'that action is futile; that individual value judgements are likely to cancel each other out; that one opinion is as good as another; that it would be futile and dishonest to choose one path above any other; that disinterested contemplation is superior to any attempt at action'. Thus postmodern ambivalence not only preserves the status quo, it also generates a culture that readily accepts all modes of behaviour as long as its own privileges and advantages are not threatened — what Galbraith has called the 'culture of contentment' In the post-Cold War era, when communism has failed and capitalism has seemingly triumphed, the power of contentment to override moral imperatives and codes of moral behaviour has become universal: 'What is new in the so-called capitalist countries', suggests Galbraith, 'is that the controlling contentment.

L. THE DECONSTRUCTIVE EXERCISE LEAVES ALL EXISTING INSTITUTIONS IN PLACE.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, 4. Among the lettered multitudes, we no longer see the "Left": no coherent movement of dissent exists anymore—it is literally finished. Instead, the spectacle is one of affluent middle-class intellectuals, nearly all white males of European descent, that are divided into two factions: the Liberals (modernists) on one side, and the prankishly antagonizing postmodernists on the other. Under the cover of a politically correct truce signed in the name of propriety, the one faction (barely) tolerates the whims of the other, and while the modernists carry on business as usual, telling their pupils that life is a game of chance in which "the market" alone can take them to the top, the postmodernists reach conclusions not altogether dissimilar. Put another way, postmodernist professors invite their classes to apply relativistic exercises and "deconstructivist" techniques, whereby the students are made to take apart a narrative and identify the social prejudices informing the text; but after the deconstruction has crushed all the idols, the class has in fact no option but to fall back upon whatever is the current system of belief, that is, the creed of self-interest and faith in the "free-market" with which every Anglo-Saxon is raised.

**M. THE CRITIQUE IS SATISFIED WITH RHETORICAL PERFORMANCE, ALLOWING REAL WORLD INJUSTICES TO CONTINUE UNABATED.**

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 25. Postmodern criticism subverts dogmatic claims in science, ethics and politics. But as scholars and as citizens we still need to justify the truth of our scientific statements and the morality of our political actions. Indeed, we must do this if we are to establish rational and ethical standards for our collective life. Thus rhetorical analysis of scholarly and social texts has a positive, constructive task as well as a negative, deconstructive one. This positive task begins with the human authorship of human worlds: it requires us to imagine more adequate narratives for our political community, and to show how academic writing can help create these narratives. This is not purely a product of textual criticism, however. Interpretive openness and moral sensibility through critical rhetorical methods are possible only within the context of certain social and historical conditions. Thus the reform of knowledge requires more than the replacement of positivistic constructions with rhetorical deconstructions.

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 25. Through postmodern awareness and criticism, norms of cognition and of conduct can be relocated in the act of symbolic construction, and no longer regarded as sacred or natural laws that symbols subserviently convey. In such a postmodernism, norms are not viewed merely as objective products, but also as symbolic processes that are inherently persuasive. Humans enact truth and justice not merely by rational legislation, but also by rhetorical performance. In this view, standards for knowledge and conduct are not based on some extra-linguistic rationality, because rationality itself is demystified and reconstituted as a historical construction and deployment by human rhetors. Logic, reason and ethics all are brought down from their absolute, pre-existent heights into the creative, contextual web of history and action.

**N. THE CRITIQUE PROVIDES AN ALIBI FOR CONTINUED INJUSTICE.**

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 40. Postmodernism takes the ideological mystification of colonialism and modernity to a new, all-pervasive level of control and oppression of the Other while parading itself as an intellectual alibi for the west's perpetual quest for meaning through consumption, including the consumption of all Others.

**O. THE CRITIQUE PRESERVES CORPORATE STRUCTURES.**

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, 4-5. In the end, even though in the classroom "God" and patriarchy have come to be arraigned, tried, and sentenced a million times, our system, as a whole, as many critics (including various postmodernists) have understood, is never questioned. Moreover, it is widely remarked that the postmodern attitude, in its craving for differentiation, erasure of boundaries, and permissiveness, is indeed highly compatible with the defining traits of our corporate, market-oriented age. This basic realization reveals that the apparent antagonism between modernists and postmodernists is somewhat feigned, if not imaginary.

**P. THE CRITIQUE'S CLAIM THAT DEBATE IS IRRELEVANT TO REAL WORLD CHANGE IS WRONG; THIS NOTION LEADS TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO.**

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 37. However, in postmodernism, critiques, debates, intellectual and critical positions have little meaning for its fundamental postulate is that nothing can count as an argument when all criteria for assessing reality and truth, as well as reality and truth themselves, have been deconstructed and shown to be chimeras. This is the control principle of postmodernism. At one level, it demolishes the hierarchy of truth established under colonialism and expanded by modernity. But on another, it creates a new monopoly through which control of the Other is exercised. To understand how it works we need go no further than Baudrillard himself — the guru of postmodernism. To maintain control, Baudrillard tells us, monopoly tactically creates a double: "In all domains, duopoly is the highest stage of monopoly. It is not political will that breaks the monopoly of the market (state intervention, anti-trust law etc.); it is the fact that every unitary system, if it wants to survive, has to evolve a binary system of regulation. This changes nothing in the essence of monopoly; on the contrary, power is only absolute if it knows how to diffract itself in equivalent variations; this is, if it knows how to redouble itself through doubling. This goes for brands of detergent as much as for 'peaceful coexistence'. You need two superpowers to maintain a universe under control; a single empire collapses under its own weight. The equilibrium of terror is what permits a strategy of regulated oppositions to be established, since the strategy is really structural rather than atomic."

**Q. THE CRITIQUE'S OBSESSION WITH LEAVING THE WORLD OF REALITY IS PRECISELY THE EVIL THAT SHOULD BE RESISTED.**

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 35. We see, then, that the internal traits of western culture — its obsession with representation, insistence on duality and control, ruthless instrumentalism and persistent gaze — are in fact a metalanguage of oppression and domination. Postmodernism exhibits the same traits; but in as much as it is a transcendence of modernity, it gives the western metalanguage of oppression a few new twists. The enframing of non-western cultures continues, but the process itself of enframing is now presented as an illusion, a mirage, a simulation; simultaneously simulations and mirages are constructed to make it appear as though all hierarchy and control, and hence domination and oppression, have disappeared. The object of postmodernism is not simply to absorb the non-west —that is the goal of hackneyed modernity — no: postmodernism aims at nothing less than to exhaust and consume the non-west.

**R. THE CRITIQUE ATTEMPTS TO SILENCE OPPOSITION THROUGH ITS AD HOMINEM APPROACH.**

**1. THE CRITIQUE IS AN EXERCISE OF POWER DESIGNED TO SUPPRESS ALTERNATIVE VOICES.**

Herbert Simons, (Prof., Comm. Studies, Temple U.), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 6. Zygmunt Bauman, in *Intimations of Postmodernity*, describes how the new mood can appear to be one of 'all-eroding, all dissolving destructiveness'. He goes on: 'the postmodern mind seems to condemn everything, propose nothing', as if 'demolition is the only job the postmodern mind seems to be good at'. The genie of critique has escaped its bottle, and now, unstopably, it darts hither and thither in random flights of mischief. It does not merely attack the ruling ideas, or the mass-produced ideas of economically organized popular culture. What Paul Ricoeur calls 'the hermeneutics of suspicion' has become the prevailing mood. Every assertion of truth is to be a target of critique, for every such assertion, so it is alleged, makes claims which cannot be securely substantiated. Moreover, it is an exercise of power, for each claim about 'the true', or 'the real', asserts its own voice, and thereby suppresses alternative voices.

2. THE CRITIQUE DEMEANS THE OPPOSITION.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 70. As I am proposing, the common form of argumentation, with assertion and critique serving as the adjacency pair of focal significance, is deeply problematic. Critique establishes a binary ontology, reifying the terms of disagreement, and removing other entries from the ledger. Further, critique as a rhetorical move has the effect of demeaning the opposition, generating animosity, atomizing the culture and blocking the way to resolution. Contemporary critique, informed by post-empiricist, critical and post- structuralist thought, carries with it the additional difficulties of favouring the very kinds of totalizing discourses against which it is set, and destroying the grounds of its own rationality.

3. THE CRITIQUE CENSORS FREE DISCUSSION.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM, 96, 26. For all its vaunted openness to the Other, postmodernism can be quite as exclusive and censorious as the orthodoxies it opposes.

4. THE CRITIQUE CREATES RIGID STEREOTYPES BECAUSE OF ITS INSISTENCE ON BINARIES.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM, 96, 25-26. For all its talk of difference, plurality, heterogeneity, postmodern theory often operates with quite rigid binary oppositions, with 'difference', 'plurality' and allied terms lined up bravely on one side of the theoretical fence as unequivocally positive, and whatever their antitheses might be (unity, identity, totality, universality) ranged balefully on the other.

5. THE CRITIQUE DESTROYS COMMUNITY.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER, 98, 62. The goals of postmodern democracy therefore focus on providing the individual with all possible avenues to pursue whatever is desired, even if it is at the expense of the community, as it so often is. Everyone makes his or her own rules, creates his or her own universe, and pursues his or her own happiness in his or her own way. How can one create a community from so many individual points of greed?

6. THE CRITIQUE DESTROYS DELIBERATION – IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO IGNORE THE GOOD REASONS WHICH PERFORM THE HARD WORK OF SOCIAL CHANGE.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 73. By contemporary standards, to criticize is to threaten annihilation and thus to alienate. Agreeable solutions seldom emerge from the process of assertion and critique; the more common outcome is the creation of self-sustaining and self-satisfying enclaves of antagonists. In effect, critique serves to insulate groups from the 'good reasons' of the other. Critical voices go either unheeded, or are bludgeoned because they are critical. The result is the same in either case: decision-making not by virtue of common deliberation — that is, by participation of all — but rather through a jockeying for power, inside position or private control of outcomes.

Herbert Simons, (Prof., Comm. Studies, Temple U.), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 6. The voice of ideology critique, confident in the powers to expose 'the real' behind 'the appearance' of ideas, is suspected of suppressing the voices of others and of making unwarranted, foundationalist claims about the 'real'. Thus, the radical urge to re-assert the suppressed voices of others (or, more generally, the voice of the Other) and to expose the illusions of the powerful is turned against itself.

Christopher Norris, (Prof., English, U. Wales), WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY, 90, 137. Such is at any rate the version of Derrida that has gained wide currency among literary critics, as well as neo-pragmatists like Rorty who see it as a handy tactical resource against foundationalist arguments of whatever kind. This is why Ellis regards deconstruction as a thoroughly perverse and mischievous doctrine, an affront to all decent standards of scholarly and critical debate.

7. THE CRITIQUE ACTUALLY STIGMATIZES UNDERPRIVILEGED GROUPS.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, xv. In the postmodernist camp, by pushing to the extreme this aggressive invective against the dogmas of truth, beauty, and the divine, by celebrating the "diverse," the postcolonial "Other," the "black" versus the "white," the female versus the male, and the homosexual versus the heterosexual, the learned class has driven itself into a corner and created a general state of apartheid, whereby groups, defined by gender, race, or creed come to assume radical positions and end up cutting off all communication between one another.

8. THE CRITIQUE, IN ITS EFFORT TO PROMOTE DISSENT, ACTUALLY SILENCES OPPOSING VOICES.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 68. The fully successful critique will also stifle those voices placed under attack. They are thrust to the margins for their hegemonic tendencies. Should the critic prove successful, the accomplishment is not thus the broadening of the discursive domain. It is the replacement of one form of totalization with its opposite number. It is an inversion of the binary, with results that are no less stifling.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 70. The social constructionist furnishes a sophisticated discourse on the way assertions emerge from social interchange, the ideology critic demonstrates the value biases that lend vitality to such assertions, and post-structuralists reveal the many literary and rhetorical devices at work in making compelling sense. The effect of each variety of weaponry is to rob the opponent's assertions of any form of validity or rhetorical force. At best, the opponent's words are reduced to hearsay or personal prejudice; at worst they are deprived of meaning altogether. Yet, at this point the problem of to quoque begins. For while it has become enormously effective in undermining the opposition, such critique simultaneously casts aspersions on its own production. Not only the grounds of its arguments, but all forms of counter-assertion stand subject to the same forms of self-immolation. And in opening themselves to such analysis, they also lose both validity and possible meaning. To demonstrate the social basis of scientific fact is to reduce this demonstration to mere conversation; to attack the class bias underlying a given policy is to transform the attack to a class bias; and to deconstruct the rhetoric of war is to transform talk of peace to rhetorical flourish.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 67-68. Yet, in what degree does the critical impulse truly serve the function of democratization? As we have seen, the problems begin with the symbiotic nature of the critical form. Once an assertion is followed by a critical negation, there is a radical truncation in the range of relevant voices. The combination of assertion and counter-assertion establishes the grounds for subsequent discussion; any voice registered outside the binary is rendered irrelevant. If we are arguing over abortion rights, there is no room for an advocate of migrant workers' rights; psychologists debating over experimentation vs more humanistic alternatives are unprepared for entry of 'Praise the Lord' proselytizers. Once the binary has been struck, it is not any voice that can be heard, but only those that remain within the reified world of the debate as structured. The case is more severe, however, when the target of criticism is placed under attack for totalization — for pressing a single truth and extinguishing all dissent. As males, heterosexuals, capitalists, communists, empiricists, moralists and others are vilified for the dominating effects of their discourse, the symbiotic structure of critique again plays a deleterious role. Specifically, the arrangement lends to the critical impulse a deadly demeanour: the target of attack becomes subject to annihilation.



9. THE CRITIQUE'S EFFORT TO RIDICULE SHOULD BE RESISTED.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 85. Postmodernism achieves its effects through deconstruction, ridicule and parody. None of these features comes rootless into the contemporary imagination; postmodernism arrives as a stance, a convention in history, which is also a point of attack on history. For modernity, history is a record of the self-aggrandisement of the victors, a self-interested portrayal of how they saw themselves and those ranged against them. The history of modernity, as much as the writing of history in the conventions of modernity, is a linear progress. Even when the Marxist notion of rupture between eras is introduced it implies a new linear trajectory, whether it be through time or conceptual improvement. Linear progress is the triumph of an implicit rightness, the record of the vindication of ideas and people by their coming to dominance through time. Postmodernism leaves behind precious few heroes and no noble causes. It also collapses the sense of linear connection. What happened in history is on a par with today's news; by corollary today's news can attain no greater significance or transparency from a knowledge of history, which consists of a collection of divergent, opposing interpretations, all of equivalent dubiety. History becomes so many competing attempts to author non-authoritative explanations of reality through the disposition of representations, manipulation of images and obfuscation of unfortunate facts."

10. THE CRITIQUE ENABLES TYRANNY AND FASCISM.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 28. But in seeking to cut the ground from under its opponents' feet, postmodernism finds itself unavoidably pulling the rug out from under itself, leaving itself with no more reason why we should resist fascism than the feebly pragmatic plea that fascism is not the way we do things in Sussex or Sacramento.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 134. Postmodern end-of-history thinking does not envisage a future for us much different from the present, a prospect it oddly views as a cause for celebration. But there is indeed one such possible future among several, and its name is fascism. The greatest test of postmodernism, or for that matter of any other political doctrine, is how it would shape up to that. Its rich body of work on racism and ethnicity, on the paranoia of identity-thinking, on the perils of totality and the fear of otherness: all this, along with its deepened insights into the cunning of power, would no doubt be of considerable value. But its cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, its lack of any adequate theory of political agency: all these would tell heavily against it. In confronting its political antagonists, the left, now more than ever, has need of strong ethical and even anthropological foundations; nothing short of this is likely to furnish us with the political resources we require. And on this score, postmodernism is in the end part of the problem rather than of the solution.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, xvi-xvii. The state of paralysis induced by the fluid dissemination of such a gospel has been extraordinary, far more crippling, in fact, than the old contraposition between Socialists and Liberals. And, as such, postmodernism has configured itself as the new, potent ideology of tyranny.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, 171. Postmodernism, the "Parisian fad," would pass, Bloom hoped, but in the meantime it was wreaking havoc by appealing "to our worst instincts." The relativists, Strauss had warned, by drawing no distinction between men and brutes, would spell "the victory of the gutter."

11. THE CRITIQUE ABANDONS ANY CONCEPT OF JUSTICE OR MORALITY.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 114. One kind of postmodern sceptic of universality believes in culturalist style that moral values are just embedded in contingent local traditions, and have no more force than that. An egregious example of this case is the American philosopher Richard Rorty, who in an essay entitled 'Solidarity' argues that those who helped Jews in the last world war probably did so less because they saw them as fellow human beings but because they belonged to the same city, profession or other social grouping as themselves. He then goes on to ask himself why modern American liberals should help oppressed American blacks. 'Do we say that these people must be helped because they are our fellow human beings? We may, but it is much more persuasive, morally as well as politically, to describe them as our fellow Americans — to insist that it is outrageous that an American should live without hope.' Morality, in short, is really just a species of patriotism.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 40. Reliance on individual conscience has meaning only when individuals have a conscience. All of postmodernism's traits work towards depriving individuals of their conscience. If neither the ends nor the means need justification then anything goes. Both thought and action are motivated by expediency: witness the Gulf War, the first trial of Rodney King, the denial of assistance to Bosnian Muslims subjected to 'ethnic cleansing'; it's all so very pragmatic. Postmodernism engenders double standards. And the individual is not just trapped into a system of ambiguous morality and double standards, perpetual and insatiable quest for consumption, inescapable bombardment of images and representations, and constant manipulation of and by all: there is also the very real fear created by the postmodern need to choose an identity wrapped in a manufactured reality: 'when we choose to adopt one, we know — even if we are terrified by the knowledge and do all we can to repress it in ourselves and others — that we could choose an entirely different one.' What role can conscience play in a world of such fear, angst and darkness?

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 41. But as this project can never really prosper, since to sacrifice the notion of truth altogether would be to disable some rather useful principles of social cohesion like religion and civic morality, the more radical forms of postmodernism are in business to turn their suspicion of truth against their rulers' continuing need for it as a form of social control. The irony is that in doing so, in insisting that truth is a function of power and desire, they sail hair-raisingly close to what their rulers hold in practice.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 86-87. But postmodern theory then proceeds to combine all this with some of the least palatable aspects of the very liberalism which the communitarians view as their enemy. It has little to say of the great liberal motifs of justice, freedom, equality, human rights and the like, since these topics sit uncomfortably with its nervousness of the 'autonomous subject'.

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 24. After postmodern awareness and deconstructive criticism have done their work of resistance, we still are faced with the challenge of establishing moral authority and inventing positive values as central elements of any polity. In addition to a postmodern hermeneutic of suspicion, then, we also need a 'hermeneutic of affirmation'.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 112-113. The exotic new thesis was abroad that you were entitled to freedom, autonomy, justice, happiness, political equality and the rest not because you were the son of a minor Prussian count but simply on account of your humanity. We now had rights, obligations and responsibilities which put in brackets all of our most intimately individuating features. Postmodernism is in general allergic to any such trampling on the particular, and this ferocious abstraction trampled on it with a vengeance. It was also one of the greatest emancipatory ideas of world history, one which postmodernism has come so much to take for granted that it can apparently only identify it by its blindspots.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, 3. Among American educators, as the issue was one of "resistance," what this new trend thus translated into, practically, was a mischievous pantomime of antagonisms. In other words, the "new dissenters"—who, exactly as their predecessors (the Marxists of yesteryear), never acted outside or against the system but always within it—resolved to play a game in which each entrenched himself or herself in the nominal dugout of "tolerance." From that position, they proceeded to analyze all "cultural artifacts" (the "great books," films, scholarly and media articles, etc.) and tear them apart—"deconstruct" was the proper expression—with a (more or less overt) view to lashing out at a number of choice targets, which were always the same for all (we will come to these shortly). The beauty of it all was that, through this game, one got to disintegrate much and construct nothing; and no systematic alliances across the dugout were possible for these would have meant one step toward unity, which, as a "totalizing discourse"—as a "universal"—was, for the "new dissenters," the ultimate taboo. In truth, the "deconstructivists" came to form an alliance of sorts: a loose but nevertheless strong and resilient alliance against anyone seeking unity across the political spectrum in the name of justice. Phrased differently, the "new culture of resistance" stood for an alliance against alliances. The new trend took on the name of "postmodernism," and its prophet was a white, thoroughly European male: Michel Foucault a darling of Western propaganda, whose decisive endorsement by the Parisian intelligentsia in 1966 and by its New York counterpart in 1975 transformed him instantly into an intellectual icon of the West.

12. THE PROFOUND CYNICISM OF THE CRITIQUE SHOULD BE REJECTED.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 46. In postmodern times, power is not about financial and military muscle over and above anything else, it is about cynicism. Those with and in power are motivated purely by self-aggrandisement, which is itself enhanced by demonstrations of the total helplessness of their victims. This is true not just of political power but also of corporate power: postmodern politics and corporate behaviour are all about cynical power.

Christopher Norris, (Prof., English, U. Wales), *WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY*, 90, 4. In short, we have reached a point where theory has effectively turned against itself, generating a form of extreme epistemological scepticism which reduces everything — philosophy, politics, criticism and 'theory' alike — to a dead level of suasive or rhetorical effect where consensus-values are the last (indeed the only) court of appeal.

13. CLARITY IS SUPERIOR TO CONFUSION WHEN CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.

Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, (Co-Founders, The Breakthrough Institute), *BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY*, 07, 222. We also know that people uniformly describe themselves as happier when they are exercising control over their lives and feel discouraged and depressed when they lose control. So first we need a story and a plan that makes people feel more in control of their future and better able to address the climate crisis. We also know that people respond most strongly to threats that they have a mental image of and to threats that involve immediate changes in their perceptions of the world. So second, we need a story that offers immediate, perceptible impacts that can be observed and directly addressed in the present, not the future.

14. THE CRITIQUE IS BUILT UPON A CONTRADICTION.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 70. While the critical attempt is interesting and intelligible enough, in the end it falls of its own weight. For once I have deconstructed mind and world as evidential sites — and cast them instead as elements in language — so have I also thrown my critique into jeopardy. For where are we to locate the 'forestructure of understandings,' the 'culture,' 'the propositions' and so on, all of which are essential elements in my argument? If they are not part of the world or of mind, now fragments of a castaway epistemology, to what world do they belong? Why should the use of such terms in my argument count against the position I am assailing. If 'real-world' existants are irrelevant to the propositional network under attack, then the rationale for my critique is also placed beyond real-world concern

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 36. Of course, the binary oppositions presented by postmodernism are just as much an artificial construction as the duality championed by colonialism and modernity.

15. THE CRITIQUE SERVES ONLY TO FRAGMENT DISSENT.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), *THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT*, 07, 191. Per se, postmodernism represented no epochal, life-changing shock; it was a fancy, academic fixative that came to be employed in the late seventies to clinch a state of near-complete fragmentation.

16. THE CRITIQUE SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE IT MAKES MEANINGLESS DISTINCTIONS.

Christopher Norris, (Prof., English, U. Wales), *WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY*, 90, 154. So it is unthinkable — in the strictest sense of that word — that we should now follow the lead of postmodern-pragmatists like Rorty and learn to treat philosophy as just one more voice in the cultural 'conversation of mankind', on a level with literature, criticism and other such styles of 'edifying' discourse. For this is nothing more than a line of least resistance, a refusal to acknowledge the very real problems that arise as soon as one posits an alternative 'final vocabulary' — in Rorty's case, an idiom of strong misreading, creative renewal, poetic redescription, etc. — conceived as a preferable substitute for all those dead-end philosophical debates. What such thinking cannot acknowledge is the fact that any suggested alternative will always involve a covert appeal to distinctions — like that between 'concept' and 'metaphor' — which are so far from breaking with the language and resources of Western philosophy that they reproduce its characteristic features at every turn.

17. THE CRITIQUE, WHILE IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS, MAKES MANY UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTIONS OF ITS OWN.

Kenneth Gergen, (Prof., Psychology, Swarthmore College), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 71. At present, the critical impulse largely acquires its justification from a family of interrelated suppositions, including but not limited to the following: (a) adequate or adaptive behaviour is guided by processes of rationality within the individual mind; (b) in matters of rationality, certain states of mind (e.g. logical, objective) are more desirable (or adaptive) than others; (c) the process of critique is essential to reaching a state of optimal rationality; (d) critical thought enables the individual to resist humbug, tyranny and the pressures of the social group; and (e) critical thought at the individual level is a necessary ingredient of a democratic society.<sup>3</sup> Yet, there is not one of these suppositions that can withstand close scrutiny, not one that can viably sustain the critical impulse.

18. THE CRITIQUE'S ASSAULT ON TRUTH OR "VALIDITY" IS UNJUSTIFIED.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 41-42. Not only does postmodernism recycle notions well established in non-western cultures, it makes two further assertions. The argument that since there are many realities there can be no criteria for determining their validity becomes quite meaningless when viewed, for example, from the perspective of Hindu logic. Western logic is based on the principle of 'valid inference' and formulated in a content-independent 'formal' language which aims to translate everything into mathematical symbols. In contrast to western logic which uses sequential techniques of quantification and negation, Indian logic uses a geometric system to demonstrate configurational relationships of similarity and convergence: it is both mathematical and symbolic. Instead of a universe seen through an either/or duality, the Indian system sees the world through a fourfold logic (X is neither A, nor non-A, nor both A and non-A, nor neither A nor non-A) and Jain logic expands these categories into a sevenfold logic. Being a logic of cognition, the Indian system achieves a precise and unambiguous formulation of universal statements in terms of its technical language without recourse to quantification over unspecified universal domain. Again, I do not want to give an exposition of Indian logic here: the point is that non-western cultures are not only aware of the diversity of realities but they have also developed criteria for the validation of different realities. The universe is not as meaningless as postmodernism would have us believe.

19. THE CRITIQUE'S DESTRUCTION OF ANY UNIVERSAL LOGIC, ENABLES CONTINUED DOMINATION; INDIVIDUAL GREED IS MADE THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF BENEVOLENT ACTION.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 39. The postmodern desire to consume the Other is not just a collective cultural phenomenon: it is also an individual quest. Postmodernism takes individualism to a new level. As Anderson notes, 'the rush of postmodern reaction from the old certainties has swept some people headlong into a (radical) worldview. Many voices can now be heard declaring that what is out there is not only what we put out there. More precisely, what I put there — just little me, euphorically creating my own universe: Postmodern individuals — being so many points of greed within the western civilisation — are forever acquiring new identities, creating new universes of realities, consuming whatever they think would satisfy their insatiable quest for meaning, identity and belonging: largely at the expense of non-western cultures.

20. THE CRITIQUE'S ULTIMATE GOAL IS MEANINGLESSNESS OR NIHILISM.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 85-86. Postmodernism has a particular take on the end of history: it is truly the end of history as we have known it because it envelops all historical events in meaninglessness. Significance can only be an act of interpretation — postmodernism recognises only multiple competing interpretations. How can one subject them all to truth or reality tests? The grand school of history sought objective verification, but postmodernism suggests a new possibility — that all interpretations are in their way cogent and valid.

21. WE SHOULD REJECT THE CLAIMS MADE BY CRITIQUES THAT THEY SHOULD BE JUDGED BY A DIFFERENT STANDARD.

Christopher Norris, (Prof., English, U. Wales), WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY, 90, 134. I am in sympathy with John Ellis's book *Against Deconstruction\** on several counts, not least his insistence that deconstruction — or those who speak in its name — be held accountable to the standards of logical rigour, argumentative consistency and truth. He is also perfectly right to maintain that such ideas need testing through a process of genuine and open intellectual debate; that deconstructionists are failing this test if they resort to a notion of open-ended textual 'freeplay' or all-purpose rhetorical 'undecidability'; and furthermore, that one simply cannot make sense of arguments that claim allegiance to a different, alternative or uniquely 'Derridean' kind of logic whose terms they are then unable to specify with any degree of exactitude.

## **ACTION & CALCULABILITY IS GOOD**

### **1. ETHICS AND POLITICS ARE CO-PRESENT; THE PERMUTATION IS THE OPTIMAL COURSE OF ACTION**

Michael Dillon (Professor of Politics @ U of Lancaster), *POLITICAL THEORY*, April 1999, v27, n2.. Online. Internet. EBSCO Host Research Database. Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and ethics opens his first major work, *Totality and Infinity*, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political. Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does for the understanding of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas the ethical comes first and ethics is first philosophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own deferral to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate. In this essay I understand the challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political. Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life.

### **2. WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF HUMANITY**

Michael Dillon (Professor of Politics @ U of Lancaster), *POLITICAL THEORY*, April 1999, v27, n2.. Online. Internet. EBSCO Host Research Database. The advent of another Justice is intimately related to the essentially active and futural character of the temporality of human freedom. It comes into its own, and we are continually challenged to plot and assume new bearings in consequence of it, precisely because the human's radically hermeneutical adventure in the finely spun filigree of absence presencing discloses its ineradicably present absence in everything which we do. To assume this responsibility is not, then, to discharge it, for there always remains an irreducible gap, but to bear it. Only because the human has continuously to assume responsibility which it can never discharge—not because it is guilty of an original sin, but because it is an open, radically hermeneutical and futural, way of being—does it have the very possibility of a future. Generosity is, however, the composure, and openness the tone, for the welcome such a condition requires if, taken on, it is to be lived on into the future at all.

### **3. OUR ACTION DOESN'T FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINGENCY, BUT WE MUST MAKE DECISIONS IN ORDER TO TAKE RESPONSIBLE ACTION**

Michael Dillon (Professor of Politics @ U of Lancaster), *POLITICAL THEORY*, April 1999, v27, n2.. Online. Internet. EBSCO Host Research Database. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality. What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contingency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, knowing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'decision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The management science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.<sup>38</sup> But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as heterogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located. And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been—could not as yet have been—known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything.

4. WE CANNOT KNOW EVERYTHING, NOR CAN WE AVOID ASSIGNING VALUE TO HUMAN LIFE;  
BUT WE STILL HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT TO PREVENT HARM

Michael Dillon (Professor of Politics @ U of Lancaster), POLITICAL THEORY, April 1999, v27, n2.. Online. Internet. EBSCO Host Research Database. This is no simple absence of knowing. Neither is it an economic account of the asymmetry of knowing. Nor, finally, is it a matter of calculating the logics that apply in situations of imperfect information. Here we have no mere lack of knowledge that may be remedied, calibrated, or otherwise represented mathematically and of which an account can be taken. What I am referring to is, instead, a lack integral to the structure of any and every 'decision'; where the issue precisely is not a matter of not yet knowing but of the unknowable inalienable from knowing itself. Further even, and this is the crux of the issue, it is a matter of that peculiar infinite responsibility which releases the human pneuma in respect of unknowability as such. A peculiar and quite distinctive form of responsibility thereby arises; it corresponds to the very unknowability that invokes it. Since the unknowable is not the not yet known, but that which cannot be known in every act or exercise of knowing, it is attended by a responsibility which can similarly never be discharged. Assumption of responsibility for this unknowability—taking it on—is what makes a 'decision' a 'decision'; rather than the application of judgment according to a rule, or the submission to the necessity of a law, however that law is decreed or described. Short of divesting the human of that very lack of measure, the assumption of which distinguishes the being of human being, this responsibility will never be discharged. Here then, too, the thinking of deconstruction reveals its profoundly ethical and political character: through its commitment to think and not elide the aporetic character of the co-presence of the ethical and the political; through its insistence on the inescapability of assuming responsibility for that immeasurable task; and through its continuous indictment of the hubristic eclipsing of undecidability by decidedness. For deconstruction is ultimately not an analytical technique. Rather, it is the event of undecidability, simply the case as Derrida puts it, taking place in every decidedness. Thus 'decision' is that which is prepared to own responsibility for undecidability. It knows that neither 'decision' nor responsibility will ever discharge each other in relation to this Otherness. Since undecidable is therefore what 'we' are—or suffer—an ethos may arise governed by the desire continuously to make way for the immeasurable responsibility consequent upon it. Such an ethos, it may then be said—I would want to say—is what distinguishes political life.

5. ALL EVILS, NO MATTER HOW GREAT, ARE RECTIFIABLE; BUT THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE IS THE ULTIMATE EVIL AND OUTWIEGHS ALL OTHERS BECAUSE IT IS THE ULTIMATE DEVALUATION OF LIFE AND IS IRREVERSIBLE

Robert Warren (U.S. District Court Judge), UNITED STATES V. THE PROGRESSIVE, March 28, 1979. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. The destruction of various human rights can come about in differing ways and at varying speeds. Freedom of the press can be obliterated overnight by some dictator's imposition of censorship or by the slow nibbling away at a free press through successive bits of repressive legislation enacted by a nation's lawmakers. Yet, even in the most drastic of such situations, it is always possible for a dictator to be overthrown, for a bad law to be repealed or for a judge's error to be subsequently rectified. Only when human life is at stake are such corrections impossible. The case at bar is so difficult precisely because the consequences of error involve human life itself and on such an awesome scale. The Secretary of State states that publication will increase thermonuclear proliferation and that this would "irreparably impair the national security of the United States." The Secretary of Defense says that dissemination of the Morland paper will mean a substantial increase in the risk of thermonuclear proliferation and lead to use or threats that would "adversely affect the national security of the United States." Howard Morland asserts that "if the information in my article were not in the public domain, it should be put there . . . so that ordinary citizens may have informed opinions about nuclear weapons." Erwin Knoll, the editor of *The Progressive*, states he is "totally convinced that publication of the article will be of substantial benefit to the United States because it will demonstrate that this country's security does not lie in an oppressive and ineffective system of secrecy and classification but [996] in open, honest, and informed public debate about issues which the people must decide." The Court is faced with the difficult task of weighing and resolving these divergent views. A mistake in ruling against *The Progressive* will seriously infringe cherished First Amendment rights. If a preliminary injunction is issued, it will constitute the first instance of prior restraint against a publication in this fashion in the history of this country, to this Court's knowledge. Such notoriety is not to be sought. It will curtail defendants' First Amendment rights in a drastic and substantial fashion. It will infringe upon our right to know and to be informed as well. A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot.

6. DILLON DOESN'T ADVOCATE REJECTION; ENDORSING THE POLITICAL ACT OF THE PLAN IS CONSISTENT WITH DILLON'S CALL FOR ANOTHER FORM OF JUSTICE

Michael Dillon (Professor of Politics @ U of Lancaster), POLITICAL THEORY, April 1999, v27, n2.. Online. Internet. EBSCO Host Research Database. In order to be at all, then, this way of being has to pose and respond to the question what it is to be. In doing so it takes its bearing—composure of transits, plots, courses, and fixes—from the connectedness in the midst of which it always already finds itself. More often than not, it is only when those navigational aids are disrupted, and its automatic pilots break down, that it fully recognises its radically hermeneutical condition. It is at these points, especially, that the call of another Justice resounds most loudly throughout its hermeneuticism. Here the bearing of a new bearing may be assumed. Each always has to be assumed questioningly, however, within a given world; and none ever exhausts the task of having to do so. For another Justice always already arises within and alongside—is vented through—the legislation, execution, and adjudication of existing distributive regimes. This making way for other ways of being to be is a political art. Other justices emerge out of the injustices of regimes of distributive justice in response to the call of another Justice. That is why there is an intimate link between another Justice and politics. Such a politics is neither a supposedly habitual tradition, a contractual negotiation, nor an epistemically realist computation of the correlates of rigorously self-interested behaviour. It is an irruptive and inventive practice called up by specific historical circumstances. Politics becomes that way of being (*politeia*) whose composure is an art of intimation, articulation, intervention, and judgment. It is a practice that responds to the call of another Justice. There is no guarantee that it will be available when required, just as there is no guarantee that it will be successful should it be exercised, or that everybody is able to practice it on demand. Too often rule, management decision, and violence occlude it. Recognisable when it makes its appearance, we have to bear witness to it.



7. SPECTATORS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR INACTION—WE CAN'T JUST STAND ASIDE AND LET PEOPLE SUFFER

Nancy Scheper-Hughes (Professor of Anthropology @ UC Berkeley), CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, June 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://sas.epnet.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>. My point here is that a politically engaged anthropology could not make the mistake of overlooking the enormous significance of chronic hunger in driving the everyday lives of the poor of Northeast Brazil, just as it could not ignore the massacres and disappearances of vulnerable people that often occur (though one would hardly know it) right in front of the anthropologist's unsteady gaze. Stam takes to task those traditional Andeanist anthropologists whose selective blindness to the ongoing war in Pem allowed them to go about business as usual, blithely concerned “with ecology and ritual, with depicting remoteness rather than discerning links”, and therefore complicit in the structures of violence and space of death that the ongoing war left in its wake. Similarly, Clifford Geertz's celebrated Balinese “cockfight” scenario was developed within the larger context of a national political emergency that resulted in the massacre of almost three-quarters of a million Indonesians, though it took Geertz three decades to mention the killings that had engulfed his Javanese field site, now forever associated in our minds with those semiotic fighting roosters. Anthropologists should, I believe, be held accountable for what they see and what they fail to see, how they act or fail to act in critical situations.

8. PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-REFLECTION IS AN IRRESPONSIBLE ACT; IT NEGATES THE NEED TO TAKE A STAND

Nancy Scheper-Hughes (Professor of Anthropology @ UC Berkeley), CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, June 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://sas.epnet.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>. Anthropologists have, I believe, a responsibility to be public intellectuals, and I could not disagree more with Kuper's insular view that “ethnographers should write [principally] for [other] anthropologists.” Similarly, in response to Crapanzano's defense of the postmodern as an inescapable social fact of our times, I would only point to the regrettable situation we have reached when an entire symposium of the 1994 American Anthropological Association meetings entitled “Receptions of Violence: Reactive After-Texts, Afterimages, and the Post-Ethnographic Site” can concern itself with reader “reactions” to anthropological writings on violence and political terror, from rape in Bosnia to the dirty tricks of the Argentina dirty war, focusing on the effects these responses have on the comfort level of anthropologists. I think we must question the meaningfulness of the postmodern, self-absorbed reflexive turn. (No doubt Grapanzano will reply that there is nothing “postmodern” about the postethnographic site!)

9. ACTION ISN'T COLONIALIST OR EVIL; COMMITTING OURSELVES TO A STRUGGLE IS IMPORTANT

Nancy Scheper-Hughes (Professor of Anthropology @ UC Berkeley), CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, June 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://sas.epnet.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>. Anthropologists, too, can be negative workers. We can practice an anthropology-with-one's-feet-on-the-ground, a committed, grounded, even a “barefoot” anthropology. We can write books that go against the grain by avoiding impenetrable prose (whether postmodernist or Lacanian) so as to be accessible to the people we say we represent. We can disrupt *expected* academic roles and statuses in the spirit of the Brazilian “carnavalesque.” We can make ourselves available not just as friends or as “patrons” in the old colonialist sense but as *comrades* (with all the demands and responsibilities that this word implies) to the people who are the subjects of our writings, whose lives and miseries provide us with a livelihood. We can—as Michel De Certeau (1984) suggests—exchange gifts based on our labors, use book royalties to support radical actions, and seek to avoid the deadening treadmill of academic achievement and in this way subvert the process that puts our work at the service of the scientific, academic factory. We can distance ourselves from old and unreal loyalties, as Virginia Woolf (1938) described them: loyalties to old schools, old churches, old ceremonies, and old countries. Freedom from unreal loyalties means ridding oneself of pride of family, nation, religion, pride of sex and gender, and all the other dangerous loyalties that spring from them. In doing so we can position ourselves, as Robert Redfield once put it, squarely on the side of humanity. We can be anthropologists, comrades, and *companheiras*.

## PRAGMATISM IS GOOD/JUSTIFIED

1. PRAGMATISM IS THE OPTIMAL PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK; IT TRANSCENDS THE METAPHYSICAL “PSEUDO-PROBLEMS” DISCUSSED ENDLESSLY BY POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHERS LIKE NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, AND DELEUZE

Richard Rorty, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, 1982. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm>. Among contemporary philosophers, pragmatism is usually regarded as an outdated philosophical movement—one which flourished in the early years of this century in a rather provincial atmosphere, and which has now been either refuted or *aufgehoben*. The great pragmatists - James and Dewey—are occasionally praised for their criticisms of Platonism (e.g., Dewey on traditional conceptions of education, James on metaphysical pseudo-problems). But their anti-Platonism is thought by analytic philosophers to have been insufficiently rigorous and by non-analytic philosophers to have been insufficiently radical. For the tradition which originates in logical positivism the pragmatists' attacks on “transcendental,” quasi-Platonist philosophy need to be sharpened by more careful and detailed analysis of such notions as “meaning” and truth.” For the anti-Philosophical tradition in contemporary French and German thought which takes its point of departure from Nietzsche's criticism of both strands in nineteenth-century Philosophical thought—positivistic as well as transcendental—the American pragmatists are thinkers who never really broke out of positivism, and thus never really broke with Philosophy. I do not think that either of these dismissive attitudes is 'justified. on the account of recent analytic philosophy which I offered in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, the history of that movement has been marked by a gradual “pragmaticisation” of the original tenets of logical positivism. On the account of recent “Continental” philosophy which I hope to offer in a book on Heidegger which I am writing,' James and Nietzsche make parallel criticisms of nineteenth-century thought. Further, James's version is preferable, for it avoids the “metaphysical” elements in Nietzsche which Heidegger criticises, and, for that matter, the “metaphysical” elements in Heidegger which Derrida criticises.' On my view, James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialectical road which analytic philosophy travelled, but are waiting at the end of the road which, for example, Foucault and Deleuze are currently travelling.

2. PRAGMATISM ALLOWS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE “TRUTHS”; WE DON'T ENDORSE ONE STATIC MEANING OF “TRUTH”; RATHER, WE ENDORSE “TRUISMS” LIKE THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN

Richard Rorty, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, 1982. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm>. If the pragmatist is advised that he must not confuse the *advisability of asserting S* with the *truth of S*, he will respond. that the advice is question-begging. The question is precisely whether “the true” is more than what William James defined it as: “the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.” On James's view, “true” resembles “good” or “rational” in being a normative notion, a compliment paid to sentences that seem to be paying their way and that fit in with other sentences which are doing so.

3. PRAGMATIC ACTIONS LIKE THE PLAN ARE THE BEST OPTION; ENDORSING, OR EVEN CONSIDERING, EVERY INTELLECTUAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWPOINT WILL LEAD TO PARALYSIS

Richard Rorty, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, 1982. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06.<http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm>. The pragmatist, on the other hand, thinks that the quest for a universal human community will be self-defeating if it tries to preserve the elements of every intellectual tradition, all the “deep” intuitions everybody has ever had. It is not to be achieved by an attempt at commensuration, at a common vocabulary which isolates the common human essence of Achilles and the Buddha, Lavoisier and Derrida. Rather, it is to be reached, if at all, by acts, of making rather than of finding-by poetic -' rather than Philosophical achievement. The culture which will transcend, and thus unite, East and West, or the Earthlings and the Galactics, is not likely to be one which does equal justice to each, but one which looks back on both with the amused condescension typical of later generations looking back at their ancestors. So the pragmatist's quarrel with the intuitive realist should be about the *status* ' of intuitions-about their *right* to be respected as opposed to how particular intuitions might be “synthesised” or explained away.” To treat his opponent properly, the pragmatist must begin by admitting that the realistic intuitions in question are as deep and compelling as the realist says they are. But he should then try to change the subject by asking, “And what should we *do* about such intuitions-extirpate them, or find a vocabulary which does justice to them?”

4. THE AFFIRMATIVE WILL DEFEND RORTY'S NOTION OF THE PRAGMATIC, “ALL-PURPOSE” INTELLECTUAL WHO CAN MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS AND TAKE GOOD ACTIONS WITHOUT ADHERING TO ABSOLUTIST PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS

Richard Rorty, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, 1982. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06.<http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm>. The question of whether the pragmatist is right to be so sanguine is the question of whether a culture is imaginable, or desirable, in which no one-or at least no intellectual-believes that we have, deep down inside us, a criterion for telling whether we are in touch with reality or not, when we are in the Truth. This would be a culture in which neither the priests nor the physicists nor the poets nor the Party were thought of as more “rational,” or more “scientific” or “deeper” than one another. No particular portion of culture would be singled out as exemplifying (or signally failing to exemplify) the condition to which the rest aspired. There would be no sense that, beyond the current intra-disciplinary criteria, which, for example, good priests or good physicists obeyed, there were other, transdisciplinary, transcultural, ahistorical criteria, which they also obeyed. There would still be hero-worship in such a culture, but it would not be worship of heroes as children of the gods, as marked off from the rest of mankind by closeness to the Immortal. It would simply be admiration of exceptional men and women who were very good at doing the quite diverse kinds of things they did. Such people would not be those who knew a Secret, who had won through to the Truth, but simply people who were good at being human. *A fortiori*, such a culture would contain nobody called “the Philosopher” who could explain why and how certain areas of culture enjoyed a special relation to reality. Such a culture would, doubtless, contain specialists in seeing how things hung together. But these would be people who had no special “problems” to solve, nor any special “method” to apply, abided by no particular disciplinary standards, had no collective self-image as a “profession.” They might resemble contemporary philosophy professors in being more interested in moral responsibility than in prosody, or more interested in the articulation of sentences than in that of the human body, but they might not. They would be all-purpose intellectuals who were ready to offer a view on pretty much anything, in the hope of making it hang together with everything else.

## **POLICY DEBATE/FIAT IS GOOD**

### **1. ACADEMIC DEBATE IS EDUCATIONAL AND ENRICHING AS IT EXISTS NOW; MAKING DEBATE INTO AN “ACTIVIST” ACTIVITY WILL BACKFIRE**

Alan Coverstone (Teacher of Government and Economics & Academic Dean at Montgomery Bell Academy), *AN INWARD GLANCE: A RESPONSE TO MITCHELL’S OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN*, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>. Mitchell's call for an outward activist turn among academic debate practitioners is, indeed, a wake up call. The problems inherent in political discourse today are manifold. As the information age gathers momentum, the power of the information “haves” in society dramatically increases. As masters of information, academic debaters are uniquely situated to direct the future flow of political life in America. Mitchell's work is important for its potential to elevate our awareness of the latent power we possess and the responsibilities such power confers upon us. There is value in the inspiration he provides for individual and collective participation in the democratic process. By identifying channels of influence that are open to debate practitioners, he enables effective involvement. Yet, Mitchell goes too far. In two important areas, his argument is slightly miscalibrated. First, Mitchell underestimates the value of debate as it is currently practiced. There is greater value in the somewhat insular nature of our present activity than he assumes. Debate's inward focus creates an unusual space for training and practice with the tools of modern political discourse. Such space is largely unavailable elsewhere in American society. Second, Mitchell overextends his concept of activism. He argues fervently for mass action along ideological lines. Such a turn replaces control by society's information elite with control by an elite all our own. More than any other group in America today, practitioners of debate should recognize the subtle issues upon which political diversity turns. Mitchell's search for broad themes around which to organize mass action runs counter to this insight. As a result, Mitchell's call for an outward activist turn threatens to subvert the very values it seeks to achieve.

### **2. AN ACTIVIST TURN IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATE RISKS BEING CO-OPTED BY THE POLITICAL AND MEDIA ELITE; THIS WILL DESTROY THE ENTIRE ACTIVITY**

Alan Coverstone (Teacher of Government and Economics & Academic Dean at Montgomery Bell Academy), *AN INWARD GLANCE: A RESPONSE TO MITCHELL’S OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN*, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>. Second, Mitchell's argument underestimates the risks associated with an outward turn. Individuals trained in the art and practice of debate are, indeed, well suited to the task of entering the political world. At some unspecified point in one's training, the same motivation and focus that has consumed Mitchell will also consume most of us. At that point, political action becomes a proper endeavor. However, all of the members of the academic debate community will not reach that point together. A political outward turn threatens to corrupt the oasis in two ways. It makes our oasis a target, and it threatens to politicize the training process. As long as debate appears to be focused inwardly, political elites will not feel threatened. Yet one of Mitchell's primary concerns is recognition of our oasis in the political world. In this world we face well trained information managers. Sensing a threat from “debate,” they will begin to infiltrate our space. Ready made information will increase and debaters will eat it up. Not yet able to truly discern the relative values of information, young debaters will eventually be influenced dramatically by the infiltration of political elites. Retaining our present anonymity in political life offers a better hope for reinvigorating political discourse.

3. ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE TRAINS PEOPLE TO BE RESPONSIBLE AND MEANINGFUL PARTICIPANTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND IN AMERICAN CIVIL LIFE

Alan Coverstone (Teacher of Government and Economics & Academic Dean at Montgomery Bell Academy), AN INWARD GLANCE: A RESPONSE TO MITCHELL'S OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>. Mitchell's argument underestimates the nature of academic debate in three ways. First, debate trains students in the very skills required for navigation in the public sphere of the information age. In the past, political discourse was controlled by those elements who controlled access to information. While this basic reality will continue in the future, its essential features will change. No longer will mere possession of information determine control of political life. Information is widely available. For the first time in human history we face the prospect of an entirely new threat. The risk of an information overload is already shifting control of political discourse to superior information managers. It is no longer possible to control political discourse by limiting access to information. Instead, control belongs to those who are capable of identifying and delivering bits of information to a thirsty public. Mitchell calls this the "desertification of the public sphere." The public senses a deep desire for the ability to manage the information around them. Yet, they are unsure how to process and make sense of it all. In this environment, snake charmers and charlatans abound. The popularity of the evening news wanes as more and more information becomes available. People realize that these half hour glimpses at the news do not even come close to covering all available information. They desperately want to select information for themselves. So they watch CNN until they fall asleep. Gavel to gavel coverage of political events assumes top spots on the Nielsen charts. Desperate to decide for themselves, the public of the twenty-first century drinks deeply from the well of information. When they are finished, they find they are no more able to decide. Those who make decisions are envied and glorified. Debate teaches individual decision-making for the information age. No other academic activity available today teaches people more about information gathering, assessment, selection, and delivery. Most importantly, debate teaches individuals how to make and defend their own decisions. Debate is the only academic activity that moves at the speed of the information age. Time is required for individuals to achieve escape velocity. Academic debate holds tremendous value as a space for training.

4. POLICY DEBATE IS THE FIRST, ONLY, AND LAST ACTIVITY THAT TRAINS PEOPLE TO BE RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF THE POLIS; IT IS A PREREQUISITE TO BENEFICIAL TYPES OF PUBLIC ACTIVISM

Alan Coverstone (Teacher of Government and Economics & Academic Dean at Montgomery Bell Academy), AN INWARD GLANCE: A RESPONSE TO MITCHELL'S OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>. As perhaps the only truly non-partisan space in American political society, academic debate holds the last real possibility for training active political participants. Nowhere else are people allowed, let alone encouraged, to test all manner of political ideas. This is the process through which debaters learn what they believe and why they believe it. In many ways this natural evolution is made possible by the isolation of the debate community. An example should help illustrate this idea. Like many young debaters, I learned a great deal about socialism early on. This was not crammed down my throat. Rather, I learned about the issue in the free flow of information that is debate. The intrigue of this, and other outmoded political arguments, was in its relative unfamiliarity. Reading socialist literature avidly, I was ready to take on the world. Yet I only had one side of the story. I was an easy mark for the present political powers. Nevertheless, I decided to fight City Hall. I had received a parking ticket which I felt was unfairly issued. Unable to convince the parking department to see it my way, I went straight to the top. I wrote the Mayor a letter. In this letter, I accused the city of exploitation of its citizens for the purpose of capital accumulation. I presented a strong Marxist critique of parking meters in my town. The mayor's reply was simple and straightforward. He called me a communist. He said I was being silly and should pay the ticket. I was completely embarrassed by the entire exchange. I thought I was ready to start the revolution. In reality, I wasn't even ready to speak to the Mayor. I did learn from the experience, but I did not learn what Gordon might have hoped. I learned to stop reading useless material and to keep my opinions to myself. Do we really want to force students into that type of situation? I wrote the mayor on my own. Debaters will experiment with political activism on their own. This is all part of the natural impulse for activism which debate inspires. Yet, in the absence of such individual motivation, an outward turn threatens to short circuit the learning process. Debate should capitalize on its isolation. We can teach our students to examine all sides of an issue and reach individual conclusions before we force them into political exchanges. To prematurely turn debaters out threatens to undo the positive potential of involvement in debate.

5. VIEWING DEBATE AS A "SOCIAL MOVEMENT" RISKS FRACTURING AND HOMOGENIZING THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY

Alan Coverstone (Teacher of Government and Economics & Academic Dean at Montgomery Bell Academy), AN INWARD GLANCE: A RESPONSE TO MITCHELL'S OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 5, 06. <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>. My third, and final reaction to Mitchell's proposal, targets his desire for mass action. The danger is that we will replace mass control of the media/government elite with a mass control of our own elite. The greatest virtue of academic debate is its ability to teach people that they can and must make their own decisions. An outward turn, organized along the lines of mass action, threatens to homogenize the individual members of the debate community. Such an outcome will, at best, politicize and fracture our community. At worst, it will coerce people to participate before making their own decisions.

6. TRAINING IN TRADITIONAL ACADEMIC DEBATE IS KEY TO EDUCATION

Gordon Mitchell (Professor of Communication @ Univ. of Pittsburgh), ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. Accessed June 6, 06. <http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/ArgAgency.pdf>. For those schooled in the tradition of argumentation and debate, faith in the tensile strength of critical thinking and oral expression as pillars of democratic decision-making is almost second nature, a natural outgrowth of disciplinary training. This faith, inscribed in the American Forensic Association's Credo, reproduced in scores of argumentation textbooks, and rehearsed over and over again in introductory argumentation courses, grounds the act of argumentation pedagogy in a progressive political vision that swells the enthusiasm of teachers and students alike, while ostensibly locating the study of argumentation in a zone of relevance that lends a distinctive sense of meaning and significance to academic work in this area. Demographic surveys of debaters suggest that indeed, the practice of debate has significant value for participants. Some studies confirm debate's potential as a tool to develop critical thinking and communication skills. For example, Sendlak and Shields find that "students with debate experience were significantly better at employing the three communication skills (analysis, delivery, and organization) utilized in this study than students without the experience." In a similar vein, Colbert and Biggers write that "the conclusion seems fairly simple, debate training is an excellent way of improving many communication skills." Finally, Keefe, Harte and Norton provide strong corroboration for these observations with their assessment that "many researchers over the past four decades have come to the same general conclusions. Critical thinking ability is significantly improved by courses in argumentation and debate and by debate experience."

7. DEBATE IS KEY TO EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC EMPOWERMENT

Gordon Mitchell (Professor of Communication @ Univ. of Pittsburgh), ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. Accessed June 6, 06. <http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/ArgAgency.pdf>. Other studies document the professional success of debaters after graduation. For example, 15% of persons in Keele and Matlon's survey of former debaters went on to become "top-ranking executives." This finding is consistent with the results of Center's survey, which suggests that participation in forensics is an employee attribute desired strongly by businesses, especially law firms. While these survey data bode well for debate students preparing to test the waters of the corporate job market, such data shed little light on the degree to which argumentation skills learned in debate actually translate into practical tools of democratic empowerment. Regardless of whether or not survey data is ever generated to definitively answer this question, it is likely that faith in debate as an inherently democratic craft will persist.

8. DEBATE IS KEY TO THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

Gordon Mitchell (Professor of Communication @ Univ. of Pittsburgh), ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. Accessed June 6, 06. <http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/ArgAgency.pdf>. In the process of explaining their teaching approach, argumentation scholars sometimes invoke a bifurcation that separates academic study of argumentation from applied practice in public argument. This explanation typically begins with an elucidation of the democratic and emancipatory potential of debate as a process of decisionmaking, and then proceeds to an explanation of academic study as an essential preparatory step on the way to achievement of such emancipatory potential. This route of explanation is consistent with the American Forensic Association Credo, which declares that the purpose of forensic education is to "prepare students through classrooms, forums, and competition for participation in their world through the power of expression." Writing from this posture to defend the value of National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy competition, Edward Panetta posits that NDT debate "will prepare students to be societal leaders ..." Similarly, Austin Freeley suggests that academic debate "provides preparation for effective participation in a democratic society" and "offers preparation for leadership."

9. DEBATE IS CRITICAL TO PREPARATION FOR RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP

Gordon Mitchell (Professor of Communication @ Univ. of Pittsburgh), ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. Accessed June 6, 06. <http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/ArgAgency.pdf>. As two prominent teachers of argumentation point out, "Many scholars and educators term academic debate a laboratory for testing and developing approaches to argumentation" (Hill and Leeman 1997, p. 6). This explanation of academic debate squares with descriptions of the study of argumentation that highlight debate training as preparation for citizenship. As a safe space that permits the controlled "testing" of approaches to argumentation, the academic laboratory, on this account, constitutes a training ground for "future" citizens and leaders to hone their critical thinking and advocacy skills.

## **ANSWERS TO KRITIK OF TOPICALITY**

### **A. THE KRITIK OF TOPICALITY HURTS OUR GROUND WHICH IS CRITICAL TO REAL WORLD EDUCATION**

#### **1. THE PROMOTERS OF THE KRITIK CAN ALWAYS WIN THEIR ADVOCACY IS GOOD IN THE ABSTRACT. HOWEVER, IT IS MORE PRUDENT AS A POLICY MAKER TO DEFEND A TRUE POLICY OPTION.**

Michael Ignatieff (Carr professor of human rights at Harvard) 2004 LESSER EVILS p. 20-1 As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

#### **2. WITHOUT PREDICTABLE GROUND, DEBATE BECOMES VIOLENT AND INEFFECTIVE FOR CHANGE.**

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, 182-3. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.



3. GROUND IN DEBATE IS CRITICAL TO INVIGORATE SOCIAL INDEPENDENCE.

Adolf G. Gundersen (Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 108-109. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening list of empirical findings which suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the problems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if deliberation will of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time enhance interdependence. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new, something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, citizens must borrow a page from the participatory democrat's book by coming to view deliberation as their responsibility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are, after all, under direct and constant pressure to act rather than deliberate. Politics, in other words, must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.

4. FAIRNESS FROM THE DENIAL OF GROUND PROCEEDS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OR ELSE THE CONTEST IS MEANINGLESS.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 181. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 186. Which is to say that in denouncing anything, theorists cannot help but suggest what it is that they are not denouncing—or what they are accepting as preferable. While, as I said, the ambiguists acknowledge the impossibility of subverting all categorizations, they do not think that this undermines their general policy of subversion. Rather, they maintain that the acknowledgment of this fact should make us approach our own (and others') ideas with skepticism and flexibility, prompting us to see our ideas not as justified truths but as useful positions from which to unmask truth claims and not as enduring grounds for political theory but as temporary resting points from which to unsettle others—points that can themselves be expected to be challenged and changed down the road. The problem with this position is that even temporary and unstable positions need justification. That is, even if we acknowledge that our categorizations are apt to be undermined and overthrown, they must be given reasons at the moment we are using them. If we are denouncing others' choices, we are necessarily commending our own and, as such, we need to say why we think our own commendable. Likewise then, in denouncing traditional categories, the ambiguists cannot avoid suggesting that their own categories are superior; and, as such, they cannot avoid making positive moral claims or presenting a general, alternative theory about humanity and society. Thus, they are obligated to present their reasons for this alternative vision.

5. GROUND IS CRITICAL TO PERSONAL AGENCY WHICH LEADS TO RADICAL CHANGE AND GRASS ROOTS ADVOCACY.

Adolf G. Gundersen (Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 108-109. Instead, the premium this strategy places on indirect political engagement asks us to look for deliberative opportunities precisely in those places we are least accustomed to looking for them: families, churches, civic organizations, professions, public spaces, and the like. To encourage indirect political engagement by encouraging political deliberation is, in one sense, quite radical, for although it is not at all the same thing as adopting the view that "everything is political," it is tantamount to claiming that "everything can be a site for political deliberation." Conversely, from another perspective this view hardly represents much of a challenge at all, for it simply asks us to recognize the obvious fact that, ever since Athenian citizens carried the business of the assembly and courts into the agora, politics has always seeped out through the cracks of formal institutions. And it is to recognize that, at least within certain limits, this is not only proper, but desirable—desirable because decisions that are discussed are likely to be wiser than those that are not, wherever they happen to be discussed. In general terms, then, aiming somewhere between Athens and Philadelphia means spurring deliberation. But we can locate our target more precisely than that. We saw earlier that the second element of this strategy is to counter partisanship not only at the institutional treetops, but at the grass roots as well. This second criteria narrows our search to reforms that might stimulate deliberation there—where it is insulated from the inherently partisan pressure to adjudicate disputes and issue policy. But just what does stimulating grass-roots deliberation mean? It means encouraging citizens to actively deliberate outside of formal decision-making institutions at what is normally thought of as the "pre-political" level. It means stimulating political discourse in places that are not normally thought of as "political." It means working to promote thoughtful exchanges among those who are political, but not yet partisan. It means cultivating a public both willing and able to engage one another in political discussion. Finally, and most centrally, it means finding creative ways to support the civic fabric of society, of strengthening those institutions which, while not charged with the responsibility for making political decisions, are potential sites for political deliberation.

6. INSTRUMENTAL POLICY DEBATE AN ETHIC OF FAIRNESS WHICH HELPS REAL WORLD POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS.

Thomas A. Spragens (Professor of Polisci at Duke), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 82-3. The first of these modalities of political association will be essentially contractual. This is a mode of association that governs the economy and a significant part of political interaction. This is the realm in which bargaining, horse trading, wheeling and dealing, brokering, compromising, and vote-swapping occupy center stage. This realm encompasses much of everyday political life, and it is a perfectly legitimate component of a democratic society. This is the realm in which instrumental rationality reigns supreme, the arena in which straightforward "rational choice" explanations are proper and effective. It is a thoroughly partisan realm because it is grounded in the pursuit of self-interest, and interests in a free society always are in conflict. Interests, of course, may also coincide in important ways, as, for example, when Ben Franklin admonished his colleagues that they would either all hang together or hang separately. This phenomenon is what sustains the logic of collective action and what makes it important for a society to develop ways to facilitate cooperative behavior when that is clearly in everyone's interest to have that happen. This cooperation could be deemed an expression of what Aristotle deemed to be the lowest form of friendship, friendship based upon mutual usefulness one to another (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.3). Even this self-interested, instrumental rationality mode of political association, it should be noted, has its own ethic. This ethic is essentially what is sometimes depicted as that of good business practice. It encompasses honesty, fair dealing, the avoidance of fraud or misrepresentation, and living up to one's promises. What is important to observe here, moreover, is that this fair dealing business ethos is made possible in part because the contractual realm is situated in the context of the other layers and modalities of democratic association. Those we bargain with are also people who share with us a commitment to justice and people with whom we seek the good life. Without that shaping and constraining context, the bargaining mode of social interaction tends to slide almost ineluctably toward mutual predation."

7. GROUND IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT VIOLENT MONOPOLIZATION OF THE DISCUSSION.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 183. In public debate, our goal is to persuade others with ideas that they recognize as true rather than by trying to manipulate them or move them without their conscious, rational assent. Of course, to say that this is the implicit end of political action is not to say that we always recognize or act in accord with it. Like most ideals, it is, strictly speaking, unattainable. Yet, like most ideals, it nonetheless defines our judgments on the subject. It is the gauge against which we judge progress or decline. Nor is this recognition of rational persuasion a rejection of the role of interest or power in politics. Clearly, the reasons we may give in persuading others may be based on issues of interest or power. We may try to convince others, for example, that a certain policy position is in their self-interest or that a certain action will increase their bargaining power. Though I should quickly add that, in a democracy, there must be other reasons recognized beside power and interest. For if power trumps everything, then those with the most power will always win and those with less will always lose (unless, by happy chance, their interests coincide), and there is no point in talking about democratic concepts like rights or equality or freedom. Democracy necessarily assumes that certain ideas trump power: for example, that ideas like the right to assemble, the right to free speech and representation, the rights of the accused, and so on, are to be rendered to people regardless of their positions in society. I should also say that by calling these activities "rational" I do not mean to conjure up universal, rational principles or Rawlsian original positions, but only to say that democratic political activities have as their end persuasion by appeal to shared reasons. The "rational" tag simply serves to distinguish voluntary from less-than-voluntary kinds of persuasions. Thus, for example, I may "persuade" a man to do something by hypnotizing him or by holding a gun to his head, but I would not be using rational persuasion; I would not be giving him reasons upon which he might make his own judgment. Instead, I would be deciding for him. Again, the point is that in order to respect the self-determination of others, we must give them reasons they can recognize, or grounds that allow them to weigh their own thoughts and choose.

Donald S. Lutz (Professor of Polisci at Houston), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000. 47. Constitutionalism, like the rule of law upon which it is built, requires some level of consensus among the people, elite and common, who would use these constructs as more than window dressing. At the beginning, the level of consensus may be low in terms of breadth or weak in terms of depth, but without a certain level of consensus we can have neither political institutions nor constitutional principles to guide these institutions. Consensus cannot be produced constitutionally, but must result from politics—literally the decision to replace force and violence with some *modus vivendi* of discourse about how to proceed collectively. Such discourse in turn requires guiding principles and rules that will serve to undergird and safeguard the continued use of speech and persuasion rather than force and violence. The institutional/constitutional construct, if it is successful over time, will enhance consensus, but along with an increased depth in consensus may come an enhanced breadth in the range of problems and issues that are subject to such disciplined speech. HE CONTINUES...To the extent we function as a cognitive elite of mandarins who refuse to engage in the discussion with political actors, and give aid to those among them who might preserve the marriage, to that extent we must plead guilty. In the end, if we do not face the possibility of guilt, the day of reckoning will judge us guilty anyway, and political theory will, in fact, be, despite all our protestations to the contrary, not dead, but sublimely irrelevant to the people it was designed to serve.

**B. THE KRITIK OF TOPICALITY UNDERMINES TOPIC SPECIFIC EDUCATION.**

**1. AVOIDING TOPIC SPECIFIC EDUCATION SKIRTS DEBATE ABOUT GOVERNMENT POLICY. EVEN IF THEIR INTENTIONS ARE NOBLE, THIS LEADS TO IGNORANCE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY WHICH CAUSES COMPLETE FASCISM.**

Martin Lewis (Assistant Professor at George Washington), *GREEN DELUSIONS*, 1992, 258. A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. It is actually possible that a radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today's students may embrace only the new creed's rejection of the past. Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism's contempt for established social and political philosophy—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors' intentions. According to sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb (1991), cynicism is the hallmark—and main defect—of the current age. He persuasively argues that cynicism's roots lie in failed left- and right-wing ideologies—systems of thought that deductively connect "a simple rationalized absolute truth ... to a totalized set of political actions and policies" (1991:82). Although most eco-radicals are anything but cynical when they imagine a "green future," they do take a cynical turn when contemplating the present political order. The dual cynical-ideological mode represents nothing less than the death of liberalism and of reform. Its dangers are eloquently spelled out by Goldfarb (1991:9): "When one thinks ideologically and acts ideologically, opponents become enemies to be vanquished, political compromise becomes a kind of immorality, and constitutional refinements become inconvenient niceties.

2. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE

Michael Ignatieff (Carr professor of human rights at Harvard) *LESSER EVILS*, 2004, 18. In a war on terror, I would argue, the issue is not whether we can avoid evil acts altogether, but whether we can succeed in choosing lesser evils and keep them from becoming greater ones. We should do so, I would argue, by making some starting commitments—to the conservative principle (maintaining the free institutions we have), to the dignity principle (preserving individuals from gross harms)—and then reasoning out the consequences of various courses of action, anticipating harms and coming to a rational judgment of which course of action is likely to inflict the least damage on the two principles. When we are satisfied that a coercive measure is a genuine last resort, justified by the facts as we can understand them, we have chosen the lesser evil, and we are entitled to stick to it even if the price proves higher than we anticipated. But not indefinitely so. At some point—when we "have to destroy the village in order to save it"—we may conclude that we have slipped from the lesser to the greater. Then we have no choice but to admit our error and reverse course. In the situation of factual uncertainty in which most decisions about terrorism have to be taken, error is probably unavoidable. It is tempting to suppose that moral life can avoid this slope simply by avoiding evil means altogether. But no such angelic option may exist. Either we fight evil with evil or we succumb. So if we resort to the lesser evil, we should do so, first, in full awareness that evil is involved. Second, we should act under a demonstrable state of necessity. Third, we should chose evil means only as a last resort, having tried everything else. Finally, we must satisfy a fourth obligation: we must justify our actions publicly to our fellow citizens and submit to their judgment as to their correctness.

3. TOPIC SPECIFIC EDUCATION ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT IS CRITICAL TO CHECK POWERFUL INTERESTS

Donald S. Lutz (Professor of Polisci at Houston), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000. 36. Politics is the realm of power. More specifically it is the realm where force and violence are replaced by debates and discussion about how to implement power. Without the meaningful injection of considerations of justice, politics tends to become discourse by the most powerful about how to implement their preferred regime. Although constitutionalism tends to be disparaged by contemporary political science, a constitution is the very place where justice and power are married. Aristotle first taught us that a constitution must be matched to the realities of the political system—the character, hopes, fears, needs and environment of the people—which requires that constitutionalism be addressed by men and women practiced in the art of the possible.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle also taught us that a constitution (the politeia, or plan for a way of life) should address the improvement of people toward the best life possible, which requires that constitutionalism be addressed by political theorists who can hold out a vision of justice and the means for advancing toward it. The conversation between politician and political theorist stands at the center of their respective callings, and a constitution, even though it reflects only a part of the reality of a political system, has a special status in this central conversation. Although the focus of this chapter is on a direct conversation between theorist and politician, there is an important, indirect aspect of the conversation that should not be overlooked—classroom teaching. Too often the conversation between politician and political theorist is described in terms of a direct one between philosophers and those holding power. Overlooked is the central need to educate as many young people as possible.

4. EDUCATING STUDENTS CAN LEAD TO RADICAL CHANGE.

Adolf G. Gundersen (Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 121. A new via media will also encourage a new attitude toward partisanship, one that recognizes its necessity, but believes in the possibility of confining it within clear limits. Citizens, like their representatives in Washington or the state capitol, will deliberate only if they see some value in doing so. Deliberation does not work very well in a world in which everyone behaves like the Athenian ambassadors in the Melian dialogue or in which everyone believes that, when all is said and done, Thomas Hobbes really was right. Here too, every single item on the above list can probably play some role. Deliberation begets deliberation, partly because it works—and people see that it works. At the same time, I would argue that here we must take a long view. Reorienting how society thinks about politics (in this case, how it thinks about a thinking politics), is no small matter. It requires a solution with reach, from an institution that enjoys widespread public support, and in a way that is capable of dealing with the important cognitive component involved in all deliberation. Here I do not think there is an alternative to public schools—which, for starters, means strengthening them, not weakening them, as now seems fashionable. It also means changing curriculum to emphasize the inevitability of partisanship, struggle and manipulation, on the one hand, and the desirability and possibility of public deliberation, on the other. Schools should, of course, also teach deliberative skills. But my view is that the big change must come here: in the broad orientation to political life that they convey. Schools should be places where kids learn the lessons of Pericles and James Madison—and then learn to move beyond them. Most of what I have had to say here stems from the view that partisanship is both the bane of deliberation and its natural outcome. Partisanship puts an end to deliberation—and in one sense that is all well and good, since deliberation is not an end in itself but is, rather, "thought-directed-at-action." Between thought and action, there will always be a place for partisanship in any democratic society worthy of the name. At the same time, partisanship that inordinately encroaches on the thoughtful activity of deliberation itself ought to be limited wherever possible.

5. AVOIDING POLICY MAKING EDUCATION IS INCONSISTENT WITH TRANSFORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 120. In the second instance, Machiavelli anticipates the limitations of a concept of political speech as a practice of redeeming validity claims (especially with regard to sincerity), when he advises the prince that politics requires both the appearance of such qualities as sincerity, but also a "mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite qualities" (1950, 65). In short, a truly virtuous prince-as-political-actor must not only be always ready to intend to deceive others, but also able to resist attempts by others to "redeem" the (sincere) intention behind the speech-act that deceives. In light of these Machiavellian insights, we might also bear in mind Foucault's observation that even the "best" theories and philosophies do not constitute very effective protection against disastrous political choices. We should reckon with the fact that there is an extremely tenuous link between a philosophical conception of (political) language as communication, or a philosophically grounded account of political principles on the one hand, and the concrete speech dynamics of strategic political actors who appeal to such principles on the other.

6. TOPIC SPECIFIC EDUCATION HAS A TRICKLE UP EFFECT ON POLITICIANS.

Donald S. Lutz (Professor of Polisci at Houston), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 45. Politicians are more than willing to listen to political scientists about matters of institutional design, and the special virtue of constitutional discourse is that it raises the discussion to the level where the entire set of questions addressed by political theory end up being considered. The recent proposal for term limits is a case in point. Without considering here the merit of the idea, this seemingly simple proposal for one institutional change has led to a discussion of its possible effects on the entire interlocking set of institutions defined by the Constitution. Before they know what they are doing, politicians and political scientists alike find themselves discussing propositions about the interlocking effects of different institutions, the probable empirical effects of the proposed change on one political variable or another, the probable direction in which the political system will be moved, and the desirability of moving in that direction. It is precisely in constitutional discourse that the entire set of questions asked by political theory are addressed, and this for the simple reason that constitutions encode answers to all of these questions. Preambles and bills of rights lay out the ideals which animate the design of the institutions. The institutions themselves rest on implicit empirical propositions to the effect that if we follow such and such a set of rules the kind of behavior that will result will have certain predictable characteristics, not in the sense of specific outcomes but in the sense of predictable tendencies. The proposed change rests on an assumption of moving us toward the ideal, as well as on a critique of the current state of affairs that finds it deficient with respect to these ideals.

C. LIMITS ON DISCUSSION ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO DEBATE.

1. EXPLODING LIMITS TO DEBATE UNDERMINE ANY DISCOURSIVE BENEFIT OF THE KRITIK.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 180. "Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the boundaries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—because he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited—"he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.

2. THERE ARE LIMITLESS TYPES OF KRITIK. LIMITS ON DISCUSSION ARE CRITICAL TO EFFECTIVE DEBATE.

Donald S. Lutz (Professor of Polisci at Houston), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000. 45. To the extent politicians believe theorists who tell them that pre-theoretical clarification of language describing an ideal is the essence and sum total of political philosophy, to that extent they will properly conclude that political philosophers have little to tell them, since politics is the realm of the possible not the realm of logical clarity. However, once the ideal is clarified, the political philosopher will begin to articulate and assess the reasons why we might want to pursue such an ideal. At this point, analysis leaves the realm of pure logic and enters the realm of the logic of human longing, aspiration, and anxiety. The analysis is now limited by the interior parameters of the human heart (more properly the human psyche) to which the theorist must appeal. Unlike the clarification stage where anything that is logical is possible, there are now definite limits on where logic can take us.

3. LIMITS ARE KEY TO EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION.

Thomas Farrell (Prof. of Communication, Northwestern), *JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION*, August 1985, 118. Although both conversation and rhetoric occur with the natural unfolding of encounter-time (the ongoing life-history of communicators), one of these communicative forms is presumed to be shaped, at least in part, by the prior preparation of an author. That form, obviously, is rhetorical. This prior "preparedness" is often misread as manipulation. But as I have tried to show elsewhere, we often consent to just such prepared direction of our collective "time" in many a social forum (11, pp. 277-279). I should add that there are many other relevant "phenomenal" differences among rhetoric and its generic counterparts. Rhetoric is typically disputational, positional, instrumental in its aims, presumptuous in its methods, and so forth. My point is only that these other characteristics actually reinforce the necessity for some "thinking ahead" throughout the process of rhetorical engagement.

Thomas Farrell (Prof. of Communication, Northwestern), *JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION*, August 1985, 118. Of course, there is more to be said about communicative action than that it is boundless and unpredictable; otherwise, it would be unintelligible as well. In practice, we (that is, the interactants in an episode) set certain bounds or horizons for interpretation, so that a succession of utterances: so that we can understand what "went on." And also, in practice, we try not so much to predict as to anticipate general themes, topics, and issues in the talk of others, for a multitude of reasons. As Kenneth Burke would probably say, there is form or coherence throughout communicative action partly because we expect that there will be. Much has been written from the so called "rules approach" about the various sanctions and structures that can be made relevant to natural discourse. We know, for instance, that some rules are encounter-specific, whereas others are rooted in the form-of-life assumptions of a culture. We know that some rules can be invented, invoked, or bracketed with the consent of interactants. Still others can carry considerable regulatory force. In general, the rules perspective has complemented the aesthetic understanding of communication texts with an appreciation of the ethical domain of communication practice.



4. UNDERLIMITING IS NOT ETHICAL. IT PERPETUATES DISCUSSION THAT DOES NOT LEAD TO CHANGE.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 131. Thus in politics an openness toward the opinions of others is sometimes not a condition of mutual respect, but antithetical to it. It may be a peculiarity of the political domain that "when every-one can tell you the truth, you lose their respect," but it is a peculiarity that discourse ethicists ignore to their peril (Machiavelli 1950, 87). One might say, then, that speaking the truth is an indispensable element in politics, but not the point of it. To make communicative action, or the enactment of principles of discourse ethics, or moral conversation, the end or goal of politics is to mistake the nature of working in half-truth and thereby misconstrue "the milieu that is proper to politics" itself. The supervenience of strategic (speech) action on communicative (speech) action in politics that I have been alluding to here is what I also think Timothy Garton Ash meant to convey when, in the aftermath of the PEN Congress, he referred to the "qualitatively different responsibility" that the intellectual has for "the validity, intellectual coherence, and truth of what he says and writes," as opposed to the politician, who invariably works in half-truth. The point is not that the intellectual lives in a communicative world of validity, coherence, and truth while the politician does not. (Although Habermas's ideal communication situation might stand a better chance of realization in a scholarly conference or a graduate seminar, as opposed to a press conference, an election campaign, or even a neighborhood caucus.) The politician also inhabits a world of validity, coherence, and truth. Yet validity, coherence, and truth take on different colorations working in the context peculiar to politics—where strategic imperatives and the exercise of power, conflicts of interest and drives of ambition, are ineliminable aspects of collective action. Hence, it is one thing to encourage (or even insist upon) the intellectual's responsibility to keep providing us with various practical (or even imaginary) means for judging the health or sickness of the body politic, and quite another to expect the politician—or the citizen—to "live" them.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 178-80. "Good" political acts—acts of legitimate resistance and contest—are, for them, as for most other people, civil acts: meaning, essentially, acts that are respectful of the goods of democracy and liberty; acts that are nonviolent and designed to increase others' freedom and knowledge. For example, no ambiguists (in my readings) seek or sanction acts of "contest" that involve behaviors like burning crosses on people's lawns, lying to the public, shouting others into silence, hitting or killing or threatening political opponents, or the like. Rather, their political examples uniformly suggest that the expansion of contest would involve only civil kinds of resistance and subversion: things like teaching, protesting, demonstrating, arguing, raising awareness, questioning and the like. After all, the point of being in the ambiguist camp in the first place is to protest acts of tyranny and compulsion. So, despite strong rhetoric about disrupting all orders and undermining all rules, they cannot, and do not, contest or undermine basic rules of civility (rules which I will define further in a moment). In keeping with their democratic ambitions, they do not seek to annihilate or silence opposition, but to diversify and increase its voices and opportunities. My point here is not just to say that the ambiguists are nice people who happen to reject violent and tyrannical tactics. It is to say that their goals imply and require this. For certain subversive or disruptive political activities—like threatening others with violence or shouting opponents into silence—are such that they undermine any further subversions and disruptions. In this sense, some disruptions turn out to solidify the status quo and some subversions turn out to be counter-subversive. Which is why the ambiguists must stop short of celebrating all differences or disorders, for what would be the point of rejecting the old system for its supposed tyrannies—its bullying and silencing tactics—only to take up more of the same?

D. TOPICALITY IS AN A-PRIORI VOTING ISSUE

1. USE THE BALLOT TO RATIFY CONSTRAINTS ON SOME DISCOURSE.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 179. To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specifying what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the principles of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand deliberation and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain clear limits, rules, closure. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be retaught and reenforced among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that they require the most unflinching and firm support that we can give them.

2. PRECONDITIONS ON DISCUSSION COME BEFORE DISCOURSIIVE IMPACTS.

Adolf G. Gundersen (Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 121. Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes.

2. FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS ADDRESS THE FOUNDATION OF THE DEBATE AND SHOULD COME BEFORE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Paul Saurette (PhD Johns Hopkins), *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES*, 2000, 5. The problem of concepts -- what they are, where they are located, how we create/discover them -- has always been close to the heart of philosophy and extends deep into the sciences and social sciences. Within IR, this concern has generally been located in the sphere of methodology and it remains crucial to the various behaviourist - positivist - empiricist - traditionalist debates. All but the most stubborn empiricists accept that concepts influence our thinking, the validity of studies and the utility of certain perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that some of the most heated debates in the history of IR (and international law) have focused on the proper place, method and definition of certain key concepts such as sovereignty, war, human rights, anarchy, institutions, power, and international. If all concepts are equally created, however, some become represented and treated as more equal than others. There are, in fact, different layers of conceptual understanding and degrees of articulability and these render certain concepts more or less subject to question.<sup>8</sup> In any debate, certain understandings are shared by its participants and certain concepts must be common for communication to occur. These concepts become the foundational layer of the debate, rarely being raised for consideration, but profoundly shaping the contours of the debate.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 179. To sum up the argument thus far, the ambiguists cannot support political contest unless they are willing to say "no" to—or to bring closure to—some activities, and unless they are willing to say "yes" to the rational rules of persuasion. Like all other democratic theorists, they must make some foundational assumptions about the goodness of self-determination, the preferability of reasons over force, and the evils of tyranny, among other things. All democratic visions presuppose that politics is about rational persuasion. Thus, talk of resisting or subverting all orders or all rational foundations is incoherent. At the very least, the foundations of rational persuasion must be rigidly upheld. It will not do, then, to say we simply need more contest or more "politics" and less rationality or foundationalism. It will not do to invoke contest as a kind of talisman against the need to make difficult judgments about good and bad, healthy and unhealthy, political actions. For inasmuch as the conditions necessary to political contest require constant support and protection and inasmuch as we require constant education and improvement in upholding and effectively applying them, the conditions necessary to political contest require these judgments.

Paul Saurette (PhD Johns Hopkins), *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES*, 2000, 5. According to Kant (and shifting him into the language of this essay), there exist certain natural preconditions - - transcendental fields -- of thought that allow us to make sense of experience. And while some of these necessary preconditions (categories and concepts) can be traced and categorized, others, such as the constitutive and regulative Ideas, cannot be known with the same theoretical rigor. On this view, the concepts (Ideas) of this deep layer of shared understandings (experience) are not transparent and available to examination. Even those we can represent cannot be manipulated and reconfigured. Far from being heuristic devices of our own making, they are the necessary and universal conditions of possibility for any experience and understanding.

3. TOPICALITY IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT COVERT EXCLUSION.

C. Day (Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin) *CENTRAL STATES SPEECH JOURNAL*, Feb 1966, 8. The ethic suggested here is similar to another ethical position which is widely accepted. Most readily acknowledge an ethical responsibility to oppose overt attempts to silence debate or suppress the expression of minority and unpopular views, even when such attempts are made in the name of personal conviction. Most fail, however, to recognize the more subtle and dangerous form of suppression which takes place in the name of personal conviction; an individual's failure to give effective expression to an argument which is not otherwise being effectively expressed, because the argument is in opposition to personal conviction on a problem. The act of suppression is no less harmful to the decision making process because it is covert instead of overt. The social effects are the same decision based on incomplete debate. The covert suppression of argument and information is as ethically culpable as is overt suppression. And personal conviction is no justification for either. Covert suppression is the greater threat to democratic processes because it is clandestine and is more difficult to overcome because of the ego-involvement that usually accompanies personal convictions.

## **ROLEPLAYING IS GOOD**

### **1. ROLEPLAYING IS INFORMATIVE AND EDUCATIONAL; IT EMPOWERS THE PARTICIPANTS**

Judith Innes (Professor of City & Regional Planning @ UC-Berkeley), *JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION*, Winter 1999. Online. Internet. Accessed June 6, 06. InfoTrac Research Database, <http://find.galegroup.com>. Our observation and practice of consensus building suggests that the analogy to role-playing games will help to illuminate the dynamic of effective consensus processes. Even when the dispute seems intractable, role playing in consensus building allows players to let go of actual or assumed constraints and to develop ideas for creating new conditions and possibilities. Drama and suspension of reality allows competing, even bitterly opposed interests to collaborate, and engages individual players emotionally over many months. Scenario building and storytelling can make collective sense of complexity, of predicting possibilities in an uncertain world, and can allow the playful imagination, which people normally suppress, to go to work.<sup>(9)</sup> In the course of engaging in various roles, participants develop identities for themselves and others and become more effective participants, representing their stakeholders' interests more clearly.<sup>(10)</sup> In many of their most productive moments, participants in consensus building engage not only in playing out scenarios, but also in a kind of collective, speculative tinkering, or bricolage, similar in principle to what game participants do. That is, they play with heterogeneous concepts, strategies, and actions with which various individuals in the group have experience, and try combining them until they create a new scenario that they collectively believe will work. This bricolage, discussed further below, is a type of reasoning and collective creativity fundamentally different from the more familiar types, argumentation and tradeoffs.<sup>(11)</sup> The latter modes of problem solving or dispute resolution typically allow zero sum allocation of resources among participants or finding the actions acceptable to everyone. Bricolage, however, produces, rather than a solution to a known problem, a new way of framing the situation and of developing unanticipated combinations of actions that are qualitatively different from the options on the table at the outset.<sup>(12)</sup> The result of this collective tinkering with new scenarios is, most importantly, learning and change among the players, and growth in their sophistication about each other, about the issues, and about the futures they could seek. Both consensus building and role-playing games center on learning, innovation, and change, in a process that is entertaining and - when conducted effectively - in some fundamental sense empowers individuals.<sup>(13)</sup> We do not contend that such familiar discussion methods as making tradeoffs, taking moral positions, or using logic and invoking scientific evidence are irrelevant in consensus building - indeed they are all part of the overall process - but do contend in controversial, complex, and uncertain conditions that these more familiar approaches are usually not enough to produce agreement.

### **2. ROLEPLAYING, OR PRETENDING TO ACT AS THE "STATE", IS GOOD; IT TEACHES STUDENTS ABOUT THE FUNCTION OF IDENTITY IN GLOBAL POLITICS**

Barbara Stark (Prof. of Law @ U of Tennessee), *STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*, Winter 1996. Online. Nexis. Accessed May 29, 06. Role-playing exercises, in which students assume the roles of various states, replicate the diffusion of normative authority and the need for consensus which characterize the law on the use of force. n68 In addition, role-playing enables students to explore state identity from the "inside." What shapes state identity? The case studies contained in Volume II allow students to explore a wide range of political, geo-political and historical factors which have produced various hot-spots throughout the world, as well as to distinguish state identity from "American" identity. Through role-playing, students discover how self-interest shapes state narratives. Which states want to strengthen the Charter paradigm and which seek to challenge it? Which state dominates the conversation? Why do the others allow it to do so?

### 3. ETHICAL POLICY MAKING REQUIRES ROLE PLAYING. THE ALTERNATIVE IS NIHILISM.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 124. For the Machiavellian, attending to such philosophical matters is just so much fiddling while Girolamo Savonarola burns.<sup>17</sup> Where the Machiavellian thesis takes its stand against Habermasian discourse ethics is within "the milieu proper to politics," or what the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty imaginatively terms (in deference to Machiavelli) "that knot of collective life in which pure morality can be cruel and pure politics requires something like a morality" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 211, 214). This shifting of the terms of the debate from the Habermasian to the Machiavellian highlights the distance between a formal theory of practical discourse and the concrete complexities of the phenomenal world of politics and political speech.<sup>18</sup> From this vantage point of politics, the Habermasian appears all-too-modern, and Diskursethik seems politically naive, if not practically irrelevant. But what is the "range of phenomena," as Sheldon Wolin puts it, that Machiavelli perceived as uniquely peculiar to politics (Wolin 1960, 211), and how is it resistant to the categories of Habermasian discourse ethics? With this question in mind, we might note (at least) three levels of action in where Machiavelli situates politics in *The Prince*.<sup>19</sup> Each of these levels involves the exercise of what we might call "instituting" and "constituting" acts. On the first and grandest level, Machiavelli's action concept of politics comes to life at the end of the treatise, with the exhortation to "liberate Italy from the barbarians" (Machiavelli 1950, 94). From this vantage point, politics is the activity that aims at the fate of the state, the whole community, or the collectivity, and for a period of time that is, in principle, indeterminate and open to the vicissitudes of fortune (Machiavelli 1950, 92-93; see also Castoriadis 1992, 255).<sup>20</sup> Politics in its grandest sense thereby undertakes the initiation of innovations or even, at its most transformative, a "new system" (94) or "order of things" (21). Under these circumstances, Machiavelli writes, it is sometimes necessary for the prince "to disturb the existing condition and bring about disorders ... in order to obtain secure mastery," as Alexander VI did in Italy (25). It is one of the paradoxes of politics that sometimes acting contrary to a goal enables one to reach it. Disorders can bring order. However, disorders can undermine order as well. Hence, on a second level, politics demands the astute exercise of power and an acute sense of what works in practice (*verita effettuale*), always with a view toward avoiding ruin (Machiavelli 1950, 14). Machiavelli offers this "general rule" to the prince: "whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful, is ruined himself; for that power is produced by him either through craft or force; and both of these are suspected by the one who has been raised to power" (14). Implicit in this observation is the fundamental view of politics as an arena of conflict and struggle where the political actor must anticipate and detect (as only the prudent man can) "the evils that are brewing" (11). The prince must be prepared to "remedy disorders" that are not of his own making through violence if necessary, and before they become insoluble (8).<sup>21</sup> Yet no certainty attends the politician's capacity to anticipate and counter disorder. "This is found in the nature of things," Machiavelli writes, "that one never tries to avoid one difficulty without running into another, but prudence consists in being able to know the nature of the difficulties, and taking the least harmful as good" (84-85).

#### 4. ROLEPLAYING IS KEY TO POLICY EDUCATION.

Donald S. Lutz (Professor of Polisci at Houston), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000. 45 To the extent politicians do listen to political theorists who fail to practice the entire project of political philosophy, to that extent we stand in danger of contributing to one of the natural pathologies inherent in raw politics. Failure to inform politics with discourse about ideals enhances the pathology of pursuing mere power indifferent to justice. At best politics remains reactive and without purpose, and at worst it pursues only the ends imposed by the most powerful among us. Authoritarianism is the child of this pathology. Failure to inform politics with discourse about the best possible contributes to the pathology of fanaticism by leaving politics open to the pursuit of fanatical ends, of which communism and fascism are the most recent exemplars. Totalitarianism is the child of this pathology. Failure to address the current empirical realities or the means of improving on them contributes to the pathology of political alienation. Not knowing where we are at the moment, and therefore what needs improvement, or not knowing what effective means are available for achieving such improvement, leads to policies and institutions that are increasingly viewed as irrelevant to human needs and aspirations. The child of this pathology is political instability. Critical theory provides the impetus to use empirical analysis for improving institutions and for moving us from the status quo, but practiced badly it merely undercuts belief in any institutions and contributes to the political alienation that enhances instability. Ironically, critical theory in this guise also contributes to the loss of linkage between ends and means, which undermines the hope for movement toward any ideal, and thereby aids those who would provide at least stability whether justice is part of the result or not. On the other hand, a political theory that serves the integrated questions just outlined is comprehensible to politicians, if not always welcomed by them, and leaves open the possibility that political theorists may contribute to the marriage of justice with power by providing arguments, grounded in human aspiration as well as in empirically supported analysis and philosophically sound logic, that can be used by constitutionally oriented political actors to address the needs and aspirations of the poorer, less powerful, more marginal parts of society as well as the rest of society. Either we accept the possibility of such politicians coming to the fore, and the efficacy of constitutional politics, or abandon the project of political theory entirely and resign ourselves, at best, to a mutual yet sterile stance of rhetorical moral superiority.

#### 5. ROLEPLAYING IS DEFIANT IN NATURE AND CLAIMS POLITICS FOR THE PEOPLE.

Jessica Kulynych (Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University) *POLITY*, Winter, 1997, 315. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding. SHE CONTINUES... Consider, for example, a public hearing. When seen from a discursive legitimation perspective, deliberation and debate are about the sincere, controlled attempt to discern the best, most rational, least biased arguments that most precisely express an interlocutor's ideas and interests. In practice, however, deliberation is a much less deliberative and much more performative activity. The literary aspects of debate – irony, satire, sarcasm, and wit – work precisely on the slippage between what is said and what is meant, or what can be said and what can be conceived. Strategies such as humor are not merely rational, but visceral and often uncontrollable, as is the laughter that is evoked from such strategies. Performative actions are not alternative ways of deliberating; rather they are agonistic expressions of what cannot be captured by deliberative rationality. As such, they resist the confines of that rationality and gesture toward places where words, arguments, and claims are not enough. Without an understanding of the performative aspects of political action, Hager cannot explain how citizens are able to introduce genuinely new and different “ways of perceiving and naming the world” into a realm where such epistemic standards are unimaginable. It is in the process of acting as citizens in a technical bureaucratic setting, where citizen action is by definition precluded, that alternative, epistemic standards of evaluation become possible.

6. ROLEPLAYING IS KEY TO PRECIPATORY DEMOCRACY.

John Rawls (Famous Philosopher), *THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE*, 1999, 56. To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people's foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among people.

## PERMUTATIONS ARE BEST

### 1. WE CAN USE THE “MASTER’S TOOLS” TO CHIP AWAY AT FORCES OF DOMINATION; TO NOT EVEN TRY DOOMS US TO MORE SUFFERING

Noam Chomsky (Professor @ Massachusetts Institute of Technology), TALKING “ANARCHY” WITH CHOMSKY, April 12, 2000. Online. Internet. Accessed May 16, 06. <http://uuhome.de/global/english/WTO012.html>. Comment on an African proverb that perhaps intersects with what we're talking about: “The master's tools will never be used to dismantle the master's house.” If this is intended to mean, don't try to improve conditions for suffering people, I don't agree. It's true that centralized power, whether in a corporation or a government, is not going to willingly commit suicide. But that doesn't mean you shouldn't chip away at it, for many reasons. For one thing, it benefits suffering people. That's something that always should be done, no matter what broader considerations are. But even from the point of view of dismantling the master's house, if people can learn what power they have when they work together, and if they can see dramatically at just what point they're going to be stopped, by force, perhaps, that teaches very valuable lessons in how to go on. The alternative to that is to sit in academic seminars and talk about how awful the system is.

### 2. REJECTING THE BOTH/AND OF THE PERMUTATION FOR THE EITHER/OR OF THE KRITIK AMOUNTS TO POSTMODERN INSULARITY THAT SEVERS ANALYSIS FROM EMPOWERMENT; ONLY THE PERMUTATION CAN BRIDGE THIS GAP AND CHALLENGE POWER:

Anthony Cook (Assoc. Prof of Law @ Georgetown), NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW, Spring 1992, v26, p.759. Online. Nexis. Accessed May 16, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). Several things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurtures in many ways an unhealthy insularity that fails to connect localized struggle to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism, racism, sexism, and homophobia that transcend their localized articulation within this particular law school, that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among some followers of Foucault an unhealthy propensity to rely on rich, thick, ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflict. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation begins, ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from the normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say *and* do something about the oppressive world in which we live.



3. THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ONLY AGENT OF TRUE CHANGE- THE PERMUTATION IS CRITICAL TO REAL CHANGE.

Richard Rorty (Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy at Stanford University) 1998, *ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY*, 98. The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that “the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism,” but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice. The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marx’s philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semi-conscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for “the system” and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy—and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard’s account of America as Disneyland—as a country of simulacra—and to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action. Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People’s Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list—endlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals’ toilets—might revitalize leftist politics. .

5. THE PERMUTATIONS PEACEMEAL REFORM IS CRITICAL TO END OPPRESSION

Chinua Achebe (Author and Professor Emeritus of English at University of Nigeria) 1988, *ANTHILLS OF THE SAVANNAHA*, 90. “The sweeping, majestic visions of people rising victorious like a dial wave against their oppressors and transforming their world with theories and slogans into a new heaven and a new earth of brotherhood, justice and freedom are at best grand illusions. The rising, conquering tide, yes; but the millennium afterwards, no! New oppressors will have been readying themselves secretly in the undertow long before the tidal wave got really going. “Experience and intelligence warn us that [human] man’s progress will be piecemeal, slow and undramatic. Revolution may be necessary for taking a society out of an intractable stretch of quagmire but it does not confer freedom, and may indeed hinder it. “Bloody reformist? That’s a term of abuse it would be redundant to remind you I have more than my fair share of invoking against others across the years. But I ask myself: beyond the pleasant glow that the javelin of an epithet certainly brings to the heart of the righteous hurler what serious benefit can it offer to the solution of our problems? And I don’t see any. “Reform may be a dirty word then but it begins to look more like the most promising rout to success in the real world. I limit myself to most promising rather than only for the simple reason that all certitude must now be suspect. “Society is an extension of the individual. The most we can hope to do with a problematic individual is to re-form it. No responsible psychoanalyst would aim to do more, for to do more, to overthrow the psyche itself, would be to unleash insanity. No. We can only hope to rearrange some details in the periphery of the human personality. Any disturbance of its core is an irresponsible invitation to disaster. Even a one-day-old baby does not make itself available for your root-and-branch psychological engineering, for it comes trailing clouds of immorality. What immorality? Its baggage of irreducible inheritance of genes. That is immorality. “It has to be the same with society. You re-form it around what it is, its core of reality; not around an intellectual abstraction. “None of this is a valid excuse for political inactivity or apathy. Indeed to understand it is an absolute necessity for meaningful action, the knowledge of it being the only protective inoculation we can have against false hopes and virulent epidemics of gullibility.

6. MOVEMENTS CAN ONLY BE GENERATED FROM INCREMENTAL PRAGMATIC CHANGE, WHICH AVOIDS THE PITFALLS OF DOGMATISM.

David Bouchier (Writer, Radio Broadcaster and Sociologist at the University of Essex), *RADICAL CITIZENSHIP: THE NEW AMERICAN ACTIVISM*. 1987, 147. Saul Alinsky, who died in 1972, was the quintessential prophet of pragmatic, nonviolent American radicalism. The basic requirement for the understanding of the politics of change is to recognize the world as it is. . . . Radicals must be resilient, adaptable to shifting political circumstances, and sensitive enough to the process of action and reaction to avoid being hopped by their own tactics and forced to travel a road not of their choosing.<sup>6</sup> This was not the spirit of the impatient sixties. But the comprehensive failure of the mass-revolution idea forced radicals back to Alinsky's basic insight: you must start from where people are and not frighten them with proposals for sudden and drastic change. The groups and organizations reviewed in the last chapter all work within this pragmatic, gradualist paradigm, formulating winnable local goals that help people to understand that change is possible. Such a strategy can only move beyond simple reformism within the system when bread-and-butter issues and small changes are developed into a radical critique of society. The experience of democratic action intersects with radical education to change people's consciousness. This, at least, is the ideal, and this is where it is very easy for activists to lose sight of the radical goal (the general interest) in pursuit of the reformist victory (the particular and immediate interest). The overriding virtue of pragmatism, to be set against this reformist tendency, is that it excludes dogmatism, the dangerous certainty of rightness that so quickly perverts the highest ideals. This was one of Alinsky's central concerns: Dogma is the enemy of human freedom . . . The human spirit glows from that small inner light of doubt whether we are right, while those who believe with complete certainty that they possess the right are dark inside and darken the world outside with cruelty, pain and injustice. <sup>17</sup> For citizen radicals, there can be no final solutions, no perfect societies, no gains without some losses. Dogmas and orthodoxies promise a kind of security by "explaining" everything. Pragmatism allows the citizen activist to respond to conditions as they arise, creating real changes rather than the temporary psychic relief that dogma offers. Gradualism is inseparable from pragmatism. Very complex institutional arrangements and cultural habits cannot be changed suddenly; even if such a change could be managed, it would be destructive and uncontrollable. If a sudden, transformative revolution in the United States can be imagined, it is clear that it would cause great suffering and unleash all kind of messianic and irrational forces. As anarchists have always argued, the state can be destroyed by new human relationships and new behaviors far more certainly than by violence. ~ This means that a cultural revolution, a revolution of ideas and values and understandings, is the essential prelude to any radical change in the power arrangements of modern society. The purpose of radical citizenship is to take the initiative in this process

7. APPEALING TO FRAMEWORKS THOSE IN POWER IS THE ONLY WAY TO MOBILIZE CHANGE

Andrew Sullivan (Editor of the *New Republic*), *VIRTUALLY NORMAL*, 1995, 88. Moreover, a cultural strategy as a political strategy is a dangerous one for a minority-and a small minority at that. Inevitably, the vast majority of the culture will be at best uninterested. In a society where the market rules the culture, majorities win the culture wars. And in a society where the state, *pace* Foucault actually does exist, where laws are passed according to rules by which the society operates, culture, in any case, is not enough. It may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. To achieve actual results, to end persecution of homosexuals in the military, to allow gay parents to keep their children, to provide basic education about homosexuality in high schools, to prevent murderers of homosexuals from getting lenient treatment, it is necessary to work through the, very channels Foucault and his followers revile. It is necessary to conform to certain disciplines in order to reform them, necessary to speak a certain language before it can say something different, necessary to abandon the anarchy of random resistance if actual homosexuals are to be protected. As Michael Walzer has written of Foucault, he stands nowhere and finds no reasons, Angrily he rattles the bars of the iron cage. But he has no plans or projects for turning the cage into something more like a human home." The difficult and compromising task of interpreting one world for another, of reforming an imperfect and unjust society from a criterion of truth or reasoning, is not available to the liberationists. Into Foucault's philosophical anarchy they hurl a political *cri de coeur*. When it eventually goes unheard, when its impact fades, when its internal nihilism blows itself out, they have nothing left to offer.

## **POLITICS THAT BUILD COALITIONS ARE BEST**

### **1. THE KRITIK DESTROYS OUR ACTIVIST COALITION BUILDING AND INHIBITS REAL CHANGE**

Sankaran Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 1993, *ALTERNATIVES*, v. 18, p. 400-401. The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic,” essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the move mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing “facts” and “realities,” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

### **2. THE KRITIK DESTROYS OUR ACTIVIST COALITION BUILDING AND INHIBITS REAL CHANGE**

Barbara Smith, and Beverly Smith (Founding Members of the Combahee River Collective), *THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN OF COLOR*, 1983, 126. Bar: A solution to tokenism is not racial separatism. There are definitely separatist aspects emerging among the Black and Third World feminist community and that is fine. But, ultimately, any kind of separatism is a dead end. It's good for forging identity and gathering strength, but I do feel that the strongest politics are coalition politics that cover a broad base of issues. There is no way that one oppressed group is going to topple a system by itself. Forming principled coalitions around specific issues is very important. You don't necessarily have to like or love the people you're in coalition with. This brings me back to the issue of lesbian separatism. I read in a women's newspaper an article by a woman speaking on behalf of lesbian separatists. She claimed that separatists are more radical than other feminists. What I really feel is radical is trying to make coalitions with people who are different from you. I feel it is radical to be dealing with race and sex and class and sexual identity all at one time. I think that is really radical because it has never been done before. And it really pisses me off that they think of themselves as radical. I think there is a difference between being extreme and being radical. This is why Third World women are forming the leadership in the feminist movement because we are not one dimensional, one-issued in our political understanding. Just by virtue of our identities we certainly define race and usually define class as being fundamental issues that we have to address. The more wide-ranged your politics, the more potentially profound and transformative they are.

## INDIVIDUAL ACTION FAILS

### 1. INDIVIDAL ACTION FAILS IN THE REAL WORLD

Lester W. Milbrath (Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Sociology at SUNY-Buffalo), *IN BUILDING SUSTAINABLE SOCIETIES*, 1996, 289. In some respects personal change cannot be separated from societal change. Societal transformation will not be successful without change at the personal level; such change is a necessary but not sufficient step on the route to sustainability. People hoping to live sustainably must adopt new beliefs, new values, new lifestyles, and new worldview. But lasting personal change is unlikely without simultaneous transformation of the socioeconomic/political system in which people function. Persons may solemnly resolve to change, but that resolve is likely to weaken as they perform day-to-day within a system reinforcing different beliefs and values. Change agents typically are met with denial and great resistance. Reluctance to challenge mainstream society is the major reason most efforts emphasizing education to bring about change are ineffective. If societal transformation must be speedy, and most of us believe it must, pleading with individuals to change is not likely to be effective.

### 2. EVEN INDIFFERENCE IS BETTER THAN A FOCUS ON INDIVIDAL ACTION

Murry Edelman (George Herbert Mead Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin) *CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTICAL*, 1988, 7. That indifference, which academic political science notices but treats as an obstacle to enlightenment or democracy, is, from another perspective, a refuge against the kind of engagement that would, if it could, keep everyone's energies taken up with activism: election campaigns, lobbying, repressing some and liberating others, wars, and all other political activities that displace living, loving, and creative work. Regimes and proponents of political causes know that it takes much coercion, propaganda, and the portrayal of issues in terms that entertain, distort, and shock to extract a public response of any kind. "The public" is mainly a black hole into which the political efforts of politicians, advocates of causes, the media, and the schools disappear with hardly a trace.<sup>5</sup> Its apathy, indifference, quiescence, and resistance to the consciousness industry<sup>6</sup> is especially impressive in an age of widespread literacy and virtually universal access to the media. Indifference to the enthusiasms and alarms of political activists has very likely always been a paramount political force, though only partially effective and hard to recognize because it is a nonaction. Without it, the slaughter and repression of diverse groups in the name of nationalism, morality, or rationality would certainly be even more widespread than it has been; for the claim that a political cause serves the public interest has often distorted or destroyed concern for personal wellbeing.

### 3. FRAMING RESISTANCE INTO INDIVIDUAL ACTION DEMOBILIZES CHALLENGES TO SYSTEMS OF DOMINATION

Kellie Hay and Mary Garrett (Assistant Professor of Communication at Oakland University, Associate Professor of Communications at Wayne State University) *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH*, Nov 2001, 439. Cloud labels this rhetoric a "containment strategy," since "therapeutic discourses dislocate political energy, anger and activity into the realm of personal life, where opposition s to systems of oppression and exploitation can do little damage and exert minimal long-term influence on relations of power as they exist" (Cloud, 104). According to Cloud, therapeutic rhetoric operates by abstracting above material struggles and oppressions through a set of codes that make the dominant elites invisible. In this way real class contradictions and struggles are muted and overwritten by an ideology that blames social, political and material problems on individual disease and frailty, on individuals always already in need of help, support and consolation, rather than on those who own the means of economic production. An ethics of care, or care of the self, displaces open, public, collective debate and organized interventions into state institutions.

Dana Cloud (Associate Professor of Communications at University of Texas-Austin), *CONTROL AND CONSOLATION IN CULTURE AND POLITICS*, 1998, xiv. My argument about this social transformation stands in contrast to other perspectives on the therapeutic. Unlike communitarians (Left and Right), who see the retreat into narcissism as a moral failure of our culture, I regard the therapeutic as a political strategy of contemporary capitalism, by which potential dissent is contained within a discourse of individual responsibility. Against postmodernists who celebrate the atomization of contemporary culture and proclaim the death of mass collective action for social change, I see a real need to repoliticize issues of power as a precondition for renewed oppositional social movement organizing. In contrast to scholars of liberalism who applaud therapy's near-exclusive emphasis on individual initiative and personal responsibility, my argument insists on acknowledging the collective and structural features of an unequal social reality in which individuals are embedded and out of which our personal experience, in large part, den ves. Racism, sexism, and capitalism pose significant obstacles to individual mobility and well-being; their roles in structuring social reality, however, are obscured in therapeutic discourses that locate the ill not with the society but with the individual or private family.

4. FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL ACTION MAY MAKE ONE FEEL BETTER BUT CANNOT HOPE TO SOLVE.

Dana Cloud (Associate Professor of Communications at University of Texas-Austin), *CONTROL AND CONSOLATION IN CULTURE AND POLITICS*, 1998, 2. The discursive pattern of translating social and political problems into the language of individual responsibility and healing as a rhetoric because of its powerful persuasive force; it constitutes therapy because of its focus on the personal life of the individual as locus of both problem and responsibility for change. This discursive pattern is ubiquitous in U. S. popular culture, especially in artifacts taking social crisis as their subject. Therapeutic discourse, a powerful rhetorical strategy within liberal capitalist society, works to recover political challenges to the established social order and mitigates against collective social action for change. The therapeutic persuades us to adopt private-sphere coping strategies in the wake of post-1960s social conflict and fragmentation and to translate challenges to an unjust political and economic system into personal survival or growth. Anthony Giddens states it well when he suggests that in the therapeutic, outrage is converted to rage and political energy is converted to life planning (Giddens 1991, 209-231). As such, the therapeutic is the rhetorical response of an entire system under strain. It has no single rhetor or author but rather pervades American popular and political culture.

Dana Cloud (Associate Professor of Communications at University of Texas-Austin), *CONTROL AND CONSOLATION IN CULTURE AND POLITICS*, 1998, 16. It is my argument that therapeutic discourse becomes the locus of radical political energy because, within the framework of liberalism, opposition must be framed in individualist terms. "Dis-ease" is the major trope available for this impulse. In other words, the therapeutic provides a frame for complaints against the system but ultimately recuperates and neutralizes political opposition by rendering protest private.

## **REJECTION IS A FLAWED PHILOSOPHY**

### **1. DECONSTRUCTION WITHOUT ACTION BLOCKS POLITICAL ESCAPE FROM OPPRESSION AND REINFORCES IVORY TOWER ELITISM.**

Anthony Cook (Associate Professor at Georgetown Law) *NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW*, Spring, 1992, 762. The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, creates a political and spiritual void into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed. To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the void will be filled by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

### **2. REJECTION STIFLES POLITICAL REFORM**

Paul Schiff Berman (Associate Professor, at the University of Connecticut School of Law) *YALE JOURNAL OF LAW*, 2001, 95. If that is one's viewpoint, it will inevitably be difficult to muster one's energy to believe in the possibility of positive action in the world, short of revolution (and even revolution is probably inevitably compromised). As Rorty points out, though the writers of supposedly "subversive" works "honestly believe that they are serving human liberty," it may ultimately be "almost impossible to clamber back down from [these works] to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy." Of course, one might view this as a positive development. One might think people should stop being lulled into a false sense of believing that the rhetoric of public life really matters. If people began to view such rhetoric as a construction of entrenched power, so the argument might go, they would form the nucleus of a truly revolutionary political movement. I doubt that such an eventuality is likely to occur. Moreover, I am not sure that a culture of suspiciousness is the most effective way to seek political (or personal) change anyway. Suspicious analysis seeks to expose the dangers of our enchantment with reason or truth or collectivity, but there are dangers that arise from relentless disenchantment as well.

Paul Schiff Berman (Associate Professor, at the University of Connecticut School of Law) *YALE JOURNAL OF LAW*, 2001, 95. Let me use an example that is closer to home. My experience has been that, at academic conferences, reading groups or colloquia, or in humanities or law classes, much of the conversation centers on all the issues the book or article under discussion failed to address. Thus, we hear that the author left out a consideration of X, which would have complicated her analysis, or that she failed to recognize the ways in which issues of power were embedded in Y, so she missed a key part of what was "really" going on, etc. Almost inevitably, the piece that was "left out" happens to be the focus of the critic's own scholarly agenda. These are not sympathetic readings. Because human experience is widely varied and multi-faceted, there will always be aspects of an issue that are omitted in any given scholarly account. But instead of focusing on what the author failed to do, we might look at what her particular project was and see if we can form the best possible understanding of that project. I remember when I was in an undergraduate anthropology course, we would read book after book from the history of anthropological theory, and for each book, all we would discuss was what that account had missed. By the end of the semester, I was left feeling that there were no examples of worthwhile anthropology scholarship. This is precisely what can happen if the stories we tell are unrelentingly suspicious. We deprive our listeners of a sense of inspiration, of models to follow, of belief in possibilities.

3. CRITICISM WITHOUT POLITICAL ATTACHMENT RECREATES THE DOMINATION IT TRIES TO QUESTION

John Beverley (Professor of Spanish and Latin American Literature and Cultural Studies at Pittsburgh University) *SUBALTERNITY AND REPRESENTATION: ARGUMENTS IN CRITICAL THEORY*, 1999, 23. That is all to the good, I think, because it makes of subaltern studies a place where people with different convictions and agendas, but committed to the cause of social equality and emancipation, can work together. On the other hand, if subaltern studies is not connected to a politics, then it risks being recaptured by the very forms of academic and cultural elitism it means to question. I agree with the Latin American critics of subaltern studies I mentioned earlier that what is most urgent today is a defense and rehabilitation of the project of the left. But this must start from an analysis of what went wrong; it cannot be simply a matter of "keeping the Red Flag flying here," as if the collapse of the left had not happened in Latin America as everywhere else. Subaltern studies can help in this task by exploring the gap between the claims of the organized left to represent the subordinated classes and social groups and their actual needs, desires, strategies, and possibilities. What brought about the so-called crisis of Marxism was its identification, in both social democratic and Leninist forms, with an ethos of modernization that ultimately could not deliver the goods, to put it crudely. What is represented in this crisis, then, is not so much the crisis of Marxism as such as the crisis of this identification.

## RETHINKING IS A FLAWED PHILOSOPHY

### 1. ABSTRACT THEORIZING DESTROY LEFTIST AGENDA AND CREATES SPECTATORS RATHER THAN ACTORS

Richard Rorty (Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy at Stanford University) *ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA*, 1998, 91. It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twentieth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* in which he expresses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus communitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the traditionally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a rightist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellectual justifications of the established order." For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the established order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential subjectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's impossible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by problematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete or near at hand—a current TV show, a media celebrity, a recent scandal—they offer the most abstract and barren explanations imaginable. These futile attempt to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations.



2. RETHINKING DOES NOT LEAD TO REFORM

Richard Rorty (Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy at Stanford University) *ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA*, 1998, 35. I said earlier that we now have, among many American students and teachers, a spectral, disgusted, mocking Left rather than a Left which dreams of achieving our country. This is not the only Left we have, but it is the most prominent and vocal one. Members of this Left find America unforgivable, as Baldwin did, and also unachievable, as he did not. This leads them to step back from their country and, as they say, "theorize" it. It leads them to do what Henry Adams did: to give cultural politics preference over real politics, and to mock the very idea that democratic institutions might once again be made to serve social justice. It leads them to prefer knowledge to hope. I see this preference as a turn away from secularism and pragmatism – as an attempt to do precisely what Dewey and Whitman thought should not be done: namely, to see the American adventure within a fixed frame of reference, a frame supplied by theory. Paradoxically, the leftists who are most concerned not to "totalize," and who insist that everything be seen as the play of discursive differences rather than in the old metaphysics-of-presence way, are also the most eager to theorize, to become spectators rather than agents. Rorty continues... (p. 37) The Foucauldian Left represents an unfortunate regression to the Marxist obsession with scientific rigor. This Left still wants to put historical events in a theoretical context. It exaggerates the importance of philosophy for politics, and wastes its energy on sophisticated theoretical analyses of the significance of current events. But Foucauldian theoretical sophistication is even more useless to leftist politics than was Engels' dialectical materialism. Engels at least had an eschatology. Foucauldians do not even have that. Because they regard liberal reformist initiatives as symptoms of "humanism," they have little interest in designing new social experiments.

2. ONLY SMALL REFORMS LIKE THE PLAN PROVIDE CHANGE. RETHINKING EXACERBATES PROBLEMS.

Richard Rorty (Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy at Stanford University) *ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA*, 1998, 94. Someday, perhaps, cumulative piecemeal reforms will be found to have brought about revolutionary change. Such reforms might someday produce a presently unimaginable nonmarket economy, and much more widely distributed powers of decisionmaking. They might also, given similar reforms in other countries, bring about an international federation, a world government. In such a new world, American national pride would become as quaint as pride in being from Nebraska or Kazakhstan or Sicily. But in the meantime, we should not let the abstractly described best be the enemy of the better. We should not let speculation about a totally changed system, and a totally different way of thinking about human life and human affairs, replace step-by-step reform of the system we presently have.

Maxine Eichner (J.D. at the Yale Law School in 1988), *HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW*, Winter, 2001. 1. Postmodernists have often been criticized for their failure to propose concrete political projects, a failure that has been attributed to several sources. First, the backbone of much postmodern theorizing has been deconstruction, which has focused on dismantling conceptual oppositions in existing projects rather than on proposing constructive political projects of its own. n194 In addition, postmodern contentions that no objective truth or transcendent norms exist have left postmodernists on firmer ground in showing that particular positive projects are not justified by any concrete foundations than in developing positive projects. For this reason, Martha Minow warns that "postmodernism risks a relativism that conflicts with feminist commitments to political engagement, and with a continuing ability to name, authoritatively, and to fight, effectively, what is oppressive." n195 Even when postmodernists have made positive proposals, they have tended to be pitched at a theoretical level far above the specific political tradeoffs necessary for a viable strategy of resistance. n196 Richard Rorty calls such proposals "futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance [that] are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations." n197 Critics have argued that such postmodern projects, often phrased in the form of vague admonitions to embrace tolerance, respect the Other in its otherness, or resist oppression, "empty the category of the political." n198 As John McGowan points out, everyone claims to be against oppression and in favor of working for freedom. The real question is how to activate such "vague norms in specific circumstances" to curtail oppression, n199 an issue that postmodernists have thus far generally failed to address.

## PREDICTIONS ARE GOOD

### 1. THERE IS AN ETHICAL IMPERATIVE TO FUTURE GENERATIONS TO HAVE PREDICTIVE POLITICS

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. Aside from the moral imagination, and given that the idea of gambling with humanity's future or failing to minimize its possible sources of suffering is logically unsustainable, the appeal to reason represents another main trigger of intergenerational solidarity. Since actual deliberation between current and future generations is obviously impossible, a Rawlsian contractualist thought experiment allows us to demonstrate the soundness of a farsighted cosmopolitanism. If, in the original position, persons were to operate behind a chronological veil of ignorance that would preclude them from knowing the generation to which they belong, it is reasonable to expect them to devise a social order characterized by a fair distribution of risks and perils over time. Conversely, it is unreasonable to expect them to agree to a situation where these burdens would expand over time and thereby be transferred from one generation to the next. "The life of a people," Rawls writes, "is conceived as a scheme of cooperation spread out in historical time. It is to be governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the cooperation of contemporaries. No generation has stronger claims than any other."<sup>35</sup> Via the practice of preventive foresight, this norm of crossgenerational fairness may acquire sufficient weight.

### 2. PREDICTIONS ARE CRITICAL TO PREVENT HUMAN EXTINCTION.

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. From a precautionary standpoint, the lack of absolute certainty about a serious danger should not deter us from erring on the side of caution and taking reasonable measures to address it.<sup>38</sup> Consequently, the instrumental-strategic orientation to action must be balanced out by a two-part moral injunction: act prudently (in a manner that aims to avoid mass human suffering and ecological damage), and do no harm (in a manner that worsens the existing state of affairs or moves us closer to catastrophe). Kant's bold cry of "Sapere aude!" comes face-to-face with Jonas's humble pleas of "beware!" and "preserve!" Built into any precautionary stance is a participatory and reflexive concept of "measured action," which stipulates that we should only decide on a particular course of action after extensive public input, deliberation, and informed consideration of the range of options and their probable effects.<sup>39</sup> This kind of participatory reflexivity forthrightly acknowledges the fallibilism of decision-making processes about the future, notably because of the existence of unexpected and unintended consequences. As such, measured action is an intersubjective practice that is always subject to revision through decisional feedback loops incorporating factors that may emerge out of a subsequent broadening of collective horizons (better arguments, new evidence, unforeseen or inadvertent side-effects, shifting public opinion, etc.). Additionally, the norm of precaution's self-limiting character allows us to advocate turning away from certain possibilities if they are likely to introduce large-scale risks without proper steering mechanisms to control or alleviate them – endangering human survival, potentially creating greater problems than the ones targeted by the original action, or risking mass human suffering and ecological destruction.

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. Allowing past disasters to reoccur and unprecedented calamities to unfold is now widely seen as unbearable when, in the process, the suffering of future generations is callously tolerated and our survival is being irresponsibly jeopardized. Hence, we need to pay attention to what a widely circulated report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identifies as a burgeoning "culture of prevention,"<sup>3</sup> a dynamic that carries major, albeit still poorly understood, normative and political implications. Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that can be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, since it is, just as significantly, a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society. In other words, what I want to underscore is the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes.

## 3. PREDICTIONS ARE OUR FIRST DUTY. PREDICTIONS ARE CRITICAL TO ALL ETHICS.

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. Inverting Foucault's Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society's participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.<sup>42</sup> Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. None of this is to disavow the international community's rather patchy record of avoiding foreseeable calamities over the last decades, or to minimize the difficulties of implementing the kinds of global institutional reforms described above and the perils of historical contingency, presentist indifference toward the future, or alarmism and resignation. To my mind, however, this is all the more reason to pay attention to the work of preventive foresight in global civil society, through which civic associations can build up the latter's coordination mechanisms and institutional leverage, cultivate and mobilize public opinion in distant parts of the world, and compel political leaders and national and transnational governance structures to implement certain policies. While seeking to prevent cataclysms from worsening or, better yet, from occurring in the first place, these sorts of initiatives can and must remain consistent with a vision of a just world order. Furthermore, the labor of farsightedness supports an autonomous view of the future, according to which we are the creators of the field of possibilities within which our successors will dwell. The current socio-political order, with all its short-term biases, is neither natural nor necessary. Accordingly, informed public participation in deliberative processes makes a socially self-instituting future possible, through the involvement of groups and individuals active in domestic and supranational public spaces; prevention is a public practice, and a public responsibility. To believe otherwise is, I would argue, to leave the path clear for a series of alternatives that heteronomously compromise the well-being of those who will come after us. We would thereby effectively abandon the future to the vagaries of history ('let it unfold as it may'), the technocratic or instrumental will of official institutions ('let others decide for us'), or to gambles about the time-lags of risks ('let our progeny deal with their realization'). But, as I have tried to show here, this will not and cannot be accepted. Engaging in autonomous preventive struggles, then, remains our best hope. A farsighted cosmopolitanism that aims to avert crises while working toward the realization of precaution and global justice represents a compelling ethico-political project, for we will not inherit a better future. It must be made, starting with us, in the here and now.

4. PREDICTIONS ARE CRITICAL TO DELIBERATION AND SOCIAL SOCIETY

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the ‘warners,’ who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors’ messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational “strong publics” with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that “weak publics” with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.<sup>4</sup> Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the ‘inside’ and pressuring them from the ‘outside,’ as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future.

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism – of solidarity that extends to future generations – can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).

5. EVEN IF WE DON’T KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE FUTURE, PREDICTIONS ARE CRITICAL TO ETHICAL POLICY MAKING.

Fuyuki Kurasawa (Assistant Professor of Sociology, York University), *CONSTELLATIONS*, 2004, 11,4. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

## NIHILISM KRITIK ANSWERS

### A. THE KRITIK'S ABANDONMENT OF VALUES BREEDS AN EERIE RESEMBLANCE TO THE HOLOCAUST.

Violet Ketels (Associate Professor of English at Temple University, Director of the Intellectual Heritage Program), *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*, November 1996. Accessed Online. Nexis. The political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past." Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence.

Violet Ketels (Associate Professor of English at Temple University, Director of the Intellectual Heritage Program), *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*, November 1996. Accessed Online. Nexis. Successive Nazi and Communist conquests of Czechoslovakia, enforced by guns and tanks, had been reinforced by conquest of human speech and conscience through the poisoning of the linguistic environment and the going-along of citizens who fatalistically stopped protesting. The deadly consequences of linguistic abuse and skepticism, including their insidious seduction to silence, passivity, and nihilism, were vividly prefigured more than a century earlier by Georg Buchner in his plays and in his private correspondence. In Danton's Death, Robespierre and his followers mouth "empty and impersonal and formalistic oratory and rhetoric," not to enlighten but to delude citizens into accepting absolute state control without protest.

Violet Ketels (Associate Professor of English at Temple University, Director of the Intellectual Heritage Program), *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*, November 1996. Accessed Online. Nexis. Stalin and Hitler debased and manipulated language as a terroristic strategy to make citizens easier prey to a corruption of values that proved hospitable to catastrophe of monumental scale. So, too, in the killing fields of Yugoslavia, where we became so used to slaughter sanitized as "ethnic cleansing" that rescuing the helpless from carnage seemed outside our tidy moral categories, shielded by definition from the combined might and will of the United Nations. The world watched, dumbly passive, as before, in the Holocaust against Jews. Killing the Jews began with "reducing them to the 'other,'" warned Croatian journalist and fiction writer Slavenka Drakulic, eyewitness to genocide in the bloody Balkan war.

**B. THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN'S ETHIC OF INTERVENTION IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT HUMAN EXTINCTION**

Violet Ketels (Associate Professor of English at Temple University, Director of the Intellectual Heritage Program), *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*, November 1996. Accessed Online. Nexis. Hundreds of thousands of students, workers, and peasants joined in the final efforts to defeat the totalitarian regimes that collapsed in 1989. Still, it was the intellectuals, during decades when they repeatedly risked careers, freedom, and their very lives, often in dangerous solitary challenges to power, who formed the unifying consensus, developed the liberating philosophy, wrote the rallying cries, framed the politics, mobilized the will and energies of disparate groups, and literally took to the streets to lead nonviolent protests that became revolutions. The most profound insights into this process that gradually penetrated social consciousness sufficiently to make revolution possible can be read in the role Vaclav Havel played before and during Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution. As George Steiner reflects, while "the mystery of creative and analytic genius . . . is given to the very few," others can be "woken to its presence and exposed to its demands." Havel possesses that rare creative and analytic genius. We see it in the spaciousness of his moral vision for the future, distilled from the crucible of personal suffering and observation; in his poet's ability to translate both experience and vision into language that comes as close as possible to truth and survives translation across cultures; in the compelling force of his personal heroism. Characteristically, Havel raises local experience to universal relevance. "If today's planetary civilization has any hope of survival," he begins, "that hope lies chiefly in what we understand as the human spirit." He continues: If we don't wish to destroy ourselves in national, religious or political discord; if we don't wish to find our world with twice its current population, half of it dying of hunger; if we don't wish to kill ourselves with ballistic missiles armed with atomic warheads or eliminate ourselves with bacteria specially cultivated for the purpose; if we don't wish to see some people go desperately hungry while others throw tons of wheat into the ocean; if we don't wish to suffocate in the global greenhouse we are heating up for ourselves or to be burned by radiation leaking through holes we have made in the ozone; if we don't wish to exhaust the nonrenewable, mineral resources of this planet, without which we cannot survive; if, in short, we don't wish any of this to happen, then we must--as humanity, as people, as conscious beings with spirit, mind and a sense of responsibility--somehow come to our senses.

**C. PLAYING VACUOUS WORD GAMES DOES NOTHING TO HELP THE OPPRESSED**

Violet Ketels (Associate Professor of English at Temple University, Director of the Intellectual Heritage Program), *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*, November 1996. Accessed Online. Nexis. Such failures of nerve seem justified by the history we are enjoined to plunder. They precipitate descent into a fatalistic nihilism that relieves us from responsibility. Words do not matter; they rarely mean what they say. What does it matter, then, how intellectuals use their verbal virtuosity? Values are relative and truth elusive. We stand precisely where many gifted French intellectuals stood during World War II, in spite of the myth of resistance promulgated by the most brilliant among them. They remained glacially unmoved, engrossed in vacuous verbal games, when the desperation of the situation should have aroused their moral conscience, their humane consciousness, and their civic spirit. They rushed to embrace the position "that language is not referential and the writing of history impossible,"<sup>n14</sup> because it let them off the hook. History has survived them and provides a regenerative, other view against nihilism and detachment. It testifies that our terror of being found guilty of phrases too smooth or judgment too simple is not in itself a value. Some longing for transcendence persists in the human spirit, some tenacious faith that truth and goodness exist and can prevail. What happened in the death camps, the invasion of Prague by Russian tanks, the rape of Muslim women, the dismembering of Bosnian men, the degrading of a sophisticated society to subsistence and barbarous banditry: these things do not become fictions simply because we cannot speak of them adequately or because composing abstractions is safer than responding to the heinous reality of criminal acts. No response to the Holocaust and its murderous wake or to the carnage in the former Yugoslavia could possibly be adequate to the atrocities alphabetized in file folders of perpetrators or to the unspeakable experiences burned into brains and bodies of survivors. But no response at all breeds new catastrophe. Saul Bellow warned about the "humanistic civilized moral imagination" that, seized with despair, "declines into lethargy and sleep." Imagine the plight of human creatures if it were to be silenced altogether, extinguished or forgotten. "

Violet Ketels (Associate Professor of English at Temple University, Director of the Intellectual Heritage Program), *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*, November 1996. Accessed Online. Nexis. Basic human rights asserted in words cannot be restored in reality unless they are matched to practices in all the spheres of influence we occupy. We feel revulsion at the repudiation of humanist values so visible in the savagery of the battlefield and the councils of war. Yet we seem inoculated against seeing the brutalities of daily human interactions, the devaluing of values in our own intellectual spheres, the moral and ethical debunking formally incorporated into scholarly exegesis in literature, philosophy, the social sciences, and linguistics, the very disciplines that cradled humanist values. Remembering for the future by rehearsing the record, then, is not enough, as the most eloquent witnesses to Holocaust history have sorrowfully attested. We must also respond to the record with strategies that challenge humanist reductionism in places where we tend to overlook it or think it harmless. Our moral outrage should be intensified, not subdued, by what we know. We must search out alternatives to the anomie that seizes us when the linguistic distance between words and reality seems unbridgeably vast, and reflections upon historical events ill matched to the dark complexities of the human experience we would illumine.

Romesh Diwan (Professor of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), RPI, 1997. Accessed Online from rpi.edu. This is exactly what Gandhi did and how he empowered millions of exploited Indians. This is now going on among the Blacks in America, American- Indians in South America Gandhi. Empowerment follows from believing in oneself, in one's family, in one's heritage. This has been the lesson of history in all societies. Unfortunately, by denouncing their belief systems, left intellectuals help their exploitation. No wonder, left ideologies have never acquired mass base in spite of their writer's virtual chorus that they are for the masses. Nor have they played any meaningful part in helping the poor and exploited to unshackle their exploitation. Take for example India's struggle to gain independence from its colonial British rule. Can one identify any part of left ideology or a person associated with such ideology to have participated effectively in this struggle? The country pays homage to Mahatma Gandhi and Subhash Bose; both of them bourgeoisie. In the last analysis, empowerment of people whom we consider poor and weak has to come through their own belief systems and hence their religion. Marx's use of "religion as opium of the poor" has been taken out of context. It is their religion alone on which the poor have most control. The global exploitation of the weak is getting more common and serious. This is reflected in the growing income inequality. In fact the world today is facing a far more serious disaster in ecological degradation; its gravest danger is to the poor. Thoughtful scholars now feel that the only salvation from this looming ecological and poverty disaster is through ethical belief systems.

## LANGUAGE CRITIQUES OFFER AN UNWORTHY BASIS FOR JUDGMENT

### 1. THE SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS – THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE – IS INHERENTLY FLAWED.

A. Linguistic determinism has been empirically disproved – people do think outside of language.

Diane Lillo-Martin, (Prof., Linguistics, U. Connecticut), *RELATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT*, 1997, 62-63. Around 1930 Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf made two proposals: “First, that all higher levels of thinking are dependent on language. Second, that the structure of the language one habitually uses influences the manner in which one understands his environment. The picture of the universe shifts from tongue to tongue.” Careful reviews of this position usually point out that Sapir and Whorf were not originators of such ideas, not did they even put them so strongly. But the idea that language shapes thought – or cognition – has been debated in various forms over the years and now usually goes by the name of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Despite their popular appeal, the two hypotheses, linguistic determinism and linguistic relativity, have been largely discredited by thorough cross-linguistic study and experimentation. The linguistic determinism hypothesis is the easiest to put to rest. The facts that (1) one can discover patterns in a language other than one’s own and that (2) cross-cultural miscommunications are frequent even among the speakers of the same language attest to the ability of human cognition to think outside of language. The linguistic relativity hypothesis has been subject to greater scrutiny. Whorf’s famous example of the Hopi view of time (“becoming later”) as embodied in the linguistic system (e.g. the absence of tense marking in verbs) has frequently been discredited in terms of both the actual linguistic system and the relationship between such a system and such a worldview.

B. Language differences do not explain cultural differences.

Diane Lillo-Martin, (Prof., Linguistics, U. Connecticut), *RELATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT*, 1997, 63. In large part, then, the strongest form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis cannot be true. Although languages differ, and cultures differ, it is usually concluded that where differences exist between languages, they may be entirely accidental or they may reflect – not determine – speaker’s worldviews.

C. There is no relationship between language and social change.

John Smith, (Prof., Language Sciences, Stanford U.), *THE JUDAS ROSE*, 1987, 160. It is, of course, utter nonsense to claim that any connection exists between language change and social change, except in the most superficial sense of the word. The fate of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (also known, quaintly, as the “linguistic relativity” hypothesis) is a case in point; it now stands entirely discredited.

D. The hypothesis exaggerates the role of language as a guide to cognition.

Raymond Cohen, (Prof., International Relations, Hebrew U.), *NEGOTIATION JOURNAL*, 2001, No. 1, 19. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is the best-known theory about the influence of language on cognition. In its original version, it exaggeratedly presented language as a cognitive straitjacket, compelling a certain way of constructing reality. This overstated version has been theoretically and experimentally discredited.

E. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was based upon empirical observations which have now been shown to be incorrect interpretations of the cultures evaluated.

Roy F. Baumeister, (Prof., Psychology, Florida State U.), *THE CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE*, 2005, 53. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is more wrong than right, however. Subsequent work has discredited it point by point. The Eskimos have many words for snow, but so do Americans. More important, when Americans need to make finer distinctions – such as when they take up skiing and want to talk about the different snow conditions – they quickly develop the words they need (e.g. powder, corn). This fact is actually the crucial rebuttal of Sapir and Whorf, because it shows that thought is not constrained by language. Americans’ language does not prevent them from recognizing the differences among various kinds of snow or from thinking about them. When the thought is needed, the language changes to accommodate it. The Hopi seem to understand time pretty much the same way we do, and like everyone else they are able to talk about the past and the future.



F. The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis is not only wrong – it is the opposite of the truth.

Roy F. Baumeister, (Prof., Psychology, Florida State U.), *THE CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE*, 2005, 54. The important thing to appreciate about the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is not merely that it is wrong, but how wildly and outrageously misleading the whole idea was. The important point, the one that offers the truly profound insight, is contained in the exact opposite point of view. It is the sameness, not the difference, that is the extraordinary thing about different languages and their resulting thoughts. Almost any thought can be expressed in almost any language. That is what is remarkable.

Wayne O'Neil, (Prof., Linguistics, MIT), *THE ENGLISH JOURNAL*, 1990, No. 4, 81. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has just the standing and just the persistency as, for example, the notion that the earth is flat: it conforms to our common-sense view of things in nature, but it is dead wrong and is not a serious candidate for the explanation of the things in nature.

2. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE INVOLVES CENSORSHIP OF THOUGHT.

Rex Jory, (Staff), *THE ADVERTISER*, Apr. 10, 2007, 20. Political correctness is little more than censorship of thought and expression. It reduces society to the lowest common denominator. It is a form of verbal and written communism under which we all sacrifice rights of expression so that somehow everyone appears equal. Political correctness is social engineering devised by a minority determined to silence contradiction and extinguish free thought and expression.

3. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE CHILLS EXPRESSION BY CREATING AN IRRATIONAL FEAR OF USING A CHANCE WRONG WORD.

Edward Lucas, (Staff), *THE INDEPENDENT*, June 9, 1991, 13. The fear that certain words and opinions will bring an unjustified charge of racism chills the intellectual climate. Even at conservative, prosperous Princeton, a survey found between a half and two thirds of undergraduates did not feel they could speak freely in the classroom. "What bothers me is that this has become an alternative to critical thought," said Paul Starr, a sociologist at Princeton. "With respect to race and gender, there is a climate which inhibits free discussion.

4. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE DESTROYS A MEANINGFUL USE OF LANGUAGE.

Morris Wolfe, (Staff), *THE GLOBE AND MAIL*, Jan. 31, 1991, 7. In pursuit of intellectual conformity, the Thought Police have been vigilant in ferreting out examples not only of racism but of ableism ("oppression of the differently abled"); ageism; classism; heterosexism; and lookism ("the belief that appearance is an indicator of a person's value"). There's actually a movement afoot to begin referring to pets as "animal companions." A delightful student cartoonist at Brown, Jeff Shesol, has come up with a politically correct euphemism for nine-year-old girls. They're "pre-women."

5. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

Flora Lewis, (Staff), *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE*, July 12, 1991, 12. Ostensibly, the aim of PC is to protect minorities and enforce awareness of their dignity and human worth. In practice, it destroys free speech, intellectual standards and the ethical canons on which Western democracy (as yet there is no other) is based. This is a dramatic irony at the time when the rest of the world, not only ex-Communist societies in Europe, is reaching for democracy and individual freedom as the necessary foundation for societies which can improve their people's lives. Far from rejecting these values as "Eurocentric," critics from within these societies insist that they are universal, although far from universally enjoyed. It is also ironic - although perhaps it should not be surprising, given the history of how totalitarian movements are formed - that the advocates of PC are the rebels of a generation ago.

6. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE DESTROYS TRUE DIALOGUE.

Morris Wolfe, (Staff), *THE GLOBE AND MAIL*, Jan. 31, 1991, 7. Issues of political correctness seem to be getting in the way of real dialogue everywhere. Nowhere, alas, is that more true than in post-secondary institutions. An old friend, who teaches at a Canadian university, told me recently that he's now reluctant to talk freely on campus to anyone he doesn't know well; when he speaks to others, he feels that the political correctness of what he's saying is constantly being judged. It's not surprising. The humanities have been politicized in recent years. The belief that what they're about is the disinterested pursuit of knowledge has largely been discarded.

7. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE PROMOTES DOGMATIC INTOLERANCE.

Morris Wolfe, (Staff), THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 31, 1991, 7. Thought Police, who want it all now, seem worried about every -ism but dogmatism. Their moral terrorism seems indistinguishable from the tactics of a Meir Kahane or a Louis Farrakhan. I find especially offensive the manipulation of students by their faculty and fellow students. As one American professor puts it, “You have to let students say the most outrageous and stupid things. To get people to think and talk, to question their own ideas, you don't regulate their speech.” There's far more intolerance these days among the educated than among the uneducated. Isn't it supposed to be the other way around? The tyranny of politically correct thinking is a scary thing.

8. OBJECTING TO LANGUAGE IN QUOTED STATEMENTS IS AN AMAZING EXAMPLE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH INTOLERANCE WILL GO.

Mark Kingwell, (Doctoral Candidate in Philosophy, Yale U.), THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 15, 1991, 5. The PC Police are not new, despite all the recent furor about them. In fact, the political orthodoxy they represent, like so much of what today passes for the cutting edge on North American campuses, is of 1960s vintage. Stated plainly, this orthodoxy is pretty unobjectionable: sexism, racism and homophobia are bad. Prejudice and intolerance are bad. Anything else is good. But, as with other orthodoxies, it is prosecuted with such zealous rigour as to become self defeating; the prejudice against prejudice, tolerance as intolerance. Today's PC are everywhere, but they're still particularly noticeable on college campuses. There, the main targets are: (1) literary or philosophical canons, mainly works by dead white guys known as the “classics” or “great books;” (2) the uttering, or sometimes even the quoting, of statements deemed somehow objectionable, whether in classrooms, dining halls, dormitory corridors, or anywhere else. Both of these issues are important, and it seems to me there are good arguments on both sides of them: tradition versus diversity; free speech versus the elimination of bigotry. But what is amazing about the current round of PC Police action is the vehemence, and the crudeness, of the debate. You will have heard some of the stories, since some of them happened in Canada: of professors openly jeered in classrooms, of insults hurled by otherwise mild-mannered professors on either side of the debate, of freshmen indoctrinated into correctness by “dorm advisers” on matters political. The Atlantic Monthly recently had a cover story on Illiberal Education. And Newsweek, of all things, ran a cover story that compared the PC Police to George Orwell's Big Brother. The comparison is overdrawn, but the United States has reached an intellectual crossroads of sorts in these debates. And, not being a country much given to deep self-analysis, it is feeling the effects of a philosophical disagreement for which no genuine forum of resolution exists. The universities often play host to what passes for argument in U.S. political life but, if my students are any example, the United States is in for a tough time. Intellectually, this country hasn't got the resources to solve its own problems. That's one aspect of the current situation that is disturbing. Even more serious, perhaps, for those expecting or hoping the PC Policemen (persons?) to be agents of lasting social change, is the substantive poverty of their ideology.

9. REAL DEBATE REQUIRES LISTENING TO THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT IS SAID RATHER THAN TO FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL WORDS.

Morris Wolfe, (Staff), THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 31, 1991, 7. I don't know whether the phrase “consecutive monologues” actually originated with the late Northrop Frye, but he was the first person I heard use it. He was describing the kind of interaction that occurs when one person talks to another without hearing a word of what the other person is saying. Real dialogue, as philosopher Martin Buber suggests in his I and Thou, dialogue that genuinely acknowledges the otherness of others, is rare.

10. LANGUAGE CRITICISM WOULD REJECT THE GREAT WORKS OF THE PAST.

Suanne Kelman, (Staff), THE GLOBE AND MAIL, May 6, 1991, 3. On one hand — the left — universities and government agencies become ever more politically correct, zealously stalking the faintest wisp of sexism, racism, ageism and the latest contender, lookism. This is particularly true on U.S. campuses, where the next step may be a call for a boycott of Shakespeare on the grounds that his portrait of the hunchbacked, oops, physically challenged, Richard III is offensive to what we now call the otherly-abled.

11. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE IS THE HEIGHT OF HYPOCRISY – IT JUDGES PEOPLE FOR THE ACT OF JUDGING OTHERS.

Mark Kingwell, (Doctoral Candidate in Philosophy, Yale U.), THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 15, 1991, 5. Over in relativism, by contrast, they can learn (or think they can) why it really is okay not to judge anybody, and why cultural differences do indeed transcend moral evaluation. Then they can get out there on the campus and start judging people for judging others. And that's the amazing thing about the correctness of political correctness. It may mean making friends with people of other skin colours or sexual persuasions, or treating your girlfriend like a person (and that may be good), but it sure doesn't mean revolution or even structural political change. In practice, it's just the Inquisition with a simple-minded, ultimately reactionary, agenda. The PC Police would like us to believe that they are radical thinkers, cutting-edge reformists. The real poverty of political correctness is not that its pleas for tolerance are frequently so intolerant - although they are - but that its politics are so damn superficial.

12. THE LANGUAGE CRITIQUE IS THE NEW MCCARTHYISM.

Morris Wolfe, (Staff), THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 31, 1991, 7. Consider the case of Stephan Thernstrom, who until recently co-taught a course at Harvard in the history of American race relations. His story is told in an article entitled Are You Politically Correct? in the Jan. 21 issue of New York magazine. Thernstrom's students objected to his using the word "Indians" instead of "Native Americans" "Indians" was racist, they said. Thernstrom tried, unsuccessfully, to point out that that's the word most Indians themselves prefer. Then the students objected to Thernstrom's assigning a book that mentioned that some people regard affirmative action as preferential treatment. But when Thernstrom, who is white, endorsed U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's view that the breakup of the black family is a cause of persistent black poverty, his students were convinced he was a racist. Thernstrom decided there was nothing else to do but to drop the course. "It's like being a Commie in the fifties," he says. "Whatever explanation you offer, once accused, you're always suspect."

13. LANGUAGE DOES NOT CREATE REALITY, AND THERE IS NO LINK BETWEEN THE RHETORIC OF THE DEBATERS THEMSELVES AND THE CLAIMS MADE BY THE AUTHORS THEY READ IN DEBATES:

Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. Language "arguments" assume the veracity of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Usually, this is made explicit in a subpoint labeled something like "language creates reality." Often, this is implicitly argued as part of claims such as "they're responsible for their rhetoric" or "ought always to avoid X language." Additionally, even if a given language "argument" does not articulate this as a premise, the authors who write the evidence comprising the position will usually if not always assume the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Perhaps the most common example is the popular sexist language "argument" critiquing masculine generic references. Frequently debaters making this "argument" specifically state that language creates reality. The fact that their authors assume this is documented by Khosroshahi: The claim that masculine generic words help to perpetuate an androcentric world view assumes more or less explicitly the validity of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis according to which the structure of the language we speak affects the way we think. We believe this example to be very typical of language "arguments." If the advocate of a language "argument" does not defend the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, then there can be no link between the debater's rhetoric and the impacts claimed. This being the case, we will claim that a refutation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is a sufficient condition for the refutation of language "arguments".

14. VOTING ON CRITICISMS OF OUR LANGUAGE JUSTIFIES CENSORSHIP AND VIOLATES THE 1<sup>ST</sup> AMENDMENT—THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE REALM OF ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE!  
Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. The proper interpretation of these first amendment rights is articulated by the now famous words of Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, who declared: If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate. Certainly this principle would prohibit the enforcement of any language “argument.” If one despised the rhetoric of a given debater enough to vote against that debater, then as Holmes suggests, the principles of the Constitution require one to refrain from censorship. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts articulated the essence of this argument so eloquently that their entire statement deserves repetition here: When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take steps to shut up those who utter the wounding words. When, as here, that impulse is likely to be felt by those who are normally the first amendment's staunchest defenders, free expression faces its greatest threat. At such times, it is important for those committed to principles of free expressions to remind each other of what they have always known regarding the long term costs of short term victories bought through compromising first amendment principles. Certainly debaters and debate coaches, whose entire activity is premised upon the freedom of expression, ought to be among the staunchest defenders of that freedom. When we are asked to censor the rhetoric of a debater, as the C.L.U. warns, we ought to think long and hard about the risks associated with playing fast and loose with free speech.
15. ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF SPEECH SHOULD BE RESPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE; VOTING AGAINST US BECAUSE OF SOMETHING OUR AUTHORS SAID IS UNFAIR  
Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. Not only does the first amendment create a moral or deontological barrier to language “arguments”, the principles it defends also create a pragmatic barrier. The free and sometimes irreverent discourse protected by the first amendment is essential to the health and future success of our society. History has borne out the belief that the freedom to challenge convictions is essential to our ability to adapt to change. As Hyde and Fishman observe, university scholars must be allowed to “think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable” because “major discoveries and advances in knowledge are often highly unsettling and distasteful to the existing order.” This leads them to conclude that “we cannot afford” to impose “orthodoxies, censorship, and other artificial barriers to creative thought.” Given the rapid pace of political and technological change that our society faces, and given that debates often focus around the cutting edge of such changes, the imposition of linguistic straitjackets upon the creative thought and critical thinking of debaters would seem to uniquely jeopardize these interests. This is not just exaggerated rhetoric, nor is it merely our old debate disadvantages in new clothes. Hyde & Fishman's claims have been repeatedly validated by historical events. Had Elie Wiesel debated in Germany, a “Zionist language” argument would not have been unlikely. As Bennett Katz has argued, The essentiality of freedom in the community of American Universities is almost self-evident... To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.

16. GIVING LANGUAGE-BASED ARGUMENTS SPECIAL STATUS AS “VOTING ISSUES” WILL BACKFIRE AND ENTRENCH OPPRESSIVE DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. The second ramification is that language “arguments” could become a genuine slippery slope. The current fashion on the debate circuit is to oppose sexism and homophobia. If the AIDS crisis becomes worse, or if current feminism becomes more radicalized and begins to generate a backlash, then the prevailing attitude of the community could well reverse. If we legitimize language “arguments” as special voting issues now, with the intent of deterring rhetoric we find objectionable, then we risk a generation of language “arguments” that offend the very principles we intended to protect. If language “arguments” deserve any special status as voting issues, then we must presume that casting a ballot on a language “argument” is somewhat effective in deterring the allegedly repugnant rhetoric. If that is so, it is easy to imagine a circuit where repeated use of language “arguments” has successfully deterred all pro-homosexual rhetoric.

17. LANGUAGE-BASED CRITIQUES CHILL FREE SPEECH MORE SO THAN SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS

Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. One could defend language “arguments” by observing that the slippery slope claim applies equally well to substantive issues. We would suggest that there is an important distinction. Substantive issues are considered and weighed within the hypothetical realm of the debate round. Language “arguments” rely for their force upon the notion that they transcend that hypothetical realm. If language “arguments” operated within the hypothetical realm, then the critic would weigh the amount of patriarchy or whatever the impact-du-jour is against the case impact. Such an evaluation would almost always result in rejecting the language “argument” since the rhetoric of the debaters usually affects from 5 to 7 people while the case usually affects much more. Most advocates of language “arguments” instead claim that the debaters are personally responsible for their rhetoric in some way that is distinct from the substantive arguments in the debate. Our claim is that by transcending the hypothetical realm, language “arguments” develop a potential to chill speech above and beyond that of substantives. It is one thing to lose a debate because the case oppresses women in some manner, it is another to lose a debate because the debater is accused of oppressing women. The latter carries more social stigma and also would tend to be perceived more personally by debaters.

18. LINGUISTIC REFORMS TRADE OFF WITH REAL SOCIAL CHANGE

Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. There are several levels upon which language “arguments” are actually counterproductive. We will discuss the quiescence effect, deacademization, and publicization. The quiescence effect is explained by Strossen when she writes “the censorship approach is diversionary. It makes it easier for communities to avoid coming to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but ultimately more meaningful approaches.” Essentially, the argument is that allowing the restriction of language we find offensive substitutes for taking actions to check the real problems that generated the language. Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language “arguments” have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, “when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern,” further noting “there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change.”

19. DEBATE IS THE BEST PLACE FOR LANGUAGE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED; BUT PUNISHING ONE TYPE OF SPEECH WILL ONLY DRIVE IT TO OTHER REALMS OF SOCIETY WHERE THERE IS NO WAY TO EXPOSE IT

Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. The second major reason why language “arguments” are counterproductive is that they contribute to deacademization. In the context of critiquing the Hazelwood decision, Hopkins explains the phenomenon: To escape censorship, therefore, student journalists may eschew school sponsorship in favor of producing their own product. In such a case, the result would almost certainly be lower quality of high school journalism. . . . The purpose of high school journalism, however, is more than learning newsgathering, writing, and editing skills. It is also to learn the role of the press in society; it is to teach responsibility as well as freedom. Hyde & Fishman further explain that to protect students from offensive views, is to deprive them of the experiences through which they “attain intellectual and moral maturity and become self-reliant.” The application of these notions to the debate round is clear and relevant. If language “arguments” become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback.

20. CENSORED SPEECH ONLY BECOMES MORE ATTRACTIVE, MAKING THEIR PROJECT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. “Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very reason - becomes more appealing to many people.” These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language “arguments” becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language “arguments” are counterproductive.

21. VOTING AGAINST US ON LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE; THOSE QUESTIONS CAN BE RESOLVED IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OR BETWEEN ROUNDS

Matt Roskowski & Joe Peabody, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>. Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language “arguments”: The battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language “argument” ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can take place. It is our position that interpersonal transactions will be more effective methods of raising consciousness about the negative ramifications of language. These interactions can achieve the goals intended by language “arguments” without the attendant infringements upon the freedom of speech.

22. LANGUAGE IS A TOOL FOR ACCOMPLISHING GOALS AND SHOULD BE USED TO BETTER THE HUMAN CONDITION

Bjorn Ramberg, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 2001. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/>. In Rorty's view, both Dewey's pragmatism and Darwinism encourage us to see vocabularies as tools, to be assessed in terms of the particular purposes they may serve. Our vocabularies, Rorty suggests, "have no more of a *representational* relation to an intrinsic nature of things than does the anteater's snout or the bowerbird's skill at weaving." Pragmatic evaluation of various linguistically infused practices requires a degree of specificity. From Rorty's perspective, to suggest that we might evaluate vocabularies with respect to their ability to uncover the truth, would be like claiming to evaluate tools for their ability to help us get what we want—full stop. Is the hammer or the saw or the scissors better—in general? Questions about usefulness can only be answered, Rorty points out, once we give substance to our purposes. Rorty's pragmatist appropriation of Darwin also defuses the significance of reduction. He rejects as representationalist the sort of naturalism that implies a program of nomological or conceptual reduction to terms at home in a basic science. Rorty's naturalism echoes Nietzsche's perspectivism; a descriptive vocabulary is useful insofar as the patterns it highlights are usefully attended to by creatures with needs and interests like ours. Darwinian naturalism, for Rorty, implies that there is no one privileged vocabulary whose purpose is to serve as a critical touchstone for our various descriptive practices. For Rorty, then, any vocabulary, even that of evolutionary explanation, is a tool for a purpose, and therefore subject to teleological assessment. Typically, Rorty justifies his own commitment to Darwinian naturalism by suggesting that this vocabulary is suited to further the secularization and democratization of society that Rorty thinks we should aim for. Accordingly, there is a close tie between Rorty's construal of the naturalism he endorses and his most basic political convictions.

23. IT IS JUSTIFIED TO USE LANGUAGE TO COMPARE DIFFERENT POLICY ALTERNATIVES, SO LONG AS THE PURPOSE IS ETHICAL

Bjorn Ramberg, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 2001. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/>. Rorty's liberal ironist, recognizing—indeed, affirming—the contingency of her own commitments, is explicitly ethnocentric. (ORT "Solidarity or Objectivity") For the liberal ironist, ...one consequence of antirepresentationalism is the recognition that no description of how things are from a God's-eye point of view, no skyhook provided by some contemporary or yet-to-be-developed science, is going to free us from the contingency of having been acculturated as we were. Our acculturation is what makes certain options live, or momentous, or forced, while leaving others dead, or trivial, or optional. So the liberal ironist accepts that bourgeois liberalism has no universality other than the transient and unstable one which time, luck, and discursive effort might win for it. This view looks to many readers like a version of cultural relativism. True, Rorty does not say that what is true, what is good, and what is right is relative to some particular ethnos, and so in that sense he is no relativist. But the worry about relativism, that it leaves us with no rational way to adjudicate conflict, seems to apply equally to Rorty's ethnocentric view. Rorty's answer is to say that in one sense of "rational" that is true, but that in another sense it is not, and to recommend that we drop the former. Rorty's position is that we have no notion of rational warrant that exceeds, or transcends, or grounds, the norms that liberal intellectuals take to define thorough, open-minded, reflective discussion. It is chimerical, Rorty holds, to think that the force or attractiveness of these norms can be enhanced by argument that does not presuppose them. It is pointless, equally, to look for ways of convicting those who pay them no heed of irrationality. Persuasion across such fundamental differences is achieved, if at all, by concrete comparisons of particular alternatives, by elaborate description and redescription of the kinds of life to which different practices conduce.

24. STRUCTURALIST KRITIKS OF LANGUAGE ARE BANKRUPT AND IGNORE THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Tom Heller (Prof. of Law @ Stanford), STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January 1984. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 1, 06. www.nexis.com. The essence of the problem of poststructuralism is determining how to treat structuralism. One possibility is to regard structuralism as one example of the generalized form of the claim to objective knowledge. If explanation is to be more than the narration of spirit's travels, it should reduce the vagaries of consciousness to cause. A structuralist discourse alters time by creating the extrahistorical standpoint of a stable body of knowledge that confines phenomenology within the bounds of a self-reproducing system. But, even considered apart from its relation to other discourses, the meaning of structural analysis is unclear. It seems at some points to be a totalizing utopia and at others a **humble confession** of the finitude of our understanding. In its pretense to universal explanation, structuralism recalls both the longing for a nonrelative science and the associated threat of an ideological repression of disparate interpretations of experience. In the frank recognition that order emerges only in a collective representation suspended sequentially in disordered time, the epistemic break between discrete structuralisms underscores the limitations of knowledge locked inside the conceptual system that produces it. To dwell upon the utopian formulation seems insensitive to twentieth century history. To adopt the confessional leads back toward an existential hermeneutics of endless interpretations, which undercuts the logic of structuralist discourse and the lessons about the illusion of the interpreting subject that we should have learned from it.

25. STRUCTURALISM FAILS TO ESCAPE THE NOTION THAT WE CAN DIRECTLY KNOW "THE OTHER"

Tom Heller (Prof. of Law @ Stanford), STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January 1984. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 1, 06. www.nexis.com. To phrase the problem another way, the relationship of these two discourses is uncertain. Structuralism is taken historically as the contradiction of subjectivist discourse. To speak structurally is to criticize characterizations of experience dependent upon phenomenological constructions. But viewed together from a metalevel, these two discourses can be seen as complements. They are mirror or shadow constructions of experience. To grasp the meaning of either, we are forced to refer to the absence of the other. Moreover, as Derrida suggests in the passage quoted at the outset, they are alternative dreams of the presence of knowledge. Structuralism dreams that one can directly and immediately know the Other; phenomenology dreams that one can directly and immediately know oneself.

26. POLITICAL CORRECTNESS CREATES A DIVERSION. BY FOCUSING ON LANGUAGE, IT ALLOWS POLITICS TO CONTINUE AS USUAL.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT, 07, 5. The fact remains that, since the advent of postmodernism, whatever was left of a dissenting mood has beaten a hasty retreat. And the impact of political correctness on the middle class' education system might have something to do with this. Twenty-plus years of disintegrative labor in the schools have eventually managed to discipline American pupils, conditioning them to snarl, snap and bite whenever they sniff anything redolent of "sexism," "absolutism," "Eurocentrism," or "white male chauvinism." They have been disciplined by means of a politically correct lack of any spiritual certainty, other than a patriotic feeling of righteousness, a feeling shared and reinforced on the other hand by the pupils' Liberal education—the other pedagogical half of America. Joining the postmodern half to the Liberal half, and taking the limit of our argumentation, thus assuming that in time all empathy will be wrested from the hearts of young Americans, we obtain this hypothetical, neotype "American citizen": a fanaticized hybrid who, as a creature of Liberalism, decomposes life in costs and benefits, considers compassion an (expensive and unnecessary) option, and is convinced of his/her intellectual and cultural superiority vis-à-vis all those peoples incapable of mastering the technological arts or the savvy ways of commerce. As a creature of postmodernism, however, the "new western type" will not always dare to confess openly the conviction of being culturally superior. He or she is ever the hypocrite.



## **ANSWERS TO KRITIK OF CAPITALISM**

### **A. THERE IS NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM**

#### **1. CAPITALISM IS WITHIN THE HUMAN SPIRITS. THE KRITIK CANNOT HOPE TO CHANGE US ALL.**

Paul Bowles (graduate of the London School of Economics and Teacher at the University of Canada) CAPITALISM, 2007, 25-26, The act of market exchange was, for Smith, "natural" in the sense that it was based upon a propensity which was found in all humans and, more strongly, only in humans. That is, for Smith, market exchange was a central defining characteristic of our own humanness. The question "what distinguishes humans as humans?" was a well-debated topic at the end of the eighteenth century. For some, the answer to this lay in the ability of humans to communicate and to develop language. For Smith, the answer was to be found in humans' ability to enter into exchange. Smith (1976: 25) refers to this as "the propensity to truck, barter and exchange", in other words to trade. This propensity, Smith (1976: 25-26) tells us, "is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavors to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that" From this view, important implications arise. Firstly, market exchange, being based on a natural propensity, is common to all people and all places. The "market" is a universal institution arising from an innate "propensity" within human beings. Attempts to limit exchange are regarded as both futile and oppressive. They are futile in that they attempt to deny human nature and, as such, will ultimately fail. Thus, attempts to limit the operations of the market in many countries, such as those which occurred in the countries of the former communist bloc, simply resulted in the rise of "black" or "grey" market activity; that is, in market exchange which was not officially sanctioned by the state. Attempts to suppress the market in any significant degree could not work in the long run, since human nature would always find an avenue to escape the shackles of any state imposed restrictions. The contemporary relevance of this view is not only that economic systems which seek to radically limit the operations of the market are doomed to failure because human ingenuity, propelled by the "propensity to truck, barter, and exchange", will overcome such limitations. This position also implies that the transition to a market system can be achieved reasonably quickly, since markets will "naturally" and spontaneously develop. For example, the "transition to capitalism" in the former Soviet bloc could possibly be a short one if a supportive enabling environment was quickly established. The second implication of Smith's argument is that limits on market exchange are limits on human freedom. If our humanity is expressed and defined by our ability to enter into exchange relationships with others, then any attempts to limit these exchanges are therefore attempts to limit our humanity.

2. MARXIST CRITIQUES ARE TOTALLY DISCONNECTED FROM EMPIRICAL REALITY.

David E. McClean, (philosopher, writer and business consultant) 2001 "The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope." Accessed online at [http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\\_conference\\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm) There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

3. SOCIALISM IS A DEAD THEORY- THE LEFT NEEDS TO QUIT FOCUSING ON IT.

John K Wilson, (Author of many books including 'The Myth of Political Correctness' ) HOW THE LEFT CAN WIN ARGUMENTS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE. 2000, 7-10. Socialism is dead. Kaput. Stick a fork in Lenin's corpse. Take the Fidel posters off the wall. Welcome to the twenty-first century. Wake up and smell the capitalism. I have no particular hostility to socialism. But nothing can kill a good idea in America so quickly as sticking the "socialist" label on it.

John K Wilson, (Author of many books including 'The Myth of Political Correctness' ) HOW THE LEFT CAN WIN ARGUMENTS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE. 2000, 7-10The reality in America is that socialism is about as successful as Marxist footwear (and have you ever seen a sickle and hammer on anybody's shoes?). Allow your position to be defined as socialist even if it isn't (remember Clinton's capitalist health care plan?), and the idea is doomed. Instead of fighting to repair the tattered remnants of socialism as a marketing slogan, the left needs to address the core issues of social justice. You can form the word socialist from the letters in social justice, but it sounds better if you don't.

John K Wilson, (Author of many books including 'The Myth of Political Correctness' ) HOW THE LEFT CAN WIN ARGUMENTS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE. 2000, 7-10At least 90 percent of America opposes socialism, and 90 percent of America thinks "social justice" might be a good idea. Why alienate so many people with a word? Even the true believers hawking copies of the Revolutionary Socialist Worker must realize by now that the word socialist doesn't have a lot of drawing power. In the movie Bulworth, Warren Beatty declares: "Let me hear that dirty word: socialism!" Socialism isn't really a dirty word, however; if it were, socialism might have a little underground appeal as a forbidden topic. Instead, socialism is a forgotten word, part of an archaic vocabulary and a dead language that is no longer spoken in America. Even Michael Harrington, the founder of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), didn't use the word socialism in his influential book on poverty, *The Other America*.

John K Wilson, (Author of many books including 'The Myth of Political Correctness' ) HOW THE LEFT CAN WIN ARGUMENTS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE. 2000, 7-10. The best reason for the left to abandon socialism is not PR but honesty. Most of the self-described "socialists" remaining in America don't qualify as real socialists in any technical sense. If you look at the DSA (whose prominent members include Harvard professor Cornel West and former Time columnist Barbara Ehrenreich), most of the policies they urge—a living wage, universal health care, environmental protection, reduced spending on the Pentagon, and an end to corporate welfare—have nothing to do with socialism in the specific sense of government ownership of the means of production. Rather, the DSA program is really nothing more than what a liberal political party ought to push for, if we had one in America. Europeans, to whom the hysteria over socialism must seem rather strange, would never consider abandoning socialism as a legitimate political ideology. But in America, socialism simply isn't taken seriously by the mainstream. Therefore, if socialists want to be taken seriously, they need to pursue socialist goals using nonsocialist rhetoric. Whenever someone tries to attack an idea as "socialist" (or, better yet, "communist"), there's an easy answer: Some people think everything done by a government, from Social Security to Medicare to public schools to public libraries, is socialism. The rest of us just think it's a good idea. (Whenever possible, throw public libraries into an argument, whether it's about good government programs or NEA funding. Nobody with any sense is opposed to public libraries. They are by far the most popular government institutions.) If an argument turns into a debate over socialism, simply define socialism as the total government ownership of all factories and natural resources—which, since we don't have it and no one is really arguing for this to happen, makes socialism a rather pointless debate. Of course, socialists will always argue among themselves about socialism and continue their internal debates. But when it comes to influencing public policy, abstract discussions about socialism are worse than useless, for they alienate the progressive potential of the American people. It's only by pursuing specific progressive policies on nonsocialist terms that socialists have any hope in the long term of convincing the public that socialism isn't (or shouldn't be) a long-dead ideology.

Martin Lewis, 1992, Professor at Duke University School of the Environment, "Green Delusions" p. 170. Yet a successful Marxian transformation, be it evolutionary or revolutionary, hardly seems likely within the United States. The evolutionary path is moribund; socialist parties never achieve more than a percentage point or two in any election, except in a few errant university towns like Berkeley and Santa Cruz, California – or in Vermont. So too the chances of a revolution in the near future, as most Marxists fully recognize, are nil.

#### 4. EXPERIMENTS WITHOUT CAPITALISM FAIL

John Isbister (Professor Economics, U. Cal @ Santa Cruz), CAPITALISM AND JUSTICE, 2001, 46. Some in the capitalist world try to retain or re-create the best parts of precapitalism. Some Amish and Mennonite communities are based on precapitalist values, as are some other faith-based groups. The 1960s and 1970s saw the creation of secular alternative rural communes, communities whose members tried to eliminate all marks of distinction between them, to be self-sufficient, and to live simply. The communes had some successes, but most eventually collapsed. Communities such as these have attempted to embody precapitalist values, but none has succeeded in cutting itself off from capitalist influences: from the market, from the media, from the legal system, and from other influences of the modern world. While we can learn from our antecedent societies, we cannot return to them. The door has been closed.

#### 5. CAPITALISM WILL BOUNCE BACK, EVEN WITH THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Alex Singleton (lead writer for the Daily Telegraph), THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, October 10, 2008, Accessed online from telegraph.co.uk. The fattening of the state under this Government has been deeply depressing for those of us who believe in free markets. And now that the economy is coughing up blood, the opponents of free markets are hoping that they can finally roll back the frontiers of Thatcherism. They'll be lucky. Big government is easy to implement when times are good. It's much more unattractive when taxpayers are feeling the pinch. In the 1990s, many members of the public were won over to Labour's view that the hospitals and schools were poor only because they are under-funded. Not any longer. There is now a consensus that much of the cash has been wasted, and that tedious bureaucracy and over-paid civil service managers have overrun out public services. For the first time in years, the campaigners for low taxes are winning the argument. People are fed up with all they have to pay to the Government, be it when they fill up their cars or receive mail from the council. Even the hysteria over global warming now falling on deaf ears: green taxes are off the agenda. The result of all this is that David Cameron's Conservatives, once very wary of tax or spending cuts, are now openly pledging - though admittedly in vague terms - that they want to cut tax and that they will cut spending. Social democracy is dead. Yes, there will be a move to look at regulation of the City, and there is a risk that the economic illiteracy of politicians could cause immense damage. There is a fight to be had but I suspect that even Gordon Brown will be reluctant to roast the golden goose too much. The City could face some regulatory changes it would benefit from anyway, like moving powers back to the Bank of England away from that Labour creation, the Financial Services Authority. The capital requirements of banks are being set by the FSA as part of the bail-out, and will continue to be regulated. Big deal: capital requirements already at the top of shareholders' demands, so regulation here would hardly be an imposition that's unwelcome. While the economy - in the UK at least - has been cushioned from the bankruptcy of a bank, banking reputations have been won and lost, and consolidation has been allowed to occur. That's a healthy part of markets that creates long-term strength. And, let's face it: the banks are going to be much more profitable in the future.

Alex Singleton (lead writer for the Daily Telegraph), THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, October 10, 2008, Accessed online from telegraph.co.uk. Besides, as Adam Smith put it: "There is a lot of ruin in a nation", and despite all the unwise impositions of politicians that harm the economy, markets are surprisingly resilient. In the next bull market, we'll look back to the scars of the past few weeks, and to the recession of the next couple of years, and think that it was rather scary. But we'll also celebrate that we're richer and pay lower taxes - and we'll remember the Leftists who believed the crisis would be their greatest victory, and smile.

#### 6. RESOURCE SCARCITY WON'T COLLAPSE CAPITALISM

Ronald Bailey (Adjunct Scholar with the CATO Institute), CATO, 2000, accessed online from cato.org. We cannot deplete the supply of ideas, designs and recipes. They are immaterial and limitless, and therefore not bound in any meaningful sense by the second law of thermodynamics. Surely no one believes that humanity has already devised all of the methods to conserve, locate and exploit new sources of energy, or that the flow of ideas to improve houses, transportation, communications, medicine and farming has suddenly dried up. Though far too many of our fellow human beings are caught in local versions of the Malthusian trap, we must not mistake the situation of that segment as representing the future of all of humanity and the earth itself; it is, instead, a dwindling remnant of an unhappy past. Misery is not the inevitable lot of humanity, nor is the ruin of the natural world a foregone conclusion.

#### 7. RESOURCE SCARCITY WON'T COLLAPSE CAPITALISM

Ronald Bailey (Adjunct Scholar with the CATO Institute), CATO, 2000, accessed online from cato.org. We cannot deplete the supply of ideas, designs and recipes. They are immaterial and limitless, and therefore not bound in any meaningful sense by the second law of thermodynamics. Surely no one believes that humanity has already devised all of the methods to conserve, locate and exploit new sources of energy, or that the flow of ideas to improve houses, transportation, communications, medicine and farming has suddenly dried up. Though far too many of our fellow human beings are caught in local versions of the Malthusian trap, we must not mistake the situation of that segment as representing the future of all of humanity and the earth itself; it is, instead, a dwindling remnant of an unhappy past. Misery is not the inevitable lot of humanity, nor is the ruin of the natural world a foregone conclusion.

8. THE LACK OF A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE MEANS THE KRITIK CANNOT SOLVE.

Richard Rorty (Professor of Philosophy at UVA), *ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY AMERICA*, 1998, 103. The cultural left still skips over such questions. Doing so is a consequence of its preference for talking about “the system” rather than about specific social practices and specific changes in those practices. The rhetoric of this left remains revolutionary rather than reformist and pragmatic. Its insouciant use of terms like “late capitalism” suggests that we can just wait for capitalism to collapse, rather than figuring out what, in the absence of markets, will set prices and regulate distribution. The voting public, the public which must be won over if the left is to emerge from the academy into the public square, sensibly wants to be told the details. It wants to know how things are going to work after markets are put behind us. The cultural Left offers no answers to such demands for further information, but until it confronts them it will not be able to be a political left. The public, sensibly, has no interest in getting rid of capitalism until it is offered details about the alternatives.

Brian Martin (Professor of Sociology), *UPROOTING WAR*, '90, accessed online. Without detailed ideas of methods and alternatives, most people will rely on the models with which they are most familiar, such as existing large-scale bureaucracies, decisions by elites and advice from experts. Presenting ideas for how social change might be achieved does not necessarily pre-empt local initiatives. The result instead can be to stimulate local initiative and foster widespread discussion of strategy and action. After all, ideas do not cause social change. Rather, social change is caused by people who can choose to use the ideas, adapt them or reject them, and take action.

B. THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION. WE SHOULD DO THE PLAN AND VOW TO FIGHT CAPITALISM AT THE SAME TIME.

1. TOTALIZING KRITIKS OF CAPITALISM ONLY MAKE CAPITALISM STRONGER.

J.K. Gibson-Graham (Feminist economist) *END OF CAPITALISM*, 1996, 216. One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can't the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could begin to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there's no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there's no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE TO REFORM CAPITALISM FROM WITHIN.

John K Wilson, (Author of many books including 'The Myth of Political Correctness' ) HOW THE LEFT CAN WIN ARGUMENTS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE. 2000, 7-10. Capitalism is far too ingrained in American life to eliminate. If you go into the most impoverished areas of America, you will find that the people who live there are not seeking government control over factories or even more social welfare programs; they're hoping, usually in vain, for a fair chance to share in the capitalist wealth. The poor do not pray for socialism-they strive to be a part of the capitalist system. They want jobs, they want to start businesses, and they want to make money and be successful. What's wrong with America is not capitalism as a system but capitalism as a religion. We worship the accumulation of wealth and treat the horrible inequality between rich and poor as if it were an act of God. Worst of all, we allow the government to exacerbate the financial divide by favoring the wealthy: go anywhere in America, and compare a rich suburb with a poor town-the city services, schools, parks, and practically everything else will be better financed in the place populated by rich people. The aim is not to overthrow capitalism but to overhaul it. Give it a social-justice tune-up, make it more efficient, get the economic engine to hit on all cylinders for everybody, and stop putting out so many environmentally hazardous substances. To some people, this goal means selling out leftist ideals for the sake of capitalism. But the right thrives on having an ineffective opposition. The Revolutionary Communist Party helps stabilize the "free market" capitalist system by making it seem as if the only alternative to free-market capitalism is a return to Stalinism. Prospective activists for change are instead channeled into pointless discussions about the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Instead of working to persuade people to accept progressive ideas, the far left talks to itself (which may be a blessing, given the way it communicates) and tries to sell copies of the Socialist Worker to an uninterested public.

MONTHLY REVIEW, Feb 2002, 53, issue 1, 14. The future is open because for all its coherence, capitalism is itself not a closed system. It allows for private and public spaces that can nurture resistance (and are the results of prior resistance). It includes its own ideological and material contradictions that can be, and have been, used to create further openings. Struggles, as heightened moments with openings to new experiences and awareness, are themselves ways of standing outside of the system, even if only partially and temporarily, to create a measure of liberated space.

C. THE TRANSITION AWAY FROM CAPITALISM WILL LEAD TO DISASTEROUS CONSEQUENCES.

1. SOCIALIST EXPERIMENTS WILL KILL MILLIONS AND LEAVE THEM IN POVERTY.

David Ramsay Steele (Author, Economist), *FROM MARX TO MISES: POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND THE CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC CALCULATION*, 1992, 374-375. All arguments against capitalism fail unless there is some feasible alternative which can do better. It seemed obvious and indisputable to the early Marxists that communism or some form of NFM socialism would do better than the market. This conviction based on a misinterpretation of trends within capitalism and on misconception of the role played by the market. The crucial misinterpretation was the centralization theory: capitalism could not because the number of firms must become ever smaller, the ultimate limit being one big firm. The crucial misconception was the opposition to 'anarchy 'of production', seen as being wholly bad and manifestly inferior to 'conscious' planning. Lying behind the hostility to anarchy of production was an almost total unawareness of the economic calculation problem, and lying behind this, perhaps, was a deeper misunderstanding: the theory that anything humans create they can and should completely understand and control (Bartley 1990). Although it may be premature to say that no one will ever find a replacement for the market, it is hardly premature to say that any such replacement, like the market, will have to be characterized by anarchy of production, as some antimarket socialists implicitly recognize (O'Neill 1989; Albert and Hahne 1991). According to Popper, the chief difference between Einstein and an amoeba is that the amoeba perishes along with its refuted theory, while Einstein can kill his theories and replace them with new ones. Tragically, Marxism fostered a partial regression to amoebic epistemology. By elevating into a principle the notion that it was 'unscientific' to discuss the way in which socialism would work, Marxism ensured that millions would perish before we could all agree that Marxian socialism was an impossibility. Many people now draw the conclusion that the problem with Marxism is its 'utopianism', and that utopias are dangerous. But if Marxism had been more unabashedly utopian, it would not have had the same motive to evade discussion of the mechanics of its proposed future society. The attempt to abstain from utopianism merely leads to unexamined utopias. Critical utopianism could emerge as a legitimate branch of social science. In the freely creative and vigorously self-critical spirit of brainstorming, this discipline could scrutinize and evaluate proposed utopias, from both radical social theorists and speculative fiction, and could construct new utopias. Utopian proposals can be quite detailed, not because anyone seriously supposes that the details specified will ever come to pass, but as illustrations of possibilities or perhaps, after examination, as demonstrations of impossibilities. This branch of enquiry would not immediately arrive at unanimous agreement on which utopias were out of the question, but there may be rapid convergence on some limited conclusions, along with an identification of those areas still open to investigation and debate. There is no escape from utopianism, other than mute abstentionism. But we can criticize our utopias, discard those convicted of unfeasibility, and replace them with better utopias. Wishful thinking is no vice, but openness to argument is a wonderful virtue.

J. Kothari (Professor of political science at University of Delhi), *TOWARDS A JUST SOCIAL ORDER*, 1982 571. Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression -- producing in their wake an intensification of the old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for eventual global holocaust.

2. CAPITALISM WILL MERELY RECONSTITUTE ITSELF AFTER THE TRANSITION WARS.

John Vidal (Staff Writer), THE GUARDIAN, Nov 5, 2005. Accessed Online, risc.org.uk. His argument is pragmatic and goes briefly like this: it is impossible to deny the need for profound change in the face of today's ecological crises; the pace of change is not sufficient, and conventional environmentalism has failed to win over hearts and minds; change has to be desirable and will not come by threatening people with ecological doom; therefore, we must embrace capitalism as the only overarching system capable of both reconciling ecological sustainability, and reforming it. More to the point, he says, "we don't have time to wait for any big-picture ideological successor". It has taken 30 years of heart-searching to distill that, but Porritt insists that he is not complacent. "I don't have great faith in capitalism, but it is formidably flexible," he says. "It is potent, able to recreate itself in many forms. I also feel that there are enough capitalists who feel passionately that they don't want to see their system disappear. But this is a last-chance-saloon job. If you leave through the wrong door your passion for capitalism is finished." Tooth and claw He also knows that capitalism in 30 years has created most of the problems it is now charged with solving, and that what is emerging in China may be something even redder in tooth and claw than what has been seen before. "My one concern is that India and China are already so indoctrinated," he says. "The majority may have been suborned by exposure to western-driven media messages." It also worries him that it is the very few leading the very many. "There is an elite of unreconstructed, vicious capitalists for whom the process of accumulation is so powerful ... a tiny group controls so much leverage, and people are in thrall to this minuscule group."

Andrew Flood (Author), CIVILISATION, PRIMITIVISM, AND ANARCHISM, April 9, 2005. Accessed online from libcom.org/library/civilisation-primitivism-anarchism-andrew-flood. The primitivists seem to forget that we live in a class society. The population of the earth is divided into a few people with vast resources and power and the rest of us. It is not a case of equal access to resources, rather of quite incredible unequal access. Those who fell victim to the mass die off would not include Rupert Murdoch, Bill Gates or George Bush because these people have the money and power to monopolise remaining supplies for themselves. Instead the first to die in huge number would be the population of the poorer mega cities on the planet. Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt have a population of around 20 million between them. Egypt is dependent both on food imports and on the very intensive agriculture of the Nile valley and the oasis. Except for the tiny wealthy elite those 20 million urban dwellers would have nowhere to go and there is no more land to be worked. Current high yields are in part dependent on high inputs of cheap energy. The mass deaths of millions of people is not something that destroys capitalism. Indeed at periods of history it has been seen as quite natural and even desirable for the modernization of capital. The potato famine of the 1840's that reduced the population of Ireland by 30% was seen as desirable by many advocates of free trade.(16) So was the 1943/4 famine in British ruled Bengal in which four million died(17). For the capitalist class such mass deaths, particularly in colonies, afford opportunities to restructure the economy in ways that would otherwise be resisted. The real result of an 'end of energy' crisis would see our rulers stock piling what energy sources remained and using them to power the helicopter gunships that would be used to control those of us fortunate enough to be selected to toil for them in the biofuel fields. The unlucky majority would just be kept where they are and allowed to die off. More of the 'Matrix' than utopia in other words. The other point to be made here is that destruction can serve to regenerate capitalism. Like it or not large scale destruction allows some capitalist to make a lot of money. Think of the Iraq war. The destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure may be a disaster for the people of Iraq but it's a profit making bonanza for Halliburton and co[18].

3. TRANSITION WARS LEAVE THE SYSTEM INTACT AND LEAD TO MASSIVE DEATH

AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, Dec 10, 2002. Accessed Online. Lexis. IN the late 19th Century, the chief author of the Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx, argued that the contradictions of capitalism would one day destroy the capitalist system. His predictions were followed by two world wars in the first half of the 20th Century. The 1914-1918 First World War was followed by a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Russia in 1917 and the 1939-1945 Second World War was followed by a Maoist Revolution in China in 1949. The Great Depression in the West in the 1930s seemed to indicate that Karl Marx had been right. But there is something paradoxical about an economic system which is based on the law of the jungle, euphemistically referred to as "the market forces of supply and demand". It goes through periodical crises, in which it leaves behind a lot of casualties, but the basic pillars of the system always remain intact.



Brian Martin (Professor of Sociology), UPROOTING WAR, '90, accessed online. Some revolutionary groups, such as some Marxist parties in Western countries, consider that abolition of war is something that will happen after 'the revolution.' But even the victory of revolutionary parties in countries throughout the world would be no guarantee of a world without war. Every variety of state socialism so far, including the Soviet, Chinese, Cuban and Vietnamese models, has resulted in an increased role for the military. Military confrontations, occupations and wars between socialist states are quite common, including Soviet Union-Hungary, Soviet Union-China, Soviet Union-Czechoslovakia and China-Vietnam. The proponents of socialist revolution led by vanguard parties have no programme for abolishing war. Far from achieving this end, their revolutionary success would more likely mean an even greater militarisation of society. Marx and particularly Engels took a keen interest in military matters, but they did not seriously address the problem of eliminating war. Marxist theorists since then have continued to avoid this topic. Marxists focus on class relations in capitalist societies as the source of the world's major problems. But class dynamics are not the primary driving force behind many social problems, including sexism, racism and environmental degradation. Those following a strict class analysis are hard pressed to say something useful about such problems, much less formulate a strategy for eliminating them. For example, by focussing on the role of the economic mode of production, there is a downgrading of the role of the state as a structure in its own right rather than as just a tool of the capitalist class or a site for class struggle. This downgrading is related to the failure of basic assumptions in the Marxist perspective for socialist revolution, such as the assumptions of the international character of the capitalist working class and of the withering away of the state after socialist revolution. Rather than exhibiting transnational solidarity, working class groups in particular countries have more often supported the policies of their own state, especially military policy. Rather than socialist revolution and the abolition of capitalist ownership being followed by the withering away of the state, the power of the state and especially of the military has become even greater.

#### D. CAPITALISM IS CRITICAL TO SOLVE POVERTY WHICH WILL LEAD TO MASSIVE NUCLEAR WARS

Bill Emmott (Editor-in-Chief of *The Economist*) *VISION*, 2003, 20:21, 265-266. Poverty and despair act as a more powerful recruiting sergeant for terrorists than do mere alienation or beliefs in anarchism. Other people worry about inequality because of a fear of war: the fear that countries which feel that they are unable to advance their living standards and sense of power by conventional economic means may be tempted to use military methods as a shortcut. As a general proposition, this argument is unconvincing, for a poorer country is also often militarily weak, though that still made the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact countries a formidable enemy to NATO during the cold war. By and large, however, the rich will always be able to defeat poor countries in anything other than a guerrilla war—and such fighting methods may be common in civil wars or in wars of liberation, but they do not put other countries themselves in physical danger, except from terrorism. But in some circumstances this argument may hold good. North Korea, for example, has long used the threat of military attack either on its southern compatriot, or on Japan or the United States, as a means by which to blackmail the rich. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 in order to grab its oil as well as merely to make a territorial point. Inequality, in other words, may lead to an increase in the number of unpredictable dictators—slightly euphemistically known as rogue states (even more euphemistically known, by America's State Department, as "states of concern"). These rogues have become more dangerous as technology has advanced sufficiently to make long-range missiles cheap enough to buy and develop, and to use as a threat. They could become extremely deadly if any obtain the means to develop and deploy nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The findings of history are quite simple, even if it is not becoming any easier to implement them. To believe them, however, one must first believe in capitalism and in the fact that it has been the only successful generator of sustained improvements in human welfare that has so far been discovered.

Bill Emmott (Editor-in-Chief of *The Economist*) *VISION*, 2003, 20:21, 265-266. That is what an international study, *Economic Freedom of the World*, has sought to do every year since it was first published, in 1996, by eleven economic think tanks around the world led by the Fraser Institute in Canada. The correlations it finds between sustained economic success and aspects of capitalist circumstances suggest that most of the explanations lie in how poor countries are governed, rather than in natural disadvantages or unfairness by the rich. Those suspicious of free-marketeers should note that conclusion: it is government, or the lack of it, that makes the crucial difference. The aim of the study was to see whether countries in which people had more economic freedom were also richer and grew more rapidly. But the study also sought to define economic freedom, in the hope of capturing and measuring the things that matter in making capitalism work. Broadly, economic freedom means the ability to do what you want with whatever property you have legally acquired, as long as your actions do not violate other people's rights to do the same. Goods and services do not, alas, fall like manna from heaven; their arrival depends on property rights and the incentives to use and create them. So the issues surrounding those are what matter: Are property rights legally protected? Are people hemmed in by government regulations and trade barriers, or fearful of confiscation? Are their savings under attack from inflation, or can they do what they want with their money? Is it economically viable for parents to send their kids to school? The study's authors initially found seventeen measures of these things, expanded in the 2001 update to twenty-one, and rated 102 (now 123) countries on each of them, going back, if possible, to 1975. They then had to find ways to weight the measures according to their importance, and used a panel of economists to do so. The conclusion was abundantly clear: the freer the economy, the higher the growth and the richer the people. This was especially so for countries that maintained a fairly free economy for many years, since before individuals and companies will respond to such freedom they need to feel confident that it will last.

#### E. CAPITALISM PROMOTES INTERDEPENDENCE WHICH SOLVES WAR

Erik Gartzke (Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University), *INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW*, 2005, 57. The intellectual liberal tradition of economic peace beginning with Montesquieu, Mill, Adam Smith and others, and progressing through Richard Cobden, Norman Angell and Richard Rosecrance suggests a variety of ways in which capitalism can encourage peace. Perhaps the most general explanation is that economic interdependence creates something of mutual value to countries, which then leaves states loath to fight for fear of destroying economic benefits that they prize. While this is not implausible, the explanation depends on the supposition that items of mutual value do not themselves spark or facilitate conflict. Thomas Schelling tells a story of two mountain climbers tied together by a rope that in effect creates one common destiny. Schelling shows how something of mutual value can be used strategically to manipulate a counterpart; states that share economic linkages can in fact use the economic linkages to play a game of chicken: the more valuable the linkages, the more effective and telling is the game. If a state is reluctant to endanger the benefits of prosperous economic ties, it does not follow that peace will ensue. Other countries must be tempted to view a reluctance to fight as a vulnerability. To ensure peace, all possible participants must be unwilling to play the game of chicken or, indeed, to use military force. Students of international relations traditionally looked to motive and opportunity (capability) to explain war. However, as murder-mystery novels and the game of Clue make clear, these conditions are seldom sufficient. Individuals, groups, and countries often disagree, but usually entities with different interests find that they can negotiate bargains that avoid more costly or flamboyant behavior.

Erik Gartzke (Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University), *INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW*, 2005, 57. Economic freedom is important to peace for at least two reasons. First, free markets act as a sounding board for political activity. Actions that frighten markets discourage investment, drive down economic conditions domestically, and thus are likely to be avoided by local leaders. The use of force abroad is often associated with a decline in domestic investment and with outflows of capital. To the degree that leaders are willing to make foreign policy statements that scare capital markets, and to the extent that free monetary policies are in place that make it difficult for the government to interfere with capital flows, the international community may be able to infer a leader's true resolve. Knowing what an opponent is willing to do makes it possible to bargain more effectively, so that resorting to violence to obtain what one side needs is less often necessary. Autonomous global markets create a venue through which leaders can establish credibility without needing to escalate to military force.

J.R. Nyquist (Author and Commentator), FINANCIAL SENSE, September 2006. Accessed Online from [financialsense.com](http://financialsense.com). The truth, however, is that the socialist countries (i.e., the old Soviet bloc) have damaged the environment far more seriously than capitalism; and it is socialism and not capitalism that threatens to trigger another world war. As Mises explained, "Let those who wish to eliminate ... enterprise understand quite clearly that they are proposing to undermine the foundations of our well-being. That in 1914 the earth nourished far more human beings than ever before, and that they all lived far better than their ancestors, was due entirely to the acquisitive instinct. If the diligence of modern industry were replaced by the contemplative life of the past, unnumbered millions would be doomed to death by starvation." The free market teaches men to love peace, while the miserable circumstances of socialist decline teach men the necessity of predatory warfare. According to Mises, the market's love of peace "does not spring from philanthropic considerations" but depends on a proper appreciation of economic self-interest. Those who believe in profit and the free market reject war because war signifies the destruction of property. Wars are not initiated by corporate greed. Wars are initiated by backward cults who seek a return to medieval conditions. World revolution is the cry of the militant socialists, the Marxist-Leninists of the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and the KGB clique that presently governs the "former" Soviet Union. To understand world events properly we must understand the distinction between socialist and free market economies. Dictatorship and war belong to the sphere of socialism and economic controls (or restrictions). Freedom means the freedom to buy and sell, to build and create. Once you allow a mob of political activists to legislate against the free market – in accordance with moral or environmental pleas – your economic decline is foreordained.

**F. THE ARGUMENT THAT CAPITALISM IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF WAR IS FALSE.**

Jonathan Nitzan and Shishon Bichler (Professor), GLOBAL RESEARCH, Nov 16, 2006. Accessed Online. The new conflicts of the twenty-first century – the "infinite wars," the "clashes of civilization," the "new crusades" – are fundamentally different from the "mass wars" and statist military conflicts that characterized capitalism from the nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War. The main difference lies not so much in the military nature of the conflicts, as in the broader role that war plays in capitalism. To begin with, in a world open for business there is no need to physically conquer new territory – not for raw materials and not for additional markets (note that Iraqi oil production has nearly ceased since its conquest in 2003, while its market for foreign imports, negligible to begin with, has contracted). The same goes for military spending: with the share of foreign profits soaring, there is no longer a business imperative for high military expenditures. While U.S. military budgets have risen marginally in the wake of the new wars – from 3.9 percent of GDP at the end of Clinton's presidency to 4.7 percent presently – this is an increase whose effect on aggregate demand is insignificant by historical standards. The U.S. attacks of the 2000s also make little military sense. Countries with proven nuclear capabilities, such as Pakistan and North Korea, have been left alone, while others that presented no real danger – specifically Afghanistan and Iraq – were invaded, occupied and now tie down much of the U.S. standing army, with no end in sight. Finally, the televised war footing and constant talk about terrorism may have frightened the Western population. But unlike the success of nationalist-liberal ideologies during the two world wars and the Cold War that followed, the new rhetoric of infinite war hasn't made the masses fall for neoliberal capitalism. The wars of the 2000s are indeed new. And they are new, at least in part, because capitalism itself has changed.

**G. THE ARGUMENT THAT CAPITALISM IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF POVERTY IS FALSE.**

Richard Aberdeen (Author), *THE WAY: A THEORY OF ROOT CAUSE AND SOLUTION*, 2003 Accessed Online from [freedomtracks.com](http://freedomtracks.com). The Marx/Engles view of history being a "class" struggle <sup>1</sup> does not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see Gallo Brothers for more details). So-called "classes" of people, unions, corporations and political groups are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their own individual needs, greed and desires and thus, an apparent "class struggle" in reality, is an extension of individual motivation. Likewise, nations engage in wars of aggression, not because capitalism or classes of society are at root cause, but because individual members of a society are individually convinced that it is in their own economic survival best interest. War, poverty, starvation and lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before the rise of modern capitalism, free enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this. Junior Bush and the neo-conservative genocidal maniacs of modern-day America could not have recently effectively gone to war against Iraq without the individual support of individual troops and a certain percentage of individual citizens within the U.S. population, each lending support for their own personal motives, whatever they individually may have been. While it is true that corrupt leaders often provoke war, using all manner of religious, social and political means to justify, often as not, entirely ludicrous ends, very rare indeed is a battle only engaged in by these same unscrupulous miscreants of power. And though a few iniquitous elitist powerbrokers may initiate nefarious policies of global genocidal oppression, it takes a very great many individuals operating from individual personal motivations of survival, desire and greed to develop these policies into a multi-national exploitive reality. No economic or political organization and no political or social cause exists unto itself but rather, individual members power a collective agenda.

**H. THE ARGUMENT THAT CAPITALISM IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF ALL OPPRESSION IS FALSE AND BLINDS US TO HOW POWER ACTUALLY OPERATES**

Chris Dixon, (Author) 2005 "Reflection of Privilege Reformism, and Activism Accessed online at [http://www.geocities.com/kk\\_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html](http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html)) Unfortunately, beyond this important point, he seems otherwise wholly unconcerned with the consequences and dynamics of racism specifically, and of many other systems of power more generally. And this isn't a minor oversight on his part; it's embedded in his assumptions. "The movement of the exploited and excluded," he writes passionately, "which is antagonistic to capitalism and the state...is a movement that grows out of our present social conditions and our desires for a different world." A noble sentiment for sure, but exactly who does "our" refer to? And what are "our" present social conditions? If he refers to us, as in all people, then our social conditions are widely divergent as we navigate through a complex matrix of systems that award or oppress us, in finely-tuned degrees, based on our genders, colors, cultures, classes, citizenship statuses, first languages, ages, sexualities, and much more. Certainly we have commonalities in our social conditions, yet also very distinct particularities. Any accurate radical analysis requires a focus on both. But I don't think sasha, along with the approach that he represents, cares to notice particularities. The presumption is a social reality in which we are all evenly oppressed, largely undifferentiated, "enmeshed," as he says, in "capitalist social relations." This generalization is actually easy to make, assuming one is privileged and insulated enough to ignore the specifics of oppressive systems, especially those that don't fall under the rubric of "capitalism and the state."

**I. CAPITALISM IS CRITICAL TO THE ENVIRONMENT**

James Q. Wilson (Professor of Government at Harvard University), CIS, Oct 1997. Accessed Online from [cis.org.au](http://cis.org.au). But by maintaining a private sphere you also provide a protected place for people to stand who wish to make controversial proposals. You create a world in which the critics of capitalism - those who wish to see capitalism restrained in order to protect the environment - have an opportunity to move. No such world existed for them in the Soviet Union, and no such world exists for them today in the People's Republic of China. The absence of a private sphere means the absence of an environmental ethic.(ii) Secondly, capitalism produces prosperity, and prosperity changes the minds of people, especially young people. It endows them what we in the social science business call in our professional journals, post-materialist or post-industrial goals. That is a fancy way of saying that when society becomes rich enough for everybody to be fed and where no-one has to struggle day and night to put food on their table, we begin to think of other things we can use resources for. Those other things include taking care of animals, protecting the environment, preserving land and the like. The prosperity induced by capitalism produces of necessity an environmental movement.

James Q. Wilson (Professor of Government at Harvard University), CIS, Oct 1997. Accessed Online from [cis.org.au](http://cis.org.au). The final thing capitalism brings to this task is that it creates firms that can be regulated. You may think that this is a trivial statement. You all know that business firms are regulated -sometimes to the advantage of the firm, sometimes to its disadvantage. But I don't think you realize the importance of this fact. Consider the alternative. Suppose the government ran everything, What would be regulated? The main reason why Eastern Europe was a vast toxic waste dump, and why many parts of China are becoming a vast toxic waste dump, is because the government owns the enterprises and one government agency does not - cannot - regulate another government agency. This is because neither the regulator nor the regulatee has any personal motives to accept regulation. But they can regulate firms, and so when firms are producing wealth and people decide that the distribution of wealth ought to be made to accord to an environmental ethic, capitalism makes that possible. It is also the case that capitalism makes it easier to deal with environmental problems. Environmental problems exist. Air is free; we consume air without charge, we emit pollutants back into the air, often without charge. And if something is free people will consume more of it than they really need, or at least much more than they would if they had to pay for it. Since we have found no way to endow clean air with property rights, we do not know how to limit this except by the use of an external authority that will put some restrictions on it. To compel people who are engaged in production and exchange to internalize all of their costs without destroying production and exchange, one must be able to make proposals to people who do not want to hear them, induce action among people who do not want to act, and monitor performance by people who do not like monitors - and do all of this only to the extent that the gains in human welfare are purchased at an acceptable cost. No regime will make this result certain, but only democratic capitalist regimes make it at all possible. Why? It is not that capitalists believe in the environment or have a wish to improve the world. It is because they are part of a system in which the world must be improved if they are to survive. Capitalism brings three advantages to the environmental task:(i) It creates and maintains a private sphere of action. A private sphere of action makes capitalism possible because you can operate free of government control.

Hebert Walberg and Joseph Bast (distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and C.E.O. of the Heartland Institute) EDUCATION AND CAPITALISM, 2003, x. Today most of us are environmentalists, so the environmental effects of capitalism concern us greatly. If we believe capitalism allows greedy business owners to pollute the air and rivers without concern for the future or the health of others, we are unlikely to entrust capitalism with the education of future generations. One way to judge the impact of capitalism on the environment is to compare the environmental records of capitalist countries with those of countries with precapitalist, socialist, or communist economies.<sup>35</sup> The record clearly shows environmental conditions are improving in every capitalist country in the world and deteriorating only in noncapitalist countries.<sup>36</sup> Environmental conditions in the former Soviet Union prior to that communist nation's collapse, for example, were devastating and getting worse.<sup>37</sup> Untreated sewage was routinely dumped in the country's rivers, workers were exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals in their workplaces, and air quality was so poor in many major cities that children suffered asthma and other breathing disorders at epidemic levels. Some environmentalists say it is unfair to compare environmental progress in a very affluent nation, such as the United States, to conditions in very poor nations, such as those in Africa. But it was the latter's rejection of capitalism that made those countries poor in the first place. Moreover, comparing the United States to developed countries with mixed or socialist economies also reveals a considerable gap on a wide range of environmental indicators. Comparing urban air quality and water quality in the largest rivers in the United States, France, Germany, and England, for example, reveals better conditions in the United States.<sup>38</sup> Emerging capitalist countries experience rising levels of pollution attributable to rapid industrialization, but history reveals this to be a transitional period followed by declining emissions and rising environmental quality.<sup>39</sup> There is no evidence, prior to its economic collapse, that conditions in the former Soviet Union were improving or ever would improve. There is no evidence today that many of the nations of Africa are creating the institutions necessary to stop the destruction of their natural resources or lower the alarming mortality and morbidity rates of their people.

J. CAPITALISM IS KEY TO GLOBAL PEACE

Francis Fukuyama (Senior Social Scientist, Rand Corporation ) TRUST, 1995. 360-1. The role that a capitalist economy plays in channeling recognition struggles in a peaceful direction, and its consequent importance to democratic stability, is evident in post-communist Eastern Europe. The totalitarian project envisioned the destruction of an independent civil society and the creation of a new socialist community centered exclusively around the state. When the latter, highly artificial community, there were virtually no alternative forms of community beyond those of family and ethnic group, or else in the delinquent communities constituted by criminal gangs. In the absence of a layer of voluntary associations, individuals clung to their ascriptive identities all the more fiercely. Ethnicity provided an easy form of community by which they could avoid feeling atomized, weak, and victimized by the larger historical forces swirling around them. In developed capitalist societies with strong civil societies, by contrast, the economy itself is the locus of a substantial part of social life. When one works for Motorola, Siemens, Toyota, or even a small family dry-cleaning business, one is part of a moral network that absorbs a large part of one's energies and ambitions. The Eastern European countries that appear to have the greatest chances for success as democracies are Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, which retained nascent civil societies throughout the communist period and were able to generate capitalist private sectors in relatively short order. There is no lack of divisive ethnic conflicts in these places, whether over competing Polish and Lithuanian claims to Vilnius or Hungarian irredenta vis-à-vis neighbors. But they have not flared up into violent conflicts yet because the economy has been sufficiently vigorous to provide an alternative source of social identity and belonging.

James Q. Wilson (Professor of Government at Harvard University), CIS, Oct 1997. Accessed Online from cis.org.au. In traditional and in statist societies, the way to attain wealth is first to attain power, usually by force. But in market societies, 'production becomes a better path to wealth than domination.' Critics of capitalism argue that wealth confers power, and indeed it does, up to a point. Show people the road to wealth, status, or power, and they will rush down that road, and many will do some rather unattractive things along the way. But this is not a decisive criticism unless one supposes, fancifully, that there is some way to arrange human affairs so that the desire for advantage vanishes. The real choice is between becoming wealthy by first acquiring political or military power, or getting money directly without bothering with conquest or domination. If it is in man's nature to seek domination over other men, there are really only two ways to make that domination work. One is military power, and that is the principle upon which domination existed from the beginning of man's time on this earth to down about two hundred years ago, when it began to be set aside by another principle, namely the accumulation of wealth. Now you may feel that men should not try to dominate other men - although I do not see how you could believe this in Australia given the importance attached to sports. You may like to replace man's desire to dominate other men, and in a few cases it is prevented by religious conversion or a decent temperament. But as long as the instinct persists, you only have two choices, and if you choose to compete economically you will reduce the extent to which one group of men will tyrannise over another by the use of military might or political power.

K. CAPITALISM IS GOOD; IT UNITES WORKERS AND DECREASES RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Ganeshwar Chand, THE REVIEW OF THE BLACK POLITICAL ECONOMY, Fall 1994. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. In this respect, Cox's fundamental argument is that with the advancement of capitalism, workers of various races will see common cause in uniting against capital. This will tend to eliminate discrimination against workers of certain races. Industrialization creates the need for an exploitable labor force, but it is in this very need that the power of the proletariat finally resides. The factory organization not only provides the basis for the worker organization but also facilitates the development of a consciousness of class power and indispensability. Social equality . . . has been an explicit objective of the whole proletariat, regardless of color or country, almost from the dawn of industrial capitalism. Therefore, as the stronger white proletariat advanced toward this end in the North, Negroes have advanced also. In the South the white proletariat is weak and Negroes . . . weaker still. To the extent that democracy is achieved, to that extent also the power of the ruling class to exploit through race prejudice is limited.(35)

L. CAPITALISM SERVES AS A RALLYING POINT FOR WORKERS TO RESIST RACISM AND ECONOMIC DOMINATION

Ganeshwar Chand, *THE REVIEW OF THE BLACK POLITICAL ECONOMY*, Fall 1994. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. The argument is that where there is greater democracy, the incidence and intensity of racial exploitation is lower. Cox argues that this explained the relatively lower prejudice and discrimination against the Negroes in the Northern United States vis-a-vis those in the South at the time he was writing. In the highly industrialized North, the proletariat is further advanced than it is in the South. In fact, we may think of advanced capitalism as a state in which the proletariat has attained some considerable degree of power. In other words, the further the progress of capitalism, the greater the relative power of the proletariat.

M. CAPITALISM IS GOOD; IT IS KEY TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Dr. Ronald Nash, *THE SCHWARZ REPORT*, March 1999, v39, n3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 16, 06. <http://www.schwarzreport.org/SchwarzReport/1999/march99.html>. Capitalism is not economic anarchy. When properly defined, it recognizes several necessary conditions for the kinds of voluntary relationships it supports. One of these is the existence of inherent human rights, such as the right to make decisions, the right to be free, the right to hold property, and the right to exchange peacefully what one owns for something else.

N. CAPITALISM IS AN ETHICAL SYSTEM; IT PROTECTS PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH A SERIES OF SOCIALLY IMPOSED MORAL CONSTRAINTS SUCH AS THE LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM

Dr. Ronald Nash, *THE SCHWARZ REPORT*, March 1999, v39, n3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 16, 06. <http://www.schwarzreport.org/SchwarzReport/1999/march99.html>. Capitalism also presupposes a system of morality. Under capitalism, there are definite limits, moral and otherwise, to the ways in which people can exchange. Capitalism should be viewed as a system of voluntary relationships within a framework of laws that protect people's rights against force, fraud, theft, and violations of contracts. "Thou shalt not steal" and "Thou shalt not lie" are part of the underlying moral constraints of the system. After all, economic exchanges can hardly be voluntary if one participant is coerced, deceived, defrauded, or robbed.

O. CAPITALISM IS NOT THE CAUSE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS; RACISM, SEXISM, AND POVERTY EXIST IN SOCIALIST & INTERVENTIONIST SYSTEMS TOO

Dr. Ronald Nash, *THE SCHWARZ REPORT*, March 1999, v39, n3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 16, 06. <http://www.schwarzreport.org/SchwarzReport/1999/march99.html>. Economic interventionism and socialism are the real sources of monopolies. This is illustrated, for example, in the success of the American robber barons of the nineteenth century. Without government aid such as subsidies, the robber barons would never have succeeded. Liberals blame capitalism for every evil in contemporary society, including its greed, materialism, selfishness, the prevalence of fraudulent behavior, the debasement of society's tastes, the pollution of the environment, the alienation and despair within society, and vast disparities of wealth. Even racism and sexism are treated as effects of capitalism. Many of the objections to a market system result from a simple but fallacious two-step operation. First, some undesirable feature is noted in a society that is allegedly capitalistic; then it is simply asserted that capitalism is the cause of this problem. Logic texts call this the Fallacy of False Cause. Mere coincidence does not prove causal connection. Moreover, this belief ignores the fact that these same features exist in interventionist and socialist societies.

P. CAPITALISM IS A SYSTEM BASED ON VOLUNTARY FREE EXCHANGE; IT ALLOWS FOR NONVIOLENT CONFLICT RESOLUTION BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES WIN

Dr. Ronald Nash, *THE SCHWARZ REPORT*, March 1999, v39, n3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 16, 06. <http://www.schwarzreport.org/SchwarzReport/1999/march99.html>. Liberal critics of capitalism often attack it for encouraging greed. The truth, however, is that the mechanism of the market actually *neutralizes* greed as it forces people to find ways of serving the needs of those with whom they wish to exchange. As long as our rights are protected (a basic precondition of market exchanges), the greed of others cannot harm us. As long as greedy people are prohibited from introducing force, fraud, and theft into the exchange process and as long as these persons cannot secure special privileges from the state under interventionist or socialist arrangements, their greed must be channeled into the discovery of products or services for which people are willing to trade. Every person in a market economy has to be other-directed. The market is one area of life where concern for the other person is required. The market, therefore, does not pander to greed. Rather, it is a mechanism that allows natural human desires to be satisfied in nonviolent ways.

Q. CAPITALIST EXCHANGE DOES NOT ALWAYS CREATE A “LOSER”, IT IS NOT A “ZERO-SUM” GAME AND THUS DOES NOT LEAD TO OPPRESSION

Dr. Ronald Nash, THE SCHWARZ REPORT, March 1999, v39, n3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 16, 06. <http://www.schwarzreport.org/SchwarzReport/1999/march99.html>. Capitalism is also attacked on the ground that it leads to situations in which some people (the “exploiters”) win at the expense of other people (the “losers”). A fancier way to put this is to say that market exchanges are examples of what is called a *zero-sum game*, namely, an exchange where only one participant can win. If one person (or group) wins, then the other must lose. Baseball and basketball are two examples of zero-sum games. If A wins, then B must lose. The error here consists in thinking that market exchanges are a zero-sum game. On the contrary, market exchanges illustrate what is called a *positive-sum* game, that is, one in which both players may win. We must reject the myth that economic exchanges necessarily benefit only one party at the expense of the other. In voluntary economic exchanges, both parties may leave the exchange in better economic shape than would otherwise have been the case. To repeat the message of the peaceful means of exchange, “If you do something good for me, then I will do something good for you.” If both parties did not believe they gained through the trade, if each did not see the exchange as beneficial, they would not continue to take part in it.

R. CAPITALISM IS A MORALLY AND ETHICALLY JUSTIFIED SYSTEM THAT ENCOURAGES NON-VIOLENCE

Dr. Ronald Nash, THE SCHWARZ REPORT, March 1999, v39, n3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 16, 06. <http://www.schwarzreport.org/SchwarzReport/1999/march99.html>. Most religious critics of capitalism focus their attacks on what they take to be its moral shortcomings. In truth, the moral objections to capitalism turn out to be a sorry collection of claims that reflect, more than anything else, serious confusions about the real nature of a market system. When capitalism is put to the moral test, it beats its competition easily. Among all of our economic options, Arthur Shenfield writes, only capitalism operates on the basis of respect for free, independent, responsible persons. All other systems in varying degrees treat men as less than this. Socialist systems above all treat men as pawns to be moved about by the authorities, or as children to be given what the rulers decide is good for them, or as serfs or slaves. The rulers begin by boasting about their compassion, which in any case is fraudulent, but after a time they drop this pretense which they find unnecessary for the maintenance of power. In all things they act on the presumption that they know best. Therefore they and their systems are morally stunted. Only the free system, the much assailed capitalism, is morally mature. The alternative to free exchange is coercion and violence. Capitalism is a mechanism that allows natural human desires to be satisfied in a nonviolent way.

S. CAPITALISM IS A MORE ETHICAL SYSTEM THAN SOCIALIST MODELS

Dr. Ronald Nash, THE SCHWARZ REPORT, March 1999, v39, n3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 16, 06. <http://www.schwarzreport.org/SchwarzReport/1999/march99.html>. Once people realize that few things in life are free, that most things carry a price tag, and that therefore we have to work for most of the things we want, we are in a position to learn a vital truth about life. Capitalism helps teach this truth. But under socialism, Arthur Sheffield warns, “Everything still has a cost, but everyone is tempted, even urged to behave as if there is no cost or as if the cost will be borne by somebody else. This is one of the most corrosive effects of collectivism upon the moral character of people.” And so, we see, capitalism is not merely the more effective economic system; it is also morally superior. When capitalism, the system of free economic exchange, is described fairly, it comes closer to matching the demands of the biblical ethic than does either socialism or interventionism.



## **THE CRITIQUE OF THE FREE MARKET OFFERS NO REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

### **1. MARKETS ARE CONSTRUCTED BY HUMANS.**

Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, (Co-Founders, The Breakthrough Institute), *BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY*, 07, 234-235. The endless debates between environmentalists and market fundamentalists ultimately pit one theological construct, nature, against another, the market. For either camp to expect that reason or science or economics will prevail in such a debate is folly. Just as humans, from indigenous tribes in the Amazon to Americans in Yosemite, are always constructing natures, whether for development or conservation or something else, humans are always constructing markets, whether for positive ends, like ecological restoration, or negative ends, like slave trading. Once we abandon the belief that there exists a nature or a market separate from humans, we can start to think about creating natures and markets to serve the kind of world we want and the kind of species we want to become.

### **2. MARKETS SHOULD NOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS ALL GOOD OR ALL BAD.**

Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, (Co-Founders, The Breakthrough Institute), *BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY*, 07, 233. We speak of the market in the singular, but markets, like nature, have no spirit, essence, or invisible hand. They are little more than (to borrow from the textbook definition) mechanisms for efficiently distributing scarce resources. Markets have no universal end goal, nor do they operate according to a universal set of values. Some markets are good, which is to say that they serve our values, and others are bad, which is to say that they don't.

### **3. MARKETS WOULD NOT FUNCTION WITHOUT GOVERNMENT.**

Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, (Co-Founders, The Breakthrough Institute), *BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY*, 07, 234. Market fundamentalists claim that human governance is always an impediment to markets, but in fact human governance is what makes markets possible. Government provides the courts, regulates commerce, and sets the rules for society. The ban on murder can be seen as an impediment of the free market. By prohibiting the murder of one's competitors, one is restricting commerce. While it's true that market fundamentalists don't argue against prohibitions on murder (at least to our knowledge), neither do they fully acknowledge the ways in which all human laws — our codified values — create the conditions for that particular domain of human behavior known as the marketplace. All markets are constructed and shaped by humans through laws and regulations as well as through values. The idea that one should or can hold a political position on markets in general is absurd, and yet left and right, environmentalists and market fundamentalists alike, continue to argue in the abstract about whether they are pro-business and pro-market.

### **4. THE MARKETPLACE IS PLURALISTIC.**

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 133. Capitalism is the most pluralistic order history has ever known, restlessly transgressing boundaries and dismantling oppositions, pitching together diverse life-forms and continually overflowing the measure.

### **5. THE MARKET IS INHERENTLY ANTI-ELITIST.**

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 97-98. They might also fail to notice that the most formidably anti-elitist force in modern capitalist societies is known as the marketplace, which levels all distinctions, garbles all gradations and buries all distinctions of use-value beneath the abstract equality of exchange-value.

## ANSWERS TO “DEVELOPMENT” KRITIK/ESCOBAR

### A. WE MUST KRITIK DEVELOPMENT FROM WITHIN. USE OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE WILL BE CRITICAL

Katy Gardner (University Of Sussex) *JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES*, Mar. 96, 171. In this book Arturo Escobar reformulates the 'development as neo-colonialism stance in terms of discourse theory. This, he argues: 'gives us the possibility of singling out "development" as an encompassing social space and at the same time of separating ourselves from it by perceiving it in a totally new form (p. 6). Drawing upon Foucault's work on representation, knowledge and power, Escobar argues that development should be understood as a historically specific representation of social reality which permits particular modes of thinking and doing, whilst disqualifying others. This involves specific forms of knowledge, systems of power which regulate practice, and subjectivities by which people recognize themselves as developed or undeveloped. It also consists of particular perceptual domains of inquiry, registration of problems and forms of intervention. A key example is the 'discovery of poverty after the second world war. The management of this required interventions in the newly labelled 'developing countries in health, employment, morality and so forth, as well as new fields of empirical study and theory (for example development economics). Such is the hegemonic power of development discourse that it can only ever be criticized from within; those opposed to it can only propose modifications or improvements, for 'development (has) achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary (p. 5). Encountering development is an important contribution to the anthropology of development. Whilst Escobar is not alone in deconstructing development discourse (e.g. Ferguson 1990; Esteva 1992) this book, which summarizes and builds upon articles published over the last decade, is likely to become a definitive statement. Escobar makes his case boldly: he is not afraid of sweeping claims, nor of vivid -- and sometimes polemical -- prose. Whilst his argument is largely convincing, this, plus his tendency to generalize, at times undermines it. Throughout the text 'development is largely spoken of as if it were a homogeneous, unitary set of representations and practices, epitomized and led by the World Bank. Whilst undoubtedly extremely powerful, the World Bank however only represents a certain type of developmental institution; many northern and southern non-governmental organizations utilize significantly different knowledges and practices. Groups and individuals within institutions are also rarely in agreement over what 'development should involve. Thus whilst at one level reports can be read as discursive representations which organize their subjects in certain ways, at another they can be analysed in terms of the internal dynamics of agencies, the results of complex processes and negotiations. This more subtle and nuanced understanding of how power works within the aid industry, and how the discourse is contested from within is largely ignored. Escobar's view of hegemony is also somewhat slippery. At one level he argues that whilst new objects of development such as 'women and 'the environment may have been introduced in recent years, or particular projects modified, the system of relations remains essentially the same, allowing the discourse to adapt to new conditions without being fundamentally challenged. Yet later in the text (for example in a rather disappointing discussion of 'Women in development ) he [Escobar] acknowledges that changes from within might be possible, that relations of power can shift. Indeed, to maintain that nothing has ever changed is to remain blinkered to the highly complex ways in which meanings and practices are negotiated within development: the growth in power of social advisors, who challenge the discourses of economists within Britain's Overseas Development Administration is just one small example.

Arun Agrawal (assistant professor of political science at Yale University) *PEACE & CHANGE*, Oct 96, Vol. 21 Issue 4, 464. A second productive move might be to accept the impossibility of questioning all metanarratives and instead to rethink how development can be profitably contested from within as well as from outside. Persistent criticisms of "development" are indispensable; calls to go beyond it make sense primarily as signifiers of romantic utopian thinking. In posing the dualisms of local and global, indigenous and Western, traditional and scientific, society and state--and locating the possibility of change only in one of these opposed pairs--one is forced to draw lines that are potentially ridiculous, and ultimately indefensible.[11] Development, like progress, rationality, or modernity, may be impossible to give up. Harboring the seeds of its own transformation, it may be far more suited to co-optation than disavowal. Rather than fearing the co-optation by "development" of each new strategy of change, it may be time to think about how to co-opt "development." "[R]eversing, displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding"[12] is not just the task of the postcolonial position; it is the impossible task of all critical positions.

Jonathan Crush (Professor of Geography at Queens University) *THE POWER OF DEVELOPMENT*, 1995, 19-20. Deploying Derrida's concept of logocentrism, Manzo proceeds to argue that romantic images of indigenous societies and their authentic knowledges do not push beyond modern relations of domination and threaten to reinscribe them in their most violent form. Hence, 'efforts in the post-colonial world to reinvent a pre-colonial Eden that never existed in fact, have been no less violent in their scripting of identity than those that practise domination in the name of development.' This trap - the reinscription of modernist dualisms - is also inherent in any claim that there can be pristine counter-hegemonic discourses of anti-development which are implacably opposed and totally untainted by the language of development itself. Here Foucault's notion or the 'tactical polyvalence of discourses' seems particularly useful. He argues (Foucault 1990: 100-1) that we should not imagine a world of dominant and dominated, or accepted and excluded, discourses. We should think instead of a 'complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy.'

## B. ESCOBAR'S KRITIK FAILS TO OVERCOME DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE.

### 1. THE KRITIK CEDES POWER TO DEVELOPMENT.

Arun Agrawal (assistant professor of political science at Yale University) *PEACE & CHANGE*, Oct 96, Vol. 21 Issue 4, 464. Poststructuralist approaches, then, have uncovered previously neglected facets of "development" that require more insistent and systematic analysis. Beyond this point, however, problems quickly arise. If poststructuralist scholars stop with critique here, they have offered no program of constructive engagement. There are two implications to advancing only a critique: what I call the problems of (a) the "empty critique," and (b) "overdetermination." Yet, if poststructuralists attempt to move beyond simply attacking established notions, they are liable to contradict the epistemological imperative of their stance. Empty Critique The arguments are rather well rehearsed. Opponents of the poststructuralists can ask, "While many of your criticisms are valid, what are your alternatives?" Poststructuralist theorists can answer, "We only aim to critique." The questioning has a special force, however, because as long as one accepts the real-world existence of the problems to which "development" is posed as a solution, academic critiques become insufficient. You cannot replace something with nothing. Constructive engagements with the development project are necessary because the trenchant critiques of development from poststructuralist scholars arrive at a time when the apparatus of development is simultaneously in disarray and has gained greater strength.

Arun Agrawal (assistant professor of political science at Yale University) *PEACE & CHANGE*, Oct 96, Vol. 21 Issue 4, 464. Calling for a disengagement from "development," he suggests that those who are constituted as underdeveloped, can, and do, fight their own battles (p. 281). But his call to disengage is troubling. If Ferguson means disengaging from the discourse of development, his advocacy rests upon a belief in the productive logic of critique and counter-critique. That is to say, if one stops engaging development discourses, they would wither away, various subject populations would find their own ways to contest development and marginalization, and development through state intrusion would lose its legitimacy. But such a vision is ultimately founded upon the confusion of a purist. It is far more than patterns of criticism that sustain development processes and the discourses of development. However, if Ferguson is advocating working with counter-hegemonic forces alone, and agrees that hegemony is defined locally (p. 287), there is no compelling reason to disengage from the state or international development agencies. Given the enormous power and resources [development agencies] they wield, and the possibilities of discontinuities within them, giving up on them as lost causes would be to yield too much--just as focusing only on reforming them through critique would be to hope for too much.

Arun Agrawal (assistant professor of political science at Yale University) PEACE & CHANGE, Oct 96, Vol. 21 Issue 4, 464. The second, more fundamental implication of relying merely on a critique is what I call the problem of overdetermination or tautological restatement. As already suggested, poststructuralism begins with the assumption that universalist notions of progress, truth, and rationality are not persuasive. The crisis of representation that is the hallmark of postmodernity is a function precisely of the denial of reality and its replacement by text and discourse. All universalist themes thus become problematic and contested, their validity depending simply on their location in specific discursive formations. The poststructuralist critique of "development," when it seeks to disengage, stops precisely at this point--reiterating its initial assumptions. "Development" becomes simply a flawed vision of progress. There is nothing in terms of evidence that might lead poststructuralist scholars to a different conclusion. But if this is the point at which one wished to stop, there was little need to have gone through the arguments questioning development: one could simply have asserted the complicity of development with power, as an article of faith. One could, then, simply have stopped at the beginning. Recognition of the twin problems of "empty critique" and "overdetermination" compels poststructuralist scholars of development to pose solutions.

2. THE KRITIK MERELY REPLICATES DOMINATION BY ASSERTING THEIR OWN STATUS AS ALL KNOWING.

Jonathan Crush (Professor of Geography at Queens University) THE POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, 1995, 18. Is there a way of writing (speaking or thinking) beyond the language of development? Can its hold on the imagination of both the powerful and the powerless be transcended? Can we get round, what Watts calls, the 'develop- ment gridlock'? Can, as Escobar puts it, the idea of 'catching up' with the West be drained of its appeal? Any contemporary volume of development- related essays can no longer afford to ignore these questions. One of the most damaging criticisms levelled against Said's (1978) notion of Orientalism is that it provides no basis for understanding how that discourse can be overcome. This book also, by definition, cannot stand outside the phenomenon being analysed. The text itself is made possible by the languages of development and, in a sense, it contributes to their perpetuation. To imagine that the Western scholar can gaze on development from above as a distanced and impartial observer, and formulate alternative ways of thinking and writing, is simply a conceit. To claim or adopt such a position is simply to replicate a basic rhetorical strategy of development itself. What we can do, as a first step, is to examine critically the rival claims of those who say that the language of development can, or is, being transcended. To assert, like Esteva (1987: 135), that 'development stinks' is all very well, but it is not that helpful if we have no idea about how the odour will be erased.

C. THE PERMUTATION IS BEST- KRITIKING DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE SHOULD FOLLOW WITH A CONCRETE POLICY CHOICE.

Arun Agrawal (assistant professor of political science at Yale University) PEACE & CHANGE, Oct 96, Vol. 21 Issue 4, 464. But these appeals are themselves subject to precisely the same critiques that scholars like Escobar and Ferguson level against "development." Part of the tension, of course, stems from the treatment of multiple discourses around development as unitary and undifferentiated. Poststructuralist critics, especially Escobar, wield a broad brush that leaves tainted all aspects of whatever is connected with development. Little room remains for constructive engagement. This is quite ironic since much of what Ferguson, Escobar, and the contributors to Sachs suggest as possibilities for moving beyond "development" has been explored by those who believe in development and by precisely those actors in whom Escobar locates the possibility of an alternative strategy: indigenous peoples' collectives, grass-roots organizations, popular movements, and so forth. In this sense, the calls to move beyond "development" or repudiate it may themselves be a submission to an illusion that there is something beyond development.

## D. DESCRIBING DEVELOPMENT AS MONOLITHIC IS DISEMPOWERING

R.D. Grillo (School of African and Asian Studies, University of Sussex) 1997, *DISCOURSES ON DEVELOPMENT*, 20-22. While not denying the validity of the idea of a 'development gaze', we should note its limits. Mosse (this volume, p. 280) says, I am not suggesting that development institutions (irrigation bureaucracies or donor agencies) are the creators of social theory, merely that they constrain and select theory [and] nudge the thinking of their members in particular directions -...' There is a tendency - illustrated, for example, by Hobart, Escobar and to a lesser degree Ferguson - to see development as a monolithic enterprise, heavily controlled from the top, convinced of the superiority of its own wisdom and impervious to local knowledge, or indeed common-sense experience, a single gaze or voice which is all-powerful and beyond influence. This underpins what I would call the 'myth of development' which pervades much critical writing in this field. It might also be called the Development Dictionary perspective, as echoed throughout the book of that name (Sachs ed. 1992). The perspective is shared by Escobar, and to a lesser extent Ferguson and in a different way Hobart. Like most myths it is based on poor or partial history, betraying a lack of knowledge of both colonialism and decolonization, and throughout it reflects a surprising ethnocentrism: it is very much the view from North America. Ill-informed about the history of government, it has a Jacobinist conviction of the state's power to achieve miraculous things: the title of Ferguson's book. The Anti- Politics Machine, is an eloquent expression of this. It is also grounded in the 'victim culture'. Rather as those engaged in anti- racist training sometimes argued that there are 'racists' and there are 'victims of racism' (Donald and Rattansi eds 1992; Gilroy 1993), the development myth proposes that there are 'developers' and 'victims of development' (see the unfortunate souls portrayed on the dust-cover of Crush's edited collection, 1995). Escobar adds 'resisters of development', but there is no other way. Thus the myth would, for example, have great difficulty in encompassing the wide range of responses and agendas found among Indian women working in and for development whose work is documented in this volume in the paper by Unnithan and Srivastava. Drinkwater (1992: 169) points to the 'danger of oversimplifying and setting up a dominant position as an easy target'. Although development is sometimes guided by authoritative, monocular visions, Unnithan and Srivastava's paper (this volume), along with Gardner's discussion of a major project in a country in South Asia, underline the point that development knowledge is not usually a single set of ideas and assumptions. Gardner observes correctly (this volume, p. 134) that while our understanding of 'indigenous knowledge' is growing increasingly sophisticated, that of developmental knowledge often remains frustratingly simplistic. This is generally presented as homogeneous and rooted in 'scientific rationalism' . . . [but there is a] need to understand how development knowledge is not one single set of ideas and assumptions. While . . . it may function hegemonically, it is also created and recreated by multiple agents, who often have very different understandings of their work. To think of the discourse of development is far too limiting. To that extent, Hobart is correct to refer to 'several co-existent discourses of development' (1993: 12). But there is as much diversity within the community of 'professional developers' (one of the parties identified by Hobart), as between them and other stakeholders or 'players' (in Hobart's account, local people' and 'national government'). Within development there is and has always been a multiplicity of voices, 'a multiplicity of "knowledges"' (Cohen 1993: 32), even if some are more powerful than others: as Pettier, this volume, points out, 'a simple recording of the plurality of voices' is never enough. Preston, who has written extensively on development, provides an interesting way into this subject.

E. ESCOBAR'S THEORY DENIES AGENCY TO THE THIRD WORLD

Nederveen Pieterse (Institute of Social Studies) *THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY*, 2002, 175. According to Escobar (1992), the problem with 'development' is that it is external, based on the model of the industrialized world, and what is needed instead are 'more endogenous discourses.' The assertion of 'endogenous development' calls to mind dependency theory and the 'foreign bad, local good' position (Kiely, 1999). According to Rajni Kothari, 'where colonialism left off, development took over' (1988: 143). This view is as old as the critique of modernisation theory. It calls to mind the momentum and pathos of decolonisation and the familiar cultural homogenisation thesis, according to which Western media, advertising and consumerism induce cultural uniformity. All this may be satisfying as the sound of a familiar tune, but it is also one-sided and old-hat. In effect, it denies the agency of the Third World. It denies the extent to which the South also owns development. Several recent development perspectives—such as dependency theory, alternative development and human development—have originated to a considerable extent in the South. Furthermore, what about 'Easternisation,' as in the East Asian model, touted by the World Bank as a development miracle? What about Japanisation, as in the 'Japanese challenge,' the influence of Japanese management technique and Toyotism (Kaplinsky, 1994)? At any rate, 'Westernisation' is a catch all concept that ignores diverse historical currents. Latouche and others use the bulky category 'the West' which, given the sharp historical differences between Europe and North America is not really meaningful. This argument also overlooks more complex assessments of globalisation (eg Nederveen Pieterse, 1995). A more appropriate analytics is polycentrism. Here the rejoinder to Eurocentrism is not Third Worldism but a recognition that multiple centres, also in the South, now shape development discourse (e.g. Amin, 1989; Nederveen Pieterse 1991).

F. DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY DISCOURSE CAN BE REAPPROPRIATED BY THOSE LIVING IN POVERTY.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse (Hague Institute of Social Studies) *THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY*, v21, n2, 2000, 2. Post-development thinking is fundamentally uneven. For all the concern with discourse analysis, the actual use of language is sloppy and indulgent. Escobar plays games of rhetoric: in referring to development as 'Development' and thus suggesting its homogeneity and consistency, he essentialises 'development'. The same applies to Sachs and his call to do away with development: 'in the very call for banishment, Sachs implicitly suggests that it is possible to arrive at an unequivocal definition' (Crush, 1996: 3). Apparently this kind of essentialising of 'development' is necessary in order to arrive at the radical repudiation of development, and without this anti-development pathos, the post-development perspective loses its foundation. At times one has the impression that post-development turns on a language game rather than an analysis. Attending a conference entitled 'Towards a post-development age', Anisur Rahman reacted as follows: 'I was struck by the intensity with which the very notion of "development" was attacked . . . I submitted that I found the word "development" to be a very powerful means of expressing the conception of societal progress as the flowering of people's creativity. Must we abandon valuable words because they are abused? What to do then with words like democracy, cooperation, socialism, all of which are abused?' (1993: 213-214)

Howard Richards (University of Baroda, Gujarat State) EDUCATION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT, Summer, 1995. Accessed online from earlham.edu. Denis Goulet has written an extensive series of books and articles in which he holds that the word "development" should be used, but only as a "hinge" to promote an "authentic development" based on normative values. In a sense these lectures are a contribution to Goulet's philosophy, because they are about how to make operational a "creative incrementalism" that builds steps toward structural change and a culture of solidarity into every development project. In another sense these lectures try to cope with economic issues I find that Goulet and many liberation theologians cannot cope with effectively, because they are too grounded in a liberal ethics that shares too many premises with liberal economics. See e.g. Denis Goulet, *Mexico: Development Strategies for the Future*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983; "'Development' ...or Liberation?" *International Development Review* vol. 13, no. 3 (September, 1971). For a critical review of attempts to rescue the word "development" by qualifying it as "sustainable development," see S. Lele, "Sustainable Development: A Critical Review," *World Development*, volume 19 (1991), pp. 607-621. See generally the *International Journal of Sustainable Development*. On the other hand, the term "development" is often given a positive and constructive meaning. For example, "'Development' is taken here to mean the general improvement in human living conditions, including access to more consumption goods, better health care, greater job security, and better working hours and conditions." Clive Hamilton, "Can the Rest of Asia Emulate the NICs?" *The Third World Quarterly*, volume 87 (1987), pp. 1225-1256. "Development" has generally been associated with finding ways to mobilize and put to use the energies of the unemployed and underemployed. See Amartya Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?," *Economic Journal*. vol. 93 (December 1983), pp. 745-62. "Development" has as a connotation creating "linkages" and "complementarities" so that a major social investment is not just an isolated event, but part of a related series which opens up new possibilities and opportunities.

#### H. DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE IS CRITICAL TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS WITH DEVELOPMENT

Howard Richards, (University of Baroda, Gujarat State), EDUCATION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT, Summer, 1995. Accessed online from earlham.edu. I use the word "development" in spite of its drawbacks because it is the word commonly and officially used worldwide to describe efforts to end poverty. I use the term because I want to stay in touch with the mainstream while trying to change its direction. I use it, too, because whatever else development may be about, it is about economics. Today social and educational issues are economic issues, and vice-versa. Although there may have been a time when religious and cultural values determined educational and social philosophy, I do not believe I exaggerate when I say that today the practical and effective educational and social philosophies are increasingly driven by what is taken to be economic reality; and inspired by economic theories that prescribe what is to be done about that reality. The term "development," which in turn is associated with the idea of a "development model," helps us to remember that wherever we go in our contemporary world we are never far from the pervasive influence of economics. I will support the view that, because of the basic structure of modern society, economics must be dealt with in order to deal successfully with literacy, child care, gender, race, caste, ethnic conflict, environment or other issues. I add the word "constructive" partly to cancel some of the usual meanings of "development." Similarly, some people speak of "sustainable development" when they believe that one of the main consequences of development as it is ordinarily understood is ecological ruin, which is unsustainable. Thus the qualifying adjective subtracts from as well as adds to the meaning of the noun qualified. For me "development" is only tolerable when it is transformed by a qualifying term like "sustainable" or "constructive." The word "constructive" redeems the word "development" in two ways. First, it connotes, "the social construction of reality," as in Berger and Luckmann's book with that title. Thus it reminds us that humans create and recreate multiple social worlds that are constructed, that can be deconstructed, and that - to the extent that they are nonfunctional - should be reconstructed. This connotation balances the tendency of the word "development" to suggest that history is a series of parallel one-way streets, leading every country in the world in the same direction from being an undeveloped area, through being a developing country, to being a fully developed modern nation. The word "constructive" helps to remind us that cultures create many realities, and we human beings, versatile mammals that we are, live in them. Secondly, the word "constructive" connotes what is positive and desirable, as in the binary polarity, "constructive, not destructive." Thus it implies a critical and selective attitude toward development; it implies that since there is constructive development there must also be development that is not constructive.

Denis Goulet (O'Neill Professor in Education for Justice and Department of Economics Faculty at Notre Dame, Fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies), *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS*, v24 n11, Nov 1997, 1165. More fundamentally, however, the primary mission of development ethics is to keep hope alive[7], for by any purely rational calculus of future probabilities, the development enterprise of most countries is doomed to fail. The probable future scenario is that technological and resource gaps will continue to widen, and that vast resources will continue to be devoted to destructive armaments and wasteful consumption. By any reasonable projection over the next 50 years, development will remain the privilege of a relative few, while underdevelopment will continue to be the lot of the vast majority. Only some trans-rational calculus of hope, situated beyond apparent realms of possibility, can elicit the creative energies and vision which authentic development for all requires. This calculus of hope must be ratified by development ethics, which summons human persons and societies to become their best selves, to create structures of justice to replace exploitation and aggressive competition. A basis for hope is suggested by Dubos and other sociobiologists, who remind us that only a tiny fragment of human brain-power has been utilized up till the present (Dubos, 1978). This means that Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans can invent new, more authentic models of development. In *The Coming Dark Age* Vacca (1973) gloomily forecasts a world with no future. Development ethics corrects this view by reminding us that futures are not foreordained. Indeed the most important banner development ethics must raise high is that of hope, hope in the possibility of creating new possibilities. Development ethics pleads normatively for a certain reading of history, one in which human agents are makers of history even as they bear witness to values of transcendence (Goulet, 1974b).

#### I. OVEREMPHASIS ON RHETORIC AND LANGUAGE IS FLAWED.

David Kidner, (Prof., Psychology, Nottingham Trent U.), *NATURE AND PSYCHE*, 01, 59. This exclusion of the natural, for example, is quite explicitly advocated by Michael Billig. He approvingly quotes Karl Popper's opinion that the origin of the social sciences can be traced to Protagoras' distinction between the natural and the social, arguing that "questions about the existence or nonexistence of unchanging realities can be left to one side," and that "we must concentrate on the one power which separates humans from all those other organisms: the power of language." But why should the social sciences be based on the "one power which separates humans from ... other organisms"? Why not, instead, base it on the many powers that relate us to other organisms? The implication of this curious choice seems to be that psychology can take place within a purely social realm dissociated from the natural, and that we are therefore justified in ignoring our relation to the natural world together with any potential implications that nature might hold for social behaviour. According to Billig, we should focus on the dynamics of the opposing rhetorical views; and it is the argument and counterargument between such opposed views that is the real stuff of life rather than any natural reality which we might argue about. Thought is a by-product of this rhetorical universe, since "[h]umans do not converse because they have inner thoughts to express but they have thoughts because they are able to converse." This view is powerfully repressive in effect, since it denies the existence of experience and thought that cannot be expressed in language, sealing us within this constricted linguistic world. As Andre Gorz points out: "Language is a filter which always forces me to say more or less than I feel."



## **NEOLIBERALISM IS AN ADVANTAGEOUS ECONOMIC SYSTEM**

### **1. NEOLIBERALISM KRITIK FAILS TO PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE- IT IS SIMPLY THE BEST SYSTEM**

Aaron Lukas (Policy analyst at the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY, No. 10, 2008. Accessed online from freetrade.org. Second, contrary to the claims of the anti-trade forces, there is no evidence whatsoever that countries that have shut themselves off from global markets have prospered over the long term. Perhaps the strongest evidence of the benefits of economic liberalization is that developing countries over the past couple of decades have been opening their markets voluntarily, independent of any quid pro quo negotiations. Countries as diverse as Argentina, the Philippines, Chile, and Thailand have taken aggressive unilateral steps toward integration into the global economy. Even the most traditionally closed economies are finally abandoning the failed autarkic model of protectionism in favor of freer trade.

### **2. NEOLIBERALISM PREVENTS GLOBAL POVERTY.**

Aaron Lukas (Policy analyst at the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY, No. 10, 2008. Accessed online from freetrade.org. Developing countries embrace globalization for a variety of reasons. The removal of trade barriers immediately expands the range of choices for consumers and places downward pressure on prices, thus raising the real value of workers' earnings. Foreign investment provides more jobs, new production technologies, infrastructure improvements, and a source of capital for local entrepreneurs. Domestic businesses gain access to both cheaper inputs and vastly larger markets for their products. But for most people, the many and varied benefits of a liberal trade and investment regime can be boiled down to one very attractive proposition: globalization spurs economic growth, and growth raises living standards. Empirical research supports the link between the freedom to conduct international transactions and economic growth. A well known paper by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University, for example, found that developing countries with open economies grew by an average of 4.5 percent per year in the 1970s and 1980s while those with closed economies grew by only 0.7 percent. 2 The same pattern held for developed countries: those with open economies grew by 2.3 percent per year while those with closed economies grew by 0.7 percent.

### **3. NEOLIBERALISM IS CRITICAL TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM.**

Aaron Lukas (Policy analyst at the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY, No. 10, 2008. Accessed online from freetrade.org. Developing First, environmental standards are only one of many factors that businesses take into account when choosing the best location to set up shop. Such considerations as guaranteed property rights protection, a functioning legal system, a well-educated workforce, and sufficient infrastructure figure much more prominently in the calculations of most entrepreneurs and business managers than do environmental regulations. Given those facts, it is not surprising that there is scant evidence that governments actually lower environmental standards in order to attract investment.<sup>36</sup> Second, there are considerable cost savings associated with standardized production techniques. Thus, companies tend to operate at the highest environmental world standard rather than adopt multiple production technologies for use in different areas.<sup>37</sup> Third, much of the foreign direct investment (FDI) directed to developing countries is used to privatize inefficient state-owned manufacturers, which tend to become less polluting as they are restructured. Finally, trade and investment help speed the spread of pollution control technology and enable developing countries to purchase cleaner energy inputs on world markets. The most important result of trade and investment, however, is economic growth, which in turn leads to a better environment.

4. NEOLIBERALISM IS CRITICAL TO LIFT MILLIONS OUT OF POVERTY

Daniel T. Griswold (Associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies) CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES NO. 26. 2004. Accessed online [freetrade.org](http://freetrade.org). Trade policy has implications beyond economic growth and living standards. It can directly and indirectly influence a nation's political development by decentralizing power and influence, by spreading technology, information, and ideas in a society, and by raising incomes and creating a larger middle class. Theory and evidence together argue that trade liberalization and a more general openness to the global economy do correlate with more political and civil freedom, in the world as a whole and within individual countries. When debating trade policy, members of Congress cannot ignore the broader foreign policy implications of trade. By opening our markets at home and encouraging freer trade abroad, the United States promotes not only economic growth but a more humane and democratic world. Free trade and globalization do not guarantee democracy and respect for human rights, but they do provide a more favorable trade wind for achieving those goals. Members of Congress who consistently vote against more open markets at home and market-opening trade agreements with other nations are in effect voting to keep millions of people locked within the walls of tyranny, and millions more trapped in a partly free netherworld of halfrights, half-freedoms, and half-democracy. In light of the evidence that free trade promotes democracy and civil freedoms, policymakers in Washington need to ask themselves: How can we fully ensure our security as a nation when billions of people around the world are denied their most basic rights to civil freedom, representative government, and the opportunity to realize their productive potential in the marketplace?

5. NEOLIBERALISM IS CRITICAL TO PERSONAL FREEDOM

Daniel T. Griswold (Associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies) CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES NO. 26. 2004. Accessed online [freetrade.org](http://freetrade.org). Historians will note that in many nations, the advance of markets and free enterprise helped to create a middle class that was confident enough to demand their own rights. They will point to the role of technology in frustrating censorship and central control—and marvel at the power of instant communications to spread the truth, the news, and courage across borders.<sup>1</sup> In an April 2002 speech in which President Bush urged Congress to grant him trade promotion authority, he argued that trade is about more than raising incomes. “Trade creates the habits of freedom,” the president said, and those habits “begin to create the expectations of democracy and demands for better democratic institutions. Societies that are open to commerce across their borders are more open to democracy within their borders.”<sup>2</sup> Other administration officials have taken that reasoning a step further, arguing that the democracy and respect for human rights that trade can foster would create a more peaceful world, reducing the frustration and resentment that can breed radicalism and terrorism.

6. NEOLIBERALISM CHECKS TOTALITARIANISM

Daniel T. Griswold (Associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies) CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES NO. 26. 2004. Accessed online [freetrade.org](http://freetrade.org). The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. From Aristotle down to the present, [wo]men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the population intelligently participate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues.<sup>8</sup> Wealth by itself does not promote democracy if the wealth is controlled by the state or a small ruling elite. A resource-rich country can have a relatively high per capita gross domestic product, but if its natural wealth is centrally held and does not nurture an autonomous middle class that earns its wealth independently of the state, the prospects for political pluralism, civil liberties, and democracy are probably no better than in a poor country without resources. For wealth to cultivate the soil for democracy, it must be produced, retained, and controlled by a broad base of society, and for wealth to be created in that manner, an economy must be relatively open and free.

Daniel T. Griswold (Associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies) CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES NO. 26. 2004. Accessed online [freetrade.org](http://freetrade.org). Economic freedom and trade provide a counterweight to governmental power. A free market diffuses economic decisionmaking among millions of producers and consumers rather than leaving it in the hands of a few centralized government actors who could, and often do, use that power to suppress or marginalize political opposition. Milton Friedman, the Nobel-prize-winning economist, noted the connection between economic and political freedom in his 1962 book, *Capitalism and Freedom*: Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.<sup>3</sup> This dispersion of economic control, in turn, creates space for nongovernmental organizations and private-sector alternatives to political leadership—in short, civil society. A thriving private economy creates sources of funding for nonstate institutions, which in turn can provide ideas, influence, and leadership outside the existing government. A more pluralistic social and political culture greatly enhances the prospects for a more pluralistic and representative political system. Private sector corporations, both domestic and foreign- owned, create an alternate source of wealth, influence, and leadership. Theologian and social thinker Michael Novak identified this as the “Wedge Theory,” in which capitalist practices “bring contact with the ideas and practices of the free societies, generate the economic growth that gives political confidence to a rising middle class, and raise up successful business leaders who come to represent a political alternative to military or party leaders. In short, capitalist firms wedge a democratic camel’s nose under the authoritarian tent.”

#### 7. NEOLIBERALISM PREVENTS RACISM

Daniel T. Griswold (Associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies) CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES NO. 26. 2004. Accessed online [freetrade.org](http://freetrade.org). Economic development raises expectations that change and progress are possible. In less developed countries, it often leads to growing urbanization, which fosters greater literacy, communication, and access to alternative media. Palpable material progress can take the steam out of radical political movements that feed on frustration and hopelessness, and increase tolerance for minority ethnic and political groups. Ruling elites tend to treat their middle-class countrymen with more respect and deference than they would those in the impoverished and uneducated lower classes.

## **KUEHL'S ECOPOLITICS CRITIQUE OFFERS NO REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

### **1. A COMMITMENT TO "DOING THINGS NATURE'S WAY" CAN JUSTIFY UNSPEAKABLE VIOLENCE.**

Bruce Braun, (Prof., Geography, U. Minnesota), ANTIPODE, 99, 334. Any attempt to ground "ethics" in Nietzsche's (1968) perspectivism and Botkin's (1990) ecology of chaos is bound to be problematic. Botkin's (1990) "new ecology," for instance, makes it extremely difficult to establish standards by which to evaluate the effect of changes caused by human practices. Likewise, as Kuehls himself admits, Nietzsche's (1968) insistence that the world has no single or inevitable telos can easily justify human practices that cause nature irrevocable harm. Such changes--however catastrophic--can be seen to be entirely consistent with notions of nature's historical contingency.

### **2. KUEHLS' CLAIMS ARE INTERNALLY CONTRADICTIONARY: HE CAN'T DECIDE WHETHER NATURE IS STATIC OR WHETHER IT IS IN CONSTANT CHANGE.**

Bruce Braun, (Prof., Geography, U. Minnesota), ANTIPODE, 99, 334. Kuehls' discussion also contains contradictions. While he correctly shows earlier mechanistic and organistic conceptions of the earth to be deeply cultural, Kuehls takes recent work in the ecological sciences at face value. Thus, he explains that change is "intrinsic and natural" and that "life is essentially diverse and inter-related; it depends upon change" (p. 17). He then decries forest clearcuts for their "interference" in ongoing, "natural" processes of change and their imposition of a human-directed telos upon a non-teleological nature. Such normative statements--based on the "truth" of nature--stand uneasily with a perspectivism that calls into question the very possibility of determining such truths. Furthermore, as this example suggests, it is not clear that Kuehls' eco-ethic differs in any substantial way from earlier ethical systems founded on notions of "static" nature. While arguments about nature's intrinsic "balance" led ecologists in the past to call for "caution" (since they saw human practices as introducing an unnatural "chaos"), the notion of the intrinsic nature of "change"--dependent on "difference and diversity"--results in the same call today (since the same practices are now seen to introduce an unnatural "order").

### **3. ECOPHILOSOPHY IS ALSO GUILTY OF GOVERNMENTALITY: IT GETS CAUGHT UP IN ITS OWN CAMPAIGN OF OPPOSING UNITED STATES INFLUENCE.**

Bruce Braun, (Prof., Geography, U. Minnesota), ANTIPODE, 99, 334. The final two chapters, on the other hand, add far less to Kuehls' project. In the first, Kuehls turns to the field of ecopolitical thought, which--as one would expect--he finds hopelessly caught in the same notions of sovereignty and practices of governmentality he just critiqued. Thus, despite their differences, writers like Bookchin (1990) and Ophuls (1977) are admonished for paying little attention to nomadic trajectories and worldwide machines, governmentality, disciplinary power, and so on.

4. KUEHLS' CRITIQUE IS REplete WITH FACTUAL ERRORS.

Bruce Braun, (Prof., Geography, U. Minnesota), *ANTIPODE*, 99, 334. Kuehls' analysis, however, is thin, leading to the suspicion that Clayoquot Sound merely provided him with a convenient example through which to ground his critique. Factual errors in the text--reference to British Columbia's Premier as its Prime Minister, the misspelling of the name of the Province's environment minister, and so on--heighten this impression. Equally problematically, Kuehls relies exclusively on the environmental movement for his information, with the result that he uncritically reproduces their rhetorics of and figures on "forest destruction." Based in part on the questionable assumption that human disturbance "destroys" nature--a position consistent with the commonly used, highly sexualized, rhetoric of "virgin" forests and "intact" watersheds--these rhetorics underlie the claim that BC's rain forests are "disappearing." This does not simply fly in the face of notions of "cyborg nature," which refuse discourses of "purity." It has also allowed environmental groups--and Kuehls--to avoid difficult questions about the type of ecological changes occurring in the forests and how these can be evaluated, as well as how struggles over these transformations are entangled with and complicated by questions of race and class. In short, the "where" of Kuehls' eco-politics matters in ways that he fails to adequately appreciate. Clayoquot Sound, for instance, has been profoundly shaped by colonial productions of space and nature which have left aboriginal peoples on the margins, displaced from the very forests whose vast wealth has generated windfall profits for corporate capital and provided resources for projects of "national development." Today, after years of struggle, First Nations are finally being recognized as legitimate owners of the forests, and industrial forestry offers an important opportunity to escape state-sanctioned poverty. In such a context, what does it mean to insist on an ethic of difference and diversity, where human practices are seen to "unnaturally" constrain the "natural" disorder of nature? In what ways does such an eco-ethic risk displacing First Nations yet again from the rich resources that surround them? For whose benefit should diversity and difference exist?

5. KUEHLS' CRITIQUE IS BLINDLY TOTALIZING, MEANING THAT HE CONVENIENTLY IGNORES ANY OF THE GOOD THINGS THAT SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS DO.

Bruce Braun, (Prof., Geography, U. Minnesota), *ANTIPODE*, 99, 334. A closer reading of events in the region might also unsettle Kuehls' discussion of governmentality, which throughout the book takes on normative and totalizing dimensions (he often presents forms of governmentality as sinister and assumes them always to be effective). As a result, in his analysis of Clayoquot Sound Kuehls fails to take into account either how contemporary governmental practices intersect with, rather than determine, Clayoquot Sound's complex historical geographies or how these practices open as many political spaces as they close.

6. KUEHLS CRITIQUE HAS THE PERVERSE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING ANY RESPONSIBILITY OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT. WAITING FOR SOME UTOPIAN INTERNATIONAL ECOSYSTEM MEANS DOING NOTHING RIGHT NOW ABOUT HELPING THE ENVIRONMENT.

Bruce Braun, (Prof., Geography, U. Minnesota), *ANTIPODE*, 99, 334. This presents a number of problems. First, in the face of the "de-skilling" of Native peoples over the past 120 years, such a critique risks undermining the necessity of such programs, without which First Nations would simply be unprepared to face the challenge of managing forests in economically and ecologically viable ways. These programs are in part the product of decades of struggle. Second, although Kuehls is certainly right to suggest that such programs assume that First Nations should continue current forest management regimes, and that this dovetails nicely with the desire of the Canadian government to see "its" forests remain "productive," he fails to raise the far more interesting question of how such governmental practices might fail, be only partially realized, or be turned to other ends. It is just as likely in this context that industrial forestry skills will be integrated with other uses and approaches to the forest drawn from still vibrant, evolving Native cultures, rather than displacing them. In other words, Kuehls fails to recognize new political spaces opened up by governmental practices, with the result that he dismisses rather than foregrounds instances where First Nations might pursue their own trajectories of modernization by combining "modern" forms of forest management with "traditional" forest use.

## **THE GUATTARI AND DELEUZE ECOPHILOSOPHY CRITIQUE OFFERS NO REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

### **1. GUATTARI'S WORK IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.**

Richard Dawkins, (Prof., Philosophy of Science, Oxford U.), *NATURE*, July 9, 98, 141. Suppose you are an intellectual impostor with nothing to say, but with strong ambitions to succeed in academic life, collect a coterie of reverent disciples and have students around the world anoint your pages with respectful yellow highlighter. What kind of literary style would you cultivate? Not a lucid one, surely, for clarity would expose your lack of content. The chances are that you would produce something like the following: "We can clearly see that there is no bi-univocal correspondence between linear signifying links or archi-writing, depending on the author, and this multireferential, multi-dimensional machinic catalysis. The symmetry of scale, the transversality, the pathic non-discursive character of their expansion: all these dimensions remove us from the logic of the excluded middle and reinforce us in our dismissal of the ontological binarism we criticised previously." This is a quotation from the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, one of many fashionable French 'intellectuals' outed by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont in their splendid book *Intellectual Impostures*, which caused a sensation when published in French last year, and which is now released in a completely rewritten and revised English edition. Guattari goes on indefinitely in this vein and offers, in the opinion of Sokal and Bricmont, "the most brilliant mélange of scientific, pseudo-scientific and philosophical jargon that we have ever encountered."

### **2. THE "INNER VOICE" IS AN UNRELIABLE GUIDE.**

Richard Dawkins, (Prof., Philosophy of Science, Oxford U.), *THE OBSERVER*, May 21, 00. Retrieved June 4, 08 from [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk). I wholeheartedly share your aim of long-term stewardship of our planet, with its diverse and complex biosphere. But what about the instinctive wisdom in Saddam Hussein's black heart? What price the Wagnerian wind that rustled Hitler's twisted leaves? The Yorkshire Ripper heard religious voices in his head urging him to kill. How do we decide which intuitive inner voices to heed?

### **3. DELEUZE'S WORK IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.**

Richard Dawkins, (Prof., Philosophy of Science, Oxford U.), *NATURE*, July 9, 98, 141. Gilles Deleuze had a similar talent for writing: "In the first place, singularities-events correspond to heterogeneous series which are organized into a system which is neither stable nor unstable, but rather 'metastable,' endowed with a potential energy wherein the differences between series are distributed . . . In the second place, singularities possess a process of auto-unification, always mobile and displaced to the extent that a paradoxical element traverses the series and makes them resonate, enveloping the corresponding singular points in a single aleatory point and all the emissions, all dice throws, in a single cast." It calls to mind Peter Medawar's earlier characterisation of a certain type of French intellectual style (note, in passing the contrast offered by Medawar's own elegant and clear prose): "Style has become an object of first importance, and what a style it is! For me it has a prancing, high-stepping quality, full of self-importance; elevated indeed, but in the balletic manner, and stopping from time to time in studied attitudes, as if awaiting an outburst of applause. It has had a deplorable influence on the quality of modern thought."

### **4. DELEUZE'S CONCEPT OF THE RHIZOME IS USELESS ANALYTICAL TOOL.**

Zelia Gregoriou, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Cyprus), *EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY*, 04, 242. The *names* Rhizome and Tree do not function as indexical signs to concepts which can analytically be put in the service of detecting correspondences, matching similarities and identifying entities; signifying essences, guarding their proper singularity and authenticating their repetitions in various contexts. The name is nothing more 'than the trace of an intensity.'

Zelia Gregoriou, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Cyprus), *EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY*, 04, 242. Though Deleuze's paratactic syntax of rhizomorphic things evolves into an overwhelming ontology where everything can be connected to everything else, it never culminates into normative statements on resistance or pedagogy: 'we still don't know what the multiple implies when it ceases to be attributed, that is to say, when it is raised to the status of a substantive'

5. THE RHIZOME LEGITIMIZES FASCISM.

Zelia Gregoriou, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Cyprus), EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, 04, 243. Such an articulation of the rhizome might always backfire by legitimizing microfascisms. Rhizome and Tree are stratified and delineated as separate forms of organization in the explanatory, cut-and-paste, didactic reading of Deleuze. Yet their difference becomes less foundational/eidetic and more temporal when it is applied towards exploring a multiplicity's variations, its visible connections but also its potential recoiling to pivotal centers of control.

6. THE RHIZOME DOES NOT ACHIEVE DELEUZE'S GOAL OF DECENTERING CAPITALISM.

Zelia Gregoriou, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Cyprus), EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, 04, 244. The rhizome has nothing to do with essence and normative ethics. It can grow in many places. It can also be dangerous. It has already been at work in corporate capitalism, in modulations of control in human resource management, in education's corporative modulations in order to produce graduates with flexible market skills.

## **BATAILLE'S "INNER KNOWLEDGE" CRITIQUE OFFERS NO REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

### **1. BATAILLE'S WORK IS USELESS FOR POLICY MAKING.**

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 165. Transcendental empiricism and counter-actualisation operate in the works of Bataille like an errant comet: never reaching its terminus, and so distant as to disqualify accurately definitive observation to make bold hermeneutic declarations. Moreover, in fact, to construct definitions from our experience of Bataille, even with this open filter of Deleuzian themes, is perhaps to construct a framework post-facto that will doom our project to unfeasibility. This game is played on many tables, and as we consider experience as not being amenable to Reason's calculation, we must append our own experience of his text, this text, and all others. Essentially, how we experience text will always be the scene of a problematic aporia: always open, never determinate.

### **2. BY "INNER EXPERIENCE" BATAILLE MEANS WE SHOULD REJECT ALL KNOWLEDGE IN AN EFFORT TO DISSOLVE THE "THINKING EGO."**

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 165. Bataille calls this type of experience 'a voyage to the end of the possible of man', which is selective in so far as not everyone can or would will this embarking on such a journey. In the Nietzschean spirit of affirmation, inner experience affirms the unknown, rejecting all positive knowledge about Being and Thought in a conflagration of or dissolution of the thinking ego subject.

### **3. BATAILLE NOTION OF "INNER EXPERIENCE," IS A MEANINGLESS CONCEPT THAT CAN BE USED TO JUSTIFY ANY CONCLUSION.**

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 165. Inner experience is not dogmatic (in so far as this would project or abide by a moral status quo) nor a science (which would be to presuppose a knowledge it could seek or begin from), but is rather a goal unto itself, and, as such, engenders a creative and experimental attitude. As a possible reiteration of Nietzschean will to power, inner experience appears to collapse two moments in one movement: rejection or destruction of all known values through critique (active nihilism) and concept creation. However, inner experience seems to portray a weaker aspect of Nietzschean critique in so far as the encounter with the unknown is reflexively a realisation of Reason's fatigue rather than a more direct and incendiary transvaluation of all values. It seems that Bataille's proposed inner experience occurs both before active nihilism and as its result (concept creation) without careful examination of the middle movement between the two.

### **4. BATAILLE'S CALL FOR ABANDONING ANY PRESUPPOSITIONS COLLAPSES ON ITSELF.**

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 166. Bataille rejects that things can be known through experience as such, for all is mutable and in constant becoming, including that which is experiencing. He claims that to erect a framework or category of understanding post facto is a futile measure, and presupposes that such framework maps seamlessly upon that which is experienced. Is this a transitional stage in Bataille's thought toward a more object-centred genealogical critique? 'Experience attains in the end the fusion of object and subject, being as subject non-knowledge, as object the unknown'. Bataille's 'inner experience' ties the knot of subjectivity and objectivity in such a way as implicitly to critique the phenomenological project (especially Husserl's version) in such a way as to state that the 'presuppositionless science' that was supposed to resolve this dualism between subject and object did not succeed, precisely because its form of presuppositionlessness was grounded in a form of experience that still appealed to rational authority. This is why phenomenology could not truly come to grips with horror, and indeed its scholasticism could not mediate the horrors to come that resulted from the post-Auschwitz era. Although a noble attempt to resolve an ancient dualism, this method was itself still too Cartesian in its calculus, assuming complicity in human experience and pledged faith in ordered values and the authorities that sanctified them. An *epoche* is nothing if there is still a subject remaining to perform this task of bracketing.



5. BATAILLE HIMSELF CLAIMS THAT THE OUTCOME OF HIS UTOPIAN IDEAL IS UNPREDICTABLE.

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 168. Bataille asserts that it is only through a wild expenditure of energy or power without sully the expenditure with attempts to rig outcomes that brings us to the extreme limit. This assertion forms an area or zone of alignment with Deleuze's own discussion of chance and necessity wherein it is the bad player who tries to rig the outcomes of chance. The fortuitous encounters that go into the constituent products of material existence are instances of forces in relation, and cannot be predicted.

6. IN FACT, HOWEVER, THE ABANDONMENT OF KNOWLEDGE WILL LEAD TO ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY OR FASCISM.

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 167. Bataille is committed to a view that the unknown and fortuitous will create a situation of dissolution, an overturning of all positive knowledge. However, Bataille then states: 'the unknown demands in the end sovereignty without partition'. This can be interpreted in at least two ways: first, that this sovereignty is one of a Nietzschean affirmative master who will not be laden with oppositional thinking, or, second, that Bataille does subscribe to a Hegelian view of reconciliation of all oppositions, and that the dialectic will succeed, albeit beyond the point that Hegel prescribes to it. Geist will only be complete and without partition once it has reconciled itself with its imminent dissolution in the long night to follow the 'end of history'. If this reading of the unknown stands, then this seriously jeopardizes any claim that Bataille holds to a nascent form of transcendental empiricism, for it would imply that the rationalist project of the dialectic will win out in the end anyway, with the proviso that the state of the absolute need not occur as Hegel predicted.

7. IN BATAILLE'S SYSTEM, "INNER KNOWLEDGE" REQUIRES THAT WE "STOP SPEAKING" – WHEN WE SPEAK, WE IMAGINE THAT "WE KNOW."

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 168-169. Bataille defines his inner experience as a 'project', and as such, he commits himself to a view that concepts do not condition experience. He uses the example of words as arbitrary designations, and the process of inner experience negates or abolishes the false power and majesty of language as a matter of course. Words complement the arsenal of the concept to explain existence, but existence does not require explanations. Explanations are post facto denominations on real experience, and as such are only symptoms of experience. It is the error of rational thought to believe that words adequately explain experience or objects, especially since words rely on concepts, and concepts can be too baggy or loose to account for the minute variations, nuances and differences manifest in experience and objects. How is one to communicate the unknown? 'The poetic is the familiar dissolving into the strange, and ourselves with it'. For Bataille, inner experience is ecstasy, ecstasy is communication, and communication is risk. Ecstasy is the only way out of non-knowledge. But this ecstasy of communication is not to be sullied by speech itself, for 'to speak is to imagine knowing.'

8. BATAILLE REJECTS THE NOTION THAT HIS CRITIQUE CAN HAVE A PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVE (SUCH AS WINNING A DEBATE, FOR EXAMPLE).

Kane X. Faucher, (Doctoral Candidate, University of Western Ontario's Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism), *CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE*, 05, 171. The 'richness of too much meaning' that Bataille critiques is an echo of Nietzsche in so far as the assignation of meaning is to make definitions and categories the objective ends of objects themselves. The will to power can have no objective, but must be in a perpetual state of becoming/overcoming, lest it fall back into a will to nothingness that assumes finality and telos.

## **THE “ESSENTIALISM” CRITIQUE OFFERS NO REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

### **1. ESSENTIALISM IS HARMLESS.**

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 97. We may turn next to essentialism, one of the most heinous crimes in the postmodernist book, a well-nigh capital offence or the equivalent in Christian theology to sins against the Holy Spirit. Essentialism in its more innocuous form is the doctrine that things are made up of certain properties, and that some of these properties are actually constitutive of them, such that if they were to be removed or radically transformed the thing in question would then become some other thing, or nothing at all. Stated as such, the doctrine of essentialism is trivially, self-evidently true, and it is hard to see why anyone would want to deny it. It has, as it stands, no very direct political implications, good or bad. Since postmodernists are keen on sensuous particularity, it is surprising in a way that they are so nervous of this belief in the specific whatness of something.

### **2. ESSENTIALISM IS INHERENT IN LANGUAGE – EVEN IN THE LANGUAGE USED BY THE CRITIQUE.**

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 102. One can put the case for essentialism in a negative form. Words like 'feminism' and 'socialism' are unwieldy, portmanteau categories which cover a complex range of beliefs and activities and accommodate an immense amount of disagreement. There is no question of their being tightly bounded or impermeable, any more than the rest of our language is. It is precisely because language is rough-hewn stuff rather than glacially smooth that it works so well. A 'perfect' language would be quite useless for social existence.

### **3. THE LOSS OF ESSENTIALISM CAN LEAD TO GENOCIDE.**

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 99. Nor does a belief in essentialism necessarily commit one to the view that there is only ever one, central property which makes a thing what it is. Essentialism is not necessarily a form of reductionism. It need not involve believing that there is never any doubt about what is essential to something and what is not. On the contrary, it can be the subject of infinite debate. Some people hold that the monarchy is essential to Britain's being what it is, while other people take leave to doubt this fantasy. All kinds of liminal cases are possible, such as wondering whether a bicycle with no wheels, seat or handlebars is still a bicycle, or whether a boat which you have completely rebuilt plank by plank over a period of time is still the boat you began with. What is and isn't essential to being human may be relevant to debates about abortion, or for that matter to imperialism: you might feel happier about slaughtering the natives if you considered that they lacked some property or properties which you took to be definitive of being human. If there is indeed such a thing as human nature, we might very well never come to agree on what it essentially consists in, as the philosophical record to date would strongly intimate.

## **LYOTARD'S REJECTION OF METANARRATIVES OFFERS NO REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

### **1. LYOTARD IMPROPERLY DISREGARDS THE RULES WITH WHICH WE REASON.**

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 21. Lyotard is confusing different registers of rationality. These might be called the rules from which we reason and the rules with which we reason. The former are heterogeneous and may or may not encourage consensus. The latter — the rules with which we reason — provide the framework of intelligibility and the possibility of consensus or dissensus.

### **2. LYOTARD'S ATTACK ON TRUTH AND VALIDITY IS UNJUSTIFIED.**

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 20. Lyotard confuses language games with validity claims. This leads him to conclude that universal pragmatics defines the content of a language game that seeks to hegemonize thought. However, this ignores the character of universal pragmatics as a procedure for argumentation that cuts across all language games. Because any language can be translated into others, language games have a common structure that universal pragmatics seeks to identify. Because of this common structure, we are not in a completely relative world of incommensurable realities. Rather, we can enter into discourse with these other language games and, in principle, come to agreement.

### **3. LYOTARD'S CRITIQUE LEADS TO NIHILISM.**

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 21-22. All discourses of knowledge have a narrative form, and to deny this is to mystify critique. Lyotard's argument could thus be turned back at him to show that what he provides is a meta-narrative of nihilism. To assert that all discourses of social relations are equally arational and amoral is also to view them as equally rational and moral. Thus Lyotard's pessimism is not only politically irresponsible; it is also intellectually incorrect, since the fact that a truth is socially constructed does not make it untrue.

### **4. LYOTARD'S CRITIQUE UNDERMINES ANY NOTION OF MORALITY.**

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 22. In the end, then, the theories of Lyotard and Habermas have another trait in common: both of them eschew the moral political realm, one through relativistic reduction, the other through idealistic transcendence.

### **5. LYOTARD'S VIEWS ARE ETHICALLY BANKRUPT.**

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE, 94, 20-21. Habermas's second argument is that Lyotard's analysis of modern society is historically inaccurate. The coordination of activity in modern society is based on the dissolution of traditional norms and a reintegration through the development of abstract norms. Because Lyotard fails to recognize the difference between traditional and modern forms of social integration, he views modernity as just another tradition. Finally, according to Habermas, Lyotard's position is ethically and politically bankrupt. It cannot provide grounds for choosing a particular language game or form of life.

### **6. METANARRATIVES SERVE A USEFUL FUNCTION.**

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford U.), THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM, 96, 112. Postmodernism, wedded as it is to the particular, would be reluctant to accept that there are propositions which are true of all times and places, yet which are not simply vacuous or trivial. The statement 'In all times and places, most men and women have led lives of fairly futile labour, usually for the profit of a few' seems one such utterance. 'Women have always suffered oppression' is another. To narrativize these propositions is to help defamiliarize them — to recover something of our naive astonishment at what we had taken for granted.

7. THE REJECTION OF ALL METANARRATIVES IS SILLY.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., English, Oxford), *THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM*, 96, 109-110. The rejection of so-called metanarratives is definitive of postmodern philosophy, but the options it poses here are sometimes rather narrow. Either you are enthused by a particular metanarrative, such as the story of technological progress or the march of Mind, or you find these fables oppressive and turn instead to a plurality of tales. But we have seen already that these are not the only choices available, as indeed the more intelligent postmodernist recognizes.

## **CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS A DEEPLY FLAWED PHILOSOPHY**

### **1. THE CLAIM THAT HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS ARE A WESTERN CREATION IS MISTAKEN.**

A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not written exclusively by Western authors.

Daan Bronkhort, (Staff, Dutch Section, Amnesty International), *DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS*, 2001, 12-13. Many individuals helped draft the Universal Declaration. Among its authors, the French legal scholar Rene Cassin (1887-1976) deserves special mention. During World War II he was among those who devised international standards on genocide. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968. The subtleties of the text, however, were not the work of only one man. They represented the collective effort of scholars, lawyers, politicians, and UN officials. Nor was the Declaration written exclusively by Western authors. Prominent members of the working group included specialists from Latin America and Asia.

B. Human rights universals are written into the domestic law of almost every nation on earth.

Louis Henkin, (Prof., Law, Columbia Law School), *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*, Jan. 01, 255. Ours is the age of rights. Human rights is the idea of our time, the only political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, has been approved by virtually all governments representing all societies. Human rights are enshrined in the constitutions of virtually every one of today's 170 states—old states and new; religious, secular, and atheist; Western and Eastern; democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian; market economy, socialist, and mixed; rich and poor, developed, developing, and less developed. Human rights is the subject of numerous international agreements, the daily grist of the mills of international politics, and a bone of continuing contention among superpowers.

J. Shand Watson, (Prof., Law, Mercer U.), *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*, Jan. 2001, 255. The penetration of human rights below the surface of the state—their entry into, and effective governance of, most legal systems today—is the single most important measure of the success of the idea of human rights. Instead of dying, as Watson suggests, the idea of human rights has now become an integral part of the fabric of societies throughout the world. Domestic legal systems—that is, in effect, sovereign states—are now enforcing human rights because they constitute domestic law. What is more, civil-society organizations in many countries now vigilantly police government respect for, and guarantees of, basic human rights. The fact that human rights laws are nevertheless violated does not distinguish them from other species of rights or obligations in criminal law, tort law, or contract law.

David Reidy, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Tennessee), *UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS*, 2005, 1. Nearly all governments of the world have now expressed their commitment to “fundamental human rights, . . . the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] . . . the equal rights of men and women” everywhere? Through the Charter of the United Nations, nearly all states have formally committed themselves to promote, realize, and “take action” to achieve human rights and fundamental freedoms for all “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” The General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” in a “Universal Declaration” of the particular human rights to which “everyone is entitled” from birth. Most states have given binding legal effect to most, in some cases all, of these listed rights through multilateral treaties, in their own constitutions, or both.

C. Human rights universals arose first in Eastern cultures, not Western ones.

William Talbott, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Washington), *WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL*, 2005, 40. The first known advocates of religious tolerance were from the East, not the West. Sen points to the Indian emperor Ashoka, who ruled in the third century B.C. (1999, 236). Ashoka was an eloquent advocate of religious tolerance who guaranteed it for all of his subjects. Perhaps the earliest known advocate of religious tolerance was Cyrus the Great, king of Persia in the sixth century B.C.E. Cyrus also opposed slavery and freed thousands of slaves. These facts do not make Cyrus or Ashoka an advocate of human rights. They do show that the ideas that led to the development of human rights are not limited to one cultural tradition.

Daan Bronkhort, (Staff, Dutch Section, Amnesty International), DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, 2001, 6-7. In China, Mencius presented a great many ideas that were remarkably similar to the Western tradition of natural law.' Mencius submitted that mankind was naturally inclined to do good, to aspire to social conduct, harmony, and prudent actions. Is it not human nature to rescue a child about to fall into a well? This implies that rulers must cultivate what is intrinsically present in every human being. In war and economic crisis, people are unlikely to develop normal human nature; they can only become true human beings in conditions of peace, justice and harmony.

Daan Bronkhort, (Staff, Dutch Section, Amnesty International), DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, 2001, 6. Human beings have contemplated human nature since the dawn of human civilization. Many have reflected upon mankind's intrinsic goodness or badness. Good human attributes were emphasized by traditions such as Christianity and by the Chinese Confucianist philosopher Mencius (Meng Tzu, third century BO. Other philosophers, for example Plato (fourth century BC) and his contemporary the Chinese legal philosopher Xun Zi, focused on the bad in mankind. These philosophers set great store by the enforcement of law and order, through dictatorial measures if necessary. Both types of philosophers formulated ideas about human rights principles, albeit from different perspectives.

William Talbott, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Washington), WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL, 2005, 40. Before considering whether cultural relativism about human rights is true, it is important to mention that some of the empirical claims on which it is typically based are simply false. It is sometimes suggested, for example, that human rights apply to Western societies, because Western societies have a tradition of respecting human rights. However, Western societies do not have a tradition of respecting human rights. Human rights are a relatively recent development, even in the West. Consider, for example, the right to religious freedom. It is true that many Western democracies now recognize such a right. However, it is a mistake to think that Western Europe has a tradition of religious tolerance. On the contrary, as Zagorin says in a history of the development of religious toleration: "Of all the great world religions past and present, Christianity has been by far the most intolerant" (2003, 1). I believe it is this tradition of religious intolerance in the West that set the stage for the discovery of a right to religious tolerance.

D. Islamic cultures support the notion of human rights universalism.

Daan Bronkhort, (Staff, Dutch Section, Amnesty International), DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, 2001, 8. Islamic ideas about human rights stress that people are absolute equals, irrespective of race, religion, nationality or status.' According to the Holy Koran, no people or individual is superior to any other. Human beings are sacred and may not be killed, except after they have been tried in a court of law. Religion contains no coercive element, and the diversity of religions has been granted by God. Justice should always prevail over hatred. In addition, the Koran prescribes many duties. The more repressive views in some Islamic currents, such as those of fundamentalism, are based less on the Koran than on subsequent interpretations in the Shari'a (law).

E. Cross-cultural research finds basically the same human rights norms in every culture.

Daan Bronkhort, (Staff, Dutch Section, Amnesty International), DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, 2001, 24-25. Does scholarly research reveal that cultures are very different, or are they essentially derived from the same choices and patterns? Our limited knowledge of the diversity of cultures suggests that standards are indeed largely universal. All cultures have principles such as the fundamental obligation to tell the truth, the prohibition of murder and theft, and the protection of the vulnerable from the whims of rulers.

F. The claim that there is a divide between Western and non-Western cultures on human rights norms is totally fictitious.

Marie-Benedicte Dembour, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Sussex), CULTURE AND RIGHTS, 2001, 59. A second problem with cultural relativism is that it often posits a stark ideological divide between the collectivism of would-be 'traditional' societies and the individualism of the West. The argument runs that the individual logic of the human rights ideology does not suit the more communitarian logic of non-Western societies. This is to forget that even these societies recognize the purposeful agent (a term possibly more adequate than the 'individual', which tends to connote a Western subject endowed with rights and duties) and the need for his or her protection.' The stark divide posited between the West and the rest of the world just does not exist.

## 2. THERE IS A LARGE PRESUMPTION AGAINST CULTURAL RELATIVISM.

A. Cultural relativism has been rejected by the greatest philosophers of the Western and non-Western philosophical traditions.

B.W. Van Norden, (Prof., Philosophy, Vassar College), WHAT IS RELATIVISM, Aug. 24, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil105/whatisrelativism.pdf>. Almost no one in the Western intellectual tradition has been a relativist. The fact that almost none of the great philosophers, poets, and religious leaders of the West for over two millennia have been relativists should make us pause and think a moment. Some people will not be surprised by this fact. They are aware that relativism is a rare doctrine in the Western tradition, but they think that this is precisely the problem with the Western tradition. Such people advocate adopting relativism as a way of overthrowing the Western tradition. But consider another fact. I have also studied several non-Western traditions. No one is an expert in every non-Western culture. However, I have studied the Chinese tradition in depth, and the Japanese, Korean and Indian philosophical traditions to a lesser extent. Based on that study, I can tell you that, if anything, relativism is even less common in these non-Western traditions than it is in the West. As Gandhi said, "Truth does not become error just because it is widely believed, nor does error become truth for the same reason." Consequently, if you believe in relativism, you are disagreeing with the major thinkers of not just the Western tradition, but of at least several major non-Western traditions as well.

B. Even many postmodern philosophers have rejected cultural relativism.

B.W. Van Norden, (Prof., Philosophy, Vassar College), WHAT IS RELATIVISM, Aug. 24, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil105/whatisrelativism.pdf>. Despite its problems, there are some philosophers who try to defend cognitive relativism, such as Nelson Goodman in his *Ways of Worldmaking*. In addition, Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* has been read as a defense of cognitive relativism. However, Kuhn himself later argued that this was a misreading of his work, and most philosophers agree that neither Goodman nor anyone else has succeeded in giving a coherent cognitive relativist position.

Sandra LaFave, (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, West Valley College), RELATIVISM, Aug. 16, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/relativ.htm>. Most contemporary philosophers would agree that everybody does have a point of view, and that no one has perfect God-like objectivity. But so what? Does that imply that all beliefs are equally reasonable and that one person's belief is necessarily as true as another's? No. "There's no view from nowhere" does not imply that "epistemologically, anything goes!" In other words, even if Premise2 is reasonable, the argument for relativism still fails the logic test.

C. Relativism has been consistently rejected since the time of Plato.

B.W. Van Norden, (Prof., Philosophy, Vassar College), WHAT IS RELATIVISM, Aug. 24, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil105/whatisrelativism.pdf>. About 2,400 years ago, Plato presented what almost all philosophers have since regarded as a definitive refutation of cognitive relativism. Plato argued (in response to Protagoras) that cognitive relativism is self-contradictory.

## 3. CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS INHERENTLY SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY.

A. One must assume the possibility of objectivity in order to condemn objectivity.

B.W. Van Norden, (Prof., Philosophy, Vassar College), WHAT IS RELATIVISM, Aug. 24, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil105/whatisrelativism.pdf>. Here's another way of seeing the problem with cognitive relativism. However you formulate it, cognitive relativism is a perspective about the nature of other perspectives. (Cognitive relativism is the perspective that claims are true or false only relative to a perspective.) But what perspective does cognitive relativism itself occupy? Where does the cognitive relativist "stand" when he makes his claim? The only perspective from which you could assert cognitive relativism would be a perspective "above" and "outside" all other perspectives. In order to assert his own doctrine, the cognitive relativist has to (whether he likes it or not) take a "God's eye view" of all the other perspectives, and pass judgment on them. ("And I said unto them, your views are all relative.") But then the cognitive relativist has to assume that there is an objective point of view in order to deny that there is one. And this is just self-contradictory.

B.W. Van Norden, (Prof., Philosophy, Vassar College), WHAT IS RELATIVISM, Aug. 24, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil105/whatisrelativism.pdf>. Cognitive relativism (whether cultural or subjective) is incoherent, because it has to adopt an objective point of view in order to assert that there is no objective point of view.

Sandra LaFave, (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, West Valley College), RELATIVISM, Aug. 16, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/relativ.htm>. When the relativist criticizes absolutism for causing harm, the relativist seems to be presupposing an objective inter-cultural notion of harm. But this is exactly the sort of idea a relativist cannot presuppose, since according to relativism, what counts as harm for one culture might not count as harm for another.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER, 98, 173. The argument goes as follows: since we cannot justify any particular culture on the basis of rationality, we are forced to tolerate a whole variety of cultural forms. Thus, the rejection of the Enlightenment faith in the power of reason, leads to pluralism. This argument, which was originally advanced by Isaiah Berlin, has a well-known logical flaw. It involves an appeal to the indefensibility of all forms of cultural life in order to defend a single one.

B. The call for cultural tolerance is itself a universalist notion.

Sandra LaFave, (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, West Valley College), RELATIVISM, Aug. 16, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/relativ.htm>. The argument is self-contradictory.

“Everyone should be respectful and tolerant” is a moral maxim the relativist intends to apply to all people in all cultures; yet at the same time the relativist denies that any moral maxims apply to all people in all cultures! Tawia Ansah, (Prof., Law, New England School of Law), SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE, Summer 2003, 309-310. Thus began the protracted theoretical debate between cultural relativists and universalists. The latter suggested that the argument against universalism is “self-contradictory,” since if all values are relative, then the value judgment that values are culturally relative undercuts its own argument as a per se rule.

William Talbott, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Washington), WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL, 2005, 43. Relativists wish to be sensitive to other points of view and to acknowledge the value of what other people believe. This is an admirable idea. But they express it by saying things like “All moral views are equally valid” or “All cultural norms are equally valid.” Views of this kind I call wishy-washy. The conquistador example reveals a problem for all wishy-washy views. Suppose the relativist claims that all moral views are equally valid. What will she say to someone whose moral view includes the proposition that all moral views are not equally valid? In the extreme case, the interlocutor may believe that those who believe that all moral views are equally valid should be killed. This is not just an idle possibility. People have been put to death for asserting that there is more than one equally valid religious view.

Xiaorong Li, (Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland), FREE INQUIRY MAGAZINE, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. [http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li\\_18\\_4.html](http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li_18_4.html). Relativists have made explicit one central value - equal respect and tolerance of other ways of life, which they insist to be absolute and universal. Ethical relativism is thus repudiated by itself. An ethical relativist should respect and tolerate the differences between individuals within a culture. And in so doing, he will be endorsing individual freedom.

C. Cultural relativists violate their own standards.

Guyora Binder, (Prof., Law, State U. of New York at Buffalo), BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, 1999, 214-215. If the “cultural relativists” really believe in some values, that means that they think some values are better than other values — for example, that material welfare is more important than free speech, or that group solidarity is more important than the rule of law. And if they think that some values are superior to other values, then they cannot truly think that all cultures are of equal value. They must believe that cultures devoted to “good” values are better than cultures devoted to “bad” values. Otherwise, their value relativism collapses into value nihilism and they have no basis on which to prefer social democracy to Nazism, or to prefer an Islamic theocracy to a Satanic cult. Indeed, if cultural relativists really believe that all cultures must be tolerated as equally valuable, then they are compelled to tolerate even militant colonialists who regard non-western peoples as savages unworthy of self-rule.

William Talbott, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Washington), WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL, 2005, 42. Is the cultural imperialism argument sound? No, on the contrary, it is deeply incoherent. To understand the incoherence, notice that the argument begins from the claim that it was wrong for the Western Europeans to forcibly impose their norms on the American natives. This is itself a moral criticism of the Western Europeans' norms for the treatment of the American natives. The conclusion of the cultural imperialism argument is that it is never appropriate to criticize a culture's norms. So the argument undermines the very insight that motivated it. If you believe the cultural imperialism of the Western European colonizers really was wrong, you should not be an extreme cultural relativist.



4. CULTURAL RELATIVISM ENABLES DEATH AND SUFFERING.

A. Relativism asks us to be indifferent to suffering.

Marie-Benedicte Dembour, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Sussex), *CULTURE AND RIGHTS*, 2001, 59. Following from this, cultural relativism obscures the fact that the spread of the modern state makes human rights relevant throughout the world. I ask the few students who fiercely contest the value of universal human rights in my classroom whether they think that opponents who face execution in a dictatorial state would accept that the fact that they are from a non-Western culture invalidates their claims for human rights protection. I try to tell them: 'Feel something, and say something!' In other words, I ask them to resist a cultural relativist position which can make moral agents indifferent to immoral situations.

B. Relativism enables ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE RETURN OF TRIBALISM*, 05. Online. Internet. <http://www.sydneyline.com/>. Cultural relativism began as an intellectual critique of Western thought but has now become an influential justification for one of the contemporary era's most potent political forces. This is the revival of tribalism in thinking and politics. The demand by representatives of tribal cultures to have the sole governance of their affairs is probably the biggest single cause of bloodshed in the world today. It has produced the charnel house politics of Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Central Africa and the Balkans. Postmodernism and cultural relativism are complicit in this—both in their insistence on the integrity of all tribal cultures, no matter what practices or values they perpetuate, and in their denunciation of all imperial cultures. In *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward Said even takes to task the Marxist literary critic Raymond Williams for the 'massive absence' in his work of any condemnation of the English imperialism imposed upon Williams's Welsh ancestors. Rather than being regarded as any advance in political conceptualisation, however, the politics of relativism should be recognised as simply a mirror image of the racist ideologies that accompanied and justified Western imperialism in the colonial era: once it was the West that imagined it brought civilisation to the heathen; today it is tribal cultures that are revered as humane, and imperial cultures that are condemned as brutish.

C. Relativism enables Chinese oppression.

Xiaorong Li, (Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland), *FREE INQUIRY MAGAZINE*, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. [http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li\\_18\\_4.html](http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li_18_4.html). Challenges to universality of human rights have continued and, more specifically, have flared up in China, where government leaders have asserted particularist cultural values. Confucianism and other traditions of thought were long derided in favor of Marxism. Having faced the need to counter international criticisms of its human rights record since 1989, the Chinese authorities now claim that their political repression is justified by traditional "cultural values." Replying to questions about human rights during Clinton's visit, Chinese president Jiang Zemin thus defended the government's authoritarian policies: "[t]he two countries differ in social system, ideology, historical tradition and cultural background, the two countries have different means and ways in realizing human rights and fundamental freedoms." Official statements have declared that China has its own unique cultural values (such as obedience to authority, collectivism, family, and other dispositions), which are said to be opposed to human rights ideals that cherish individual freedom and tolerance.

D. Relativism breeds racism.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 279-280. Those who are arguing for the revival of tribalism, then, are not only trying to push the barrow of history back up a pretty steep slope but are involved in some expensive political and cultural trade-offs. The return of tribalism would mean a revival of cultural diversity, which might have some value from an aesthetic point of view but would also have its down side. A revival of cultural exclusiveness would mean a return to differentiating between human beings on the basis of genealogical blood lines, in other words, on racial grounds. If the history of the twentieth century has taught anything it is that the attempt to establish societies based on the latter is a sure road to catastrophe.

E. Relativists enable authoritarian oppression in Iran.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), THE RETURN OF TRIBALISM, 05. Online. Internet. <http://www.sydneynline.com/>. Cultural relativism's attitude both to morals and to politics is similar to its views on epistemology. There can be no universals in either. While those of us brought up with Western concepts of morality might find the practices of some non-Western people abhorrent—such as the ritual execution and cannibalisation of thousands of people a year practised by the Aztecs of Mexico—cultural relativism holds that we should recognise such feelings as the product of our own cultural confines. We have no right either to judge or to act, as the Spaniards of the sixteenth century did, against the practices of such other cultures. The political perspective of cultural relativism regards each culture as free to pursue its own ends within its own traditions and rationalities. Western concepts such as democracy, free speech and human rights are not universal principles but merely the products of specific times and places—the Enlightenment of eighteenth century Europe and its Western successors—which should not be imposed on other times and places. Hence, Foucault, though a citizen of republican, democratic France, found no inconsistency in publicly endorsing the bloody and authoritarian religious state of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

F. Relativism enables government oppression.

Xiaorong Li, (Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland), FREE INQUIRY MAGAZINE, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. [http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li\\_18\\_4.html](http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li_18_4.html). Modern states have been the worst threat to indigenous peoples. Their struggle for survival, autonomy, and empowerment has much in common with the struggle for individual freedom from repressive states. In Asia, many indigenous groups have joined the United Nations' Nongoverning Organizations' movement to demand rights both for their groups and the individuals in them. They declared that “[w]e affirm that all peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. The right of peoples to self-determination must, therefore, be observed by all governments.” The right to self-determination is declared a right of indigenous peoples against the state, rather than a state's right to “trump” its citizens' rights to free association, free religious worship, and free assembly.

J. Oloka-Onyango, (Dean, School of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda), BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, 2000, 49. In most instances, relativists are politicians from the south whose human rights practices are at a minimum questionable, and often extremely violative on a host of fronts. Regarding the situation of women in particular, relativists seek to retain the dominance of patriarchal structures of social ordering and to resist what would amount to a diminution of traditionally exercised power and control within the family, and its attendant implications to the community and the state.

G. Relativism endorses the moral ground for rape, torture, and murder.

Xiaorong Li, (Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland), FREE INQUIRY MAGAZINE, Fall 1998. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. [http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li\\_18\\_4.html](http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/li_18_4.html). When a girl fights to escape female genital circumcision or foot-binding or arranged marriage, when a widow does not want to be burned to death to honor her dead husband, the relativist is obliged to “respect” the cultural or traditional customs from which the individuals are trying to escape. In so doing, the relativist is not merely disrespecting the individual but effectively endorsing the moral ground for torture, rape, and murder. On moral issues, ethical relativists can not possibly remain neutral — they are committed either to the individual or to the dominant force within a culture.

5. RELATIVISM IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE: IT DOES NOT PROMOTE RACIAL TOLERANCE.

A. Relativism promotes ethnocentrism.

Sandra LaFave, (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, West Valley College), RELATIVISM, Aug. 16, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/relativ.htm>. Relativism actually encourages the very ethnocentrism good-hearted relativists are trying to combat. People who have internalized the message of relativism rightly conclude that other cultures are hermetically sealed. You often hear people of good will say things like “You just can't understand people of my sex/people of my race/people of my sexual orientation, etc., if you haven't had our particular experience of oppression, if you're not one of us.” But if you can't really learn anything about other cultures, why try? Why not be lazy and give up?

B. Relativism demeans other cultures.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE RETURN OF TRIBALISM*, 05. Online. Internet. <http://www.sydneyline.com/>. The late Ernest Gellner pointed out the basic logical flaws in cultural relativism. In his book *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, Gellner showed that relativists are saddled with two unresolvable dilemmas. They endorse as legitimate other cultures that do not return the compliment. Some other cultures, of which one of the best known is Islam, will have no truck with relativism of any kind. The devout are totally confident of the universalism of their own beliefs which derive from the dictates of God, an absolute authority who is external to the world and its cultures. They regard a position such as postmodern cultural relativism as profoundly mistaken and, moreover, debasing. Relativism devalues their faith because it reduces it to merely one of many equally valid systems of meaning. So, entailed within cultural relativism is, first, an endorsement of absolutisms that deny it, and, second, a demeaning attitude to cultures it claims to respect.

C. Relativism makes us speechless – unable to talk to one another across cultures.

Richard H. Bell, (Prof., Philosophy, College of Wooster & Rhodes University, South Africa), *POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL READER*, 1997, 206. The first (relativism) leaves us speechless, unable to talk critically about our differences, while the second (hegemony of a “race”) fails to recognize our common humanness and the fact that “contamination” goes both ways. We must recognize what is common in our ways of acting, and awaken to the fact that what we share as human beings demands reciprocity in understanding. Whatever our differences, there are overriding moral and practical reasons why we should seek mutual understanding. On moral grounds Appiah says, “unless all of us understand each other, we shall not treat each other with the proper respect,” and practically, we live in a time when only the invincibly ignorant could suppose that continents and cultures are not politically and economically connected and interdependent.

K. Anthony Appiah, (Prof., Philosophy, Princeton U. & Citizen of Ghana), *GLOBALIZING RIGHTS*, 2003, 214. Rorty supposes that the rationalist is bound to think that 'we' are right and 'they' are wrong: but if there is one world only, then it is also possible that they might be right. We can only learn from each other's stories if we share both human capacities and a single world: relativism about either is a reason not to converse but to fall silent.

D. Relativism invites racist attitudes.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 274. Here we can see not only the disastrous intellectual consequences of this position but also political perspectives that are the opposite of what they claim to be. It is the universalism of Western science that recognises all human beings as the same people with the same origins. In opposition to this, cultural relativism supports the view that each native group is different and unique and that those who think they are biologically distinct are entitled to their belief. It is Western universalism that is anti-racist, not relativism.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 209. But the most important problem is that any possibility of a social critique that could reach those who are not already convinced—a necessity, given the present infinitesimal size of the American left—becomes logically impossible, due to the subjectivist presuppositions. If all discourses are merely “stories” or “narrations”, and none is more objective or truthful than another, then one must concede that the worst sexist or racist prejudices and the most reactionary socio-economic theories are “equally valid”, at least as descriptions or analyses of the real world (assuming that one admits the existence of a real world). Clearly, relativism is an extremely weak foundation on which to build a criticism of the existing social order.

E. Relativism entrenches cultural misunderstanding.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE RETURN OF TRIBALISM*, 05. Online. Internet. <http://www.sydneyle.com/>. The very existence of the discipline of anthropology itself provides another kind of dilemma. If other cultures were really so alien that there was no common human perception or underlying human nature, their meanings systems would be forever beyond our grasp. We could study their external behaviour but could never pretend to what the German philosophic tradition calls *verstehen*, that is, the ability to think ourselves into their mentalities. Yet *verstehen* is exactly what anthropologists like Sahlins are claiming to offer when they explain the meaning of the religious ceremonies and symbols of other cultures. In a powerful critique of the relativism of what they call the 'standard social science model', the evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides have argued that without the existence of a universal human 'metaculture' it would be impossible for us to understand the meanings of other cultures. The best refutation of cultural relativism, they argue, is the activity of anthropologists themselves—who could not understand or live within other human groups unless the inhabitants of those groups shared assumptions that were, in fact, similar to those of the ethnographer.

F. Relativism undermines individual choice.

Marie-Benedicte Dembour, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Sussex), *CULTURE AND RIGHTS*, 2001, 59. Cultural relativism tends to assume that people are more determined by their culture than they in fact are. This is problematic because individuals are boxed in a mode which is presumed to suit them, closing them off from avenues they may have preferred to embrace.

6. RELATIVISM SHOULD NOT BE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR INACTION.

Farish Noor, (Netherlands Humanist Committee on Human Rights), *DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS*, 2001, 50. Let me begin by stating quite unequivocally that in my view cultural differences are not a barrier to a global promotion of human rights and liberties. Concern to protect and promote fundamental human liberties and dignity exists in all cultures; it is part of the religious, philosophical, cultural and political discourses of the people themselves.

7. RELATIVISM INCORRECTLY ASSUMES THAT CULTURES ARE STATIC.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 279. Unfortunately, the historical record does not support the thesis. For the past ten thousand years at least, indigenous cultures on every continent have been subject to a process of change that has varied from merger and absorption into other cultures to complete obliteration by a conquering power. Every culture that exists today has been subject to either violent or peaceful amalgamation and absorption of earlier smaller communities.

8. RELATIVISM CREATES A FALSE DICHOTOMY – ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO ADOPT ABSOLUTE UNIVERSALISM IN ORDER TO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES ARE EVIL.

Sandra LaFave, (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, West Valley College), *RELATIVISM*, Aug. 16, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/relativ.htm>. The argument presupposes that there are only two options: absolutism and relativism. This is a false dilemma fallacy. Relativism is not the only alternative to absolutism. One could reject absolutism and still say that some behaviors are morally better or worse. Most contemporary moral theories, e.g., utilitarianism and virtue ethics, are neither absolutist nor relativist.

J. Oloka-Onyango, (Dean, School of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda), *BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW*, 2000, 49. Although the question of culture is certainly an important and relevant one in the discussion about human rights today, much of the debate on the subject is, as Yash Ghai has pointed out, unproductive. This is because it adopts concepts from both Universalists and relativists. The "Universalists" assert that the Universal Declaration and the corpus of norms that have evolved around it constitute a truly universal ethos over which there can be no debate. At the other end of the spectrum are the "relativists" who assert that there can be no universalities; all human rights standards must be subjected to the local conditions specific to the country, the culture, or the religion in question. The relativists erect culture as a barrier to criticism or challenge of practices that clearly violate fundamental human rights.

Marie-Benedicte Dembour, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Sussex), *CULTURE AND RIGHTS*, 2001, 56. Universalism and relativism are often presented as two opposite and irreconcilable moral (or epistemological) positions as regards human rights. Most often, the debate is phrased as if one should embrace either one or the other position. This chapter argues that these two positions cannot be considered independently of each other. Each is untenable by itself and needs to accommodate the other to be sustainable.

Sandra LaFave, (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, West Valley College), RELATIVISM, Aug. 16, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/relativ.htm>. The relativist conclusion is simply too strong. Even if there's no view from nowhere, it's not necessarily the case that "anything goes" epistemologically and you can believe whatever you like and all beliefs are equally correct. For example, even if there's no "view from nowhere," my belief that "red means stop" is still a better belief than "red means go," for practical (pragmatic) reasons. Pragmatist philosophers would point out that some beliefs, especially scientific ones are extremely useful as predictors; these beliefs work. For example, scientific beliefs about gravity and acceleration and mass, etc., correctly predict that people who jump off the Empire State Building will die. A person really can't say, "Well, I don't have to worry about that, because I don't believe in scientific principles."

9. MORAL ISOLATIONISM IS AN IMPOSSIBLE STANDARD.

B.W. Van Norden, (Prof., Philosophy, Vassar College), WHAT IS RELATIVISM, Aug. 24, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil105/whatisrelativism.pdf>. Given the increasing interactions and exchanges among cultures, it is impossible to live up to moral isolationism. Practically speaking, we are forced to make judgments about other cultures all the time. (For example, how can I decide whether I support increasing trade with the People's Republic of China unless I make a judgment about whether trade with the West will make the Chinese government morally better or worse?)

B.W. Van Norden, (Prof., Philosophy, Vassar College), WHAT IS RELATIVISM, Aug. 24, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil105/whatisrelativism.pdf>. Here the premise that is supposed to support ethical relativism is that we have no right to interfere in the lives of others. There are at least two problems with this argument. First, if you think about it, I think you'll agree that the premise is not very plausible. Most of us, anyway, think that we do have a right to interfere in the lives of others, at least some of the time. Typically, we think that we have a right to interfere in the lives of others if their actions have serious consequences for the rest of us. For example, we require drivers to get insurance, because it potentially affects others if they have an accident and are uninsured. And we have zoning laws, so that your next door neighbor cannot turn his house into a hog-rendering plant, with all the associated stench.

10. RELATIVISTS INCORRECTLY ASSUME THAT WE ARE THE PRODUCTS OF A SINGLE CULTURE.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), THE KILLING OF HISTORY, 1996, 279. Peter Munz argues that whether we like it or not, we are all the inheritors of cultures that have been forged out of a long process of suppression and absorption of the cultures that arose before them. Just as inexorably, this has meant that cultures that once were in conflict have ceased their struggle and cultural diversity has diminished. Over time, most of those societies that once housed two or more disparate cultures ceased to be multicultural and became monocultural. This has occurred either by minority cultures succumbing to a dominant culture or through merger and accommodation on terms acceptable to both sides.

## **DE-DEVELOPMENT IS A FAILED PHILOSOPHY**

### **1. DEVELOPMENT SIMPLY MEANS IMPROVING THE LIVES OF ORDINARY PEOPLE.**

Wondem Asres, (Research Fellow, Africa Research Center, The Netherlands), *THE STATE, THE CRISIS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS, AND REFUGEE MIGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA*, 07, 162. If social and economic development means anything at all, as Hettne argues, it must mean a clear improvement in the conditions of life and livelihood of ordinary people.

### **2. DE-DEVELOPMENT PROMOTES INTOLERANCE.**

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 92. When an economy stagnates, however, the importance people attach to living better than others against whom they naturally compare themselves is more intense. The fact they cannot do so, or at least on average cannot, then takes on heightened importance in their eyes. The resulting frustration generates intolerance, ungenerosity, and resistance to greater openness to individual opportunity. It also erodes people's willingness to trust one another, which in turn is a key prerequisite for a successful democracy.

### **3. DE-DEVELOPMENT PROMOTES MILITARISM.**

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 308-309. Focusing in particular on military coups — one all too familiar form of radical political transition — likewise reveals the same short-run relationship between falling incomes and political instability. Because sometimes one dictatorial regime overthrows another, and sometimes a coup can even be the mechanism for creating a democracy, the number of successful military coups that have occurred in recent decades is much greater than the small number of cases (just forty during 1950-90 in Przeworski's study) in which a dictatorship has replaced a democracy. These abrupt changes in government have taken place not only against the background of different regions and different cultures but also under widely varying political circumstances.

### **4. DEVELOPMENT IMPROVES THE MORAL QUALITY OF LIFE – IT IS NOT JUST ABOUT ECONOMICS.**

#### **A. Development promotes tolerance for diversity.**

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 4-5. The value of a rising standard of living lies not just in the concrete improvements it brings to how individuals live but in how it shapes the social, political, and ultimately the moral character of a people. Economic growth — meaning a rising standard of living for the clear majority of citizens — more often than not fosters greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, commitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy. Ever since the Enlightenment, Western thinking has regarded each of these tendencies positively, and in explicitly moral terms. Even societies that have already made great advances in these very dimensions, for example most of today's Western democracies, are more likely to make still further progress when their living standards rise. But when living standards stagnate or decline, most societies make little if any progress toward any of these goals, and in all too many instances they plainly regress.

#### **B. Development enriches community and family life.**

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 11-12. Greater affluence means, among many other things, better food, bigger houses, more travel, and improved medical care. It means that more people can afford a better education. It may also mean, as it did in most Western countries during the twentieth century, a shorter workweek, which allows more time for family and friends. Moreover, these material benefits of rising incomes accrue not just to individuals and their families but to communities and even entire countries. Greater affluence can also mean better schools, more parks and museums, and larger concert halls and sports arenas, not to mention more leisure to enjoy these public facilities.

C. Development improves the quantity and quality of life.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 297-298. The attraction of economic growth in the developing world, where incomes are mostly very low compared to Western industrial standards, is in many ways straightforward. In more than three-fourths of the world's countries, encompassing roughly 5 billion of the world's 6 billion inhabitants, if per capita incomes are higher, people can expect to live longer. Fewer of their children die in infancy. Both children and adults suffer less from malnutrition and disease. They are more likely to have clean water and basic sanitation, and they have better access to medical care. They are more likely to be able to read and write, and they enjoy greater access to education in general. When incomes and living standards are low to begin with, what economic growth means before anything else is enhancement of the most basic dimensions of human life.

D. Development improves interpersonal relationships.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 307-308. And economic growth also helps this process by fostering the kind of interpersonal trust that is a prerequisite for any democracy, either new or old. As political scientist Edward Banfield pointed out long ago, some minimum degree of trust between individuals who are not related by blood or marriage is an essential underpinning to many everyday arrangements — political, commercial, social — in which people must act on the assumption that others will reciprocate. This trust becomes especially important during economic development and modernization, when large numbers of people physically move away from the family- and clan-oriented social networks that often underpin traditional societies. It is important in particular to the functioning of democratic political institutions, under which governing parties that lose elections willingly surrender power because they assume that in the future their successors will do the same. Romantic notions of life in primitive societies to the contrary, surveys have repeatedly shown that the prevailing level of interpersonal trust is greater in countries where incomes on average are higher.

E. Development decreases the likelihood of military coups.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 323-324. One classic study found that each doubling of per capita income reduces the probability of a country's experiencing a successful coup by between 40 percent and 70 percent, depending on the region of the world. In light of this strong relationship — together with the parallel tendency for political instability to depress economic growth — the authors suggested that unfortunate countries may fall into a coup trap, in which poverty fosters political coups, which in turn foster more poverty, and hence more coups. Other forms of extreme political instability, such as attempted coups that do not succeed (in practice less than half do), or political assassinations and executions, likewise occur far more frequently in countries with low per capita incomes.

F. Development promotes educational opportunities.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 332-333. Openness and tolerance not only enhance a society's ability to use its existing human resources efficiently but also foster the development of greater human resources over time. Having an opportunity to get ahead creates the motivation — under the right circumstances, even the sense of obligation — to do so, and in most modern societies education has been one of the primary vehicles for achieving upward mobility. In the United States of not so long ago, barring blacks from most public schools and universities, or women from medical schools, law schools, and business schools, artificially limited the pool of potentially qualified candidates for a broad range of positions throughout the economy. Removing these restrictions has allowed American society to increase sharply its average level of education. So has the increased availability of both private and government-funded scholarships, as well as loans, which enable students from lower- and middle-income families to go on to college. At the opposite end of the economic development spectrum, in many lower-income countries numerous forms of oppression based on gender or ethnicity depress school enrollments and more generally retard the building of human resources.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 334-335. In many countries in Africa, only one-half to two-thirds of children complete a primary education, and in a few countries only one child in three does. Even where enough schools are available (in many developing countries they are not), so that in principle all children have the opportunity to attend, many stop their education prematurely because their families need the extra income they can earn. In light of the very low wages usually paid to child labor, the investment represented by leaving these children in school would pay a handsome rate of return through the increased earning power that these children would have when they entered the workforce, with greater skills, some years later. But their families cannot afford that investment. The advantage of government enabling them to remain in school is clear. Some nondemocratic governments do that too, but democracies have a better record in this regard. Countries where political democracy prevails typically attain greater overall levels of education. Because the more democratic countries are also richer on average, part of the reason is simply that they can afford to provide more education for their citizens. And a more educated citizenry presumably seeks, and in time achieves, more democratic political institutions.

G. Claims that development leaves the poor behind are false.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 352. Repeated studies have shown that as average incomes rise in developing countries, the incomes of the poor rise in pace. Whatever widening of inequality takes place typically occurs as those at the top pull ahead even faster, not because those at the bottom see their incomes stagnate or decline.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 352-353. For example, among the sixty countries for which data on income distribution currently exist for two or more periods at least ten years apart, so that direct comparisons across time are possible within each country, in only three (none a developing country) did the average income of the poorest one-fifth of the population decline while the average income in the country as a whole was rising. Overall, the income of the poorest fifth rose more rapidly than that of the population as a whole in just as many cases as it failed to keep pace. And in countries where the poorest fifth of the population started off with the smallest share of total income — in other words, in countries where the inequality was widest — the poorest fifth typically enjoyed faster income growth than did the population as a whole, so that the poor were, in effect, catching up. On balance, the evidence for today's developing economies suggests about a one-to-one relationship between a country's average income growth and the gains achieved by its lowest-income groups.

H. Development improves the environment.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 380. But it does not take much traveling around the world to discover that the places where pollution is greatest and environmental blight is most readily visible are not those with the highest living standards. Whether the issue is smoke in the air or germs in the water, or even just the discarded clutter and refuse accumulated from ongoing human habitation, countries, regions, and even individual cities where living standards are high in other respects rarely have the most pollution or present the worst eyesores.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 381-382. Rising living standards also influence the technology by which economies produce. For example, roughly four-fifths of the world populations total exposure to particulates in the air takes the form of smoke from indoor cooking fires, typically fueled by wood or coal or peat. For the most part, this form of pollution does not result from any externality. The families that cook their food on these indoor fires expose themselves to smoke inhalation, but typically not others. Most of them have low incomes, and live in low-income countries. If their income were greater, they could afford to cook their food using some other technology. The same influence of rising living standards on peoples choice of technology also applies, however, in settings in which externalities are the crux of the issue, so that the choices involved are matters of collective decision making in other words, public policy: whether to allow the use of (cheaper) leaded gasoline, whether to require cars to carry (expensive) catalytic converters, whether to ban (cheaper) high-sulfur coal, whether to require (expensive) stack scrubbers for factories and utility plants. In each case, altering individuals or firms behavior in ways that reduce pollution imposes a cost. Just as families who have sufficient incomes typically choose not to live with the smoke created by cooking indoors over an open fire, societies where living standards are high can afford to bear some cost for limiting pollution, and most choose to do so. As a result, their incomes as conventionally measured are usually smaller than would otherwise be the case. But because they also care about the air they breathe and the water they drink, and perhaps also about the global climate and the preservation of species, they are nonetheless better-off.



I. Development promotes population control.

Benjamin Friedman, (Journalist), *THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, 05, 392. The forty-two countries where per capita income is below \$2,000 — nearly a billion people — have average population growth of 2.2 percent per annum. Their average fertility is 4.9 births per woman. In the thirty-eight countries with per capita income in the \$2,000 to \$5,000 range, population growth averages 1.4 percent per annum, and the average fertility rate is 3. (Because China and India together account for more than three-quarters of the people living in these countries, however, the situation from a world perspective is actually somewhat better. China's latest population growth is just .7 percent per annum, and the Chinese fertility rate is 1.9. In India population growth has been 1.6 percent and fertility 2.9. As we have also seen, the low-income developing countries have ample incentive to slow their population growth for reasons wholly apart from environmental concerns. In countries where population is increasing rapidly, living standards are improving only slowly or, in all too many cases, eroding. It is clear that limiting fertility, and therefore the increase in its population, is one of the most effective ways for a country with a low-income developing economy to spur the rise in its living standards.

## DECONSTRUCTION IS A FLAWED PHILOSOPHY

### 1. DECONSTRUCTION IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

Robert Bernasconi, (Prof., Philosophy, U. Memphis), *POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL READER*, 1997, 185. The exclusions which deconstruction addressed were exclusions from Western metaphysics of what in some sense nevertheless belonged to it. Worse still, there is a serious question as to whether deconstruction, perhaps in spite of itself, has not paradoxically served to sustain the homogeneity of the tradition that it set out to displace. In spite of its textual rigor, the literature on deconstruction is replete with unsubstantiated generalizations about Western metaphysics that make insufficient allowance for the exceptions.

### 2. EVEN DERRIDA, THE FOUNDER OF DECONSTRUCTION, COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHAT IT IS.

Jonathan Kandell, (Staff), *NEW YORK TIMES*, Oct. 10, 2004, 1. Toward the end of the 20th century, deconstruction became a code word of intellectual discourse, much as existentialism and structuralism - two other fashionable, slippery philosophies that also emerged from France after World War II - had been before it. Mr. Derrida and his followers were unwilling - some say unable - to define deconstruction with any precision, so it has remained misunderstood, or interpreted in endlessly contradictory ways. Typical of Mr. Derrida's murky explanations of his philosophy was a 1993 paper he presented at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, in New York, which began: "Needless to say, one more time, deconstruction, if there is such a thing, takes place as the experience of the impossible."

Jonathan Kandell, (Staff), *NEW YORK TIMES*, Oct. 10, 2004, 1. Late in his career, Mr. Derrida was asked, as he had been so often, what deconstruction was. "Why don't you ask a physicist or a mathematician about difficulty?" he replied, frostily, to Dinitia Smith, a Times reporter, in a 1998. "Deconstruction requires work. If deconstruction is so obscure, why are the audiences in my lectures in the thousands? They feel they understand enough to understand more." Asked later in the same interview to at least define deconstruction, Mr. Derrida said: "It is impossible to respond. I can only do something which will leave me unsatisfied."

### 3. DECONSTRUCTION SMOTHERS MEANINGFUL DISCOURSE UNDER MEANINGLESS JARGON.

Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), *QUADRANT*, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). But what about other main planks of postmodernist practice? Perhaps the most insidious of these has been the entirely negative, and largely self-defeating, quasi-academic process known as deconstruction. Deconstruction willfully fails to see language as an excellent and poetic tool of communication and one in which the listener, also, can play a positive role by trying to perceive meaning even through veils of incoherence. The latter role will be a thoroughly familiar one to psychoanalysts, priests, pedagogues and parents. Deconstruction, which has helped wreck both the teaching of English and the joyful appreciation of literature, is a negative pseudoscience with no positive end-product. But if you feel I am being over-harsh about the subject, this is what the estimable English philosopher Roger Scruton, in *An Intelligent Person's Guide to Modern Culture*, has to say about it: What deconstruction sets before us is a profound mystery, which can be approached only through the incantation of invented words, through a Newspeak which deconstructs: its own meaning in the act of utterance. When at last the veil is lifted, we perceive a wondrous landscape: a world of negations, a world in which, wherever we look for presence we find absence, a world not of people but of vacant idols, offers, in the places where we seek for order, friendship and moral value, only the skeleton of power. There is no creation in this world, though it is full of cleverness—a cleverness actively deployed in the cause of Nothing. It is a world of uncreation, without hope or faith or love, since no “text” could possibly mean those transcendental things. It is a world in which negation has been endowed with the supreme instruments—power and intellect—so making absence into the all-embracing presence.

## GENEALOGICAL THINKING FAILS

### 1. GENEALOGICAL INVESTIGATION ONLY RE-CREATES OPPRESSION.

John Beverley (Professor of Spanish and Latin American Literature and Cultural Studies at Pittsburgh University) *SUBALTERNITY AND REPRESENTATION*, 1999, 33) If, as Said argues, Cuba's project is a continuation of the "negative" logic of the peasant insurgencies it seeks to represent as history, then the question it must pose itself is how it locates itself within the necessarily political project of changing the structures, practices, and discourses that create and maintain subaltern/elite relationships in the present. A historian might say "Guha does this by showing a different way of thinking about social history that produces a new concept of historical subjects and agency, of the nation, the national-popular." But the interests and teleology that govern the project of the historian—its "time of writing," its involvement with the idea of a progressive approximation to truth, the institutional accumulation of knowledge that results, the relation between that knowledge and "good citizenship"—are necessarily different from the "negative" interests and teleology that govern the action of the peasant insurgencies themselves. The project of the historian is still basically a representational project in which, as in Ludwig Wittgenstein's analytic, everything is left as is. Nothing is changed in the past because the past is past; but nothing is changed in the present either, in the sense that the history as such does not modify the existing relations of domination and subordination. Just the opposite, in a way: the accumulation of historical knowledge as cultural capital by the university and knowledge centers deepens already existing subalternities. Paradoxically, then, there might be a moment in which the subaltern would have to array itself against subaltern studies, just as, in Cuba's account, it arrays itself against the symbols of cultural-religious authority in peasant insurrections.

### 2. GENEALOGIES ARE NOT EMANCIPATORY.

Joseph Lewandowski, 1994 (philosophy professor, Central Missouri State), *PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM*, July 1994, p. 109-22 Spanos, however, thinks Foucault can provide an alternative materialist grounding for an emancipatory critical theory that would obviate the objections of someone such as Marcuse. But the turn to Foucault is no less problematic than the original turn to Heidegger Genealogy is not critical in any real way. Nor can it tame or augment what Spanos calls Heidegger's 'overdetermination of the ontologka of power and not, as Spanos thinks, a 'concrete diagnosis' (p 138) of power mechanisms. Thus it dramatizes, on a different level the same shortcomings of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The affiliative relationship (p. 138) that Spanos tries to develop between Heidegger and Foucault in order to avoid the problem Marcuse faced simply cannot work. Where Heidegger ontologizes Being, Foucault ontologizes power. The latter sees power as a strategic and intentional but subjectless mechanism that endows itself and punches out 'docile bodies', whereas the former sees Being as that neutered term and no-thing that call us Foucault (like Spanos) never works out how genealogy is emancipatory, or how emancipation could be realized collectively by actual agents in the world. The 'undefined work of freedom' the later Foucault speaks of in his work. The genealogy of power is as much a hypostatization as is fundamental ontology: such hypostatizations tend to institute the impossibility of practical resistance or freedom. In short, I don't think the Heideggerian 'dialogue' with Foucault sufficiency tames or complements Heidegger, nor does it make his discourse (or Foucault's, for that matter) any more emancipatory or oppositional. Indeed, Foucault's reified theory of power seems to undermine the very notion of 'Opposition' since there is no subject (but rather a 'docile' body) to do the resisting (or in his later work, a privatized self to be within a regime of truth), nor an object to be resisted. As Said rightly points out in *World, The Text, and the Critic*, 'Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society' (p. 221) Foucault's theory of power is shot through with false empirical analysis, yet Spanos seems to accept them as valid diagnoses. Spanos fails to see, to paraphrase Said's criticism of Foucault's theory of power, that power is neither a spider's web without the spider, nor a smoothly functioning diagram.

## **THE CRITIQUE OF GLOBALIZATION IS FLAWED**

### **1. THE GLOBALIZATION CRITIQUE IS LEFTOVER RELIC OF A BYGONE BATTLE BETWEEN MARXISM AND CAPITALISM.**

Achille Mbembe, (Sr. Researcher, Institute of Social & Economic Research, U. Witwatersrand, South Africa), *PUBLIC CULTURE*, 2002, 263-264. First, I must note that the thematics of anti-imperialism is exhausted. This does not mean, however, that the pathos of victimization has been transcended. The anti-imperialist debate was in fact revived during the 1980s and 1990s in the form of a critique of structural adjustment programs and neoliberal conceptions of the state's relation to the market. In the interim, however, the ideology of Pan-Africanism was confronted by the reality of national states that, contrary to received wisdom, turned out to be less artificial than had been thought. A more significant development has been an emerging junction between the old anti-imperialist thematics—"revolution," "anticolonialism"—and the nativist theses. Fragments of these imaginaires are now combining to oppose globalization, to relaunch the metaphysics of difference, to reenchant tradition, and to revive the utopian vision of an Africanity that is coterminous with blackness.

### **2. THE CLAIM THAT GLOBALIZATION DESTROYS INDIGENOUS CULTURE IS INCORRECT.**

Achille Mbembe, (Sr. Researcher, Institute of Social & Economic Research, U. Witwatersrand, South Africa), *PUBLIC CULTURE*, 2002, 266. It can further be stated that, under contemporary processes of globalization, the idioms of kinship deployed in this process of claiming citizenship—relations such as filiation, genealogy, and heritage—can be converted into recyclable resources. One of the vehicles of this conversion is the international lexicon of rights. Whether the right being invoked in a given argument cites the protection of the environment or the claims of minorities or indigenous peoples, in each case the strategy is to assert a wounded identity. The wound is configured in the deprivation of specific rights that a discrete community then attempts to recover through this recourse to the international lexicon. Another vehicle for reenchanting tradition and recycling local identities that is coming to the fore is the market. The market's role in the process is particularly apparent in the contexts of tourism and the politics of heritage.

### **3. GLOBALIZATION DOES NOT PROMOTE A HOMOGENOUS AMERICAN CULTURE.**

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), *GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS*, 06, 35. But it is a myth that globalization involves the imposition of Americanized uniformity, rather than an explosion of cultural exchange. And although—as with any change—it can have downsides, this cross-fertilization is overwhelmingly a force for good.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), *GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS*, 06, 35-36. Fears about an Americanized uniformity are overblown. For a start, many "American" products are not as all-American as they seem; MTV in Asia promotes Thai pop stars and plays rock music sung in Mandarin. Nor are American products all-conquering. Coke accounts for less than two of the 64 fluid ounces that the typical person drinks a day. France imported a mere \$620 million in food from the United States in 2000, while exporting to America three times that. Worldwide, pizzas are more popular than burgers and Chinese restaurants sprout up everywhere.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), *GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS*, 06, 40-41. English may be all-conquering outside America, but in some parts of the United States, it is now second to Spanish. The upshot is that national cultures are fragmenting into a kaleidoscope of different ones. New hybrid cultures are emerging. In "Amexica" people speak Spanglish. Regional cultures are reviving. The Scots and Welsh break with British monoculture. Estonia is reborn from the Soviet Union. Voices that were silent dare to speak again. Individuals are forming new communities, linked by shared interests and passions, that cut across national borders. Friendships with foreigners met on holiday. Scientists sharing ideas over the Internet. Environmentalists campaigning together using e-mail. Greater individualism does not spell the end of community. The new communities are simply chosen rather than coerced, unlike the older ones that communitarians hark back to.

### **4. GLOBALIZATION PRESERVES INDIGENOUS CULTURES.**

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), *GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS*, 06, 40. Yet globalization is not a one-way street. Although Europe's former colonial powers have left their stamp on much of the world, the recent flow of migration has been in the opposite direction. There are Algerian suburbs in Paris, but not French ones in Algiers. Whereas Muslims are a growing minority in Europe, Christians are a disappearing one in the Middle East.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 35. Globalization not only increases individual freedom, but also revitalizes cultures and cultural artifacts through foreign influences, technologies, and markets. Many of the best things come from cultures mixing: Paul Gauguin painting in Polynesia, the African rhythms in rock 'n' roll, the great British curry. Admire the many-colored faces of France's World Cup-winning soccer team, the ferment of ideas that came from Eastern Europe's Jewish diaspora, and the cosmopolitan cities of London and New York.

5. GLOBALIZATION PROMOTES DEMOCRACY.

Daniel Griswold, (Dir., Cato Institute for Trade Policy Studies), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 54. As globalization accelerated in the late 1980s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, so too did the global trend toward democracy. Again, according to Freedom House, the share of the world's governments that are democratically elected has spiked from 40 percent in the mid-1980s to 63 percent in 2002-03.

6. GLOBALIZATION PROMOTES HUMAN RIGHTS.

Daniel Griswold, (Dir., Cato Institute for Trade Policy Studies), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 53. The recent trend toward globalization has been accompanied by a trend toward greater political and civil liberty around the world. In the past 30 years, cross-border flows of trade, investment, and currency have increased dramatically, and far faster than output itself. Trade barriers have fallen unilaterally and through multilateral and regional trade agreements in Latin America; the former Soviet bloc nations; East Asia, including China; and more developed nations as well.

7. GLOBALIZATION PRESERVES THE ENVIRONMENT.

A. The U.S. environment has improved along with the advance of globalization.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 93. Between 1970 and 1997, U.S. population increased 31 percent, vehicle miles traveled increased 127 percent, and gross domestic product increased 114 percent—yet total air pollution actually decreased by about 31 percent.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 93. In 1972, approximately 36% of American streams were usable for fishing and/or swimming. This had increased to 64% by 1982 and 85% by 1994.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 92. Economic indicators show that the U.S. economy is becoming steadily more efficient and less polluting over time, and there is no reason this trend should not continue indefinitely.

B. Claims that globalization promotes an environmental “race-to-the-bottom” are untrue.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 95-96. It's often asserted by trade critics that multi-national corporations, if unrestrained by government oversight, will shop around for countries with lax environmental regulations. This will exert a downward pressure on pollution control efforts, fostering an environmental “race to the bottom.” There is little evidence to support this hypothesis. Studies have shown that such issues as access to markets and labor costs are far more important to companies looking to locate new facilities. When those new facilities are built, there are many reasons why managers tend to maintain high environmental standards, even when not required to do so. As a study by Daniel Esty and Bradford Gentry concluded: First, many companies find that the efficiency of having a single set of management practices, pollution control technologies, and training programs geared to a common set of standards outweigh any cost advantage that might be obtained by scaling back on environmental investments at overseas facilities. Second, multinational enterprises often operate on a large scale, and recognize that their visibility makes them especially attractive targets for local enforcement officials. . . . Third, the prospect of liability for failing to meet standards often motivates better environmental performance.

C. Globalization saves energy.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 92-93. The U.S. economy has shown a remarkable drop in energy intensity during the past 50 years. Between 1949 and 2000, energy consumption per dollar of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped steadily from 20.63 thousand Btu to 10.57. In other words, at the beginning of the new millennium, we were able to produce the same economic output that we had in 1949 using only half as much energy.

D. Globalization improves the environment in developing countries.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 94. Although it's counter-intuitive to many environmental advocates, rising affluence is an important prerequisite to environmental improvement. Empirical research first published in 1992 by the World Bank showed that the statistical relationship between per capita income and certain kinds of pollution is roughly shaped as an inverted U. In other words, economic growth is bad for air and water pollution at the initial stages of industrialization, but later on reduces pollution as countries become rich enough to pay for control technologies.

E. Globalization creates strong consumer demands for environmental quality.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 94. Wealth creation also changes consumer demand for environmental quality. The richer people become, the more they tend to value environmental objectives such as safe drinking water, proper sewage disposal, and clean air. Once these basic needs are met, they begin raising the bar by demanding such "amenities" as scenic vistas and habitat for non-game wildlife. As their income rises, they increasingly have the financial resources to act on these values by imposing appropriate regulations on polluters and purchasing technologies that provide environmental benefits.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 96. The evidence shows that our preference for free trade is not in conflict with our desire for environmental quality. On the contrary, income derived from free trade is a prerequisite for most types of environmental gain. Wealthier people place greater value on environmental amenities, and they have the resources to pay for them. True environmental advocates should embrace global wealth creation as a fundamental strategy for achieving environmental sustainability.

F. Poverty is the key factor preventing expenditure on pollution abatement.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 94. A recent report by the World Trade Organization reinforces these points. The report concludes: One reason why environmental protection is lagging in many countries is low incomes. Countries that live on the margin may simply not be able to afford to set aside resources for pollution abatement. . . . If poverty is at the core of the problem, economic growth will be part of the solution, to the extent that it allows countries to shift gears from more immediate concerns to long run sustainability issues. Indeed, at least some empirical evidence suggests that pollution increases at the early stages of development but decreases after a certain income level has been reached.

G. Marxist economies have the worst record in environmental protection.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 94-95. Many so-called "sustainability" advocates argue for greater central control of the economy through government intervention, but every place this has been tried has proven to be a failure. Some of the most polluted cities on the face of the earth are in countries formerly or currently under socialist rule. Leaders of the former Soviet Union and East Germany were as confident in their ability to run the economy as local sustainable development advocates are in Oregon, but they found out that eliminating market competition also eliminated incentives to develop innovative technologies that use resources more efficiently.

8. GLOBALIZATION PROMOTES WORLD PEACE.

Gerald O'Driscoll, (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 81. Here's a fact that could throw a wrench into the next anti-globalization march (and the next call to arms): The free trade that protestors decry promotes more than just prosperity. A growing body of research suggests it also promotes something much closer to their hearts: Peace.

9. GLOBALIZATION OPPOSES POLITICAL OPPRESSION.

Daniel Griswold, (Dir., Cato Institute for Trade Policy Studies), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 57. Nations open today to international commerce are far more likely to be free from political and civil repression than those nations that remain closed. And around the globe, the broad expansion of international trade and investment has accompanied an equally broad expansion of democracy and the political and civil freedoms it is supposed to protect.

10. GLOBALIZATION LOOSENS THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NATIONALISM.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 38. The really profound cultural changes have little to do with Coca-Cola. Western ideas about liberalism and science are taking root almost everywhere, while Europe and North America are becoming multicultural societies through immigration, mainly from developing countries. Technology is reshaping culture: Just think of the Internet. Individual choice is fragmenting the imposed uniformity of national cultures. New hybrid cultures are emerging, and regional ones reemerging. National identity is not disappearing, but the bonds of nationality are loosening.

11. GLOBALIZATION PROMOTES DIVERSITY.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 38. Cross-cultural exchange can spread greater diversity as well as greater similarity: more gourmet restaurants as well as more McDonald's outlets. And just as a big city can support a wider spread of restaurants than a small town, so a global market for cultural products allows a wider range of artists to thrive. If all the new customers are ignorant, a wider market may drive down the quality of cultural products: Think of tourist souvenirs. But as long as some customers are well informed (or have "good taste"), a general "dumbing down" is unlikely. Hobbyists, fans, artistic pride, and professional critics also help maintain (and raise) standards.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 41. So is national identity dead? Hardly. People who speak the same language, were born and live near each other, face similar problems, have a common experience, and vote in the same elections still have plenty in common. For all our awareness of the world as a single place, we are not citizens of the world but citizens of a state. But if people now wear the bonds of nationality more loosely, is that such a bad thing? People may lament the passing of old ways. Indeed, many of the worries about globalization echo age-old fears about decline, a lost golden age, and so on. But by and large, people choose the new ways because they are more relevant to their current needs and offer new opportunities.

12. GLOBALIZATION PROMOTES PERSONAL CHOICE.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 35. The beauty of globalization is that it can free people from the tyranny of geography. Just because someone was born in France does not mean they can only aspire to speak French, eat French food, read French books, and so on. That we are increasingly free to choose our cultural experiences enriches our lives immeasurably. We could not always enjoy the best the world has to offer.

Philippe Legrain, (Economist), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 38. Cross-border cultural exchange increases diversity within societies—but at the expense of making them more alike. People everywhere have more choice, but they often choose similar things. That worries cultural pessimists, even though the right to choose to be the same is an essential part of freedom.

13. GLOBALIZATION PROMOTES CIVIL SOCIETY.

GL PROMOTES CIVIL SOCIETY Daniel Griswold, (Dir., Cato Institute for Trade Policy Studies), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 50-51. This dispersion of economic control, in turn, creates space for nongovernmental organizations and private-sector alternatives to political leadership—in short, civil society. A thriving private economy creates sources of funding for nonstate institutions, which in turn can provide ideas, influence, and leadership outside the existing government. A more pluralistic social and political culture greatly enhances the prospects for a more pluralistic and representative political system. Private-sector corporations, both domestic and foreign-owned, create an alternate source of wealth, influence, and leadership. Theologian and social thinker Michael Novak identified this as the "Wedge Theory," in which capitalist practices "bring contact with the ideas and practices of the free societies, generate the economic growth that gives political confidence to a rising middle class, and raise up successful business leaders who come to represent a political alternative to military or party leaders. In short, capitalist firms wedge a democratic camel's nose under the authoritarian tent."

14. GLOBALIZATION DOES NOT PROMOTE RESOURCES SHORTAGES.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 93. Agricultural production: in the past 30 years, the production of food grains in the United States increased by 82%, while the amount of land used for growing remained relatively constant. Planted areas for all crops today in the U.S. is actually lower than it was in 1930; this has freed up land for other non-commodity uses such as wildlife habitat and outdoor recreation.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 93. The net growth of timber has exceeded the levels of timber harvest every decade since 1952. According to the U.S. Forest Service, we currently grow about 22 million net new cubic feet of wood per year, while harvesting only about 16.5 million, a net increase of 36% annually.

John A. Charles, (Environmental Policy Dir., Cascade Policy Institute), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 93. Resources that were once considered scarce are now known to be abundant. Between 1950 and 2000, the proven reserves of bauxite went up 1,786%. Reserves of chromium increased 5,143%, and quantities of copper, iron ore, nickel, tin and zinc all went up by more than 125%. The 1970s forecasts of doom for oil proved to be spectacularly wrong; the retail price of gasoline in the late 1990's (adjusted for inflation) was cheaper than at any time in history.

15. GLOBALIZATION PROMOTES THE INTER-DEPENDENCE OF PEOPLES.

Abbas Ali, (Dir., American Society for Competitiveness), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 21. Globalization symbolizes commitment and desire for a better future. It conveys optimism, and offers infinite possibilities for growth, renewal, and revitalization for every participant in world society. That is, globalization represents a giant qualitative leap forward in the history of humankind. Its underlying assumptions revolve around shared responsibilities and benefits. In the business world globalization conveys interdependence, integration, and connectivity of the world community. Based on this and familiarity with the latest conceptual developments in the areas of global and competition studies, the following definition of globalization is suggested: globalization is a set of beliefs that fosters a sense of connectivity, interdependence, and integration in the world community.

16. GLOBALIZATION RESTRICTS THE POWER OF OPPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS.

Daniel Griswold, (Dir., Cato Institute for Trade Policy Studies), GLOBALIZATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, 06, 50. Economic freedom and trade provide a counterweight to governmental power. A free market diffuses economic decisionmaking among millions of producers and consumers rather than leaving it in the hands of a few centralized government actors who could, and often do, use that power to suppress or marginalize political opposition. Milton Friedman, the Nobel-prize-winning economist, noted the connection between economic and political freedom in his 1962 book, *Capitalism and Freedom*: Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.



## **“NARRATIVES” ARE DISEMPOWERING**

### 1. Narrative storytelling leads to disempowerment by killing public discourse

Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry (Professors of Law) *BEYOND ALL REASON*, 1997, 11. Second, radical multiculturalism lends to disturbing distortions in scholarship and public discourse. Because they reject objectivity as a norm, the radicals are content to rely on personal stories as a basis for formulating views of social problems. These stories are often atypical or distorted by self-interest, yet any criticism of the stories is inevitably seen as a personal attack on the storyteller. More generally because radical multiculturalists refuse to separate the speaker from the message, they can become sidetracked from discussing the merits of the message itself into bitter disputes about the speaker's authenticity and her right to speak on behalf of an oppressed group. Criticisms of radical multiculturalism are seen as pandering to the power structure if they come from women or minorities, or as sexist and racist if they come from white men. This makes dialogue difficult at best.

Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry (Professors of Law) *BEYOND ALL REASON*, 1997, 90. Like MacKinnon other commentators also connect group identity with victimhood. For example, Eskridge suggests that the label of homosexuality, is socially constructed as a means of oppression. In some sense, then what all gays may truly have in common is their status as targets of homophobia. A community founded on victimhood poses certain problems. As feminist Harvard law professor Martha Minow has observed, it may divert attention from the political to the therapeutic, Victimhood also "passive and helpless connotations" that can be disempowering, and can encourage people to define their identities based on single traits. Indeed, Minow observes, the very idea of privileging the victim's perspective "requires a ranking of oppressions that is itself rendered problematic by the asserted authority of subjective experience." Thus, discussion can degenerate into the "victim talk world" where "people exchange testimonials of pain in a contest over who suffered more." Making a similar observation, Henry Louis Gates Jr. wryly suggests that perhaps academics should "institutionalize something that we already do implicitly at conferences on 'minority discourse': award -a prize at the end for the panelist, respondent, or contestant most oppressed; at the end of the year, we could have the 'Oppression Emmy Awards.'" This jockeying for victim status, with the concurrent struggle over whose stories can be told, threatens to block discussion altogether. A vivid illustration is provided by a national conference about feminism 'and the law that was sponsored by Signs the leading feminist journal. At the conference, a white representative of prostituted women argued that prostitution is inevitably involuntary and linked with violence against women. She was criticized by a black woman and a disabled white woman for failing to reflect the varying experiences of prostitutes, some of whom might have found a life of prostitution their best available option. At that point, the prostitution activist "left the roundtable, visibly upset." One of the conference organizers (who was white) left the room to talk with the prostitution activist. She returned with the message that the activist had felt "discounted" and "silenced" and would not be returning. The black woman who had participated in the discussion found these comments accusatory, and the discussion "become clearly polarized into ... activists versus -academics, and a white woman versus a black woman."

2. Storytelling disrupts society's ability to fight discrimination and weakens public discourse

Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry (Professors of Law) *BEYOND ALL REASON*, 1997, 74. In this chapter, we explore each of these pitfalls of radical multiculturalist discourse in turn. The individual scholars who are now aligned with radical multiculturalism have the potential to contribute to a vigorous, forward-moving debate about issues of race and gender. The issues about which they write—discrimination, affirmative action, hate speech, sexual harassment, rape—have much more than a narrow academic significance. Whether their methods deserve academic recognition is less important than whether the methods improve or degrade our society's ability to address these issues. Our fear is that legal storytelling, and the allied notion that some women or minority scholars possess a unique "Voice," will only weaken or disrupt public discourse about these critical social issues. Of course, radical scholars are far from being the only, or even the main, threat to public discourse. Manipulative advertising, irresponsible talk shows, demagogic politicians, and the like also contribute to its degradation. But the world of scholarship has always sought to present a contrast of reasoned discourse, aspiring to provide a reality check against the excesses of political debate. Experiential scholarship abandons that reality check, to the detriment of society as a whole. We begin by showing how the storytelling mode has contributed to the radicals' embrace of their untenable theory about merit. Essentially, the storytellers fail to ask whether their stories are typical of the larger universe of law school or university hiring. We show how their stories, and other scholarship purportedly reflecting a group's special voice, can frustrate dialogue even among the radical multiculturalists themselves. Radical multiculturalists can also fail to maintain a dialogue with the mainstream because of claims that only they have access to unique modes of understanding. This short-circuits any need to reply rationally to mainstream views. Stories can also misfire because their purposes are unclear, so further discussion lacks a foundation. Finally, just because stories are personal, they pose a grave risk of turning any further discussion into a donnybrook of mutual accusations and recriminations. In the end, radical multiculturalism provides a poor platform for constructive discussion of pressing social issues.

## **“OTHERNESS” IS A FLAWED PHILOSOPHY**

### 1. OTHERNESS IS BUILT ON A FALSE DICHOTOMY: ONE CAN APPRECIATE BOTH THE SIMILARITIES AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CULTURES.

Achille Mbembe, (Sr. Researcher, Institute of Social & Economic Research, U. Witwatersrand, South Africa), *PUBLIC CULTURE*, 2002, 253-254. This denial of humanity (or attribution of inferiority) has forced African responses into contradictory positions that are, however, often concurrently espoused: There is a universalistic position: “We are human beings like any others.” And there is a particularistic position: “We have a glorious past that testifies to our humanity.” Discourse on African identity has been caught in a dilemma from which it is struggling to free itself: Does African identity partake in the generic human identity? Or should one insist, in the name of difference and uniqueness, on the possibility of diverse cultural forms within a single humanity—but cultural forms whose purpose is not to be self-sufficient, whose ultimate signification is universal? The apologetic density of the assertion “we are human beings like any others” can be gauged only with respect to the violence of the denial that precedes it and makes it not only possible but necessary. The reaffirmation of a human identity that has been denied by the Other belongs, in this case, to the discourse of rehabilitation and functions as a mode of self-validation. But although the aim of the discourse of rehabilitation is to confirm that Africans too belong to humanity in general, it does not challenge the fiction of race. The defense of the humanity of Africans is almost always accompanied by the claim that their race, traditions, and customs have a specific character.

### 2. “OTHERNESS” THEORY IS GUILTY OF REVERSE RACISM.

Ali Mazrui, (Prof., African Studies, U. of New York at Binghamton), *RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES*, Fall 05, 81. 69. It is possible to accuse both Said and Mudimbe of reverse Otherness—of stereotyping the West. And just as Negritude has been defended as “antiracist racism,” Said and Mudimbe can be defended as examples of “anti-alterity Otherness” or “anti-Other Otherness.”

### 3. IMAGINING THE “OTHER” SERVES A VALUABLE PURPOSE IN CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING.

Bruce Janz, (Prof., Philosophy, Augustana U., Alberta, Canada), *POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL READER*, 1997, 233. The Other serves the function of making oneself coherent, either by mirroring or by alienating, and serves as the locus of complexity in any narrative of coherence. It establishes noetic possibilities through the making of distinctions, while unmasking the machinations of power behind knowledge through the questioning of the motives of those distinctions. The result is a move to the construction of coherence with the realization of complexity, the hope of repetition with the realization of power/knowledge, and the possibility of action with the realization of fallibility.

### 4. “OTHERNESS” THEORY IS INTERNALLY CONTRADICTORY.

Ali Mazrui, (Prof., African Studies, U. of New York at Binghamton), *RESEARCH IN AFRICAN LITERATURES*, Fall 05, 81. 69. Another characteristic that Edward Said and V. Y. Mudimbe share is that they are both whistle-blowers against ideologies of Otherness—which Mudimbe sometimes calls “alterity” and Said made famous as “Orientalism.” Both writers address the phenomenon of “the Other” in Western consciousness and Western empire. The Orient in this sense is perceived as exotic, intellectually retarded, emotionally sensual, governmentally despotic, culturally passive, and politically penetrable. Male chauvinists have sometimes regarded Asian and African societies as “feminine” in their conquerability, docility, malleability, and fundamental inferiority. Sexism, as well as racism, has often informed the Orientalist mind. Both Said and Mudimbe are exceptionally steeped in Western thought and Western literature in both English and French. Their work on “Otherness” seems calculated to expose “an unholy alliance between the Enlightenment and colonialism.” Critics have drawn attention to the apparent self-contradiction of “deploying a humanistic discourse to attack the high cultural traditions of Western humanism.”

### 5. “OTHERNESS” THEORY IS NIHILISTIC; IT OFFERS NO AVENUE FOR POLITICAL ACTION.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 233. In certain respects the problematic of “otherness”—a distinctly Levinasian inheritance—raises more questions than solves. This standpoint's criticism of the modern natural law tradition—the normative basis of the contemporary democratic societies—is sweeping and total to the point that democratic ideals themselves seem indefensible, and in this way undermines a politics of “reasonable democracy.” Instead, we are left with a “political existentialism,” in which, given the “groundless” nature of moral and political choice, one political “decision” seems almost as good as another.

6. THE CRITIQUE ACTUALLY DECLARES WAR ON NON-WESTERN CULTURES AND VALUES.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 291. By declaring that there is no truth and no morality, that all is meaningless and that life itself is a meaningless problem; by announcing that religion and philosophy, history and tradition are symptoms of will to power and symbols of decadence; by raising doubt, cynicism and ambivalence to an arch value; by its acceptance of barbarism and embrace of evil and hence legitimisation of every act of cruelty, neglect and intolerance; by appropriating the knowledge, history and cultural products of the Others; by embarking on a crusade to transform Other cultures into ahistorical, identity-less masses and perpetual consumers of its cultural products; by isolating and further marginalising Other cultures by irony and ridicule; by attempting to subsume Other cultures into the Grand Narrative of bourgeois liberalism, free market capitalism and secularism; by giving a new life to the old tools of colonial domination and subjugation — by all these means, postmodernism has declared a war on non-western cultures and societies.

7. THE CRITIQUE ENABLES CONTINUED DOMINATION OF “THE OTHER.”

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 28. But this 'turning point' does not mark postmodernism as a discontinuity from the past of the Other. Far from being a 'radical break' which effects all theoretical and cultural practices, as Fredric Jameson suggests in *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, postmodernism takes the subjugation of the Other to a new level of all-consuming transcendence. Western culture has continuously used five of its basic internal traits to oppress the Other: representation, duality, control, instrumentalism and the gaze. These facets of western culture remain intact and provide a continuous link between colonialism, modernity and postmodernity. When stripped of their outer camouflage, the three are one and the same theory of domination.

8. THE CRITIQUE PRESERVES WESTERN COLONIAL DOMINATION.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 13. Far from being a new theory of liberation, postmodernism, particularly from the perspective of the Other, the non-western cultures, is simply a new wave of domination riding on the crest of colonialism and modernity.

9. THE CRITIQUE PRESERVES WESTERN DOMINATION.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 38. Postmodernism perpetuates the monopoly of western culture not just by producing a binary system of regulation (post-cold war, the new super-demon is Islam), but also by generating a simulated plurality which veils the continuity in oppression and inequality.

10. THE CRITIQUE’S FOCUS ON “THE OTHER” IS MARGINALIZING AND DEMEANING.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 13. The postmodern prominence of the Other becomes a classic irony. Instead of finally doing justice to the marginalised and demeaned, it vaunts the category to prove how unimportant, and ultimately meaningless, is any real identity it could contain. We are all Others now, can appropriate the Other, consume artefacts of the Other, so what does it matter if Others want something different in their future — such as the chance to make it for themselves!

11. THE CRITIQUE’S INSISTENCE THAT ALL VALUES ARE “CONSTRUCTED” MEANS THAT THE STATUS QUO IS PRESERVED.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 38. Postmodernism also legitimises western representations of the Other by a sleight of hand. Since there is nothing but representation, all interpretation is misinterpretation, there is no hope of rescuing the truth of non-western cultures from the constructed images of the west. The status quo is preserved: both the historic, current and the future enframing of the Other in images of ignorance continues unabated.

## **POSTCOLONIALISM IS A FLAWED PHILOSOPHY**

### **1. ALL CULTURES ARE BUILT ON THE RUINS OF PAST INVASIONS.**

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE RETURN OF TRIBALISM*, 05. Online. Internet. <http://www.sydneyline.com/>. Unfortunately, the historical record does not support the thesis. For the past ten thousand years at least, indigenous cultures on every continent have been subject to a process of change that has varied from merger and absorption into other cultures to complete obliteration by a conquering power. Every culture that exists today has been subject to either violent or peaceful amalgamation and absorption of earlier smaller communities. The process has occurred just as certainly, if not to the same extent, in the relatively isolated indigenous cultures of the New Guinea highlands as it has in the multiracial societies of North America. If this were not true, human beings would still be living in the small family-based clans that constituted hunter-gatherer society. Whether we like it or not, Peter Munz has argued in a striking analysis of the historical logic of multiculturalism, we are all the inheritors of cultures that have been forged out of a long process of suppression and absorption of the cultures that arose before them. Just as inexorably, this has meant that cultures that once were in conflict have ceased their struggle and cultural diversity has diminished. Over time, most of those societies that once housed two or more disparate cultures ceased to be multicultural and became monocultural. This has occurred either by minority cultures succumbing to a dominant culture or through merger and accommodation on terms acceptable to both sides.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), *CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION*, May 10, 2002, B7. As the example of Islamic Spain suggests, the people of the West have participated in the game of conquest not only as the perpetrators, but also as the victims. Ancient Greece, for example, was conquered by Rome, and the Roman Empire itself was destroyed by invasions of Huns, Vandals, Lombards, and Visigoths from northern Europe. America, as we all know, was itself a colony of England before its war of independence; England, before that, had been subdued and ruled by Normans from France. Those of us living today are taking on a large project if we are going to settle on a rule of social justice based on figuring out whose ancestors did what to whom.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), *CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION*, May 10, 2002, B7. Those who identify colonialism and empire only with the West either have no sense of history or have forgotten about the Egyptian empire, the Persian empire, the Macedonian empire, the Islamic empire, the Mongol empire, the Chinese empire, and the Aztec and Inca empires in the Americas. Shouldn't the Arabs be paying reparations for their destruction of the Byzantine and Persian empires? Come to think of it, shouldn't the Byzantine and Persian people be paying reparations to the descendants of the people they subjugated? And while we're at it, shouldn't the Muslims reimburse the Spaniards for their 700-year rule?

### **2. ASSIGNMENT OF GUILT IS AN UNPRODUCTIVE EXERCISE.**

Achille Mbembe, (Sr. Researcher, Institute of Social & Economic Research, U. Witwatersrand, South Africa), *PUBLIC CULTURE*, 2002, 262-263. In many ways, colonization was a co-invention. It was the result of Western violence as well as the work of a swarm of African auxiliaries seeking profit. Where it was impractical to import a white settler population to occupy the land, colonial powers generally got blacks to colonize their own congeners (congeneres) in the name of the metropolitan nation. More decisively, "unhealthy" though it may appear to a critic, it must be recognized that colonialism exercised a strong seductive power over Africans on a mental and moral no less than material level. Manifold possibilities of upward mobility were promised by the colonial system. Whether such promises were actually fulfilled is beside the point. As a refracted and endlessly reconstituted fabric of fictions, colonialism generated mutual utopias—hallucinations shared by the colonizers and the colonized.

### **3. COLONIALISM IS NOT A WESTERN INVENTION.**

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), *CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION*, May 10, 2002, B7. There is nothing uniquely Western about colonialism. My native country of India, for example, was ruled by the British for more than two centuries, and many of my fellow Indians are still smarting about that. What they often forget, however, is that before the British came, the Indians had been invaded and conquered by the Persians, the Afghans, Alexander the Great, the Mongols, the Arabs, and the Turks. Depending on how you count, the British were preceded by at least six colonial powers that invaded and occupied India since ancient times. Indeed, ancient India was itself settled by the Aryan people, who came from the north and subjugated the dark-skinned indigenous people.

4. THE COLONIAL PAST IS MERELY AN EXCUSE.

Mathurin Hounnikpo, (Prof., International Studies, U. Miami of Ohio), *AFRICA'S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT*, 06, 15. Some people will blame our colonial oppressors. Well in some cases part of it is true but a whole lot of the blame should be put squarely on our own shoulders . . . Independence was thought to be the beginning of the golden era where political freedom and expression, freedom of association, free enterprise, economic prosperity, less ethnocentrism, responsibility and accountability of each and every one prevailed. These lofty ideals never happened because we replaced white imperialism with the black one.

Mathurin Hounnikpo, (Prof., International Studies, U. Miami of Ohio), *AFRICA'S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT*, 06, 30. Although African leaders were aware of the urgent need to improve economic and social conditions of postcolonial Africa, they chose to defend their personal interests. Ethnicity became an outward symptom of a deeper malaise, deriving its salience from the willingness of African politicians to play the tribal card. As Diamond suggests the “political class” in each region fought so hard to establish a monopoly of political power precisely because exclusion from public office simultaneously implied the loss of a class base: Because state office or patronage was virtually the only means to attain a position in the emergent dominant class, and yet state resources were too limited to satisfy all comers, competition for state control was inevitable — and inevitably tense. No candidate or party could afford to lose an election, for that would mean exclusion from the resources of class formation. Having triumphed initially, none could afford to risk defeat, for that would mean losing the means with which to consolidate the structure of class dominance, and one's own position in it.

Mathurin Hounnikpo, (Prof., International Studies, U. Miami of Ohio), *AFRICA'S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT*, 06, 125. After decades of reliance on the excuse of colonialism, Africa's “maldevelopment” clearly has more to do with its own leaders than centuries of colonial exploitation. The economic development of such former colonies as Malaysia or Indonesia in Asia falsifies the view that a colony cannot get out of underdevelopment. To their credit, some African leaders have attempted to deal with the development equation through socialism or misguided nationalism. Nyerere's Ujamaa, Kaunda's Humanism, Kenyatta's Harambee, or Mobutu's Authenticite, were all efforts to lift their countries out of misery. However, these leaders failed for lack of clear vision in the first three cases and because of an adamant will to loot in the last. Even countries such as Cote d'Ivoire or Gabon, which remained on a capitalist path of economic development, have very little success to show. The differences in economic progress cannot be explained by the ideological proclivities of African leaders, since capitalist, socialist, and nationalist leaders have all met with failure. On the eve of this new millennium, Africa's record on the economic and social development realms leaves much to be desired. An overhaul of the continent is in order if Africa is to have any chance to make up lost ground.

5. POSTCOLONIALISM'S FOCUS ON THE PAST BLOCKS NECESSARY CURRENT ACTION.

David Masci, (Sr. Fellow, Pew Forum on Religion and Society), *GLOBAL ISSUES*, 05, 247. Trade analyst Pasicolan agrees: “There are still too many dictatorships and marginal democracies in Africa, and I don't see that changing any time soon,” he says. Moreover, some African leaders — including those who have been elected or are well-intentioned — are hamstrung by the past, Pasicolan points out. “They still blame Europe and the United States for their problems and think that they are responsible for solving Africa's problems,” he says. “But look at Asian governments: They had a colonial period as well, but developed their own successful models in the post-colonial era that brought up people's living standards.”

Richard Bell, (Prof., Philosophy, The College of Wooster & Rhodes University, South Africa), *UNDERSTANDING AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY*, 2002, 44. It is all too clear that African philosophy cannot escape its being intertwined with European colonialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or with the legacy of slavery and other forms of Western imperialism for the past 500 years, or with the questions of “modernity” and its challenges to the development of present-day Africa itself. In Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze's introduction to his collection, *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader*, he writes: “The single most important factor that drives the field and the contemporary practice of African/a Philosophy has to do with the brutal encounter of the African world with European modernity—an encounter epitomized in the colonial phenomena.” As important and central as this theme is, it can become formulaic or deflect too much attention away from the conditions of the postcolony and its needs to move forward.

Achille Mbembe, (Sr. Researcher, Institute of Social & Economic Research, U. Witwatersrand, South Africa), *PUBLIC CULTURE*, 2002, 263. The above examples suffice to show that by resorting to expedients and failing to address these central questions about life—its forms, its possibilities, and what denies it—African criticism, dominated by political economy and by the nativist impulse, has from the outset inscribed the quest for political identity within a purely instrumental and short-term temporality. When the question was asked, during the heyday of colonialism, whether self-government was possible, it was never to engage the general question of being and time—in other words, of life—but rather to facilitate native people's struggle to take over the apparatus of the state.

**6. POSTCOLONIAL THEORY PROMOTES VICTIMIZATION AND RACIST CONSPIRACY THEORIES.**

Achille Mbembe, (Sr. Researcher, Institute of Social & Economic Research, U. Witwatersrand, South Africa), *PUBLIC CULTURE*, 2002, 251-252. At the heart of the postcolonial paradigm of victimization, we find a reading of the self and the world as a series of conspiracies. Such conspiracy theories have their origins in both Marxist and indigenous notions of agency. In African history, it is thought, there is neither irony nor accident. We are told that African history is essentially governed by forces beyond Africans' control. The diversity and the disorder of the world, as well as the open character of historical possibilities, are reduced to a spasmodic, unchanging cycle, infinitely repeated in accord with a conspiracy always fomented by forces beyond Africa's reach. Existence itself is expressed, almost always, as a stuttering. Ultimately, the African is supposed to be merely a castrated subject, the passive instrument of the Other's enjoyment. Under such conditions, there can be no more radical utopian vision than the one suggesting that Africa disconnect itself from the world—the mad dream of a world without Others. This hatred of the world at large (which also marks a profound desire for recognition) and this paranoid reading of history are presented as a “democratic,” “radical,” and “progressive” discourse of emancipation and autonomy—the foundation for a so-called politics of Africanity. Rhetoric to the contrary, however, the neurosis of victimization fosters a mode of thought that is at once xenophobic, racist, negative, and circular. In order to function, this logic needs superstitions. It has to create fictions that later pass for real things. It has to fabricate masks that are retained by remodeling them to suit the needs of each period. The course of African history is said to be determined by the combined action of a diabolical couple formed by an enemy—or tormentor—and a victim. In this closed universe, in which “making history” consists of annihilating one's enemies, politics is conceived of as a sacrificial process, and history, in the end, is seen as participating in a great economy of sorcery.

**7. CLAIMS THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ARE WEALTHY BECAUSE OF COLONIALISM ARE INCORRECT.**

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), *CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION*, May 10, 2002, B7. Moreover, the West could not have reached its current stage of wealth and influence by stealing from other cultures, for the simple reason that there wasn't very much to take. “Oh yes there was,” the retort often comes. “The Europeans stole the raw material to build their civilization. They took rubber from Malaya, cocoa from West Africa, and tea from India.” But as the economic historian P.T. Bauer points out, before British rule, there were no rubber trees in Malaya, no cocoa trees in West Africa, no tea in India. The British brought the rubber tree to Malaya from South America. They brought tea to India from China. And they taught the Africans to grow cocoa, a crop the native people had never heard of. None of this is to deny that when the colonialists could exploit native resources, they did. But that larceny cannot possibly account for the enormous gap in economic, political, and military power that opened up between the West and the rest of the world. What, then, is the source of that power? The reason the West became so affluent and dominant in the modern era is that it invented three institutions: science, democracy, and capitalism. All those institutions are based on universal impulses and aspirations, but those aspirations were given a unique expression in Western civilization.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), *CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION*, May 10, 2002, B7. It is the dynamic interaction among these three Western institutions — science, democracy, and capitalism — that has produced the great wealth, strength, and success of Western civilization. An example of this interaction is technology, which arises out of the marriage between science and capitalism. Science provides the knowledge that leads to invention, and capitalism supplies the mechanism by which the invention is transmitted to the larger society, as well as the economic incentive for inventors to continue to make new things.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 10, 2002, B7. Now we can understand better why the West was able, between the 16th and 19th centuries, to subdue the rest of the world and bend it to its will. Indian elephants and Zulu spears were no match for British rifles and cannonballs. Colonialism and imperialism are not the cause of the West's success; they are the result of that success. The wealth and power of European nations made them arrogant and stimulated their appetite for global conquest. Colonial possessions added to the prestige, and to a much lesser degree the wealth, of Europe. But the primary cause of Western affluence and power is internal — the institutions of science, democracy, and capitalism acting together. Consequently, it is simply wrong to maintain that the rest of the world is poor because the West is rich, or that the West grew rich off stolen goods from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The West created its own wealth, and still does.

8. WESTERN DOMINANCE PRE-DATED COLONIALISM.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 10, 2002, B7. The West did not become rich and powerful through colonial oppression. It makes no sense to claim that the West grew rich and strong by conquering other countries and taking their stuff. How did the West manage to do that? In the late Middle Ages, say 1500, the West was by no means the world's most affluent or most powerful civilization. Indeed, those of China and of the Arab-Islamic world exceeded the West in wealth, in knowledge, in exploration, in learning, and in military power. So how did the West gain so rapidly in economic, political, and military power that, by the 19th century, it was able to conquer virtually all of the other civilizations? That question demands to be answered, and the oppression theorists have never provided an adequate explanation.

9. COLONIALISM HAD SOME BENEFICIAL ASPECTS.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 10, 2002, B7. Colonialism was the transmission belt that brought to Asia, Africa, and South America the blessings of Western civilization. Many of those cultures continue to have serious problems of tyranny, tribal and religious conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment, but that is not due to an excess of Western influence; rather, it is due to the fact that those countries are insufficiently Westernized. Sub-Saharan Africa, which is probably in the worst position, has been described by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan as “a cocktail of disasters.” That is not because colonialism in Africa lasted so long, but because it lasted a mere half-century. It was too short a time to permit Western institutions to take firm root. Consequently, after their independence, most African nations have retreated into a kind of tribal barbarism that can be remedied only with more Western influence, not less. Africa needs more Western capital, more technology, more rule of law, and more individual freedom.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 10, 2002, B7. The academy needs to shed its irrational prejudice against colonialism. By providing a more balanced perspective, scholars can help to show the foolishness of policies like reparations as well as justifications of terrorism that are based on anticolonial myths. None of this is to say that colonialism by itself was a good thing, only that bad institutions sometimes produce good results.



## **RORTY'S CONTINGENCY THEORY OFFERS NO REASON TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION**

### **1. RORTY'S CRITIQUE IS CONTRADICTORY.**

Herbert Simons, (Prof., Comm. Studies, Temple U.), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 7. Steven Cole illustrates how postmodernism can be turned upon itself with critical effect. He examines recent writings of three leading American postmodernists: Stanley Fish, Barbara Herrnstein Smith and Richard Rorty. Their contingency theories claim that oppression begins with epistemological certitude, particularly of the universalizing sort that purports to know what is true for all time and for all possible modes of experience. Cole turns the insights of contingency theory against itself by suggesting that its claim to knowledge about the contingency of our own subjectivity 'is both logically deluded and pragmatically disastrous.

Steven Cole, (Prof., English, Temple U.), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 39-40. An unintended virtue of recent arguments in defence of contingency theory by Stanley Fish (1989), Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1988) and Richard Rorty (1989) is that each holds open the possibility of precisely the kind of analysis which is precluded if contingency theory is itself accepted as the basis of discourse. By insisting both on the possibility of public argument about the nature of the subject, and on the ultimate contingency of the subject which such argument seeks to define, these writers unintentionally expose the incoherence of contingency theory when it is understood as a publicly accessible argument about the nature of identity. That the very notion of publicly accessible argument draws upon the resources of the discarded 'quest for certainty' which contingency theory seeks to surmount is unimportant here: what matters is that it is precisely the impossibility of offering a coherent public account of the contingent subject which will expose the confusions attendant upon the claim of contingency theory that it is possible to derive an account of political and social interests from a contingently defined subject.

Steven Cole, (Prof., English, Temple U.), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 40. From a logical perspective, contingency theory makes sense only if subjects are privately constituted sets of interest who stand intractably outside any further description, but, as we shall see, such an account of the subject could not be true for anyone other than one's self. It is simply not coherent to claim both that all knowledge and value are reducible to the contingent interests of a subject, and that one knows that this is the case for all subjects, for such knowledge would be possible only if the claim were itself not true.

Steven Cole, (Prof., English, Temple U.), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 40. Paradoxically, the very privacy of subjectivity which is demanded by the logic of contingency theory becomes impossible if contingency theory takes seriously the social consequences of its position, for as soon as some form of social identity is granted, then the claim that identity is reducible to contingency becomes impossible to sustain without reducing the social itself to privately defined contingencies.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 172-173. While the culture of postmodernism is without perspective, it is certainly not without its crusading spirit. Foucault's *Pendulum* is a sermon, albeit a learned one. It asks us, indeed rams down our throats, the theology of contingency. And Rorty himself, despite reducing everything to contingency, cherishes cultural hopes that are not so contingent. No sooner does he denounce all metanarratives as meaningless, than he erects one of his own to take over all other metanarratives: 'postmodern bourgeois liberalism', to use the title of his well-known essay.

2. RORTY'S RELIANCE ON IRONY ACTUALLY PRESERVES EVILS SUCH AS ETHNIC CLEANSING.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 174. How does the original sin of contingency cope with the real Evil out there? The evil inherent, for example, in Serbian ethnic cleansing, in the string of serial killers stalking western cities, in the pathological concern with stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, of autocrats and dictators who know no humanity? In a human world configured by the contingent forces of language, self and community, how are we to cope with real cruelty and the suffering it generates? Rorty provides us with a strategy to come to grips with the postmodernist onion. 'Irony', he suggests, is the only thing that can overcome public suffering and reconcile the demands of self-creation and human solidarity. Ironists are the Grand Saviours of postmodernism because they realise 'that anything can be made good or bad by being redescribed', and because they deny that 'any criteria of choice between final vocabularies exist', and because they are 'never quite able to take themselves (as well as the world and truth) seriously'.? So a victim of a serial killer should take comfort in irony; a displaced individual should rejoice in irony; real victims of real evil should seek solace in irony and the belief that their bad experiences can be redescribed as good.

3. RORTY'S RELIANCE ON IRONY PRODUCES PARALYSIS IN THE FACE OF EVIL.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 175. Irony thus can serve to maintain the status quo. What Rorty seems to be saying, and Eco trying to demonstrate in his novel, is 'laugh at bourgeois liberalism, it will ease the pain of finally accepting it'. But 'bourgeois liberalism' is no laughing matter for its victims: the non-west, the majority of mankind. Irony, ridicule and cynicism is what secularism used to undermine Christianity during the Enlightenment; now they have become weapons targeted at the non-west. Taken to its extremes irony and cynicism, as Peter Sloterdijk's classic work, *Critique of Cynical Reason*, demonstrates, produce nothing but paralysis, a sensibility which is 'well off and miserable at the same time', unable to function in the real world.

4. THE INSISTENCE ON CONTINGENCY IS PRAGMATICALLY DISASTROUS.

Steven Cole, (Prof., English, Temple U.), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 40. My central argument is that far from it being the case that we now know the contingency of our own subjectivity, in fact this claim is both logically deluded and pragmatically disastrous. From both perspectives, what we will find is that the implicit claim of contingency theory that knowledge and value are reducible to privately defined interests will help to show the emptiness of the theory itself; the denial that ends have anything more than a contingent relation to the interests and desires of a subject leaves contingency theory unable to account for the very existence of the subject to which it appeals in its account of contingency.

5. THE WRITING OF FICTION SIMPLY PROVIDES ANOTHER AVENUE FOR COLONIZATION.

Ziauddin Sardar, (Prof., Postcolonial Studies, City University, London), *POSTMODERNISM AND THE OTHER*, 98, 175-176. There is also a more specific reason why postmodernism is so infatuated with 'imagination' and 'fiction', 'language games' and 'word-play'. Imagination is the one human frontier that has not been totally colonised; and fiction is the tool that can accomplish this goal. The novel is one of most powerful instruments for the colonisation of imagination. All fiction, in the final analysis, leads to the manufacture of cultural meanings which are always political meanings. Novels are thus instruments for promoting certain ideologies; and postmodern fiction is all about how the Other dreams itself to be irrelevant, obscurantist and an appendage to western liberal humanism. Moreover, while other conceptual and intellectual instruments for the projection of western desires and containing the Other — for example, 'history', 'philosophy', 'reason', 'modernity' — can be, and are, constantly challenged, argued against, and exposed, fiction is not so amenable to debate. Why take it so seriously? It is only fiction: a fictional dream of a fictional character in a fictional novel. But, as we know by now, postmodernism fiction has a nasty and persistent habit of striking back as reality: a fictional book in a fictional advertisement becomes real and ends up at the top of the bestseller list — *Fly Fishing* by J. R. Hartley from the advertisement for Yellow Pages. Fictional representation is thus everything; it is the stand-in for actual, real Others, with real history, real lives, real lived experiences. Postmodernism's obsession with representation of the Other in fiction is designed to project this representation back as reality and hence shape and reshape the Other according to its own desires.

## POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY IS FLAWED

### 1. POSTMODERNISM CLAIM THAT DEMOCRACY LEADS TO OPPRESSION HAS BEEN EMPIRICALLY DISPROVED.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xiii. In retrospect, postmodernism's contention, most pointedly expressed in Michel Foucault's work, that the institutionalization of "reason" and "progress" leads to enhanced domination rather than emancipation seems overtly cynical and empirically untenable. The "Third Wave" of democratization that swept across eastern Europe, South America, and (more tentatively) Asia during the 1980s and 1990s has demonstrated that the legacy of democratic humanism harbors considerable staying power.

### 2. POSTMODERNISM IS INHERENTLY SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY.

Peter Suber, (Prof., Philosophy, Earlham College, UK), *EARLHAMITE*, Winter 1993. 12. I have trouble accepting these post-modern propositions because they are not only indemonstrable but self-subverting. Traditional philosophy admirably recognized the difficulties of advocating relativism without self-contradiction. To simplify these: if I say that "all beliefs are relative to historical circumstances," then this claim applies to itself. If it is false, we can ignore it; if it is true, then it is merely relative to its time and place, hence not true in general or true for most other people.

### 3. POSTMODERNISM SPECIALIZES IN CREATING DIVISIONS WHERE NONE NEED EXIST.

Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), *QUADRANT*, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). To deal with postmodernism is like struggling with a Hydra—and one which constantly mutates. Among the Hydra's heads we might begin with deconstruction, post-colonialism, revisionist history, gender theory, political correctness, multiculturalism and feminism. All share one basic characteristic, in taking their flavour from neo-Marxist theory, which may be identified clearly from a continuing passion for simplistic groupings, explanations and Would-be solutions. Content no longer with communism versus capitalism nor the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie we are now exhorted to believe that the true solution to all of modern society's ills lies in warfare between men and women, blacks and whites, homosexuals and straights. An even more traditional, polarised antagonism—evil versus good—has been relegated to the sidelines as a kind of laughable anachronism. By its very age, the conflict between good and evil can be dismissed as irrelevant to contemporary problems. Instead, white heterosexual men are to blame for more or less everything—more especially so if they are British.

### 4. POSTMODERNISM BREEDS CYNICISM.

Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), *QUADRANT*, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). Since the advent of postmodernism almost every worthwhile certainty and traditional virtue has not just been called into question but has come under increasing assault—usually in our centres of further education and supposed enlightenment. When the concepts of truth, honour, objectivity, altruism, justice and religious faith are treated with contempt or scepticism by those who instruct our young, is it any great wonder that some of the young should seek refuge in oblivion or narcolepsy?

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xiv. My concern is that at a certain point postmodernism's hostility towards "reason" and "truth" is intellectually untenable and politically debilitating. Often its mistrust of logic and argumentation are so extreme that its practitioners are left dazed and disoriented—morally and politically defenseless. When, in keeping with the practice of a neo-Nietzschean "hermeneutic of suspicion," reason and democracy are reduced to objects of mistrust, one invites political impotence: one risks surrendering the capacity for effective action in the world. Esoteric theorizing—theory tailored to an audience of initiates and acolytes—threatens to become an ersatz praxis and an end in itself.

5. POSTMODERNISM BLURS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACT AND FICTION.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 207-208. The British historian Eric Hobsbawm has eloquently decried the rise of “postmodernist” intellectual fashions in Western universities, particularly in departments of literature and anthropology, which imply that all “facts” claiming objective existence are simply intellectual constructions. In short, that there is no clear difference between fact and fiction. But there is, and for historians, even for the most militantly antipositivist ones among us, the ability to distinguish between the two is absolutely fundamental.

6. POSTMODERNISM SPECIALIZES IN MEANINGLESS JARGON.

A. Postmodernism specializes in talking about talk.

Johann Hari, (Staff), *THE INDEPENDENT*, Oct. 13, 2004, 39. The critic Dale Peck has described the postmodern implosion of the novel perfectly: “This is a tradition that has systematically divested itself of any ability to comment on anything other than its own inability to comment on anything.”

B. Postmodern theorists use scientific-sounding jargon in meaningless ways.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, x. But what exactly do we claim? Neither too much nor too little. We show that famous intellectuals such as Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Baudrillard, and Deleuze have repeatedly abused scientific concepts and terminology: either using scientific ideas totally out of context, without giving the slightest justification—note that we are not against extrapolating concepts from one field to another, but only against extrapolations made without argument—or throwing around scientific jargon in front of their non-scientist readers without any regard for its relevance or even its meaning.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 153. In summary, one finds in Baudrillard's works a profusion of scientific terms, used with total disregard for their meaning and, above all, in a context where they are manifestly irrelevant. Whether or not one interprets them as metaphors, it is hard to see what role they could play, except to give an appearance of profundity to trite observations about sociology or history. Moreover, the scientific terminology is mixed up with a nonscientific vocabulary that is employed with equal sloppiness. When all is said and done, one wonders what would be left of Baudrillard's thought if the verbal veneer covering it were stripped away.

Richard Dawkins, (Prof., Zoology, Oxford U.), *NATURE*, July 9, 1998, 141. In summary, one finds in Baudrillard's works a profusion of scientific terms, used with total disregard for their meaning and, above all, in a context where they are manifestly irrelevant. Whether or not one interprets them as metaphors, it is hard to see what role they could play, except to give an appearance of profundity to trite observations about sociology or history. Moreover, the scientific terminology is mixed up with a non-scientific vocabulary that is employed with equal sloppiness. When all is said and done, one wonders what would be left of Baudrillard's thought if the verbal veneer covering it were stripped away.

C. Postmodern theory is intellectually dishonest.

Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), *QUADRANT*, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). The rhetoric of radicalism is one of the most potent forces in society today, yet is essentially anti-intellectual. Perhaps its most damaging effect is the way it manages to sell the idea that ill-conceived and destructive initiatives are automatic examples of progress, and all who resist or obstruct them are reactionaries, conservatives or worse. The rhetoric of radicalism permeates so much of contemporary thought that many people have become inured to its essential intellectual dishonesty. In fact, much of the rhetoric of radicalism can be traced back to a small number of lies and distortions, many of which have largely become hidden from view by the verbiage which has been constructed upon the framework of their basic fallacies.

D. Postmodernism attempts to bury productive social activism under pretentious jargon.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 208. Finally, for all those of us who identify with the political left, postmodernism has specific negative consequences. First of all, the extreme focus on language and the elitism linked to the use of a pretentious jargon contribute to enclosing intellectuals in sterile debates and to isolating them from social movements taking place outside their ivory tower. When progressive students arriving on American campuses learn that the most radical idea (even politically) is to adopt a thoroughly skeptical attitude and to immerse oneself completely in textual analysis, their energy—which could be fruitfully employed in research and organizing—is squandered. Second, the persistence of confused ideas and obscure discourses in some parts of the left tends to discredit the entire left; and the right does not pass up the opportunity to exploit this connection demagogically.

E. Postmodernism turns philosophy on its head; philosophy should make obscure things understandable, but postmodernism specializes in making simple concepts obscure.

Ernest Gellner, (Prof., Philosophy, Oxford U.), *THE DEVIL IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY*, 03, 7. A curious reversal! In the past, ordinary unreflective experience and thought were sometimes considered as the veil past which the philosopher must penetrate to find true reality. According to the new school, it is the veil which is reality; the doctrine that it is the veil is an illusion, and the only one. Descartes started a new philosophy by doubting virtually everything. This new school has started another by systematically doubting nothing. (This is known as Common Sense or respect for ordinary usage.) Or to use another parable; philosophy is still seen in terms of Plato's cave, but the philosopher's job is now said to be to lead us back into the cave.

F. Postmodern language is nonsensical.

Ernest Gellner, (Prof., Philosophy, Oxford U.), *THE DEVIL IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY*, 03, 17. Another relevant feature, obvious because overt and indeed much-advertised by the protagonists of these philosophies themselves, is a preoccupation with language, meaning and its obverse, nonsense. This preoccupation and its alleged beneficent consequences are after all claimed by these protagonists to be the distinguishing marks of the new era and of its merits. The advance is indeed breathtakingly radical; it replaces questions such as 'How many angels can sit on the point of a needle?', by questions such as 'In how many senses can an angel be said to sit on the point of a needle?'

G. Postmodernism uses language to obscure meaning.

Ernest Gellner, (Prof., Social Anthropology, U. Cambridge), *POSTMODERNISM, REASON, AND RELIGION*, 1992, 29-30. In the end, the operational meaning of postmodernism in anthropology seems to be something like this: a refusal (in practice, rather selective) to countenance any objective facts, any independent social structures, and their replacement by a pursuit of 'meanings', both those of the objects of inquiry and of the inquirer. There is thus a double stress on subjectivity: the world-creation by the person studied, and the text-creation by the investigator. 'Meaning' is less a tool of analysis than a conceptual intoxicant, an instrument of self-titillation. The investigator demonstrates both his initiation into the mysteries of hermeneutics, and the difficulty of the enterprise, by complex and convoluted prose, peppered with allusions to a high proportion of the authors of the World's 100 Great Books, and also to the latest fashionable scribes of the Left Bank.

*SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS*, Oct. 17, 2004, 3H. Few intellectual movements have done more to unhinge words from meaning, ideas from philosophical foundations and art from artistry than Derrida's ghastly creation. In 1992, Cambridge University proposed giving Derrida an honorary degree. Twenty professors of philosophy objected that "semi-intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university."

H. Postmodern theorists mistake obscure expression for profound thought.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 5-6. The uninitiated reader who opens a typical book on postmodernism, hermeneutics, poststructuralism et al must think he or she has stumbled onto a new foreign language, so obscure and dense is the prose. Now, this happens to be a very effective tactic to adopt in academic circles where there is always an expectation that things are never simple and that anyone who writes clearly is thereby being shallow. Obscurity is often assumed to equal profundity, a quality that signals a superiority over the thinking of the uneducated herd. Moreover, those students who put in all the work needed to comprehend a dialogue of this kind very often become converts, partly to protect their investment in the large amount of time already committed, and partly because they are bound to feel they have thereby earned a ticket into an elite. Obscurity is thus a clever way to generate a following. As Luc Ferry and Main Renault, the two wittiest and most devastating critics of the French philosophy behind this movement, have observed: The 'philosophists' of the '68 period gained their greatest success through accustoming their readers and listeners to the belief that incomprehensibility is a sign of greatness and that the thinker's silence before the incongruous demand for meaning was not proof of weakness but the indication of endurance in the presence of the Unsayable.

## 7. THE SOKAL ARTICLE IN SOCIAL TEXT DEMONSTRATES THAT POSTMODERN THEORY IS FRAUDULENT.

A. Physicist Alan Sokal attempted to illustrate the dishonesty of postmodernism by submitting an article consisting of pure jibberish to *Social Text*, a leading postmodern journal; this article was selected for publication in the Spring/Summer 1996 issue.

SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 17, 2004, 3H. In 1996, physicist Alan Sokal set out to demonstrate the intellectual vacuousness of deconstruction by submitting an article intentionally devoid of any meaning to the journal *Social Text*. In writing "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," he sought to test whether a serious academic journal would "publish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions." Sokal's opus sparkled with deconstructive-sounding gems: "These criteria, admirable as they are, are insufficient for a liberatory postmodern science: they liberate human beings from the tyranny of 'absolute truth' and 'objective reality,' but not necessarily from the tyranny of other human beings." The editors of *Social Text* couldn't help themselves. "Transgressing the Boundaries" went to print in the Spring/Summer 1996 issue.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 1-2. To respond to this phenomenon, one of us (Sokal) decided to try an unorthodox (and admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: submit to a fashionable American cultural-studies journal, *Social Text*, a parody of the type of work that has proliferated in recent years, to see whether they would publish it. The article, entitled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity", is chock-full of absurdities and blatant non-sequiturs. In addition, it asserts an extreme form of cognitive relativism: after mocking the old-fashioned "dogma" that "there exists an external world, whose properties are independent of any individual human being and indeed of humanity as a whole", it proclaims categorically that "physical 'reality', no less than social 'reality', is at bottom a social and linguistic construct". By a series of stunning leaps of logic, it arrives at the conclusion that "the it of Euclid and the G of Newton, formerly thought to be constant and universal, are now perceived in their ineluctable historicity; and the putative observer becomes fatally de-centered, disconnected from any epistemic link to a space-time point that can no longer be defined by geometry alone". The rest is in the same vein. And yet, the article was accepted and published. Worse, it was published in a special issue of *Social Text* devoted to rebutting the criticisms leveled against postmodernism and social constructivism by several distinguished scientists.' For the editors of *Social Text*, it was hard to imagine a more radical way of shooting themselves in the foot. Sokal immediately revealed the hoax, provoking a firestorm of reaction in both the popular and academic press. Many researchers in the humanities and social sciences wrote to Sokal, sometimes very movingly, to thank him for what he had done and to express their own rejection of the postmodernist and relativist tendencies dominating large parts of their disciplines. One student felt that the money he had earned to finance his studies had been spent on the clothes of an emperor who, as in the fable, was naked.

B. The Sokal affair demonstrates that postmodern theorists don't understand their own jargon.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 206-207. What is worse, in our opinion, is the adverse effect that abandoning clear thinking and clear writing has on teaching and culture. Students learn to repeat and to embellish discourses that they only barely understand. They can even, if they are lucky, make an academic career out of it by becoming expert in the manipulation of an erudite jargon. After all, one of us managed, after only three months of study, to master the postmodern lingo well enough to publish an article in a prestigious journal. As commentator Katha Pollitt astutely noted, "the comedy of the Sokal incident is that it suggests that even the postmodernists don't really understand one another's writing and make their way through the text by moving from one familiar name or notion to the next like a frog jumping across a murky pond by way of lily pads." The deliberately obscure discourses of postmodernism, and the intellectual dishonesty they engender, poison a part of intellectual life and strengthen the facile anti-intellectualism that is already all too widespread in the general public.

C. The language of postmodernism is a caricature of itself.

Richard Dawkins, (Prof., Zoology, Oxford U.), *NATURE*, July 9, 1998, 141. Here's a typical sentence from this impressively erudite work: "If one examines capitalist theory, one is faced with a choice: either reject neotextual materialism or conclude that society has objective value. If dialectic desituationism holds, we have to choose between Habermasian discourse and the subtextual paradigm of context. It could be said that the subject is contextualised into a textual nationalism that includes truth as a reality. In a sense, the premise of the subtextual paradigm of context states that reality comes from the collective unconscious."

8. POSTMODERNISM FEEDS ETHNIC CLEANSING AROUND THE GLOBE.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 313. Postmodernists claim they seek to remedy the manifest failings of really existing democracy. Yet, given their metatheoretical aversion to considerations of equity and fairness, accepting such de facto assurances at face value seems unwise. Paradoxically, their celebration of heterogeneity and radical difference risks abetting the neotribalist ethos that threatens to turn the post-communist world order into a congeries of warring, fratricidal ethnicities. Differences should be respected. But there are also occasions when they need to be bridged. The only reasonable solution to this problem is to ensure that differences are bounded and subsumed by universalistic principles of equal liberty. Ironically, then, the liberal doctrine of "justice as fairness" (Rawls) provides the optimal ethical framework by virtue of which cultural differences might be allowed to prosper and flourish.

9. POSTMODERNISM PROMOTES COMPLACENCY AND INDIFFERENCE IN RESPONSE TO REAL SUFFERING.

Nsongurua Udombana, (Prof., Legal Studies, Central European U., Budapest), *SAN DIEGO INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL*, Fall 05, 32-33. The problem with the postmodern view of development is that it encourages affluent societies to avoid assisting those in poor societies who live in absolute poverty. Such indifference leaves the poor to their own devices, and that cannot be right. The problem of poverty in any part of the world cannot be resolved by indifference in other parts of the world. If we believe that life has a purpose and is worth living, and that individuals everywhere have a right to dignity, then those who are in a position to do something about global poverty must respond not only out of compassion but also out of a "categorical imperative." They should work to remove the evils, structural and otherwise, that constitute violations of human rights. Human beings are a part of the whole that we call the universe. Our task is to free ourselves from the illusion of separateness and widen our circle of compassion to embrace all persons of all nations.

10. DEMOCRATIC HUMANISM IS MORALLY SUPERIOR TO POSTMODERNISM.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xiii-xiv. Hence, the current disaffection with postmodernism is in no small measure attributable to recent political circumstances. Humanism's return spells postmodernism's demise. Totalitarianism was the twentieth century's defining political experience. Its aftermath has left us with a new categorical imperative: no more Auschwitzes or Gulags. We now know that an inextinguishable difference separates democratic and totalitarian regimes. Despite their manifest empirical failings, democratic polities possess a capacity for internal political change that totalitarian societies do not. A discourse such as postmodernism that celebrates the virtues of cultural relativism and that remains ambivalent, at best, vis-à-vis democratic norms is inadequate to the moral and political demands of the contemporary hour.

11. POSTMODERNISM LEADS TO THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 312. As philosophers of “difference,” they present themselves as advocates of the politically marginalized. Yet the antiliberal rhetorical thrust of their arguments risks undermining the very norms of tolerance that, historically, have provided such groups with the greatest measure of political and legal protection.” Were the claims of “difference” to become the “norm,” as postmodernists recommend, our inherited notions of selfhood and community would likely all but collapse. What kind of world would it be in which all forms of identity, both individual and collective, were anathematized to such an extent? In this and other respects the radical claims of difference risk becoming a recipe for epistemological, ethical, and political incoherence.

12. POSTMODERNISM REPRESENTS AN INCREDIBLE WASTE OF INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 206. Postmodernism has three principal negative effects: a waste of time in the human sciences, a cultural confusion that favors obscurantism, and a weakening of the political left. First of all, postmodern discourse, exemplified by the texts we quote, functions in part as a dead end in which some sectors of the humanities and social sciences have gotten lost. No research, whether on the natural or the social world, can progress on a basis that is both conceptually confused and radically detached from empirical evidence.

13. EVIDENCE AND LOGIC ARE SUPERIOR TO POSTMODERN SKEPTICISM.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 275-276. Fair enough: scientists are in fact the first to advise skepticism in the face of other people's (and one's own) truth claims. But a sophomoric skepticism, a bland (or blind) agnosticism, won't get you anywhere. Cultural critics, like historians or scientists, need an informed skepticism: one that can evaluate evidence and logic, and come to reasoned (albeit tentative) judgments based on that evidence and logic.

14. POSTMODERNISM CREATES POLICY PARALYSIS.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xiv-xv. The postmodern left risks depriving democracy of valuable normative resources at an hour of extreme historical need. In times of crisis—such as the current global war on terrorism in which basic rights and liberties have been manifestly jeopardized—that the elements of a “democratic minimum” be preserved is imperative. Postmodern political thought, which devalues coalition building and consensus in favor of identity politics and political agonistics, prematurely discounts this heritage. It thereby inherits one of the most problematic traits of “leftism”: the cynical assumption that democratic norms are little more than a veil for vested interests. Of course, they can and do serve such purposes, but they also offer a crucial element of ethical leverage by means of which dominant interests may be exposed and transformed. The political gains that have been registered during the last three decades by previously marginalized social groups (women, gays, ethnic minorities) testify to a logic of political inclusion. They demonstrate capacities for progressive political change that remain lodged in democratic precepts and institutions. To surrender entirely these potentials means abandoning progressive politics altogether.

Johann Hari, (Staff), *THE INDEPENDENT*, Oct. 13, 2004, 39. To be fair to him, late in his life Derrida seems to have begun to understand the terrible forces of ultra-scepticism he unleashed. Very few people can actually bear to be nihilists; very few people can preach a message of paralysis and despair for long. So Derrida declared in the early 1990s that there are some “infinitely irreducible” ideas that should not be deconstructed - particularly justice and friendship. But it was too late. Derrida had vandalised all the tools he could have used to make a case for justice. If reason is worthless, if words are mere symbols in a void, how can he suddenly call a halt to the process of deconstruction when it comes to one particular value he happens to like? Is his use of the word “justice” somehow immune to all the rules he spent his career articulating? Derrida was left making the preposterous case that justice is a “Messianic” concept that would somehow be revealed to us once we stripped away language and reason. Oh, please. I suppose it's touching that Derrida made a tragic final attempt to chain his own deconstructionist beast. But the time for him to dissociate himself from nihilism was decades earlier, when he first launched the idea of deconstruction.



Johann Hari, (Staff), *THE INDEPENDENT*, Oct. 13, 2004, 39. Enough. No hungry person ever pined for deconstruction; no tyrannised person ever felt they were trapped in a language game. When there are urgent crises in the world that need serious intellectual application, it is faintly disgusting for intellectuals to spend time arguing about whether the world is really there at all or whether it can ever be described in language. Perhaps there is a space for a continuing debate about postmodern thought in the more obscure philosophy departments - but to allow it to dominate so much of the humanities, as it has for decades, is almost pathologically deranged. Academics, novelists and serious thinkers have been parked in the Derridan dead-end for too long.

15. POSTMODERN THEORY IS NOW – THANKFULLY – BEING REJECTED BY THE VERY PEOPLE WHO EARLIER EMBRACED IT.

Emily Eakin, (Staff), *NEW YORK TIMES*, Oct. 17, 2004, IV-12. Mr. Derrida outlived fellow theorists Louis Althusser, Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze, but signs of theory's waning influence had been accumulating around him for years. Since the early 1990's, the grand intellectual paradigms with which these men were prominently associated — Marxism, psychoanalysis, structuralism — had steadily lost adherents and prestige. The world had changed but not necessarily in the ways some of big theory's fervent champions had hoped. Ideas once greeted as potential catalysts for revolution began to seem banal, irrelevant or simply inadequate to the task of achieving social change. Deconstruction, Mr. Derrida's primary legacy, was no exception. Originally a method of rigorous textual analysis intended to show that no piece of writing is exactly what it seems, but rather laden with ambiguities and contradictions, deconstruction found ready acolytes across the humanities and beyond — including many determined to deconstruct not just text but the political system and society at large. Today, the term has become a more or less meaningless artifact of popular culture, more likely to turn up in a description of an untailored suit in the pages of *Vogue* than in a graduate seminar on James Joyce.

Alan Sokal & Jean Bricmont, (Prof., Physics, NYU & Prof., Université catholique de Louvain, France), *FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE*, 1998, 210-211. Almost forty years later, revolutionaries have aged and marginality has become institutionalized. Ideas that contained some truth, if properly understood, have degenerated into a vulgate that mixes bizarre confusions with overblown banalities. It seems to us that postmodernism, whatever usefulness it originally had as a corrective to hardened orthodoxies, has lived this out and is now running its natural course. Although the name was not ideally chosen to invite a succession (what can come after post-?), we are under the inescapable impression that times are changing. One sign is that the challenge comes nowadays not only from the rearguard, but also from people who are neither die-hard positivists nor old-fashioned Marxists, and who understand the problems encountered by science, rationality, and traditional leftist politics—but who believe that criticism of the past should enlighten the future, not lead to contemplation of the ashes.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xii. Today the postmodern juggernaut seems to have run aground. Outside of the parochial climate of contemporary academe, its program of a “farewell to reason” failed to take root. Its bold proclamation concerning the end of “metanarratives” of human emancipation also failed to gain widespread acceptance. Moreover, the eastern European dissidents whose words and actions inspired the “revolutions of 1989” successfully relied on the discourse of “human rights” to undermine totalitarianism. In this way, a political orientation predicated on the values of Western humanism that the cultural left had denigrated as a tool of American hegemony made a meaningful comeback.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xiii. It is one of the supreme ironies of the contemporary period that postmodernism's demise has been most rapid and extensive in contemporary France, its putative philosophical birthplace.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 9. As commentators have often pointed out, during the 1980s, while Republicans were commandeering the nation's political apparatus, partisans of “theory” were storming the ramparts of the Modern Language Association and the local English Department. Ironically, during the same period, the French paradigms that American academics were so busy assimilating were undergoing an eclipse across the Atlantic. In France they were perceived as expressions of an obsolete political temperament: gauchisme (“leftism”) or “French philosophy of the 1960s.” By the mid-1980s French intellectuals had passed through the acid bath of antitotalitarianism.” Under the influence of Solzhenitsyn's pathbreaking study of the Gulag as well as the timely, if slick, anticommunist polemics of the “New Philosophers” such as Andre Glucksmann and Bernard Henri-Levy, who were appalled by the “killing fields” of Pol Pot's Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge leader had been educated in Paris during the 1950s) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, French intellectuals began returning to the indigenous tradition of democratic republicanism—thereby leaving the 1960s leftists holding the bag of an outmoded philosophical anarchism.

Emily Eakin, (Staff), *NEW YORK TIMES*, Oct. 17, 2004, IV-12. Why did big theories flourish, and why are they now in retreat? The most likely explanation involves politics. In this view, the rise and fall of theory paralleled the changing fortunes of the left. “The fate of major theories was very much bound up with a political moment,” Mr. Eagleton said in a telephone interview. “The heroic period for that theory was the 1960's to the 1980's, a period in which the left was on the up.”

16. THE NOTION THAT POSTMODERN THEORY HOLDS THE ANSWER TO INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT IS A DELUSION; THE IMPULSE TO TEAR DOWN DESTROYS EVEN FRIENDSHIP.

Sam Salecki, (Staff), *THE GLOBE AND MAIL*, Jan. 15, 1994, 1. The testy relationship between Foucault and his former student Jacques Derrida emphasizes that intellectual life in Paris didn't take place in a demilitarized zone. In 1963, 10 years after having studied with Foucault, Derrida delivered the now famous lecture in Paris attacking Foucault's recently published *Madness and Civilization*. With Foucault in the audience, he argued that his former mentor had in fact misread Descartes' meditations — a key text in the analysis — and he ended by suggesting that there might be a “structuralist totalitarianism” in Foucault's approach. Foucault reportedly sat impassively during the lecture, inwardly raging but probably also aware that the younger Derrida had done to him what Foucault had done to Sartre during the past decade - he had committed “a symbolic murder of the master” in order to challenge for the position of *capo di tutti capi* in a Paris. Foucault kept silent for seven years, a near miracle for a man with a well-known temper, and then in 1970 he brutally struck back with the essay *Mon Coeur, ce papier, ce feu*. Turning the tables on Derrida, he accused him of being the one who had misread Descartes and dismissed him as reducing all pedagogy to “textual traces.”

17. POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHERS HAVE A FASCINATION FOR FASCISM.

A. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger were philosophical guiding lights of Nazi oppression.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 4. As observers of the French intellectual scene have frequently noted, although Germany lost on the battlefield, it triumphed in the seminar rooms, bookstores, and cafés of the Latin Quarter. During the 1960s Spenglerian indictments of “Western civilization,” once cultivated by leading representatives of the German intellectual right, migrated across the Rhine where they gained a new currency. Ironically, Counter-Enlightenment doctrines that had been taboo in Germany because of their unambiguous association with fascism—after all, Nietzsche had been canonized as the Nazi regime's official philosopher, and for a time Heidegger was its most outspoken philosophical advocate—seemed to best capture the mood of *Kulturpessimismus* that predominated among French intellectuals during the postwar period. Adding insult to injury, the new assault against philosophy came from the homeland of the Enlightenment itself.

B. Paul De Man, the protégé of Derrida, provided philosophical support for Hitler's "final solution" – even worse, Derrida chose to defend De Man's Nazi connections.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 11. At pivotal moment in the debate over de Man's fascist past, Derrida "deconstructed" one of the young Belgian's articles from the early 1940s that enthusiastically endorsed the deportation of European Jews—at the very moment the Nazi Final Solution was being implemented—by claiming, counterintuitively, that it demonstrated de Man's status as a closet resistant. Similarly, in the debate over Heidegger's Nazism, several poststructuralists argued implausibly that the German philosopher had succumbed to Nazism's allure owing to a surfeit of humanism. It was the later Heidegger, they claimed—the avowed "antihumanist"—who was the genuine antifascist.

Jonathan Kandell, (Staff), *NEW YORK TIMES*, Oct. 10, 2004, 1. But in 1987, four years after Mr. de Man's death, research revealed that he had written over 170 articles in the early 1940's for *Le Soir*, a Nazi newspaper in Belgium. Some of these articles were openly anti-Semitic, including one that echoed Nazi calls for "a final solution" and seemed to defend the notion of concentration camps. "A solution to the Jewish problem that aimed at the creation of a Jewish colony isolated from Europe would entail no deplorable consequences for the literary life of the West," wrote Mr. de Man. The revelations became a major scandal at Yale and other campuses where the late Mr. de Man had been lionized as an intellectual hero. Some former colleagues asserted that the scandal was being used to discredit deconstruction by people who were always hostile to the movement. But Mr. Derrida gave fodder to critics by defending Mr. de Man, and even using literary deconstruction techniques in an attempt to demonstrate that the Belgian scholar's newspaper articles were not really anti-Semitic. "Borrowing Derrida's logic one could deconstruct *Mein Kampf* to reveal that [Adolf Hitler] was in conflict with anti-Semitism," scoffed Peter Lennon, in a 1992 article for *The Guardian*. According to another critic, Mark Lilla, in a 1998 article in *The New York Review of Books*, Mr. Derrida's contortionist defense of his old friend left "the impression that deconstruction means you never have to say you're sorry." Almost as devastating for deconstruction and Mr. Derrida was the revelation, also in 1987, that Heidegger, one of his intellectual muses, was a dues-paying member of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1945. Once again, Mr. Derrida was accused by critics of being irresolute, this time for failing to condemn Heidegger's fascist ideas.

C. Derrida, Deleuze, Leotard, and Foucault have all enthusiastically defended the actions of despots.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 270. This idea of cultural relativism, which had been canonized in the work of Claude Levi-Strauss during the 1950s, was then epistemologically enshrined by the French philosophies of difference — Derrida, Deleuze, and Lyotard—that attained prominence during the 1960s. Yet once the much-emulated Third World Liberation movements in Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, and a variety of African nations (Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, the Central African Republic) turned despotic, the aforementioned philosophies of difference became increasingly difficult to defend. Instead, what was once presented as a solution now appeared to be part of the problem: in the name of these philosophies one could seemingly justify all manner of non-Western ethical and political excess—Foucault's strange fascination with Iran's "revolution of the Mullahs" offers an excellent case in point.

D. Many of the leading postmodern theorists have been associated with fascism.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, xii. In academic quarters, postmodernism has been nourished by the doctrines of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Blanchot, and Paul de Man—all of whom either prefigured or succumbed to the proverbial intellectual "fascination with fascism."

18. POSTMODERN ETHICS GET CO-OPTED BY CONSERVATIVES BECAUSE OF ITS LIBERAL NOTION OF THE BODY- THIS WILL DESTROY RIGHTS AND HINDER MINORITY PROGRESS

Richard Mohr, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana, *BEST OF THE HARVARD GAY AND LESBIAN REVIEW*, 1997, 344) Moreover, despite postmodernism's thick jargon and tangled prose, there is no reason to suppose that the courts won't eventually see through the postmodern bluff and, like Toto, pull back the curtain of its liberal guise to reveal machinery which conservative justices can effectively use to further restrict rights. It is not too difficult to imagine a scenario in which Justice Scalia signs off on an opinion upholding the mass arrest of gay Marchers on Washington by block-quoting Stanley Fish: "In short, the name of the game has always been politics, even when (indeed, especially when) it is played by stigmatizing politics as the area to be avoided by legal restraints." Indeed the Supreme Court's most recent gay case gives evidence that it is already able to co-opt postmodern discourses as means of oppressing gays. In its June 1995 St. Patrick's Day Parade ruling, the Court voided the gay civil rights protections of Massachusetts' public accommodations law as applied to parades. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court had to find that Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade constituted political speech despite the fact that the Court could find no discernible message conveyed by the parade; as far as any message went, the Court analogized the parade to the verse of Lewis Carroll and the music of Arnold Schönberg. What to do? Well, the Court sought out a source that would claim for it and against common opinion that all parades are inherently political. And where better to find such a source than in post-modern beliefs that hold that everything is politics? The Court quoted the requisite claim about the inherently political nature of parades from an obscure 1986 academic book *Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia*, which, on the very next page after the one quoted by the Court, signals its intellectual allegiances: "The concepts framing this study flow from . . . E. P Thompson . . . and Raymond Williams." These two men are the Marxist scholars who founded cultural studies in England. The Rightwing Supreme Court here used postmodern Marxist scripture to clobber gays.

19. POSTMODERN ETHICS GET CO-OPTED BY CONSERVATIVES BECAUSE OF ITS LIBERAL NOTION OF THE BODY- THIS WILL DESTROY RIGHTS AND HINDER MINORITY PROGRESS POSTMODERN ETHICS ARE USED TO JUSTIFY OPPRESSION GLOBALLY

Richard Mohr, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana, *BEST OF THE HARVARD GAY AND LESBIAN REVIEW*, 1997, 344. It used to be that tyrants—be they shah or ayatollah—would simply deny that human rights violations were occurring in their countries. But in the last few years, tyrants have become more “theoretical” and devious. Their underlings have been reading Foucault. Now, when someone claims that a ruler is violating some human right, say, religious freedom, the ruler simply asserts that while the purported right may well be a right in Northern European thinking, this fact need have no moral weight in his own way of thinking. Indeed, if, as postmoderns claim, values are always historically and culturally specific in their content, then the ruler can claim not only that North European thinking about rights need have no weight in his own thinking, but moreover that it cannot have any weight in his own thinking, determined as it is by local conditions and cultural forces. Recently Muslim fundamentalists have defended their religious cleansing of Coptic Christians out of Egypt by asserting that there is no international human right to religious freedom. In a similar spirit, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States took out a full-page ad in the Sunday New York Times titled “Modernizing in Our Own Way” (July 10, 1994). The ad couched moral relativism in pseudo-liberal verbiage—appealing to “rights to our own basic values” and “respect for other people’s cultures”—in order to justify Saudi Arabia’s barbaric departures from “Western human rights.” For a gay example of such judgment-arresting relativity, consider the case of the 19-year-old Jamaican reggae singer, Buju Banton. In 1992 he had a hit song, “Boom Bye Bye,” with lyrics that translate approximately to “Faggots have to run or get a bullet in the head.” A spokesman in the singer’s defense claimed, “Jamaica is for the most part a Third World country with a different ethical and moral code. For better or worse, homosexuality is a deep stigma there, and the recording should be judged in a Jamaican context.” If post-modernism is right, such fundamentalists, ambassadors, and spokesmen are irrefutable. Surprisingly, such moral relativism has even infected Amnesty International—a group that is a conceptual joke if the very idea of international human rights comes a cropper. Through the 1980s, British, Dutch, and American sectors of Amnesty International argued that people arrested for homosexual behavior should be classified as prisoners of conscience—Amnesty International’s blanket designation for those whose human rights have been violated. But for a long time, these arguments were drowned out by Third World voices, which claimed that while sexual privacy may be a right in some First World places, it certainly is not where they speak. If postmodernism is right, these Third World voices are irrefutable.

## **CRITICAL RACE THEORY (CRT) IS FLAWED AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DIVERT US FROM MEANINGFUL PUBLIC POLICIES**

### **1. THE CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVE INDIVIDUALIZES COMPLEX PROBLEMS SPLINTERING ANY POSSIBILITY OF A CONSENSUS THAT COULD RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS.**

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 519-520. Part of the problem here is that CRT seems to fall victim to balkanization, a splintering effect in which each racial, ethnic, or gender category becomes a unitary focus, to the neglect of the fragile overlapping consensus which binds us. Thus Paulette Caldwell contributes *A Hair Piece* which goes into great detail about her own hair as a way of exploring the issues raised in a federal case which upheld the right of American Airlines to prohibit a black employee from wearing her hair in braids. The court found that the company's rule against braided hair applied neutrally to both blacks and whites (at the time, the movie "10" had popularized braided hair for white women), and the court also pointed out that the rule did not discriminate against an immutable racial characteristic of blacks, such as bushy hair or dark skin. This was a controversial decision, and, like Caldwell, I disagree with the court's ruling; but the wrongfulness of the decision is not really affected in any way (nor is any light shed on the decision) by finding out how Caldwell wears her own hair. The implication from Caldwell's discussion of her hair is that she has special knowledge of this case because she is black, a special ability to see that the court was wrong. But we don't need an argument against a bad decision from a black perspective; we need an argument that works from all reasonable perspectives, especially if we want to convince people who are outside our race and ethnicity.

### **2. NARRATIVE UNDERMINES CRITICAL REASONING.**

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 522. Another danger of legal storytelling is that it plays upon emotion, instead of reason, and therefore it can convince people to adopt a position without giving them a doctrinal basis for it. Suppose you were uncommitted in the last presidential election, and I wanted to persuade you to vote for Bill Clinton. One method that I might use would be to cite Clinton's accomplishments, his attempt to balance the budget, his health-care proposal, or his record of judicial appointments. These are all relevant points because they bear directly on his ability to serve the country. But now suppose that I suddenly realize that these arguments, while relevant, may not work; in fact, you stand ready to present some counter-evidence against my points. In that case, I might switch tactics and try to convince you by telling a story. I might tell you about what it was like for Clinton to grow up as a poor child in the rural South, how he struggled from humble beginnings to realize the American dream of becoming President. My goal would be to move you emotionally so that you undergo a psychological conversion in which you find yourself voting for him even though you remain unconvinced of his qualifications. The problem with convincing people in this way is that it is circuitous and skirts the real issues; it is a way of convincing people at any cost, in order to serve a higher cause. CRT sometimes works similarly, where issues that should be decided on doctrinal grounds by looking at federal law (issues like affirmative action, free speech, and criminal sentencing) are determined by stories, personal accounts, and other miscellanea.

### **3. CRITICAL RACE THEORY IS SELF CONTRADICTIONARY.**

Daniel Subotnik, (Prof., Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center), CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spr. 98, 706-707. If Critical Race Theorists (CRATS) believe that there is no knowledge that exists independently of culture then there can be no universal knowledge; for, to put it simply, the only way to understand a culture (like anything else) is to apply some knowledge that exists outside of it which, according to CRATs, does not exist. Which brings us to standards of performance. Do we really want them to be abolished because we cannot agree on them? Should everyone be passed into law school and medical school? Out of law school and medical school and into the professions?

4. CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES RE-ENTRENCH RACIAL DIVISIONS.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 519. Much CRT scholarship seems to be infused with the mistaken notion that blacks have a unique ability to write about how the law affects blacks, that only Hispanics can really see how the law affects Hispanics, that white judges can't act as good judges in cases involving these "out-groups." So the movement can easily fracture into a composite of diverse people who write about themselves and their out-group; each person claims a scholarship interest in his own ethnicity or gender or both. The notion that each race has a unique view of the law is common in CRT, as we can see from the following reading of Plessy and Brown v. Board of Education by a black CRT scholar: "From a white perspective, it is unclear what is wrong with separate but equal, but when one takes a black perspective, it is easy to see why Plessy was wrong and why Brown was constitutionally right." This passage ignores the point that the Constitution (and other laws) are public documents that affect all of us regardless of our race — so Plessy was wrong from any decent perspective, and Brown was right from any perspective; it is not a question of black and white, but a question of right and wrong.

Toby Egan, (Staff), UMKC LAW REVIEW, Summer 1999, 689. Critical Race Theory embraces racial cultures and wants the laws society practices to be changed to account for the differences between cultures. Individualism denies the importance of culture as merely a set of beliefs which have been learned and can be accepted or rejected at discretion of the individual. This leaves the two theories in direct conflict. Changing laws or admissions standards to account for non-inherent and non-static differentiations would be a never-ending and pointless process. If differences between races require changing our laws to account for them, then they are not merely an individual's choice, but something deeper and more ingrained. This premise could serve as a dangerous justification for racism. Rather, it reinforces the notion of grouping, but looks to establish a more positive grouping of minorities by eliminating negative stereotypes and replacing them with positive stereotypes. Race Theorists do not seek to "see the invisible man," but rather to place constructed masks on all persons, the type of mask determinable by race. CRT's efforts to do this reinforces stereotyping and the notion that the cultural group is the proper level to judge a person. We then end up as separate groupings of harmonious cultures; creating a better world through the embracement of our socially constructed differences.

Toby Egan, (Staff), UMKC LAW REVIEW, Summer 1999, 691. The primary flaw in CRT is inherently linking race to cultures. A test or standard cannot be racially biased, only culturally. By reinforcing the idea that cultural biases are necessarily linked to race, CRT justifies racism. Rather than attacking current testing or free speech laws as racist, CRT should focus on why the tests or laws are wrong in and of themselves. For example, instead of lashing out at policies which allow the current wealth distributions to exist as racist, they should be attacked on a more philosophical ground of capitalism perpetuating injustice against the poor.

5. CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES DON'T ASSIST DECISION.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 526. But there is a problematic assumption running through much CRT scholarship to the effect that once our consciousness has been raised through narratives and stories, the correct legal decision will immediately become clear to us. That is, judges and lawyers who genuinely understand the experiences of people of color will start making decisions that will benefit these "out-groups." But is this a correct assumption? I think not, for the simple reason that a raised consciousness is no guarantee that a particular decision will be chosen. This can be seen by the rise of African-American intellectuals who have experienced stinging acts of racism yet remain staunchly opposed to affirmative action and set-asides, on doctrinal grounds. The very existence of neoconservative black intellectuals like Stephen Carter and Shelby Steele (not to mention Justice Clarence Thomas and law professor Randall Kennedy) militates against the idea that the subjective experience of racism will automatically lead to some sort of psychological conversion in which judges and lawyers will know how to "do the right thing."

6. CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES PROMOTE DESTRUCTIVE RACIAL STEREOTYPES.

Toby Egan, (Staff), UMKC LAW REVIEW, Summer 1999, 662. The flaw in viewing race as determining beliefs or thought processes is that it opens the door to stereotyping and classifying individuals by their race. For example, if an individual truly is given to linear thought because of his or her race and an employer is seeking an assistant with non-linear thought processes, then the candidate's race could be considered a non-fallacious factor in the hiring process. By embracing the idea that inherent differences exist between races, Critical Race Theory reinforces modes of thought that allow judgments based upon race. Said judgments must remain fallacious or racism will continue to flourish in our society.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 523. As a final point about storytelling, I am concerned about the potential for self-stereotyping that occurs when minority law professors write stories instead of producing exhaustively researched law review articles. The idea that minorities are specially endowed with storytelling abilities but not with analytical skills is precisely the type of stereotype that should be countered.

7. CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES INVITE FICTITIOUS CONSPIRACY THEORIES.

Daniel Subotnik, (Prof., Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center), CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spr. 98, 703. But if we follow Austin and abandon the search for literal truth in favor of another, “higher” order, are we prepared to accept the consequences? Some, like Austin, may well understand that antiblack conspiracy theories “often rest on the slenderest of factual foundations.” But surely we have to worry about those less secure about their place in the world and thus more easily influenced. Will cynicism help them when the government sets out to do some good? Are such people likely to invest in their futures if they are led to believe that the rug can be pulled out from under them at any time? Finally, who will repair the social fabric once it has been recklessly shredded?

8. CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES INVITE AN “END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS” APPROACH.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 522-523. I am disturbed by the notion that doctrine (constitutional doctrine, no less) is understood by Bell to be merely “instrumental” and something to be “manipulated” to satisfy the all-important test of black empowerment. After all, if the law is to be judged simply as an instrument for black empowerment, then the best legal system would be one which helps blacks at any cost, for example, by “manipulating” legal doctrine through “instrumental” measures like exempting blacks from income tax, requiring whites to give a tithe to the NAACP, redistributing white pensions to blacks, and appointing only blacks to the judiciary. But these changes in the law would violate deeply held notions of fairness, property, and due process. Bell's self-professed “racial realism” seems to be radical and tough-minded, but it sanctions some irresponsible legal reforms.

9. CRITICAL RACE THEORY FOCUSES ON VICTIMIZATION.

Daniel Subotnik, (Prof., Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center), CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spr. 98, 701-702. The focus on victimization has, not surprisingly, led Critical Race Theorists (CRATs) to antiblack conspiracies. “We live in conspiratorial times. Almost everyone has a favorite conspiracy theory or two.” Blacks espouse more than their proportionate share of such theories. Regina Austin lists O.J. Simpson, Clarence Thomas, Malcolm X, Marion Barry, Coors Brewing Company, and Church's Chicken as subjects of antiblack conspiracies. But it is the broader, more amorphous and thus more insidious conspiracies that primarily capture her attention. For instance, the AIDS virus was “either specifically developed to ravage African peoples or resulted from uncontrolled biological experiments conducted by the U.S. Government.” Is there any truth to any of these theories? Austin does not say. She does, however, admit that, in general, “antiblack conspiracy theories are not uniformly accepted by black people, not the least because the theories often rest on the slenderest of factual foundations.” Austin concedes that “conspiracy theorizing... can generate individual and collective paranoia.” One would think, then, that Austin would want to highlight the risks to the black community of its antiblack-conspiracy theorizing, or at least put a stop to those theories that are clearly false. Far from it.



## 10. CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES MAKE MEANINGFUL DIALOG IMPOSSIBLE.

Daniel Subotnik, (Prof., Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center), CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spr. 98, 693-694. What can an academic trained to question and to doubt possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, “I hurt bad”? “No, you don't hurt”? “You shouldn't hurt”? “Other people hurt too”? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - “What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?” If the majority were perceived as having the well-being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those “cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating.” “Precarious.” “Obliterating.” These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. “I hurt,” in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined — even silly — destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles. Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, “I hurt” discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call “first-person agony stories” that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. “The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity.” Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny. If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies Critical Race Theorists (CRATs) succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.

Daniel Subotnik, (Prof., Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center), CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spr. 98, 698-699. But “we must get beyond the stage of halting conversations filled with the superficialities of hurt feelings.” In sum, what is needed is to crack the “hermetic bravado celebrating victimization and stylized marginalization” that leads to the virtual hegemony on the discussion of race relations that the academic community has ceded to Critical Race Theorists (CRATs). No matter how raw sensibilities might understandably be after centuries of slavery and racism, a position must be staked out that allows for a rejoinder to a Derrick Bell when he says self-mutilating things like “while slavery is over, a racist society continues to exert dominion over black men and their maleness in ways more subtle but hardly less castrating....”

## 11. CRITICAL RACE THEORY'S “INTEREST CONVERGENCE THESIS” – THE NOTION THAT WHITE PEOPLE ADDRESS RACIAL INJUSTICE ONLY TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST – IS INCORRECT.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 523. The same can be said for the much-vaunted interest convergence thesis, which finds its way into a fair amount of CRT scholarship. The interest-convergence thesis originated with Derrick Bell, whose view is paraphrased by Delgado as follows: “whites will advance the cause of racial justice only when doing so coincides with their own self-interest.” According to some critical race theorists, “civil rights law was never designed to help blacks,” and decisions like *Brown* were decided not on the basis of racial justice, but as a mechanism for whites to win the Cold War. On its face, the interest-convergence thesis is a strange claim. After all, the whole point of the desegregation cases, the Voting Rights Act, Title VII, and so on, was to advance black interests by eradicating racism. The Court's decision in *Brown* makes no mention of the Cold War or the interests of the dominant white culture in desegregation. There have indeed been cases in which the Court was motivated by alleged interests of national security, as in the disastrous *Korematsu* decision, but in that case the Court told us what it was doing, for better or worse. All of this goes to show that there is little direct evidence that the decision in *Brown* was meant to help whites more than blacks. Furthermore, if desegregation and affirmative action benefitted whites, why were whites so resistant to them?

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 524-525. According to Delgado's interpretation, the interest-convergence theory is confirmed by our experience with affirmative action, which he describes as a "majoritarian device" designed to benefit whites. According to Delgado, affirmative action is not intended to help blacks, but to assuage white guilt and to absolve whites from taking further steps toward racial justice: Critics [critical race theorists] point out that periodic victories - *Brown v. Board of Education*, the 1964 Civil Rights Act - are trumpeted as proof that our system is fair and just, but are then quickly stolen away by narrow judicial construction, foot-dragging, and delay. The celebrations assure everyone that persons of color are now treated fairly in virtually every area of life... With all that, if blacks are still not achieving, well, what can be done? The implication here is that whites benefit from affirmative action more than blacks, hence the convergence of interests in which the modest gains by blacks are outweighed by gains for whites. This comment seems to confuse cause and effect, however. The "periodic victories" to which Delgado refers were caused by a concern for black equality as a matter of justice; it makes little sense to recharacterize these victories as "allowed by whites." With regard to affirmative action schemes, Delgado is probably correct that some whites have become complacent about advancing black interests, or that some whites have had their guilt assuaged since these programs became popular, but this is hardly what one would call a "benefit" that whites receive from affirmative action. In any event, there is no evidence that whites allow affirmative action because it benefits them, and in fact the opposite is true - most whites who endorse affirmative action (myself included) believe that it will work to their personal detriment, but nevertheless feel that it is required by justice.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 525. The interest-convergence thesis seems to hold that blacks can advance only when whites also advance, or in other words, that in every case where blacks advance, whites also advance. This blanket statement can be refuted by a single instance (a single piece of legislation or a single court decision) in which blacks gained and whites did not. Examples of this abound - affirmative action, Title VII, fair housing laws, and prohibitions on red-lining. To say that these much-needed reforms were really an advancement for whites is to reinterpret the facts in a way that is highly implausible.

12. THE NARRATIVE CONFUSES PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ISSUES – PRIVATE EXPRESSION OF EXPERIENCE PROVIDES AN INADEQUATE BASIS FOR PUBLIC ACTION.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 517-518. CRT's message about the legacy of racism is important, but one gets the impression that writing these pieces is a relatively easy game to play, that all one needs is an angle, a personal trait which can serve as an entrance into the game; and if one possesses several angles, she can write about how these facets intersect, that is, what it is like to lie at the "intersectionality" of blackness and femininity, or to be Latino and gay. I am not a critical race scholar but I could probably produce a manuscript in this vein in a relatively short time by following the standard format. I would begin with a story about what it was like to grow up Jewish, how I went to temple, celebrated Passover, got ridiculed by kids at school, heard people refer to Jews as "kikes," went to Germany and became depressed about the Holocaust, how I see swastikas in the bathrooms at the school where I teach, and so on. I could then discuss how Jews were discriminated against here in America, how we couldn't attend certain schools, couldn't vacation in certain places. And I could conclude by saying that anti-Semitism still exists today and that we should be on the lookout for it. But we need to ask where these stories and narratives lead in the law, especially constitutional law. The answer is nowhere. The reason for this is that in most cases the law does not turn on my private story about growing up Jewish, nor does it turn on anybody's personal account of being black, Hispanic, and so on: these are private issues; the law turns on public issues.

13. NARRATIVE ENCOURAGES NARCISSISM – THE VIEW THAT EVERYTHING IMPORTANT IS ABOUT US.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 516-517. Sigmund Freud once used the expression “narcissism of minor differences” to denote how various ethnic groups proclaim their uniqueness and superiority over other ethnicities based upon a handful of idiosyncratic traits, when in fact they are not very different from the other groups. Freud’s terminology seems to fit much of the work being done in CRT to the extent that many critical race theorists end up writing about themselves on the ground that their personal experience is unique and that there is something special that they can contribute because they are black, Latino, Asian, and so on. So instead of writing an article on why a particular law is wrong or unconstitutional, the critical race scholar provides a “raced” or “situated” analysis along the lines of: The Black View of Case X, or The Latino Perspective on Statute Y. Inevitably the authors of these types of articles write about the perspective of those who share their ethnicity. I must admit some reservations about the ultimate value of this scholarship. In Critical Race Theory we find Jennifer Russell writing about what it is like to be a black woman law professor; Margaret Montoya (a Latina law professor) writing about what it is like to grow up Latina and to attend Harvard Law School; Robert Chang writing about what it is like to be an Asian-American legal writing instructor; and Alan Freeman (a white law professor) writing about how his whiteness is an “inescapable feature” and an “uncrossable gap” which might render him incapable of truly contributing to CRT. Many of these writers are writing about themselves, and not just about how this or that event has influenced them (for example, how growing up black has motivated someone to be a civil rights lawyer), but writing about deeply personal events that are seemingly unrelated to legal questions. For example, two authors in this collection discuss in detail how they wear their hair, one article starting with the refrain, “I want to know my hair again, to own it, to delight in it again.” Generally speaking, articles in this vein have a similar format: first a series of personal stories and memoirs, then a discussion of cases and statutes from 1750 to 1950 in which courts have been insensitive to the target group, and then a conclusion which states that prejudice is still alive and well today. In most articles there is little discussion of the law as it is now, although abominations like *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, *Plessy v. Ferguson*, and *Korematsu v. United States* are repeatedly mentioned. And when recent cases are mentioned, they are often discussed without an effort by the author to see both sides of the issue - to see how the court could have reached its decision.

14. THE CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVE INVITES A REPRESSIVE COUNTER-NARRATIVE.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 1997, 521. There is a danger in storytelling precisely because it can lead in any and every direction, politically speaking. It is true that narratives about oppressed groups often lead to left-leaning social reform for the simple reason that narratives tend to humanize people whom we would otherwise consider outsiders. For example, when we read in the anthology about the experiences of minority CRT scholars struggling against racism, we begin to identify with them, and, frankly, we start rooting for them. Of course, if one identifies with people of color or with women, it is possible that one will be more likely to understand their side of an issue. But this cuts both ways. If one set of narratives can make us more sympathetic to people of color, it stands to reason that a different set of narratives can make us less sensitive. Indeed, Delgado contributes an article to the collection which recognizes that black thinkers like Shelby Steele and Stephen Carter make use of stories, irony, and humor to send a conservative message that contrasts with the narratives offered by CRT scholars Derrick Bell and Patricia Williams. We can easily imagine the emergence of narratives and stories in which white authors describe the experience of being denied entry into professional schools when they would have been accepted had they been black or female. In extreme cases it might be imagined that such authors would use storytelling to glorify a white utopian society without minorities. The error by CRT is to think that storytelling is inherently liberating when in fact it is inherently neutral — neither liberal nor conservative, neither constraining nor freeing.

## THE CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE IS MISGUIDED

### 1. SCIENCE IS NOT OWNED BY WESTERN CULTURE.

Dinesh D'Souza, (Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), *CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION*, May 10, 2002, B7. Consider science. It is based on a shared human trait: the desire to know. People in every culture have tried to learn about the world. Thus the Chinese recorded the eclipses, the Mayans developed a calendar, the Hindus discovered the number zero, and so on. But science — which requires experiments, laboratories, induction, verification, and what one scholar has called “the invention of invention,” the scientific method — that is a Western institution. Similarly, tribal participation is universal, but democracy — which involves free elections, peaceful transitions of power, and separation of powers — is a Western idea. Finally, the impulse to trade is universal, and there is nothing Western about the use of money, but capitalism — which requires property rights, contracts, courts to enforce them, limited-liability corporations, stock exchanges, patents, insurance, double-entry bookkeeping — this ensemble of practices was developed in the West.

### 2. SCIENCE BELONGS TO ALL CULTURES.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE RETURN OF TRIBALISM*, 05. Online. Internet. <http://www.sydneynline.com/>. In asserting the absolutism and non-relativism of Western scientific method, Gellner says this status is quite separate from any question about the ranking of the inhabitants of Western societies. It has nothing whatever to do with a racist, or any other, glorification of one segment of humanity over another. It is a style of knowledge and its implementation, not any category of personnel, that is being singled out. That style of knowledge did, of course, have to emerge somewhere and at some time, and to this extent it certainly has links with a particular tradition or culture. It emerged in one social context, but it is clearly accessible to all humanity. It endorses no single nation, culture or race. It is not clear which of the conditions surrounding its birth were crucial, and which were merely accidental and irrelevant, and the crucial conditions might well have come together in other places and at other times. Its greatest affinity need not be, and probably no longer is, with its place of origin. Indeed, Gellner notes with irony, the first nation to be both scientific and industrial, Great Britain, is not at present at the top of the 'first industrial division' and in recent years has been struggling in the relegation zone. This powerful form of cognition is not the prerogative of any one human group. So it does not, in this sense, give rise to any ranking of human groups. Far from being bound by Western culture, Western science belongs to the whole of humanity.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 281. In asserting the absolutism and non-relativism of Western scientific method, Gellner says this status is quite separate from any question about the ranking of the inhabitants of Western societies. It has nothing whatever to do with a racist, or any other, glorification of one segment of humanity over another. It is a style of knowledge and its implementation, not any category of personnel, that is being singled out. That style of knowledge did, of course, have to emerge somewhere and at some time, and to this extent it certainly has links with a particular tradition or culture. It emerged in one social context, but it is clearly accessible to all humanity. It endorses no single nation, culture or race. It is not clear which of the conditions surrounding its birth were crucial, and which were merely accidental and irrelevant, and the crucial conditions might well have come together in other places and at other times. Its greatest affinity need not be, and probably no longer is, with its place of origin. Indeed, Gellner observes, the first nation to be both scientific and industrial, Great Britain, is not at present at the top of the 'first industrial division' and in recent years has been struggling in the relegation zone.” This powerful form of cognition is not the prerogative of any one human group. So it does not, in this sense, give rise to any ranking of human groups. Far from being bound by Western culture, Western science belongs to the whole of humanity.

3. THE FACT THAT SCIENCE “WORKS” DEMONSTRATES THAT IT HAS A HANDLE ON TRUTH.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE RETURN OF TRIBALISM*, 05. Online. Internet. <http://www.sydneyline.com/>. Despite the claims of the relativists, there is one particular style of knowledge that has proven, historically, so overwhelmingly powerful—technologically, economically, militarily and administratively—that all societies have had to make their peace with it and adopt it. Ernest Gellner has argued that, no matter how unfashionable it might be to say it today, there is but one genuinely valid style of knowledge and that the mainstream of the Western scientific tradition has captured it. The epistemological grounds for the empirical methods of science contain some contentious assertions, he acknowledges, and agreement is lacking even among those philosophers who completely endorse the procedures themselves. But this does not constitute a good reason to doubt the efficacy of the methodology. Western science has trumped all other cognitive styles when judged by the pragmatic criterion of technological efficacy, but also when assessed by criteria such as precision, elaboration, elegance and sustained and consensual growth. In other words, Western knowledge works, and none of the others do with remotely the same effectiveness.

4. SCIENCE IS OUR BEST HOPE FOR SURVIVAL.

Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, (Co-Founders, The Breakthrough Institute), *BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY*, 07, 139. The conventional wisdom is that environmentalists and global warming deniers like best-selling novelist Michael Crichton disagree over the value of science. But both share most of the same beliefs about Science and the need for it to stay clear of values and politics. This statement — "Because in the end, science offers us the only way out of politics. And if we allow science to become politicized, then we are lost." — was uttered by Michael Crichton, but it could just as easily have been uttered by most environmental scientists.

5. SCIENCE WELCOMES MULTIPLE MEANINGS.

Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, (Co-Founders, The Breakthrough Institute), *BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY*, 07, 230-231. Environmentalists and liberals claim to be the intellectual heirs to Darwin, but most refuse to accept the fact that their own beliefs, sciences, and truths are adaptations to past realities — not reflections of them. Science has never been a reflection of nature, much less the only vehicle for the expression of the truth. There have always been multiple, contradictory, and overlapping sciences, truths, and natures. No sooner does a physicist — a practitioner of the supposedly hardest of the hard sciences — find the smallest thing in the universe (atomic particles) than another physicist comes along to announce something smaller (vibrating strings). Biology gravitates toward essentialism no less than physics gravitates toward final, unified explanations. Most practicing biologists believe that species are "natural kinds," existing out there and objectively in nature, independently of us humans. But what biologists call natural kinds are always already human categories. Consider the fact that there is no single meaning of the word species that covers all the ways biologists define the category species in practice. It is we humans, after all, who draw the boundaries between species.

6. SOCIAL SCIENCE HAS PRODUCED POSITIVE GAINS FOR SOCIETY.

Richard Harvey Brown, (Prof., Sociology, U. Maryland), *AFTER POSTMODERNISM: RECONSTRUCTING IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE*, 94, 26. As a child of liberalism and the Enlightenment, social science has been a major ideological force in the victory of civility over violence, reason and evidence over passion and prejudice, clear communication over cloudy commitment. In the social thought of the Progressive Era in particular, social science was held up as a paradigm of a democratic public discourse. The ideal practice by professional social scientists — of value-neutrality, objectivity and dispassionate, reasoned argumentation — was taken as a model of conduct, communication and inquiry for the rest of the citizenry.

## **PHILOSOPHIES WHICH REJECT THE POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIVE TRUTH SHOULD BE REJECTED**

### **1. NUMEROUS POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHIES DENY THE POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIVE TRUTH.**

A. Postmodern theorists teach that all efforts at “truth-telling” are, in fact, fictional.

Ruth Groff, (Prof., Philosophy, Marquette U.), *CRITICAL REALISM, POST-POSITIVISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE*, 2004, 4. Each discourse has its own rules about what constitutes a meaningful statement and about how to determine the truth-value of given claims. “There is no way to test whether one story is closer to the truth than another,” she says, “because there is no transcendental standpoint or mind unmeshed in its own language and story.” What settles disputes is “prior agreement on rules, not the compelling power of objective truth.” In sum, “all knowledge is fictive and non-representational.

B. The postmodern view is that there is no “denotative meaning” to truth; truth is simply a point of view.

Ruth Groff, (Prof., Philosophy, Marquette U.), *CRITICAL REALISM, POST-POSITIVISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE*, 2004, 4. Jane Flax's piece “The End of Innocence” is an emblematic expression of the stance in question. Flax's view is that the concepts of truth and reality have no genuine denotative meaning. They are simply words that philosophers (and others) use in order to impose their wills on others. By using such terms, Flax says, people are able to make it seem as though they are pursuing an objective dictate –an “innocent truth” – when in fact what they are trying to do is to advance their interests.

C. Postmodernism teaches that reality is a “social construct” – “choice posing as truth.”

Wondem Asres, (Research Fellow, Africa Research Center, The Netherlands), *THE STATE, THE CRISIS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS, AND REFUGEE MIGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA*, 07, 376. With regard to post-modernism, its understanding of the arbitrary nature of modernity; the realisation that what exists in the world is choice posing as truth; reality is a social construct, language and conceptual frame-works are prone to self-fulfilling prophecies, all are important insights in understanding how states have been (reconstituted) and how our conception of refugees has been constructed. Moreover, post-modernism's contribution in understanding the relation of knowledge and power; the introduction of the genealogical and deconstruction approach, in general; its critical account of how particular representation circulates, dominates and takes hold to produce practical political effects and marginalizes others; insight on how the discourses on territorial state and statecraft shape our imagination; are all relevant in analysing the historical development (political, economic and social) and the current situation in Africa and in explaining the refugee crisis in the continent in general and in the Horn of Africa in particular. Most importantly, the focus of both critical theory and postmodernism on freeing human beings from unnecessary social constraints and emancipation of the human race is crucial for refugee studies, for it has been and will be the refugees that need freedom, the right to live and emancipation more than anybody else.

D. Cultural relativism denies the possibility of objective truth.

Sandra LaFave, (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, West Valley College), *RELATIVISM*, Aug. 16, 2006. Online. Internet. May 21, 2007. <http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/relativ.htm>. Dogmatic relativism claims that epistemological relativism is true. But if epistemological relativism is true, there's no such thing as a “true” statement; there are only opinions. So dogmatic relativism is self-contradictory (inconsistent); if it's true, it can't be true! The relativist believes on the one hand that nothing is true, and on the other hand, that it's true that nothing is true. In other words, if all statements are just somebody's opinion (and “who's to say?” applies), then the relativist's own relativism is just the relativist's opinion (and “who's to say?” applies)!

Ruth Groff, (Prof., Philosophy, Marquette U.), *CRITICAL REALISM, POST-POSITIVISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE*, 2004, 1. The problem at the heart of this book is the recent resurgence of relativism. In the wake of the well-deserved breakdown of positivism, it no longer seems possible to rationally assess competing knowledge claims. In the social sciences in particular, the fashionable post-positivist view is that any belief can be valid, depending upon one's perspective; that truth is simply a term of praise (or, alternately, a display of power); and that there is in fact no such thing as a reality that does not belong in quotation marks.

E. Deconstruction denies the possibility of objective truth.

Robert Sibley, (Staff), OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 21, 2004, A12. In philosophic circles, however, the man gets little respect. "In the eyes of philosophers, and certainly those working in leading departments throughout the world, M. Derrida's work does not meet the accepted standards of clarity and rigor," wrote a group of philosophers protesting Cambridge University's decision in 1992 to award Derrida an honorary degree. Deconstruction denotes a form of close textual analysis by which literary or philosophical works are examined for ideas and contradictions that seem impossible to reconcile with the theme or argument driving the work. Derrida's famous expression that "there is nothing outside the text" meant that considerations of historical context and the author's purposes were irrelevant in determining the work's meaning. That's because all truth-claims reflect the prejudices of those making them. There is no "meaning" beyond our subjective perspectives, all of which are culturally and historically contingent. Thus, deconstruction denies that rational inquiry allows us to perceive unchangeable truths.

Johann Hari, (Staff), THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 13, 2004, 39. Derrida believed Western thought has been riddled since the time of Plato by a cancer he called "logocentrism". This is, at its core, the assumption that language describes the world in a fairly transparent way. You might think that the words you use are impartial tools for understanding the world — but this is, Derrida argued, a delusion. If I describe, say, Charles Manson as "mad", many people would assume I was describing an objective state called "madness" that exists in the world. Derrida would say the idea of "madness" is just a floating concept, a "signifier", that makes little sense except in relation to other words. The thing out there — the actual madness, the "signified" — is almost impossible to grasp; we are lost in a sea of words that prevent us from actually experiencing reality directly. Derrida wants to break down the belief that there is an objective external reality connected to our words, a world "out there" that can be explored through language, science and rationality. There are, he said, no universal truths, no progress and ultimately no sense, only "decentred", small stories that are often silenced by a search for rationality and consistency. The Enlightenment — the 18th century tradition that gave us our notions of rationality and progress — is just another empty narrative, a sweet set of delusions.

F. Derrida teaches that there is no such thing as "truth."

Johann Hari, (Staff), THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 13, 2004, 39. Derrida was, in short, the mad axeman of Western philosophy. He tried to hack apart the very basis of our thought - language, reason and the attempt to tell big stories about how we became as we are. All we are left with - if we accept Derrida's conclusions - is puzzled silence and irony. If reason is just another language game, if our words don't match anything out there in the world - what can we do except sink into nihilism, or turn to the supernatural?

2. THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH FAILS SIMPLE PLAUSIBILITY TESTS.

Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), QUADRANT, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). One of the most valuable responses any human being can develop is an instinct for plausibility. Note I do not use the word truth here in case there are tender, postmodernist sensibilities among us. Postmodernists claim that no such thing exists as truth in the singular. Indeed, in occasional moments of despair at the state of the world, I soothe myself by imagining conversations which might take place in post-modernist households: "Cathy and Andrew, we would like you to say who broke your little brother's space rocket. We want you to tell the truths."

3. THE UNDERMINING OF "TRUTH" SIMPLY ENABLES DESPOTISM.

Richard Wolin, (Prof., History, City U. of New York), THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON, 2004, 43. The rules of argumentation suggest that "force of the better argument"—which derives from the logical cogency of an assertion—should not be confused with the (contingent) psychological and empirical circumstances of an argument's acceptance—precisely the trap to which Foucault succumbs. As Ferry and Renault warn, "The hatred of argumentation means, principally, the return of authority." In other words, once the notion of truth has been rejected in favor of considerations of power, one is thrown back into a Hobbesian world, a war of all against all, where, as the author of Leviathan maintained, "Auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem— authority rather than truth makes the law.

## “EMPIRE” KRITIK ANSWERS

### 1. THE UNITED STATES LACKS MANY CHARACTERISTICS OF AN “EMPIRE”, AND IT DOES NOT ASPIRE TO BECOME ONE

Anthony Padgen (Prof. of History & Political Science @ UCLA), DAEDALUS, Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Database. Is then the United States really an empire? I think if we look at the history of the European empires, the answer must be no. It is often assumed that because America possesses the military capability to become an empire, any overseas interest it does have must necessarily be imperial. But if military muscle had been all that was required to make an empire, neither Rome nor Britain—to name only two—would have been one. Contrary to the popular image, most empires were, in fact, for most of their histories, fragile structures, always dependent on their subject peoples for survival. Universal citizenship was not created out of generosity. It was created out of need. “What else proved fatal to Sparta and Athens in spite of their power in arms,” the emperor Claudius asked the Roman Senate when it attempted to deny citizenship to the Gauls in Italy, “but their policy of holding the conquered aloof as alien-born?” This is not to say that the United States has not resorted to some of the strategies of past empires. Today, for instance, Iraq and Afghanistan look remarkably like British protectorates. Whatever the administration may claim publicly about the autonomy of the current Iraqi and Afghan leadership, the United States in fact shares sovereignty with the civilian governments of both places, since it retains control over the countries' armed forces. What, however, the United States is not committed to is the view that empire—the exercise of imperium—is the best, or even a possible, way to achieve this. In a number of crucial respects, the United States is, indeed, very unimperial. Despite allusions to the Pax Americana, twenty-first-century America bears not the slightest resemblance to ancient Rome. Unlike all previous European empires, it has no significant overseas settler populations in any of its formal dependencies and no obvious desire to acquire any. It does not conceive its hegemony beyond its borders as constituting a form of citizenship. It exercises no direct rule anywhere outside these areas; and it has always attempted to extricate itself as swiftly as possible from anything that looks as if it were about to develop into even indirect rule.

### 2. THE U.S. IS NOT PURSUING “EMPIRE”; RATHER, IT IS REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GLOBAL DEMOCRATIZATION

Anthony Padgen (Prof. of History & Political Science @ UCLA), DAEDALUS, Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Database. But even making the rest of the world adopt the American system did not mean, as it had for all the other empires Truman cited, ruling the rest of the world. For Truman assumed, as has every American administration since, that the world's 'others' no longer needed to be led and cajoled until one day they finally demanded their own democratic institutions. American values, as Bush put it in 2002, are not only “right and true for every person in every society”—they are self-evidently so. All humanity is capable of recognizing that democracy, or 'freedom,' will always be in its own best interest. All that has ever prevented some peoples from grasping this simple truth is fanaticism, the misguided claims of (certain) religions, and the actions of malevolent, self-interested leaders. Rather than empire, the United States' objective, then, is to eliminate these internal obstacles, to establish the conditions necessary for democracy, and then to retreat.



3. THE UNITED STATES, BY DEFINITION, IS NOT AN “EMPIRE”

Anthony Padgen (Prof. of History & Political Science @ UCLA), DAEDALUS, Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Database. But such an arrangement has never been an option for the United States. If only because the United States is the one modern nation in which no division of sovereignty is, at least conceptually, possible. The federal government shares sovereignty with the individual states of which the union is composed, but it could not contemplate, as former empires all had to, sharing sovereignty with the members of other nations. Only very briefly has the mainland United States ever been considered an empire rather than a nation. As each new U.S. territory was settled or conquered it became, within a very short space of time, a new state within the Union. This implied that any territories the United States might acquire overseas had, like Hawaii, to be incorporated fully into the nation—or returned to its native inhabitants. No American administration has been willing to tolerate any kind of colonialism for very long. Even so resolute an imperialist as Teddy Roosevelt could not imagine turning Cuba or the Philippines into colonies. The United States does possess a number of dependent territories—Guam, the Virgin Islands, Samoa, etc.—but these are too few and too small to constitute an overseas colonial empire. The major exception to this rule is Puerto Rico. The existence of a vigorous debate over the status of this 'commonwealth'—a term which itself suggests that Puerto Rico is an independent republic—and the fact that the status quo strikes everyone, even those who support its continuation, as an anomaly, largely proves the rule.

4. THE U.S. IS A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AND ONLY SEEKS TO SPREAD DEMOCRATIZATION GLOBALLY; IT IS NOT AN “EMPIRE”

Anthony Padgen (Prof. of History & Political Science @ UCLA), DAEDALUS, Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Database. Those advocating a more forceful U.S. imperial policy overlook that if America is in denial, it is in it for a very good reason. To become a true empire, as even the British were at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States would have to change radically the nature of its political culture. It is a liberal democracy (as most of the Western world now conceives it)—and liberal democracy and liberal empire (as Mill conceived it) are incompatible. The form of empire championed by Mill existed to enforce the virtues and advantages that accompanied free or liberal government in places that otherwise would be, in Mill's language, “barbarous.” The time might indeed come when the inhabitants of such places would demand European institutions—but as Mill and even Macaulay knew, when that happened, the empire would be at an end. By contrast the United States makes no claim to be holding Iraq and Afghanistan in trust until such time as their peoples are able to govern themselves in a suitable—i.e., Western—manner. It seeks, however imperfectly, to confer free democratic institutions directly on those places, and then to depart, leaving the hapless natives to fabricate as best they can the social and political infrastructure without which no democratic process can survive for long.

5. THE U.S. IS ONLY PROMOTING GLOBAL FREE TRADE; IT IS NOT PURSUING AN “EMPIRE”

Anthony Padgen (Prof. of History & Political Science @ UCLA), DAEDALUS, Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Database. In the end, perhaps, what Smith, Constant, and Schumpeter prophesied has come to pass: commerce has finally replaced conquest. True, it is commerce stripped of all its eighteenth-century attributes of benevolence, but it is commerce nonetheless. The long-term political objectives of the United States, which have varied little from administration to administration, have been to sustain and, where necessary, to create a world of democracies bound inexorably together by international trade. And the political forms best suited to international commerce are federations (such as the European Union) and trading partnerships (the OECD or NAFTA), not empires.

6. THE U.S. FULFILLS KANTIAN NOTIONS OF AN EGALITARIAN SOCIETY

Anthony Padgen (Prof. of History & Political Science @ UCLA), DAEDALUS, Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Database. With due allowance for the huge differences between the late eighteenth century and the early twenty-first, and between what Kant understood by representative republics and what is meant today by liberal democracies, the United States' vision for the world is roughly similar: a union of democracies, certainly not equal in size or power, but all committed to the common goal of greater prosperity and peace through free trade. The members of this union have the right to defend themselves against aggressors and, in the pursuit of defense, they are also entitled to do their best to cajole so-called rogue states into mending their ways sufficiently to be admitted into the union. This is what Kant called the "cosmopolitan right." We may assume that Truman had such an arrangement in mind when he said that the American system could only survive by becoming a world system. For like the "American system," Kant's "cosmopolitan right" was intended to provide precisely the kind of harmonious environment in which it was possible to pursue what Kant valued most highly, namely, the interdependence of all human societies. This indisputably "liberal order" still depended "on the possession and use of military might," but there would be no permanent, clearly identifiable, perpetual enemy—only dissidents, 'rogue' states, and the perverse malice of the excluded. Kant was also not, as Kagan seems to imply, some kind of high-minded idealist, in contrast to Hobbes, the indefatigably realist. He was in fact very suspicious of high-mindedness of any kind. "This rational idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thoroughgoing community of all the nations on the earth," he wrote, "is not a philanthropic (ethical), principle, but a principle having to do with rights." It was based quite as firmly upon a calculation of reasonable self-interest as was Hobbes's suggestion for exiting from the "war of all against all." Kant, however, was also aware that bringing human beings to understand just what is in their own self-interest would always be a long and arduous task. In order to recognize that autonomy is the highest human good, humans have to disentangle themselves from the "leading strings" by which the "guardians"—priests, lawyers, and rulers—have made them "domesticated animals." Only he who could "throw off the ball and chain of his perpetual immaturity" would be properly "enlightened," and only the enlightened could create the kind of state in which true autonomy would be possible. Because of this, the cosmopolitan right still lay for most at some considerable distance in the future. It still does—few states today fulfill Kant's criteria.

Anthony Padgen (Prof. of History & Political Science @ UCLA), DAEDALUS, Spring 2005. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. Expanded Academic ASAP Database. And of course Kant never addressed the problem of how the transition from one or another kind of despotism to "representative republicanism" was to be achieved (although he seems to have thought that the French Revolution, at least in its early phases, offered one kind of model). Kant's project for perpetual peace has often been taken to be some kind of moral blueprint for the United Nations. But in my view, it is far closer to the final objective of the modern global state system in which the United States is undoubtedly, for the moment at least, the key player. It is also, precisely because it is a project for some future time, a far better guide to the overall ideological objectives of the United States than anything that now goes under the name of 'empire.'

## **AGAMBEN & VIRILIO KRITIK ANSWERS**

1. **EVEN AGAMBEN AGREES THAT WE SHOULD ACT IN ORDER TO PREVENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DISASTERS**

Giorgio Agamben (Professor of Philosophy @ Univ. of Verona), *THEORY & EVENT*, 2002, 5:4. Online. Internet. Accessed May 29, 06. <http://www.yorku.ca/dmutimer/4260/9-11/5.4agamben.html>. It is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of democracy demands today a change of political paradigms and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror. Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. On the contrary, we can say that politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction — and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.

2. **THERE IS NO HOPE OF A POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE KRITIK—AGAMBEN'S ENTIRE PROJECT IS TO MOVE AWAY FROM POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO A LEVEL OF METAPHYSICAL ABSTRACTION. THIS ALSO MEANS THAT THERE IS NO MATERIAL CHANGE**

Andrew Norris, *RADICAL PHILOSOPHY*, May-June 2003. Online. Internet. Accessed June 1, 06. [http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel\\_id=2188&editorial\\_id=13097](http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2188&editorial_id=13097). Such claims are difficult for political philosophy to address, as they undermine so many of its guiding assumptions. Instead of asking us to construct and evaluate different plans of action, Agamben asks us to evaluate the metaphysical structure and implications of the activity of politics as such. Instead of asking us to consider the true or proper nature of political identity, Agamben asks us to consider a threshold state of the non-identical, the liminal. And far from bringing concepts such as rights, authority, public interest, liberty or equality more clearly into view, Agamben operates at a level of abstraction at which such concepts blur into their opposites. He takes this approach because, like Arendt, he believes that claims to justice can only be made if one understands the ground of the political upon which both justice and injustice stand. If Foucault's goal was 'to make the cultural unconscious apparent', Agamben's is that of bringing to expression the metaphysics that our history has thus far only shown. He argues that, properly understood, what that history shows us is that politics is the truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the logos is realized. In the 'politicization' of bare life - the metaphysical task par excellence - the humanity of living man is decided. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.

3. THERE IS NO HOPE OF A POLICY ALTERNATIVE TO THE KRITIK; WE ARE ALL POWERLESS VICTIMS

Linda Brigham (Professor @ Kansas State Univ.), *TRANSPOLITICAL TECHNOCRACY AND THE HOPE OF LANGUAGE: VIRILIO AND HABERMAS*, Sept. 13, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 1, 06. [http://proxy.arts.uci.edu/~nideffer/\\_SPEED\\_/1.4/articles/brigham.html](http://proxy.arts.uci.edu/~nideffer/_SPEED_/1.4/articles/brigham.html). In Virilio's case, though, it is impossible to bring critical theory to bear. Virilio merges ontology and physics in the single dimension of speed. Speed determines space and time, geography and individuality. Under conditions where the speed of light is the only limit to the transfer of effect, there is the prospect of a world without expanse and duration, particularly as speedy technology becomes annexed to human perception. This condition he sees as an excessively vulnerable one, a form of handicapping, as he writes in a recent article: We have before us the catastrophic figure of an individual who has lost, along with his or her natural mobility, any immediate means of intervening in the environment. The fate of the individual is handed over, for better or for worse, to the capacities of receivers, sensors, and other long-range detectors that turn the person into a being subjected to the machines with which, they say, he or she is 'in dialogue!' The origin of this catastrophe is the displacement of natural space-time with an artificial one: One by one, the perceptive faculties of an individual's body are transferred to machines, or instruments that record images and sound; more recently, the transfer is made to receivers, to sensors, and to other detectors that can replace absence of tactility overdistance. ... What is becoming critical here is no longer the concept of three spatial dimensions, but a fourth, temporal dimension — in other words, that of the present itself... 'real time' is not opposed — as many experts in electronics claim — to 'deferred time,' but only to present time. In other words, according to Virilio, the habit of space and the habit of time — a space and time without significant threats from artificial space-time — have given way to the hegemony of simulacra, of artificially mediatized perception, of cyborgian anatomies. And this new hegemony has displaced some prior balance, implicit though never explicitly theorized in Virilio's work. In contrast to Habermas' view of our capacity to right the system, for Virilio we are the victims of this critical transition, or, in his own words, we are its powerless witnesses.

4. VIRILIO'S ARGUMENT LEADS TO HORRIBLE IMPLICATIONS — THE CASE OF WOMEN PROVES THAT, FOR VIRILIO, OPPRESSION IS NOTHING MORE THAN A PHASE, AND THAT BY COUNTERING OPPRESSION, A DISEMPOWERED GROUP ONLY GETS CO-OPTED BY "THE SYSTEM"

Linda Brigham (Professor @ Kansas State Univ.), *TRANSPOLITICAL TECHNOCRACY AND THE HOPE OF LANGUAGE: VIRILIO AND HABERMAS*, Sept. 13, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 1, 06. [http://proxy.arts.uci.edu/~nideffer/\\_SPEED\\_/1.4/articles/brigham.html](http://proxy.arts.uci.edu/~nideffer/_SPEED_/1.4/articles/brigham.html). Virilio, although less concerned with agency, implies everywhere a naturalistic notion of power relations from which technology has produced a horrific deviation. Unfortunately, that purportedly natural, less dangerous form of power seems to rest on the structural foundations of traditional social hierarchies of gender and family. Only within the milieu of these stable forms can idiosyncrasy and individuality make sense. Women and children, precisely because they lack steering power, have through the ages provided a critical standpoint with respect to the dominant culture. Women's power consists in the alternative to the rational; it lies in the seductive appeal of a counter-technology that full participation in the dominant culture destroys and devalues. They occupy the site of the losers in history in the context of Benjamin's *Theses on the Philosophy of History*: they provide the perspective necessary to see every document of civilization as simultaneously a document of barbarism. But Virilio's women and children by definition write no manifestos, make no attempt to divert power to themselves. Their struggle as an alternative political potential, illuminable in a latent memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger in Benjamin's essay, is completely elided in Virilio's historiography; by definition, they remain invisible. This absence of real political potential is due to Virilio's thorough-going monism; in the final analysis, Virilio's women and children, like objects themselves, do not exist as an opposition to technological hegemony at all, but only constitute phases of the catastrophic career of a postmodern flight from nature. And in the case of women, that phase is past. Their critical value to the dominant culture has been sacrificed by their assimilation. In obtaining equal rights, and a slice of technological mastery, women only increase the momentum of the reconfiguration of control speeding the contemporary world to an asocial apocalypse. Like Habermas, Virilio sees technology as steering the norms of perception into the constricted and mass-reproducible regimens of commodity capitalism, with perception itself as a premiere commodity.

5. VIRILIO'S PROJECT FALLS VICTIM TO THE SAME HUMANIST METAPHYSICS THAT HE INDICTS

Linda Brigham (Professor @ Kansas State Univ.), *TRANSPOLITICAL TECHNOCRACY AND THE HOPE OF LANGUAGE: VIRILIO AND HABERMAS*, Sept. 13, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 1, 06. [http://proxy.arts.uci.edu/~nideffer/\\_SPEED\\_/1.4/articles/brigham.html](http://proxy.arts.uci.edu/~nideffer/_SPEED_/1.4/articles/brigham.html). Of course the relativity of media also imply that the distinction between a valid and invalid physique that Virilio wants to maintain is invalid. He writes with a certain ill-humor, If every one of us is obviously in agreement about the inalienable right that the handicapped person has to live as others do and therefore with others, it is no less revealing to note the similarities that now exist between the reduced mobility of the equipped invalid and the growing inertia of the overequipped, valid human population. Such a suggestion is somewhat Strangelovian. The media contingency of diagrammatics fail to privilege a priori any particular physical constitution. It becomes equivocal whether we are dependent on the disciplines that socialize the natural body in a Foucauldian fashion or whether we are vulnerable through the commodification of a variety of prostheses. Nonetheless, my purpose here is not techno-utopian. I think Virilio's warning concerning the undoing of physical geography has cogency, despite its inclination towards hysteria. Even more so, I find Habermas' sober analysis of the unwanted multiple consequences of steering media to hold great critical value. But both Virilio's condemnation of the manipulated precept and Habermas' methodological distinction between lifeworld and system fail to do justice to the media density of human cognition. The task of making sense in any culture is already heavily laden with technology. It is true that the accelerations of exchange facilitated by media have changed the world, in some ways disastrously. There is little doubt that transnational capital is responsible for much global violence, for a dreadful standard of living in many parts of the world, and for a backlash against the civil rights of all kinds of people. But nature was never very kind either, if it existed at all, and the limits on who is permitted free speech were always imposed by non-linguistic means. Reductive schemes to right these immense wrongs perhaps participate in the same austere prejudice that elevated the mind above the body and made it a God, starving its subjects into a so-called humanist metaphysics — a metaphysics of scarcity.

## “BUTLER” KRITIK ANSWERS

### 1. BUTLER’S FATALISM DISEMPOWERS RADICAL ACTIVISM

Martha Nussbaum, *THE NEW REPUBLIC*, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. If Butler means only to warn us against the **dangers of fantasizing** an idyllic world in which sex raises no serious problems, she is wise to do so. Yet frequently she goes much further. She suggests that the institutional structures that ensure the marginalization of lesbians and gay men in our society, and the continued inequality of women, will never be changed in a deep way; and so our best hope is to thumb our noses at them, and to find pockets of personal freedom within them. “Called by an injurious name, I come into social being, and because I have a certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a certain narcissism takes hold of any term that confers existence, I am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute me socially.” In other words: I cannot escape the humiliating structures without ceasing to be, so the best I can do is mock, and use the language of subordination stingingly. In Butler, resistance is always imagined as personal, more or less private, involving no unironic, organized public action for legal or institutional change. Isn't this like saying to a slave that the institution of slavery will never change, but you can find ways of mocking it and subverting it, finding your personal freedom within those acts of carefully limited defiance? Yet it is a fact that the institution of slavery can be changed, and was changed— but not by people who took a Butler-like view of the possibilities. It was changed because people did not rest content with parodic performance: they demanded, and to some extent they got, social upheaval. It is also a fact that the institutional structures that shape women's lives have changed. The law of rape, still defective, has at least improved; the law of sexual harassment exists, where it did not exist before; marriage is no longer regarded as giving men monarchical control over women's bodies. These things were changed by feminists who would not take parodic performance as their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should, and would, yield before justice.

### 2. BUTLER’S THEORY OF AGENCY IS UNWARRANTED

Martha Nussbaum, *THE NEW REPUBLIC*, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. Butler does in the end want to say that we have a kind of agency, an ability to undertake change and resistance. But where does this ability come from, if there is no structure in the personality that is not thoroughly power's creation? It is not impossible for Butler to answer this question, but she certainly has not answered it yet, in a way that would convince those who believe that human beings have at least some pre-cultural desires—for food, for comfort, for cognitive mastery, for survival—and that this structure in the personality is crucial in the explanation of our development as moral and political agents. One would like to see her engage with the strongest forms of such a view, and to say, clearly and without jargon, exactly why and where she rejects them. One would also like to hear her speak about real infants, who do appear to manifest a structure of striving that influences from the start their reception of cultural forms.

### 3. BUTLER’S THEORIES PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR RESISTANCE

Martha Nussbaum, *THE NEW REPUBLIC*, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. Butler uses several words for what she takes to be bad and therefore worthy of resistance: the “repressive,” the “subordinating,” the “oppressive.” But she provides no empirical discussion of resistance of the sort that we find, say, in Barry Adam's fascinating sociological study *The Survival of Domination*, which studies the subordination of blacks, Jews, women, and gays and lesbians, and their ways of wrestling with the forms of social power that have oppressed them. Nor does Butler provide any account of the concepts of resistance and oppression that would help us, were we really in doubt about what we ought to be resisting.

4. FAILURE TO CONNECT THEORY AND PRACTICE MAKES BUTLER'S SUBVERSION A REINFORCEMENT OF STATUS QUO OPPRESSION

Martha Nussbaum, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. Many feminists in America are still theorizing in a way that supports material change and responds to the situation of the most oppressed. Increasingly, however, the academic and cultural trend is toward the pessimistic flirtatiousness represented by the theorizing of Butler and her followers. Butlerian feminism is in many ways easier than the old feminism. It tells scores of talented young women that they need not work on changing the law, or feeding the hungry, or assailing power through theory harnessed to material politics. They can do politics in safety of their campuses, remaining on the symbolic level, making subversive gestures at power through speech and gesture. This, the theory says, is pretty much all that is available to us anyway, by way of political action, and isn't it exciting and sexy? In its small way, of course, this is a hopeful politics. It instructs people that they can, right now, without compromising their security, do something bold. But the boldness is entirely gestural, and insofar as Butler's ideal suggests that these symbolic gestures really are political change, it offers only a false hope. Hungry women are not fed by this, battered women are not sheltered by it, raped women do not find justice in it, gays and lesbians do not achieve legal protections through it.

5. BUTLER'S IGNORANCE OF THE MATERIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SUBORDINATION CRUSHES THE VALUE OF HER ACADEMIC THEORY

Martha Nussbaum, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. Well, parodic performance is not so bad when you are a powerful tenured academic in a liberal university. But here is where Butler's focus on the symbolic, her proud neglect of the material side of life, becomes a fatal blindness. For women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped, it is not sexy or liberating to reenact, however parodically, the conditions of hunger, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating, and rape. Such women prefer food, schools, votes, and the integrity of their bodies. I see no reason to believe that they long sadomasochistically for a return to the bad state. If some individuals cannot live without the sexiness of domination, that seems sad, but it is not really our business. But when a major theorist tells women in desperate conditions that life offers them only bondage, she purveys a cruel lie, and a lie that flatters evil by giving it much more power than it actually has.

6. FAILURE TO ARTICULATE ANY NORMS FOR ACTION MAKES RESISTANCE A POTENTIAL ACT OF OPPRESSION

Martha Nussbaum, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. www.nexis.com. There is a void, then, at the heart of Butler's notion of politics. This void can look liberating, because the reader fills it implicitly with a normative theory of human equality or dignity. But let there be no mistake: for Butler, as for Foucault, subversion is subversion, and it can in principle go in any direction. Indeed, Butler's naively empty politics is especially dangerous for the very causes she holds dear. For every friend of Butler, eager to engage in subversive performances that proclaim the repressiveness of heterosexual gender norms, there are dozens who would like to engage in subversive performances that flout the norms of tax compliance, of non-discrimination, of decent treatment of one's fellow students. To such people we should say, you cannot simply resist as you please, for there are norms of fairness, decency, and dignity that entail that this is bad behavior. But then we have to articulate those norms—and this Butler refuses to do.

7. BUTLER'S ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BODY AND POWER DOESN'T PROVIDE A MECHANISM FOR RESISTANCE OF OPPRESSION

Martha Nussbaum, *THE NEW REPUBLIC*, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). And yet it is much too simple to say that power is all that the body is. We might have had the bodies of birds or dinosaurs or lions, but we do not; and this reality shapes our choices. Culture can shape and reshape some aspects of our bodily existence, but it does not shape all the aspects of it. "In the man burdened by hunger and thirst," as Sextus Empiricus observed long ago, "it is impossible to produce by argument the conviction that he is not so burdened." This is an important fact also for feminism, since women's nutritional needs (and their special needs when pregnant or lactating) are an important feminist topic. Even where sex difference is concerned, it is surely too simple to write it all off as culture; nor should feminists be eager to make such a sweeping gesture. Women who run or play basketball, for example, were right to welcome the demolition of myths about women's athletic performance that were the product of male-dominated assumptions; but they were also right to demand the specialized research on women's bodies that has fostered a better understanding of women's training needs and women's injuries. In short: what feminism needs, and sometimes gets, is a subtle study of the interplay of bodily difference and cultural construction. And Butler's abstract pronouncements, floating high above all matter, give us none of what we need.

8. THE ALTERNATIVE TO BUTLER'S CRITICISM CRUSHES ANY HOPE OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND ACTIVISM

Martha Nussbaum, *THE NEW REPUBLIC*, Feb. 22, 1999. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). Thus the one place for agency in a world constrained by hierarchy is in the small opportunities we have to oppose gender roles every time they take shape. When I find myself doing femaleness, I can turn it around, poke fun at it, do it a little bit differently. Such reactive and parodic performances, in Butler's view, never destabilize the larger system. She doesn't envisage mass movements of resistance or campaigns for political reform; only personal acts carried out by a small number of knowing actors. Just as actors with a bad script can subvert it by delivering the bad lines oddly, so too with gender: the script remains bad, but the actors have a tiny bit of freedom. Thus we have the basis for what, in *Excitable Speech*, Butler calls "an ironic hopefulness." Up to this point, Butler's contentions, though relatively familiar, are plausible and even interesting, though one is already unsettled by her narrow vision of the possibilities for change. Yet Butler adds to these plausible claims about gender two other claims that are stronger and more contentious. The first is that there is no agent behind or prior to the social forces that produce the self. If this means only that babies are born into a gendered world that begins to replicate males and females almost immediately, the claim is plausible, but not surprising: experiments have for some time demonstrated that the way babies are held and talked to, the way their emotions are described, are profoundly shaped by the sex the adults in question believe the child to have. (The same baby will be bounced if the adults think it is a boy, cuddled if they think it is a girl; its crying will be labeled as fear if the adults think it is a girl, as anger if they think it is a boy.) Butler shows no interest in these empirical facts, but they do support her contention. If she means, however, that babies enter the world completely inert, with no tendencies and no abilities that are in some sense prior to their experience in a gendered society, this is far less plausible, and difficult to support empirically. Butler offers no such support, preferring to remain on the high plane of metaphysical abstraction. (Indeed, her recent Freudian work may even repudiate this idea: it suggests, with Freud, that there are at least some presocial impulses and tendencies, although, typically, this line is not clearly developed.) Moreover, such an exaggerated denial of pre-cultural agency takes away some of the resources that Chodorow and others use when they try to account for cultural change in the direction of the better.



## **PERFORMANCE ANSWER**

### **1. FAITH IN PERFORMATIVE RESISTANCE IS NAÏVE AND FAILS TO RESHAPE POLITICS**

Molly Rothenberg & Joseph Valente (Assoc. Professor of English @ Tulane; Asst. Professor of English @ Illinois), COLLEGE LITERATURE, February 1997. Online. Internet. Accessed June 6, 06. InfoTrac Research Database, <http://find.galegroup.com>. The recent vogue for performativity, particularly in gender and postcolonial studies, suggests that the desire for political potency has displaced the demand for critical rigor. Because Judith Butler bears the primary responsibility for investing performativity with its present critical cachet, her work furnishes a convenient site for exposing the flawed theoretical formulations and the hollow political claims advanced under the banner of performativity. We have undertaken this critique not solely in the interests of clarifying performativity's theoretical stakes: in our view, the appropriation of performativity for purposes to which it is completely unsuited has misdirected crucial activist energies, not only squandering resources but even endangering those naive enough to act on performativity's (false) political promise. It is reasonable to expect any practical political discourse to essay an analysis which links its proposed actions with their supposed effects, appraising the fruits of specific political labors before their seeds are sown. Only by means of such an assessment can any political program persuade us to undertake some tasks and forgo others.

## SPANOS KRITIK ANSWER

### 1. SPANOS' DEMANDS FOR ABSOLUTE PURITY ENSURE HIS MARGINALIZATION AND CLOSE OFF SPACE FOR COALITION-BUILDING; ONLY THE PERMUTATION OFFERS A WAY TO BUILD ON A SOLID PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION

J. Russell Perkins (Professor of English @ St. Mary's), POSTMODERN CULTURE, May 1993. Online. Internet. InfoTrac Research Database, <http://find.galegroup.com>. My final criticism is that Spanos, by his attempt to put all humanists into the same category and to break totally with the tradition of humanism, isolates himself in a posture of ultraleftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies, especially when, as I will note in conclusion, his practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks. He seems ill-informed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy, for instance, in the field of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" of the work of Paulo Freire, yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising *The Pentagon Papers* was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument); here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices *The End of Education* recommends. The academy, in short, is more diverse, more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase. By seeking to separate out only the pure (posthumanist) believers, Spanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization. For example, several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bennett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course, there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's opposition to liberalism is as mistaken as its opposition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies, "If you don't build on liberalism, you build on air." Building on air seems to me precisely what Spanos is recommending. Gates, on the other hand, criticizes "those massively totalizing theories that marginalize practical political action as a jejune indulgence," and endorses a coalition of liberalism and the left.

## **KRITIK PERMUTATIONS**

1. THE COMBINATION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN AND THE CRITICISM OFFERED BY THE NEGATIVE IS BOTH POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE. BURKE’S NOTION OF “PERSPECTIVE BY INCONGRUITY” PROVES THAT COMPARISON OF UNLIKE IDEAS OR CONCEPTS YIELDS NEW, SOCIALLY LIBERATING WAYS OF KNOWING

David Levasseuer, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Spring 1993. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. In his writings, Burke even indirectly acknowledges the edifying purpose beneath his argumentation method. In Permanence and Change, he sets forth a method for correcting society's misguided mind set. He calls this method “perspective by incongruity,” and he explains that it involves a “wrenching apart” of “all those molecular combinations of adjective and noun, substantive and verb, which still remain with us.” For instance, within this perspective “an idea which commonly carries with it diminutive modifiers . . . should be treated by magnification, as were one to discuss the heinousness of an extra slice of beef.’ Perspective by incongruity closely parallels Rorty's notion of edifying discourse. Both seek to redescribe familiar surroundings in unfamiliar terms. Also like edifying discourse, perspective by incongruity could take place at levels beyond novel word associations. That is, it could create unlikely connections between evidence and claim. One could, for instance, use a comparison of literary genres to produce claims about the best social attitudes. What would be the benefits of such arguments by incongruity? These arguments could create “new meanings” for old phenomena, and such new meanings could cause society to re-examine and question its existing orientation. As a final result, such a re-examination provides society with a chance to adopt a new and more serviceable orientation. The addition of the concept of argument by incongruity to existing theory can explain both the abnormality and the brilliance of Burke's method of argument.

2. THE AFFIRMATIVE SHOULDN’T BE TIED TO ANY ONE PARTICULAR REPRESENTATION OF HOW THE PLAN FUNCTIONS IN THE DEBATE; THAT WOULD DEFEAT THE GOALS OF THEIR PROJECT, AND IT PROVES THAT THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION

Jason Ingram, COMMUNICATION STUDIES, Spring 2002. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. For Burke, humans are always “closing the gap between self and other,” albeit provisionally. Community is always being articulated, both with and against various universals. Individuals share common elements with others, and so identify with them. However, as consubstantiality is never complete, identification with groups, individuals, ideals, and symbols never fully coheres. This holds open space for change, and for conflict: “between the possibility for exchange and an unbroachable estrangement, and by way of a dialectical movement, the social appears not as a perfectly egalitarian space of cooperation but always and already as a field necessarily fraught with factional strife.” Total identification would undercut communication. Given Burke's conception of “pure persuasion,” rhetorical action is always in process, in the sense that rhetoric is “a mode of discourse whose continued ‘existence’ is predicated upon its own perpetual failure or its irreducible inability to achieve its end.” Much as hegemony rests on attempts at representation that are “constitutively inadequate,” as they involve aporetic relations between universality and particularity, rhetoric is never complete. Identification, communication, and persuasion are always in process.

## **UTILITARIANISM IS GOOD/JUSTIFIED**

### **1. UTILITARIANISM CAN NEVER TRULY BE REJECTED; IT IS THE BASIS FOR ALL PHILOSOPHIES AND MODES OF DECISION-MAKING.**

Leonard G. Ratner (Professor of Law at U. of Southern Cali. Law Center), *HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW*, Spring 84, Online. Nexis. Accessed May 12,05. www.nexis.com. All systems of morality, however transcendental, rest ultimately on utilitarian self interest (i.e., on personal need/want fulfillment), because those who fashion such systems, like those who accept or reject them, cannot escape their own humanness. The physically controllable acts of each individual are the choice of that individual, though all of the consequences may not be foreseen or desired. Behavior choices are necessarily determined by the experience, feelings, habits, and attitudes; the concerns and beliefs; the needs and wants — in short, by the ultimate self interest — of the individual. Self interest behavior is implied by the tautological description of all individuals as “rational maximizers” of personal utility (i.e. of personal need/want fulfillment), “rational” being superfluous. An observer may view an act as an irrational (i.e., ineffective) way to fulfill the needs or wants of an individual. But the individual is the final judge of those needs or wants, and they determine the methods chosen by the individual to fulfill them.

### **2. UTILITARIANISM IS THE ONLY WAY TO DETERMINE QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY; OTHER METHODS ARE TOO VAGUE AND INAPPLICABLE.**

John Hasnas (Assistant Professor of Business Ethics at Georgetown U.), *NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW*, 95. Online. Nexis. Accessed May 12,05. www.nexis.com. But consider now that if the government is required to resolve conflicts of rights, it must first determine which of the interests underlying the conflicting rights is of greater moral significance. What basis does the government have for making such value judgments? As we have previously seen, the only ethical theory that is definite and simple enough to serve as a practical political morality is utilitarianism. The government is comprised not of philosophers, but of practically-minded lawyers, economists, statisticians, and other social scientists who are neither trained in nor familiar with the vagaries of moral philosophy. Whether politician, bureaucrat, or judge, virtually all government officials have been trained that when their actions are not constrained by people's rights or other constitutional barriers, their duty is to produce the greatest good for the greatest number - to promote general utility. Furthermore, because governmental decision-making must be capable of objective justification to the public, the nature of the job simply precludes any approach that relies primarily upon a person's moral intuitions. Therefore, as a practical matter, the only basis the government has for making comparative assessments of value is its judgment as to what will best serve the common good. As remarked earlier, for the government, utilitarian analysis is necessarily standard operating procedure. This means that when the government is called upon to resolve a conflict of rights by deciding which of the underlying interests are of greater relative importance, it will appeal to the only basis for making comparative value judgments that is available to it, utilitarianism. Thus, this determination will be made on the basis of which interest is more productive of general utility. As a result, conflicts of rights will typically be resolved by an appeal to what will best promote social welfare.

## ZIZEK KRITIK ANSWERS

### 1. ZIZEK'S PROJECT REINFORCES EUROCENTRIC OPPRESSION AND FALLS VICTIM TO ITS OWN CRITICISM BY ACCEPTING A "MODERN" VIEW OF REALITY

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. Marxism is a legacy of Christian Europe, which is the abode of agonistic universality or true politics. But what about the constitutive void at the center of Europe, the ontological lack underwriting the very notion of Eurocentrism? To put a finer point on an observation that I made earlier, doesn't Žižek blame this lack on pagans and fundamentalist freaks, on those whom I call the multicultural multitude? Isn't he accusing them of stealing his *jouissance*? To paraphrase Žižek, the question that *he* must confront is how *he* invests the ideological figures of the pagan and the fundamentalist with *his* unconscious desire, with how *he* has constructed these figures to escape a certain deadlock of *his* desire. Isn't his antipaganism and antifundamentalism a "pathological, paranoid construction?" Perhaps this accounts for the severity of Žižek's critique of the non-Christian other. Could it be that the multicultural multitude of fundamentalist freaks, New Age spiritualists, neopagans, and inauthentic Christians represent the "return of the repressed" (a case of the Empire striking back) in Žižek's neo-Hegelian account of religion? If Christianity is the fragile absolute, then colonial modernity is the absolute trauma. Colonial modernity is that of which Žižek cannot speak; it is the "impossible Real" in his account of religion.

### 2. ZIZEK'S CRITIQUE COLLAPSES ON ITSELF BECAUSE HE ENGAGES IN RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS THAT TACITLY ENDORSE THE HIERARCHICAL, RACIST WORLD SYSTEM. ZIZEK'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF REPRESENTATION DOOM HIS PROJECT

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. In their efforts to develop a general theory of religion, scholars often employ an evolutionary/hierarchical model. These models became evident at least as early as the eighteenth century and reached their zenith in the nineteenth century. Almost invariably, they exhibit the following schemata: from simple to complex religion, from primitive to civilized, from religions of the South to those of the North, from religions of the East to those of the West, from the religions of Africa, aboriginal Australia, and native America to the religions of Europe. This evolutionary and hierarchical model of religion is more properly called the *imperial/colonial model of religion*. I shall argue that Slavoj Žižek's recent book *The Fragile Absolute, or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?* is a legacy of this model of religion, the most systematic version of which is found in the work of Hegel. I shall argue, further, that Žižek's and Hegel's models share Eurocentric presuppositions—historical, cultural, political, and economic—that are troubling. What I will not argue is that Žižek *intends* to recapitulate the imperial/colonial model of religion. On the contrary, he stumbles into this model. He does so, precisely, because he *does not intend to*. He does not think about the ethics and politics of religion and representation at all. Instead, he speaks the "common sense" of his culture, which distinguishes invidiously between Christianity and other religions, viewing Christianity alternately, if not simultaneously, as the height of religious evolution and as a revelation whose very "absurdity" confounds and throws into utter disarray preexisting notions of religion, ethics, and politics. Žižek holds this common sense constant and beyond question—it does not even reach the threshold of critique—as he queries "our" culture's common sense on other matters. What he holds constant, I put into "play."

3. ZIZEK CLASSIFIES RELIGIONS ONLY BY THEIR PLACE RELATIVE TO CHRISTIANITY; THIS ACCOUNT LEADS TO EUROCENTRIC DOMINATION

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. By putting Christianity and Marxism on the same side, but more important, by linking them uniquely, irremediably, and even essentially to Europe, and thus placing them against the others, Žižek reaffirms the imperial/ colonial model in the theory of religion. This model, which Žižek appears to have appropriated without reservation, is given its most thorough philosophical exposition by Hegel in four series of *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. In these lectures Hegel develops an evolutionary schema in which *Geist*, Spirit, God moves spatiotemporally from South to North, from East to West, from the dark continent to the continent of enlightenment, from black to white, from Oriental to Occidental, from primitive to civilized, from fetish to Christ. Christianity sits at the top of religious development. And while it too must be sublated (preserved, cancelled, transformed, and lifted higher) by philosophy, philosophy would not be possible without it. But do not Žižek's accounts of Marxism and Christianity make similar moves? Are not Christianity and Marxism—at least in his account—two sides of a Eurocentric narrative of colonial modernity?

4. EUROCENTRIC LOGIC PERMEATES ZIZEK'S THOUGHT, EVEN THOUGH HE WON'T ALWAYS ADMIT IT

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. This id-logic or logic of the Real is the consequence of the postpolitical turn (on the Symbolic level) from democratic antagonism to tolerant humanism and multicultural consensus. What is hard to understand, however, is why Žižek thinks that proper politics, a politics of democratic antagonism and universality, is *essentially* European. He stops just short of this explicit claim, but it is difficult to draw any other conclusion. What is at stake? I ask this question because Žižek's argument is in excess of his theoretical needs. That he is in the grips of ideological fantasy is evident by the fact that the very argument against Eurocentrism—the notion that it can fill the constitutive emptiness at the center of things—starts to function as an argument in its favor. Thus Žižek blames what Europe lacks on the multicultural multitude, on fundamentalist freaks and New Age neopagans. This is odd. Žižek need not argue for Eurocentrism to justify selectively retrieving various aspects of the European legacy that he, like many others, values. The value of such retrievals itself is sufficient justification. That being the case, I cannot help but ask why he overstates his case. What does Žižek fear? His fear as far as I can tell is tied to the privileged role that the notion of universality plays in his thinking, in particular his view that there are only three competing and/or complimentary forms of universalism: Christianity, Capitalism, and Marxism.

5. ZIZEK CONSTRUCTS "OTHERNESS" BY SEEING OTHER CULTURES AS "NON-CULTURES" WHO ARE HARMFUL TO HIS VIEW OF THE WORLD

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. If the Jews did not steal Žižek's love object, if they are not responsible for his *jouissance*, his pain-filled satisfaction, then it seems a sure bet that the motley crew of "village idiots" (pagans), and those that he skewers as "fundamentalist freaks," are. While Doug Akoi's point, in the following passage, is to show how Žižek's analysis helps to illuminate "the fascistic moment of every culture," there is no better description of the operation that Žižek performs on the multicultural multitude: Žižek argues that there is an irreducible gap between the fantasy of culture as a *Gemeinschaft*/ethnos/Nation-Cause/shared thing, that is, as a community sustained by organic bonds, and the agonism of cultural difference, where meanings are misread and signs are misappropriated. This gap, opened up by the imaginarity of culture, motivates the displacement of its immanent impossibility onto an ideological fantasy of a pathological Other who threatens the wholesome body politic. This is the formal conversion of the negativity of cultural lack into the despised positivity of the alien Thing—the new old nationalism translated into Hegelese. In reading Žižek against himself, we have seen and will see how he constructs the non-Western, non-European, non-Christian other as lacking true politics, true ethics, true universality. This other threatens the wholesome Western/European/Christian body politic. The European/Christian ethnos—its possession of the love object, the object treasure—is being threatened by "pagans at the gate."

## 6. ZIZEK'S CRITICISM IS BASED ON IMPERIALIST EPISTEMOLOGY THAT IS INTIMATELY TIED TO EUROCENTRIC CAPITALISM

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. Larrain provides an account of what we might call the imperial/ colonial episteme of nineteenth-century Europe, allowing us to place Serequeberhan's account in a larger context. On this view, Hegel's distinction between "world historical peoples" and "peoples without history" presupposes classical political economy (Smith, Malthus, Say, Ricardo), which regards the British bourgeoisie as the privileged representative of capitalist emancipation and progress, and presages Marx and Engels's notion that the most important proletariat, that is, the universal and messianic class, "is the proletariat of the most advanced European capitalist nations." What these perspectives hold in common is "a kind of Eurocentrism: the belief that the progress brought about by these historical actors in capitalist Western Europe is inherently superior and has a historical mission which must finally prevail in the world." The concepts and images that Serequeberhan and Larrain identify in the work of the classical political economists, and in the work of Hegel and Marx—including the notion of "peoples without history," the concept of the white man's burden, and the imagery of darkest Africa—are examples of what David Spurr calls "the rhetoric of empire."

## 7. ZIZEK CLASSIFIES RELIGIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR WORTH RELATIVE TO CHRISTIANITY AND FACILITATES THE DESTRUCTION OF THOSE LESSER RELIGIONS THROUGH COLONIZATION

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. If Judeo-Christian logic is antievolutionary, as Žižek contends, then it alone can give a proper account of eternity. This logic stands against a pagan logic that denies the founding power of trauma, which is an eternal, irremediable wound or infinite sadness that we cannot speak or put into historical context because it resists the symbolizing and historicizing work of language. Judeo-Christian logic comprehends the negativity of eternity, the ontological difference between time and eternity, eternity as that which time excludes, eternity as the *negative* condition for the emergence of time. In effect, Žižek baptizes Martin Heidegger's ontological difference as Judeo-Christian. Ignorance of this difference distinguishes "pre-Christian religions." Notice: he doesn't say other religions or non-Christian religions but pre-Christian. He calls such religions pre-Christian because he is employing an evolutionary model, probably Hegel's model, in which Judaism is the Sublime Religion and Christianity is the Consummate Religion. Before and behind these religions, to the south and to the east, are the pre-Christian religions: (1) "Immediate or Natural Religion," where Spirit has yet to extricate itself from nature—Spirit being the proper measure of "man"; (2) Mediated Religion, where the spiritual is elevated above the natural; and (3) Consummate Religion, "religion that is for itself," which is self-conscious, which can take itself as an object of inquiry. If one does an ethnography of this schema, one discovers the following "ascent of 'Religion Man'": from Eskimos, Africans, Mongols, Chinese, Indians, Burmese, Jews, ancient Greeks, and ancient Romans, to modern Europeans. In ascending rank order, the list of religions are: magic (fetishism, animism, primitivism), Buddhism, Lamaism, the "State Religion of the Chinese Empire," Taoism, Hinduism, Persian Religion, Egyptian Religion, Greek Religion, Jewish Religion, Roman Religion, and Christianity. These lists are a little misleading; not only do the two orders of ascent fail to map up perfectly, they also obscure the categorical difference between Christianity as Consummate (superhistorical) Religion and all the others as Determinate (historical) Religion. The differences between the others are matters of degree; the one between them and Christianity is a difference in kind. And this is true despite the fact that there is no place in Hegel's philosophy for the kind of gaps and conceptual leaps that one finds, for example, in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, his dissident follower. Hegel's account reflects the confidence of a Christian Europe that was well on its way (in 1827) to reducing most of the globe to a colony.

8. ZIZEK'S CRITIQUE IS BASED ON HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS; HEGEL'S THOUGHT WAS ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY AND EUROCENTRIC

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf> If Žižek explicates the antievolutionary character of Judeo-Christian logic in relation to eternity, then he ignores the context of colonial modernity and, thus, the evolutionary and hierarchical episteme of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century comparative religion, which is constitutive of the very notion of Judeo-Christianity. If I am correct in assuming Žižek's reliance on Hegel—and even if I am not, since this episteme is bigger than Hegel—then Žižek bears a certain burden of proof. He must explain why his Hegelianism does not commit him to Hegel's account of religion, history, and politics. As the quotations with which I opened this essay show, there is a constitutive relation between pre-Darwinian evolutionary theory, the distinction between lower and higher races, between “primitive” religions and “world historical” religions, and claims for the preeminence of European Man. In the absence of an account that distinguishes his views from this tradition, it would be foolish not to raise the question of Žižek's complicity. Here an inversion of the ethical-judicial mood is appropriate. Žižek must be considered guilty until proven innocent.

9. HEGELIAN THOUGHT NOT ONLY JUSTIFIES COLONIALISM, IT REQUIRES IT! HEGEL BELIEVED THAT ECONOMIC DOMINATION OF THE “OTHER” WAS NECESSARY FOR THE SURVIVAL OF EUROPEAN HEGEMONY

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. Tsenay Serequeberhan and Jorge Larrain provide the kind of accounts that Žižek needs to confront if he is to exonerate himself. Serequeberhan shows why Hegel's political philosophy—which is integrally connected to his philosophies of history and religion by the evolutionary/hierarchical motif—requires colonialism. Hegel is driven by the dialectics of his own logic—with its failure to adequately address the political economy of civil society, which inexorably produces poverty, which places the poor/nonproductive/superfluous classes outside the modern system of justice that is based on property ownership—to advocate colonialism as a solution. According to Serequeberhan, colonialism is the only solution to the market imperfections of civil society, and to the surplus populations it inevitably produces, “that is compatible with the basic terms of his [Hegel's] perspective and the European reality upon which and out of which he reflected.” The structural imperfections (contradictions) inherent in civil society made colonialism attractive, even necessary. “Thus, non-European territories which do not share the peculiar European idea of property and society and thus do not have the strange problem of ‘overproduction’ are labeled ‘generally backward in industry’ and thereby become the legitimate prey of colonialist expansion.”

10. ZIZEK'S DEFENSE OF THE IMPERIAL FOUNDATIONS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY IS INADEQUATE; HIS FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE BRUTALITY OF HIS OWN THOUGHT REINFORCES OPPRESSION

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. The closest, so far as I can tell, that Žižek comes to addressing the imperial/colonial implications of Hegel's philosophy of religion is *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. There he mentions Yirmiahu Yovel's critique of Hegel's inconsistency and anti-Semitism. Indeed, Hegel's inconsistency is driven by his anti-Semitism. Thus Judaism (the religion of sublimity) precedes Greek religion (the religion of beauty) even though this violates the Kantian order—first the beautiful, then the sublime—on which Hegel's account depends. Rather than pursuing this point,<sup>7</sup> much less the evolutionary/ hierarchical character of Hegel's overall philosophy, Žižek retreats into a discussion of the philosophical sublime. Thus he turns away from the torn flesh and red blood of the historical sublime, from the bodily practices, disciplines, and tortures of anti-Semitism and colonial modernity to the discourse of a philosophy seminar.



11. ZIZEK'S RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL THOUGHTS ARE INSEPARABLE; THE NEGATIVE CAN'T ADVOCATE HIS POLITICAL BELIEFS ALONE

William David Hart (Associate Professor of Religion @ Univ. of North Carolina Greensboro), NEPLANTA, 2002, v3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 9, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v003/3.3hart.pdf>. If Christian universalism has been put in jeopardy if not displaced by capitalist universalism, then only Marxist universalism—which is a Christian legacy, filtered and augmented by Lacan, of course—can displace capitalism. Given what he regards as the European provenance of Christianity and Marxism, Žižek fears that the decline of Eurocentrism may mean the loss of universality. This should give pause to any reader who is tempted to separate Žižek's Hegelian, Eurocentric, evolutionary/hierarchical model of religion from his politics. One is no more likely to find a culturally and socially autonomous and atomistic notion of politics in Žižek's work than in Hegel's work. The temptation, for those who otherwise find his insights compelling, to quarantine Žižek's politics from his other views is understandable but wrong. For Žižek Christianity, Marxism, universality, and Europe are a uniquely precious if fragile ensemble. This is why he argues so strongly for the comparative superiority of Christianity to paganism and Judaism. Interestingly enough, Žižek never mentions Islam.<sup>9</sup> Islam, which poses so many problems for the narrative that Žižek constructs, is also absent from Hegel's account! Is this merely an interesting coincidence? Perhaps.

12. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE NEGATIVE CRITIQUE; ZIZEK'S PROJECT CREATES NO SPACE FOR CHANGE SINCE HE WILL NOT COMMIT FIRMLY TO ANY IDEOLOGICAL POSITION

Brian Donahue (Professor of English at Gonzaga Univ.), POSTMODERN CULTURE, January 2002. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/pmc/v012/12.2donahue.html> Another common criticism of Zizek holds that he ultimately takes no position on the ideological issues he addresses. The problem is related to that Moebius strip quality mentioned above: Zizek consistently performs stunning critical analyses, but the question of where they are supposed to lead is not always answered, especially in *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, his first book published in English. Indeed, at the 1999 MLA convention, Teresa Ebert criticized Zizek from a strictly traditional Marxist standpoint, characterizing him as a contemporary cynic trapped in the dead-end of “enlightened false consciousness,” and arguing that despite his self-presentation as a critic who exposes the workings of contemporary popular-cynical ideology, Zizek himself assumes what amounts to a meta-cynical posture that does not free him from the charge of cynicism.

13. ZIZEK'S INSISTENCE ON TANGIBLE “REALITY” DESTABILIZES RADICAL POLITICS AND REINFORCES THE STATUS QUO

Brian Donahue (Professor of English at Gonzaga Univ.), POSTMODERN CULTURE, January 2002. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/pmc/v012/12.2donahue.html> For all the ground it gains in destabilizing liberal politics, the “hard kernel of the Real” also raises problems for radical politics. To the extent that it can be understood as a zone of absolute, prediscursive otherness beyond criticism, the Real can function as a naturalized, ahistorical alibi that assures in advance the failure of systemic critique and future-oriented political projects by fetishizing the moment at which we must throw up our hands and admit ignorance and the failure of representation. This insistence on the Real as radically foreclosed from symbolization thus effectively serves existing hegemonic relations by reinforcing the lines of inclusion and exclusion that determine the relative power accorded to various subject positions as inevitable effects of an invariant law of the Real. This is essentially Judith Butler's critique of Zizek along feminist-poststructuralist lines.

## 14. EUROCENTRISM SHOULD BE EXPOSED AND REJECTED AT EVERY TURN

Ken Nunn (Professor of Law @ Univ. of Florida), *LAW AND INEQUALITY*, Spring 1997. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 6, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). Contesting Eurocentricity is primarily a cultural struggle. It calls for the creation of a separate cultural base that values and responds to a different cultural logic than does Eurocentricity. Aime Cesaire, the great West Indian Pan-Africanist, understood the importance of the cultural struggle and its potential: Any political and social regime that suppresses the self-determination of a people, must, at the same time, kill the creative power of the people... Wherever there is colonization, the entire people have been emptied of their culture and their creativity... It is certain, then, that the elements that structure the cultural life of a colonized people [must also] retard or degenerate the work of the colonial regime. Eurocentric law and its legal structures - legislative bodies, courts, bar associations, law schools, etc. - limit the political program that African-centered cultural activists can undertake. African-centered political activity is circumscribed in part because of a reason I have already discussed: law's limited ability to address issues of concern to African-centered people. More significantly, law limits responses to Eurocentricity through its effects on those who would use it to accomplish change. First, the law accomplishes ideological work as it embraces Eurocentric cultural styles and celebrates European historical traditions. The law and legal institutions, through the artful use of ritual and authority, uphold the legitimacy of European dominance. The constant self-congratulatory references to the majesty of the law, the continual praise of European thinkers, the unconscious reliance on European traditions, values and ways of thinking, all become unremarkable and expected. The law operates as a key component in a vast and mainly invisible signifying system in support of white supremacy. of their own movement. They reinforce the legitimacy of Eurocentricity in their own minds, in the minds of their constituency, and in the minds of their potential allies.

## 15. EUROCENTRISM IS RACIST, AND ROOTED IN ECONOMIC DOMINATION; THIS TURNS THEIR MARXIST CRITIQUE

Anibel Quijano (Dept. of Sociology @ Binghampton Univ.), *NEPANTLA*, 2000, v1i3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v001/1.3quijano.pdf>. The racial classification of the population and the early association of the new racial identities of the colonized with the forms of control of unpaid, unwaged labor developed among the Europeans the singular perception that paid labor was the whites' privilege. The racial inferiority of the colonized implied that they were not worthy of wages. They were naturally obliged to work for the profit of their owners. It is not difficult to find, to this very day, this attitude spread out among the white property owners of anyplace in the world. Furthermore, the lower wages "inferior races" receive in the present capitalist centers for the same work as done by whites cannot be explained as detached from the racist social classification of the world's population—in other words, as detached from the global capitalist coloniality of power.

## 16. EUROCENTRISM IS THE MINDSET USED TO JUSTIFY GLOBAL CAPITALIST OPPRESSION; THIS TURNS THEIR CRITICISM

Anibel Quijano (Dept. of Sociology @ Binghampton Univ.), *NEPANTLA*, 2000, v1i3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v001/1.3quijano.pdf>. What is termed globalization is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world's population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. The racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established. Therefore, the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality. In what follows, my primary aim is to open up some of the theoretically necessary questions about the implications of coloniality of power regarding the history of Latin America.

17. EUROCENTRISM LEADS TO THE COMMODIFICATION OF HUMAN LIFE AS A TOOL OF THE LABOR FORCE; THIS TURNS THEIR CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

Anibel Quijano (Dept. of Sociology @ Binghamton Univ.), NEPANTLA, 2000, v1i3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v001/1.3quijano.pdf>. The control of global commercial traffic by dominant groups headquartered in the Atlantic zones propelled in those places a new process of urbanization based on the expansion of commercial traffic between them, and, consequently, the formation of regional markets increasingly integrated and monetarized due to the flow of precious metals originating in America. A historically new region was constituted as a new geocultural *identity*: Europe—more specifically, Western Europe.<sup>7</sup> A new geocultural identity emerged as the central site for the control of the world market. The hegemony of the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Iberian peninsula was displaced toward the northwest Atlantic coast in the same historical moment. The condition Europe found itself in as the central site of the new world market cannot explain by itself alone why Europe also became, until the nineteenth century and virtually until the worldwide crisis of 1870, the central site of the process of the commodification of the labor force, while all the rest of the regions and populations colonized and incorporated into the new world market under European dominion basically remained under nonwaged relations of labor. And in non-European regions, wage labor was concentrated almost exclusively among whites. Of course, the entire production of such a division of labor was articulated in a chain of transference of value and profits whose control corresponded to Western Europe.

18. EUROCENTRIC COLONIALISM CAUSES GENOCIDE AGAINST THE “UNDEVELOPED HEATHENS” OF THE WORLD

Anibel Quijano (Dept. of Sociology @ Binghamton Univ.), NEPANTLA, 2000, v1i3. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/nepantla/v001/1.3quijano.pdf>. There is nothing in the social relation of capital itself, or in the mechanisms of the world market in general, that implies the historical necessity of European concentration first (either in Europe or elsewhere) of waged labor and later (over precisely the same base) of the concentration of industrial production for more than two centuries. As events after 1870 demonstrated, Western European control of wage labor in any sector of the world’s population would have been perfectly feasible, and probably more profitable for Western Europe. The explanation ought to lie, then, in some other aspect of history itself. The fact is that from the very beginning of the colonization of America, Europeans associated nonpaid or nonwaged labor with the dominated races because they were “inferior” races. The vast genocide of the Indians in the first decades of colonization was not caused principally by the violence of the conquest nor by the plagues the conquistadors brought, but took place because so many American Indians were used as disposable manual labor and forced to work until death. The elimination of this colonial practice did not end until the defeat of the *encomenderos* in the middle of the sixteenth century. The subsequent Iberian colonialism involved a new politics of population reorganization, a reorganization of the Indians and their relations with the colonizers. But this did not advance American Indians as free and waged laborers. From then on, they were assigned the status of unpaid serfs. The serfdom of the American Indians could not, however, be compared with feudal serfdom in Europe, since it included neither the supposed protection of a feudal lord nor, necessarily, the possession of a piece of land to cultivate instead of wages. Before independence, the Indian labor force of serfs reproduced itself in the communities, but more than one hundred years after independence, a large part of the Indian serfs was still obliged to reproduce the labor force on its own.<sup>8</sup> The other form of unwaged or, simply put, unpaid labor, slavery, was assigned exclusively to the “black” population brought from Africa.

## MARXISM IS A FAILED PHILOSOPHY

### 1. MARXISM EMBRACES THE OPPRESSIVE STATE.

Barry Hallen, (Chair, Philosophy Dept., Morehouse College & Formerly Professor of Philosophy at Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria), *A SHORT HISTORY OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY*, 2002, 87. In those instances where the terms “socialism” or “Marxism” have been linked to particular regimes or policies of an African nation-state, they have often meant nothing more than a government-run or government-sponsored industrial or agricultural initiative. “Even Marxism has become, in our countries, a form of ideology for capitalist development carried out by the State.”

### 2. MARXISM HAS PROVED ITSELF INEFFECTIVE WHEREVER IT HAS COME TO POWER.

Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), *QUADRANT*, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), *QUADRANT*, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). Thankfully, the baying of slogans still remains insufficient to bring most modern Western governments to their knees. The unfortunate inhabitants of China were not so lucky, of course, the Red Guards of the time bringing murder, misery and mayhem to millions. The would-be Red Guards of the West ran into more serious obstacles in trying to wreck the democratic institutions they had targeted. People in the West had fought too long and too hard for their freedoms—and many had also witnessed at first hand the disagreeable realities of the Marxist systems which prevailed elsewhere.

### 3. THE MARXIST FORMULA IS NON-FALSIFIABLE; WHENEVER MARXISM FAILS, CAPITALISM IS ALWAYS TO BLAME.

Douglas E. Litowitz, (Prof., Law, Chicago-Kent U. School of Law), *NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW*, 1997, 523. The problem with the Marxist formula was that it was a piece of pseudoscience incapable of demonstration or refutation. For example, if one pointed out to the ultra-Marxist that the New Deal of the 1930s was an advance for the proletariat, the Marxist could respond by saying that the New Deal was really motivated by the need for capitalists to keep the economy going, so the real beneficiaries were the bourgeoisie. The Marxist claim was pseudoscience because the Marxist refused to specify the evidence that would refute his claim: indeed, no evidence could disprove the claim, because any evidence against the claim was simply reinterpreted as evidence in favor of it. Philosophers can recall a similar situation with the position known as “psychological egoism,” which in its strongest version holds that everybody always acts self-interestedly. When the person who holds this view is asked to explain why people give anonymous gifts to charity and risk their lives fighting for others, she responds by redescribing these selfless acts as really egotistical, saying that if we really understood the person’s true motivations, we would see that they were acting egotistically. There is certainly no way to prove or disprove psychological egoism as a doctrine; the best we can do is to say that it fails to describe the facts of life as we experience them, that it is a poor interpretation of human behavior.

### 4. MARXISM HAS FAILED SO MISERABLY THAT IT IS NOW REGARDED AS IRRELEVANT.

Terry Eagleton, (Prof., Cultural Theory, U. Manchester), *AFTER THEORY*, 98, 41. As the countercultural 1960s and 70s turned in the postmodern 80s and 90s, the sheer irrelevance of Marxism seemed all the more striking. For now, industrial production really did seem on the way out, and along with it the proletariat. Terry Eagleton, (Prof., Cultural Theory, U. Manchester), *AFTER THEORY*, 98, 43. Indeed, with the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellites, Marxism had quite literally disappeared from a whole sector of the globe. It was not so much answered as out of the question. You no more needed to have an opinion about it than you did on crop circles or poltergeists.

5. MARXISM UNDERMINES CULTURE BY ITS INSISTENCE THAT NOTHING OUTSIDE THE MARXIST LENS IS RELEVANT.

Giles Auty, (Journalist & Art Critic), QUADRANT, June 2000. Online. Internet. May 15, 2007. [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-27982164\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27982164_ITM). In good Marxist fashion, culture is denied autonomy and is reduced to being a coefficient of something else: class relations, sexual oppression, racial exploitation etc. Questions of artistic quality are systematically replaced with tests for political relevance, even as the whole realm of aesthetic experience is “demythologised” as an insidious bourgeois fiction designed to consolidate the cultural hegemony of the ruling class. The thought that there might be something uniquely valuable about culture taken on its own terms, that literature, for example, might have its own criteria of achievement and offer its own distinctive satisfactions that are independent of contemporary political battles — none of this seems to matter or indeed to be seriously considered by our multiculturalist radicals.

6. EVEN MARX CAN'T EXPLAIN WHAT A SOCIALIST INSTITUTION WOULD LOOK LIKE, ALLOWING SPACE FOR ELITES TO CO-OPT THE REVOLUTION

Joergen Poulsen, SOCIAL RESEARCH, Winter 1986. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://pao.chadwyck.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/results.do?QueryType=articles>. It is of no great use to anyone to know that a postpolitical nirvana will ensue, when people stop caring about conflicting interests because of vanishing scarcity. Any sensible political ideology could deal comfortably with this situation. For this reason Marx's hints about higher stages of communism are of little theoretical and no practical interest. It is the model of the association of free agents, or the early form of communist society after transition from capitalism, which is of interest. On this issue, Marx's argument is seriously deficient since it gives a fragmentary and incoherent account of socialist institutions. This incoherence is due to the philosophical presuppositions of Marx's argument. The tale of natural society and the transformation into the postulates of natural production form an important part of the normative basis of Marx's argument. This may partly account for the continued relevance of Marx's philosophy, since the myth of “natural man” has long been—and still is—a very powerful influence in broad patterns of Western thought. However that may be, it is also these presuppositions that force Marx into an untenable position with respect to socialist institutions. At the point where traditional theory, such as that represented by Plato or that represented by Locke, cuts loose from the idea of natural society in order to confront the question of institutional design in a context of permanent conflict of interest, Marx stays with the old normative basis, although he transforms it and gives it a modern form. For this reason he is led to the contradictory position that conflict of interests at the same time is and is not a feature of the association of free agents. From this perspective it is no easy task to give a systematic account of socialist institutions, and this is why the otherwise systematic Marx left a fragmentary account of the problem.

7. THE MARXIST MOVEMENT IS DEAD

Stephen Holmes (Professor of Law & Political Science @ Univ. of Chicago), THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 1992. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 12, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). What has died is not history but Marxism, and Marxism was precisely an eschatological philosophy that distorted history by forcing it into a procrustean scheme with a predetermined direction and a happy end.

8. CRITICAL MARXIST READINGS OF CULTURE ARE TOO GENERAL; EXTERNAL CULTURAL CRITICISM ONLY CAUSES ACADEMIC PARALYSIS

Camille Paglia (Author & social critic), SEX, ART, AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1992, p. ix. A serious problem in America is the gap between academe and the mass media, which *is* our culture. Professors of humanities, with all their leftist fantasies, have little direct knowledge of American life and no impact whatever on public policy. Academic commentary on popular culture is either ghettoized as lackluster “communications”, tarted up with semiotics or loaded down with grim, quasi-Marxist, Frankfurt School censoriousness: the pitifully witless masses are always being brainwashed by money-brubbing capitalist pigs. But mass media is completely, even servilely commercial. It is a mirror of the popular mind. All the P.R. in the world cannot make a hit movie or sitcom. The people vote with ratings and dollars. Academic Marxists, with their elitist sense of superiority to popular taste, are the biggest snobs in America.

## **FOUCAULT'S STRUCTURALISM CRITIQUE IS A FLAWED PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH**

### **1. FOUCAULT COMMITS THE RELATIVIST FALLACY.**

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 131. The relativist fallacy also applies to the concept of knowledge. One cannot hold that there are alternative, indeed competing, forms of knowledge, as Foucault maintains. Inherent in the concept of knowledge is that of truth. One can only know something if it is true. If something is not true, or even if its truth status is uncertain, one cannot know it. To talk, as Foucault does, of opposing knowledges is to hold that there is one set of truths that runs counter to another set of truths. It is certainly possible to talk about beliefs or values that may be held in opposition by the authorities and by their subjects, since neither beliefs nor values necessarily entail truth. But Foucault's idea that there are knowledges held by the centralising powers that are opposed to the subjugated knowledges of the oppressed is an abuse of both logic and language.

### **2. FOUCAULT ENABLES OPPRESSION BY PREFERRING POSTMODERN TALK OVER ACTION.**

Anthony Cook (Assoc. Prof of Law @ Georgetown), *NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW*, Spring 1992, v26, p.759. Online. Nexis. Accessed May 16, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). Several things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurtures in many ways an unhealthy insularity that fails to connect localized struggle to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism, racism, sexism, and homophobia that transcend their localized articulation within this particular law school, that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among some followers of Foucault an unhealthy propensity to rely on rich, thick, ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflict. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation begins, ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from the normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say *and* do something about the oppressive world in which we live.

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 132. The Foucauldian version is little different. In debate, any question about the facts of a statement is ignored and the focus is directed to the way what is said reflects the prevailing 'discursive formation' or how it is a form of knowledge that serves the power of the authorities concerned. One of the reasons for Foucault's popularity in the university environment is that he offers such tactics to his followers—tactics which should be regarded as the negation of the traditional aims of the university: the gaining of knowledge and the practise of scholarship. Foucault's influence on the type of academic debate so frequently found today should be a matter of great concern. Instead of talk about real issues, all we get is talk about talk. Instead of debates based on evidence and reason, all we get is a retreat to a level of abstraction where enough is assumed to have been said when one has identified the epistemological position of one's opponent.

### **3. FOUCAULT'S PHILOSOPHY IS SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY.**

Keith Windschuttle, (Prof., History, New South Wales Institute of Technology), *THE KILLING OF HISTORY*, 1996, 131. However, it is not difficult to show that a relativist concept of truth of this kind is untenable. If what is true is always relative to a particular society, there are no propositions that can be true across all societies. However, this means that Foucault's own claim cannot be true for all societies. So he contradicts himself. What he says cannot be true at all.

## FOUCAULT/BIOPOWER KRITIK ANSWERS

### 1. FOUCAULT'S THEORIES DENY INDIVIDUAL AGENCY, DESTROYING OUR ABILITY TO RESIST OPPRESSION

Anthony Cook, *NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW*, Spring 1992. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 12, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-**hegemonic weapons of liberation**.

### 2. FOUCAULT'S CRITICISM COLLAPSES UPON ITSELF; BY REQUIRING UNIFORM RESISTANCE TO CERTAIN TYPES OF BIOPOWER, THE NEGATIVE ENGAGES IN THE SAME TYPE OF DISCOURSE THAT IT INDICTS:

John Muckelbauer, *COLLEGE ENGLISH*, Sept. 2000, v63, n1. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. Throughout his work, Foucault is suspicious of those who, in Deleuze's terms, invoke "a universal and eternal consciousness of the rights of man which must not be subjected to analysis" (90). For Foucault, normative ethical imperatives are ultimately premised on a conception of "the free, rational, autonomous" subject. The first problem with a normative ethics is that it indicates that resistance to any particular practice is equally possible and desirable for all: everyone can and should resist any given deployment of power. The second problem is that ethical imperatives rather uncritically reinstate the privileging of subjectivity and consciousness: a person is told why he or she should resist a particular practice and, understanding these reasons, then proceeds to do so. If I, for example, were to assert the ethical imperative that scholars should read Foucault (and others) more productively, I would be indicating, first, that this style of engagement was useful or beneficial for everyone in all situations, and second, that simply as a result of understanding my articulation of productive reading, one could just turn around and read differently—questionable assertions at best, as any teacher knows. No doubt, different bodies are differently inclined toward encountering some books, concepts, or authors productively and others programmatically. My purpose in this essay is not to advocate productive reading, but simply to attempt to provoke this style of engagement in some readers through a productive analysis designed to redirect a specific critical impasse.

John Muckelbauer, *COLLEGE ENGLISH*, Sept. 2000, v63, n1. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>. The absence of normative ethical imperatives in Foucault's work indicates not only a skepticism about the implicit assumptions that drive them, but also that, in most situations, such imperatives are dangerous. To argue that any specific deployment of power should be resisted by everyone is to impose a very limited moral criteria on a heterogeneous social body. As Foucault writes, "The role of an intellectual is not to tell others what they have to do. By what right would he do so?" Or further, that a critic's dictating "what must be or what must take place can only have the effects of domination." In the case of sexuality, he cites the advocates of sexual liberation who encourage a uniform and simple transgression of prohibitions—the transformation of sexuality into discourse—in order to effect sexual liberation. In Foucault's interpretation, "This type of discourse is, indeed, a formidable tool of control and power. . . . [I]t ends up . . . dispersing movements of revolt and liberation" because it "presents a certain form of ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom." In other words, ethical imperatives generalize singular practices of resistance into necessary and mandatory requirements for all resistance, integrating subjects into uniform power relations and, in effect, normalizing resistant practices (which explains why, for example, so many essays and books continue to reproduce the same critiques of Foucault's resistance). The normalizing effects of such technologies are dangerous primarily because they present themselves as interested in freedom and thus implicitly discourage, if not overtly prohibit, the development of alternative and multiple practices of freedom (freedoms, for example, that others might perceive as oppressive).

3. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO FOUCAULTIAN CRITICISM; HIS VERSION OF RESISTANCE IS JUST ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF BIPOWER

Steven Sangren, *CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY*, Feb. 1995, v10, n1. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://www.jstor.org>. "Resistance" thus becomes the privileged domain of agency and change in history. In the midst of a theory that claims to bypass subjectivity and theoretical totalization, resistance becomes the cipher for their covert reappearance. There is something romantic, even mystical, about the current academic infatuation with "resistance"; I suspect that this appeal is precisely the "space" that the concept "opens up" for an unanalyzable (my parodying of jargon is intentional), irreducible subjectivity against the imagined ordering, disciplining, normalizing, and totalizing force of "modern," "state," or "rational" discourses. (In the jargon of Chinese metaphysics, resistance is yin to power's yang.) Even if subjects lack "presence" and stability, even if they can be relegated to the status of elusive and illusive "effects" of language, "truth," or "power," in the concept of "resistance" there thus remains a comforting trace of ineffable creativity (and, thus, power) against language, representation, discourse, and "mere reproduction."

4. FOUCAULT USES THE SAME TOTALIZING IDEOLOGIES THAT HE CRITICIZES

Steven Sangren, *CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY*, Feb. 1995, v10, n1. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://www.jstor.org>. I believe that Foucault mislocates the distinction intended by analytical uses of ideology. Separating that in discourses which is true from that which is false need not imply that representations and ideology do not participate in the production of social truths, as Foucault's caricature assumes. On the contrary, analytical invocation of ideology insists on maintaining the distinction between how discourses represent social realities and how analysts do. Foucault's analyses themselves cannot avoid assuming such a distinction and making their own truth claims. In other words, a concept of ideology that insists on the productivity of ideological misrecognition within an encompassing social reality (always only provisionally representable in any particular analysis) does not entail a denial that ideologies (or discourses) have real social effects or that ideology's productive effects are secondary or epiphenomenal to other, more material, forces (e.g., economy, biology, etc.). Foucault's caricature of ideology diverts attention from the crucial contradiction Habermas notes in Foucault's ambition to produce an antiscience and his claims to produce new understanding. In sum, Foucault seems to desire to have things both ways; on the one hand he preserves for himself the modernist pleasure of unmasking ideology by implicitly claiming to produce "an understanding of social practices as having an intelligibility radically different from that available to actors," while on the other hand he denigrates, even demonizes, social sciences for thus objectifying human experience. I have argued that this contradictory rhetorical appropriation of unjustified and unacknowledged magisterial authority, in a discourse that overtly aims to subvert such authority/authorial claims, constitutes the ideological appeal of Foucaultian and, more generally, postmodernist discourse.

5. EMPLOYING FOUCAULT'S CRITICISM REQUIRES SELECTIVE APPROPRIATION OF HIS WORK FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEANS WITHIN THE LEGAL SYSTEM; THIS PROVES THAT THE PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION

Hugh Baxter (Assoc. prof. of Law @ Boston Univ.), *STANFORD LAW REVIEW*, January 1996. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 12, 06. [www.nexis.com](http://www.nexis.com). As I suggested above, Foucault is less directly useful for the "normative" aims of legal scholarship. Foucault paid little attention to legal questions, and his descriptive, analytic approach seems in tension with prescriptive or normative forms of legal discourse. The deeper problem is that while Foucault's genealogies doubtless had a critical edge, Foucault never made clear his criteria of evaluation. Understood as social criticism, Foucault's work seems to remain parasitic on a normative theory, or at least a set of normative views, that he never made explicit. That is, while Foucault emphasized the productivity and ubiquity of power, refusing to posit a free, fully constituted subject liberated from power, his genealogies gain their critical edge from the sense that domination and subjugation are worth opposing. Foucault's tendency to invert the traditional Enlightenment story of progressively greater freedom and autonomy - a tendency visible in his account of the rise of "disciplinary" or "carceral" society - seems still to trade on Enlightenment ideals, even in the genealogical gesture of mocking them. My point here is not that Foucault is necessarily trapped in a fatal performative contradiction, or that he owes us some fully developed (humanistic) theory that explains which forms of power are worth resisting and which are not. My point, rather, is simply that to the extent legal scholars engage in "normative legal thought," advocating some legal rule or outcome as appropriate or desirable, Foucault's work cannot be their only theoretical resource. To argue, for example, that violence against gays and lesbians amounts to unconstitutional "cruel and unusual punishment" requires an account of the meaning of this constitutional phrase.



Hugh Baxter (Assoc. prof. of Law @ Boston Univ.), STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January 1996. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 12, 06. www.nexis.com. To argue that restrictions on abortion violate the Equal Protection Clause requires an interpretation of what constitutional "equality" means. While Foucault of course does not speak directly to such issues, an encounter with his work nonetheless may be productive. For example, Siegel's constitutional argument against abortion-restrictive legislation draws from her genealogy of the state's interest in "potential life." Her account of the ancestry and development of "potential life" suggests that abortion-restrictive legislation rests upon constitutionally impermissible judgments about women's proper roles. And Thomas uses Foucault's work to characterize violence against gays and lesbians as an exercise of power, relativizing the distinction between action taken by government officials ("state action" narrowly construed) and action encouraged or permitted by the state ("state action" understood in a "functional" rather than "formal" sense). Thus, while Foucault's work may be in tension with the normative aims of legal scholarship, strategic appropriation of his work may exploit this tension productively. To be sure, appropriating Foucault requires revision of some aspects of his work. The most obvious candidate for revision is Foucault's notion of law as sovereign command. The next most obvious candidate, in my view, is Foucault's occasional suggestion that modern society is a "disciplinary" or "carceral" society, a dystopian nightmare. Further, some of Foucault's fundamental substantive concepts - such as disciplinary power and biopower - speak more directly to some areas of law than to others. Still, as Hunt and Wickham observe, the point is not to construct a "Foucaultian theory of law," but rather to appropriate from Foucault what is useful.

#### 6. FOUCAULT UNDERMINED HIS THEORIES OF GENEALOGY WITH HIS LATER RESEARCH

Judith Butler (Professor of Rhetoric & Comparative Literature @ UC-Berkeley), THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, November 1989, p.606. The critical power of Foucault's analysis assumes that only under certain conditions of power and discourse do bodies get signified and regulated in the ways that he describes in *Discipline and Punish* and in *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. I. In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," however, Foucault "confesses" his metaphysical commitments in such a way that the critical power of his genealogical critique is severely undermined. In that essay, he makes clear that "subjection," though historically specific in its modalities, is also the essential and transhistorical precondition of "history" writ large; indeed, he makes clear that this signficatory or generative subjection is the essential gesture of a singular history, its one infinitely repeatable "drama."

## 7. THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS OF TRUTH AND POWER SERVE NO REAL-WORLD FUNCTION OR MEANING

Paul Bowman, POLITICS AND ETHICS FROM BEHIND, Culture Machine n4, 2002. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/bowman.htm>. In the academic contexts of the journals, books, and conferences of cultural studies, as well as of the cluster of related academic practices sometimes called the ‘interdisciplinary humanities’, we regularly hear it said that we are all highly conscious that the sneaky rhetorical operations of tropes, figurative language, and a whole army of persuasive techniques are always at play in even the most avowedly logical, rational, and literal of communications. We say we remain conscious of this. But, as Althusser argued, consciousness itself still remains a specific kind of unconsciousness; or as Laclau and Mouffe contend, implicitly, *everything*, even a form of consciousness, is still fundamentally a repression of the consciousness of its own impossibility. For many people, ‘highly theoretical’ assertions like these demand explanation, justification: ‘What the hell is all that supposed to mean? What is the possible use of all this theoretical nonsense, this pointless profundity? Sure, it sounds profound and momentous, but really, what use is it for anything?’ And suchlike. Theoretical ‘insights’ like these are readily and perhaps quite justifiably received with an immediate question mark. And I do mean justifiably in *all* registers, including the ‘most theoretical’ of them. Theoretical discourses do seem to beg answers to the question of their possible ‘application’, of whether they *have an application*, and hence whether they ‘have’ any worth or value, or where they fit into any worthwhile practice. I don’t dispute the justifiability of these questions, and I think they must always be allowed to invade and interrupt any otherwise smooth flow of theory, and that they should be received hospitably and treated with the utmost seriousness. For it may indeed seem to be the case that much, if not all, theoretical production (the production of theoretical statements) does not even seem to be immediately intelligible, let alone potentially ‘useful’ or ‘practical’ to any real, urgent cause or practice – well, useful for any *practical* practice. And a list of practical practices obviously wouldn’t include the *theoretical* practices of which so many lofty-sounding profundities seem to be the tautological beginning and end-point. To include theoretical practice into the category of the practical would be to have stretched things a bit *too far*, it would seem. On first inspection, the question would seem to be one of where capital-t-Theory *fits in* to practical matters, where it *could* or *should* fit in, or, as Richard Rorty has said, ‘Surely the burden is on those who, like Laclau, think [that “abstract” theoretical ruminations and assertions are] useful to explain just how and where the utility appears, rather than taking it for granted.’

8. WE SHOULD IGNORE FOUCAULT'S VAGUE AND FLAWED THEORIES IN FAVOR OF MORE  
DETAIL-ORIENTED ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE TO FIGHT OPPRESSION

Noam Chomsky (Professor @ MIT), NOAM CHOMSKY ON POSTMODERNISM, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html>. What Phetland describes, accurately I'm sure, seems to me unimportant, because everyone always knew it — apart from details of social and intellectual history, and about these, I'd suggest caution: some of these are areas I happen to have worked on fairly extensively myself, and I know that Foucault's scholarship is just not trustworthy here, so I don't trust it, without independent investigation, in areas that I don't know — this comes up a bit in the discussion from 1972 that is in print. I think there is much better scholarship on the 17th and 18th century, and I keep to that, and my own research. But let's put aside the other historical work, and turn to the “theoretical constructs” and the explanations: that there has been “a great change from harsh mechanisms of repression to more subtle mechanisms by which people come to do” what the powerful want, even enthusiastically. That's true enough, in fact, utter truism. If that's a “theory,” then all the criticisms of me are wrong: I have a “theory” too, since I've been saying exactly that for years, and also giving the reasons and historical background, but without describing it as a theory (because it merits no such term), and without obfuscatory rhetoric (because it's so simple-minded), and without claiming that it is new (because it's a truism). It's been fully recognized for a long time that as the power to control and coerce has declined, it's more necessary to resort to what practitioners in the PR industry early in this century — who understood all of this well — called “controlling the public mind.” The reasons, as observed by Hume in the 18th century, are that “the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers” relies ultimately on control of opinion and attitudes. Why these truisms should suddenly become “a theory” or “philosophy,” others will have to explain; Hume would have laughed. Some of Foucault's particular examples (say, about 18th century techniques of punishment) look interesting, and worth investigating as to their accuracy. But the “theory” is merely an extremely complex and inflated restatement of what many others have put very simply, and without any pretense that anything deep is involved. There's nothing in what Phetland describes that I haven't been writing about myself for 35 years, also giving plenty of documentation to show that it was always obvious, and indeed hardly departs from truism. What's interesting about these trivialities is not the principle, which is transparent, but the demonstration of how it works itself out in specific detail to cases that are important to people: like intervention and aggression, exploitation and terror, “free market” scams, and so on. That I don't find in Foucault, though I find plenty of it by people who seem to be able to write sentences I can understand and who aren't placed in the intellectual firmament as “theoreticians.”

9. FOUCAULT SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BECAUSE OF HIS INABILITY TO EXPRESS HIMSELF IN DISCERNIBLE LANGUAGE

Noam Chomsky (Professor @ MIT), NOAM CHOMSKY ON POSTMODERNISM, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html>. It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I just lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have been unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their followers. I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years, when similar charges have been made — but without any answer to my questions. Again, they are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an answer: if I'm missing something, then show me what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if it's all beyond my comprehension, which is possible, then I'm just a lost cause, and will be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be interested in them and seem to understand them (which I'm perfectly happy to do, having no interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in these things, but apparently little else). Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left with the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm certainly willing to grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll have to remain suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don't understand — say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand it. Now Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. — even Foucault, whom I knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest — write things that I also don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says they do understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a) some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden genetic mutation, which has created a form of “theory” that is beyond quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b) ... I won't spell it out. Again, I've lived for 50 years in these worlds, have done a fair amount of work of my own in fields called “philosophy” and “science,” as well as intellectual history, and have a fair amount of personal acquaintance with the intellectual culture in the sciences, humanities, social sciences, and the arts. That has left me with my own conclusions about intellectual life, which I won't spell out. But for others, I would simply suggest that you ask those who tell you about the wonders of “theory” and “philosophy” to justify their claims — to do what people in physics, math, biology, linguistics, and other fields are happy to do when someone asks them, seriously, what are the principles of their theories, on what evidence are they based, what do they explain that wasn't already obvious, etc. These are fair requests for anyone to make. If they can't be met, then I'd suggest recourse to Hume's advice in similar circumstances: to the flames.

10. POSTMODERN LANGUAGE IS UNINTELLIBLE GIBBERISH AND SHOULD BE REJECTED

Noam Chomsky (Professor @ MIT), NOAM CHOMSKY ON POSTMODERNISM, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html>. Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me) I've met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in print, and spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on real issues, and using language that was perfectly comprehensible — he speaking French, me English); Lacan (who I met several times and considered an amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan, though his earlier work, pre-cult, was sensible and I've discussed it in print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly during the period when she was a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of them I haven't met, because I am very remote from from these circles, by choice, preferring quite different and far broader ones — the kinds where I give talks, have interviews, take part in activities, write dozens of long letters every week, etc. I've dipped into what they write out of curiosity, but not very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate, based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes, that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain gibberish. When I proceed as I do in other areas where I do not understand, I run into the problems mentioned in connection with (1) and (2) above. So that's who I'm referring to, and why I don't proceed very far. I can list a lot more names if it's not obvious.

11. WE SHOULD FOCUS ON CONCRETE ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE TO CHANGE THE WORLD; NOT POINTLESS AND ELITIST INQUIRY

Noam Chomsky (Professor @ MIT), NOAM CHOMSKY ON POSTMODERNISM, 1995. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html>. To make myself clear, Phetland is doing exactly the right thing: presenting what he sees as “important insights and theoretical constructs” that he finds in Foucault. My problem is that the “insights” seem to me familiar and there are no “theoretical constructs,” except in that simple and familiar ideas have been dressed up in complicated and pretentious rhetoric. Phetland asks whether I think this is “wrong, useless, or posturing.” No. The historical parts look interesting sometimes, though they have to be treated with caution and independent verification is even more worth undertaking than it usually is. The parts that restate what has long been obvious and put in much simpler terms are not “useless,” but indeed useful, which is why I and others have always made the very same points. As to “posturing,” a lot of it is that, in my opinion, though I don't particularly blame Foucault for it: it's such a deeply rooted part of the corrupt intellectual culture of Paris that he fell into it pretty naturally, though to his credit, he distanced himself from it. As for the “corruption” of this culture particularly since World War II, that's another topic, which I've discussed elsewhere and won't go into here. Frankly, I don't see why people in this forum should be much interested, just as I am not. There are more important things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow and (to me, at least) pretty uninteresting circles. That's a broad brush, and I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without proving them: but I've been asked, and have answered the only specific point that I find raised. When asked about my general opinion, I can only give it, or if something more specific is posed, address that. I'm not going to undertake an essay on topics that don't interest me. Unless someone can answer the simple questions that immediately arise in the mind of any reasonable person when claims about “theory” and “philosophy” are raised, I'll keep to work that seems to me sensible and enlightening, and to people who are interested in understanding and changing the world.

12. FOUCAULT FAILS TO SEE THAT POWER RELATIONS ARE INEVITABLE.

Jean Baudrillard, (Prof., Philosophy, European Graduate School), FORGET FOUCAULT, 07, 51. There is something in power that resists as well, and we see no difference here between those who enforce it and those who submit to it: this distinction has become meaningless, not because the roles are interchangeable but because power is in its form reversible, because on one side and the other something holds out against the unilateral exercise and the infinite expansion of power, just as elsewhere against the infinite expansion of production. This resistance is not a “desire” it is what causes power to come undone in exact proportion to its logical and irreversible extension. And it's taking place everywhere today.

Jean Baudrillard, (Prof., Philosophy, European Graduate School), FORGET FOUCAULT, 07, 50. With Foucault, we always brush against political determination in its last instance. One form dominates and is diffracted into the models characteristic of the prison, the military, the asylum, and disciplinary action. This form is no longer rooted in ordinary relations of production (these, on the contrary are modeled after it); this form seems to find its procedural system within itself—and this represents enormous progress over the illusion of establishing power in a substance of production or of desire. Foucault unmask all the final or causal illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself. Power is an irreversible principle of organization because it fabricates the real (always more and more of the real), effecting a quadrature, nomenclature, and dictature without appeal; nowhere does it cancel itself out, become entangled in itself, or mingle with death. In this sense, even if it has no finality and no last judgment, power returns to its own identity again as a final principle: it is the last term, the irreducible web, the last tale that can be told; it is what structures the indeterminate equation of the word.

13. FOUCAULT ENDS SOCIAL ACTIVISM BY TURNING THE FOCUS INWARD.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT, 07, 179. As recounted throughout this narrative, when America came to adopt Foucault, it was, in fact, sealing a season of social turbulence, which had ended with the discomfiture of those universal values of peace and cooperation that had played a (mixed) role in the agitation of the sixties. All things considered, the Left might have missed its chance to become an authentic movement of dissent.

14. FOUCAULT IS UNWILLING TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOOD AND BAD USES OF POWER.

Fabio Vighi, (Prof., Italian Studies, Cardiff U.), ZIZEK, 07, 92. Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer this question. Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to resist it. ... Clearly, what Foucault needs, and needs desperately, are normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power.

15. FOUCAULT'S CRITIQUE OF POWER RELATIONS IS HYPOCRITICAL.

Fabio Vighi, (Prof., Italian Studies, Cardiff U.), ZIZEK, 07, 93. Was Foucault not trying to tell us the truth about the impossibility of telling the truth, thus criticising the project of the Enlightenment while at the same time secretly relying on it? As a result, not only the adequacy but the very credibility of Foucault's account of power and resistance are being called into question.

16. FOUCAULT'S INDICTMENT OF POWER IS SO TOTALIZING THAT HE UNDERMINES THE LEGITIMACY OF USING POWER IN RESISTANCE EFFORTS.

Fabio Vighi, (Prof., Italian Studies, Cardiff U.), ZIZEK, 07, 97. Zizek's verdict on Foucault is unequivocal: within the scope of Foucault's theorisation of power, where resistance is always-already co-opted in advance, the prospects 'for individuals to rearticulate and displace the power mechanisms they are caught in' are practically zero. Foucauldian theory does not allow for a subversive act which would bring about a 'thorough restructuring of the hegemonic symbolic order in its totality.'

17. FOUCAULT'S INSISTENCE ON BREAKING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL DISABLES ANY IMPETUS FOR CHANGE.

Fabio Vighi, (Prof., Italian Studies, Cardiff U.), ZIZEK, 07, 91. Foucault distanced himself from any suggestion 'that the negation or overcoming of these evils promoted a good'. While rhetorically gesturing towards an emancipatory politics in often passionate terms, Foucault's theorisations would in effect undermine any possibility of adopting such a position. Worse still, 'he seems to raise the question whether there is such a thing as a way out' (ibid.). The burning question fuelling this cluster of criticisms is whether the problem of resistance can be conceptualised at all without a proper theory of the subject as the centre and source of possible resistance.

Fabio Vighi, (Prof., Italian Studies, Cardiff U.), ZIZEK, 07, 92. Foucault's 'happy positivism' failed to recognise the historical role of social antagonism without which neither resistance nor radical political change could be grasped, let alone be effected.'

Fabio Vighi, (Prof., Italian Studies, Cardiff U.), ZIZEK, 07, 92. Foucault's theorisations of power did not only construe modern society as being without redeeming features, it also and perhaps more importantly denied him the possibility of condemning any of modern society's objectionable aspects.

18. IN HIS DRIVE TO ERADICATE "DIFFERENCE," FOUCAULT ALSO ELIMINATES "RIGHTEOUSNESS" – THERE IS NOW NO BASIS FOR ACTING AGAINST ANY EVIL.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT, 07, 7. Most of the latter-day Foucauldians are high-minded democrats; they are committed to forging a more diverse society in which whites and people of color, straights and gays, men and women, their various and ethnic and gender "differences" intact, can nevertheless all live in compassionate harmony—an appealing, if difficult goal, with deep roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Unfortunately, Foucault's lifework is far more unconventional—and far more discomfiting—than some of his "progressive" admirers are ready to admit. Foucault issued a basic challenge to nearly everything that passes for "right" in Western culture—including everything that passes for "right" among a great many of America's left-wing academics.

19. POWER CREATES ITS OWN RESISTANCE, WHICH PREVENTS ITS EXPANSION.

Jean Baudrillard, (Prof., Philosophy, European Graduate School), FORGET FOUCAULT, 07, 52. If power were this magnetic infiltration ad infinitum of the social field, it would long ago have ceased meeting with any resistance. Inversely, if it were the one-sidedness of an act of submission, as in the traditional "optic," it would long ago have been overthrown everywhere. It would have collapsed under the pressure of antagonistic forces. Yet this has never happened, apart from a few "historical" exceptions.

Jean Baudrillard, (Prof., Philosophy, European Graduate School), FORGET FOUCAULT, 07, 58. It is useless therefore to run after power or to discourse about it ad infinitum since from now on it also partakes of the sacred horizon of appearances and is also there only to hide the fact that it no longer exists, or rather to indicate that since the apogee of the political has been crossed, the other side of the cycle is now starting in which power reverts into its own simulacrum.

20. RESISTANCE IN FOUCAULT IS AN END IN ITSELF; THE RESULT IS THAT THE STATUS QUO IS ALWAYS MAINTAINED.

Guido Preparata, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Washington), THE IDEOLOGY OF TYRANNY: BATAILLE, FOUCAULT, AND THE POSTMODERN CORRUPTION OF POLITICAL DISSENT, 07, 7. The Foucauldians have no political agenda, no program, and no plans for reform. Foucault's idea of resistance was merely to join the forces of resentment that simmer in the lower depths of society ("at the margins," as he put it), and engage in an endless tug-of-war with the constituted authorities. The invitation to transgress appeared to have been an end in itself: it managed to keep social tension always at boiling temperature. And, needless to add, the party profiting the most from such a state of perennial strife is "disciplinarian power" itself—the enemy.

## ANSWERS TO NIETZSCHE KRITIK

### 1. ENLIGHTENMENT MORALITY IS INEVITABLE AND KEY TO RADICAL SOCIAL STRUGGLES.

Lewis Call (PhD., University of California, Irvine), SCRYE, 1995. Accessed Online May 15, 2009 from [scrye.com](http://scrye.com). What, then, are the parts of Enlightened thought that Nietzsche wishes to hold onto? Patrick Madigan argues that one of the most important of these is the Enlightenment's commitment to freedom. He writes: "firmly committed to the Enlightenment's drive toward uplift and freedom, and yet sensing imminent disaster, Nietzsche responds by hurling himself into this strategy to use rigor to produce intensity, and commits himself to exploring this strategy's ultimate possibility."<sup>96</sup> This agrees with what I have been arguing: Madigan suggests that Nietzsche wishes to retain the Enlightenment's goal of freedom, yet realizes that the method by which the Enlightenment seeks such freedom--based as it is in the problematic Cartesian subject--is doomed to failure. Nietzsche thus undertakes a radical new attempt to resurrect the possibilities of freedom that traditional Enlightened thought creates but fails to realize. Madigan goes on to suggest that "as an Enlightenment thinker who is dismayed by the low level of culture in his own time, Nietzsche becomes a staunch champion of freedom and is determined to discover one incontestable method that will demonstrate freedom real. . . .That is the only possible way the Enlightenment project could end or truly come to rest."<sup>97</sup> Nietzsche was well aware, then, of the real and extreme limitations of traditional Enlightened freedom as it was articulated by Descartes, Rousseau and Kant, and their nineteenth century heirs. Against this he offered a transformed Enlightened freedom the details of which I shall explore in Chapter Five. The commitment to progress is another Enlightenment category which Nietzsche retains. As we have seen, he was definitely opposed to ideas of progress based on conventional Enlightened concepts such as those of Cartesian science or Rousseauian political development. Yet this does not by any means indicate that Nietzsche has no concept of progress. As Lars-Henrik Schmidt argues, "Nietzsche is thus reactionary in a very specific sense. He resists the ruling form and norm for progress. Yet he does not want to stop the process; on the contrary, this homogenization process is a prerequisite for a new type of difference, for a new type altogether."<sup>98</sup> Again, this is precisely my position: Nietzsche is hostile to the conventional idea of Enlightened progress, yet he retains his own concept of progress. Just as a Marxist may despise capitalism for what it does to the worker, yet still recognize the necessity of capitalism to prepare the way for socialism, so Nietzsche can decry the devastating effects which Enlightened "progress" has on modern culture, while nonetheless recognizing the absolute necessity of this "progress" in paving the way for something new, a true progress.

Lewis Call (PhD., University of California, Irvine), SCRYE, 1995. Accessed Online May 15, 2009 from [scrye.com](http://scrye.com). The final point we must remember, however, is that Nietzsche did not carry out this devastating critical project in the name of endless critique. Rather, he made this radical attack on all known political forms and on the idea of the actor who practices those forms for the purpose of making room for a profoundly new politics, and a new kind of political subject. This is the limit of Nietzsche's attack on the Enlightened politics of the nineteenth century. By retaining the idea that there could be a kind of political agent, and that this agent could and should engage in political action, Nietzsche tied himself inextricably to the Enlightenment tradition which he so vehemently attacked. His new political subject, the nature of which I shall make clear in Chapter Five below, had little in common with the rational individual postulated by Descartes and given political form by Rousseau. But the mere fact that Nietzsche retained an idea of political subjectivity at all, and that he was deeply concerned with the freedom of his new political actor, ensured that his thought would retain profound sympathies with the political project of the Enlightenment.

### 2. THE KRITIK DESTROYS ALL AVENUES OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE

Lewis Call (PhD., University of California, Irvine), SCRYE, 1995. Accessed Online May 15, 2009 from [scrye.com](http://scrye.com). One final way of dealing with Nietzsche's "antipolitical" stance is offered by Simone Goyard-Fabre, who claims that "there is no 'Nietzschean politics', because 'great politics' will never provide a doctrine. . . .because it is never thought of in terms of ideology, but essentially in metaphysical terms."<sup>5</sup> That is to say that ironically, Nietzsche uses the phrase "great politics" to describe a system which in fact does not and cannot produce any specific political goals or actions. I believe that Goyard-Fabre is right to suggest that Nietzsche's philosophy was antipolitical in the sense that it provided none of the conventional trappings of a practical political ideology; there is, for example, no description in Nietzsche's writings of how the state should be organized, or of what the rights and obligations of the citizen should be. The reason for this is that any such practical political system relies upon an idea of political subjectivity which Nietzsche explicitly rejects.



### 3. THE KRITIK LEADS TO THE ABANDONMENT OF RIGHTS WHICH LEADS TO DOMINATION AND GENOCIDE

Lewis Call (PhD., University of California, Irvine), SCRYE, 1995. Accessed Online May 15, 2009 from scrye.com. One of the defining characteristics of liberalism in the nineteenth century was its emphasis on "rights," and here Nietzsche found further grounds to attack the democratic tradition. Against the claims of liberals that they act to defend the rights and interests of individuals, Nietzsche claimed that in fact the reverse was true: democracy acted to protect the rights of the majority; that is, of the mass or herd. Thus he writes in the *Genealogy of Morals* of "the mendacious slogan of resentment, 'supreme rights of the majority'" and opposes to this a "rapturous counterslogan 'supreme rights of the few!'"<sup>17</sup> There could be no reconciliation, Nietzsche felt, between the rights of the few and those of the many, and one of the fundamental problems of democracy was that it insisted on maintaining and defending the latter.

Jose Alves (Career Diplomat, Consul General of Brazil in San Francisco), *HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY*, 2000, 22.2, 486. The individual, often discriminated against within national borders as a result of incomplete--or biased--implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, looks for other sorts of communities for his or her self-identification. Ethnicity, religion, cultural origins, gender, and sexual orientation impose themselves above the notion of nationality and citizenship. Obviously, such new forms of self-identification are positive and in full conformity with the anti-discriminatory stance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A problem only arises when they assert themselves in a fundamentalist mode. When exacerbated, they can lead to practices like those of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, of the bloody Algerian massacres perpetrated in the name of religious purity, of the genocidal frenzy of Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, or of the delirious anti-feminism of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Such identification might even *contrario sensu* "legitimize" other obnoxious kinds of radicalism like that of "supremacist militias," ethnic hatred, and subnational separatism, as well as the more widespread occurrences of xenophobia, nazi-fascist ultra-nationalism, reactionary isolationism, male anti-feminism--now substantially controlled in the West--and aggressive homophobia, still present and often violent worldwide.

Jose Alves (Career Diplomat, Consul General of Brazil in San Francisco), *HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY*, 2000, 22.2, 486. Whereas the strongest objections to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights still come from political leaders (in contradiction to what their own representatives had subscribed to--however reluctantly--in 1993 at the Vienna Conference), with the obvious intent of justifying violations in governmental policies, the anti-universalistic stance prevailing in contemporary social thinking also brings into question the legitimacy of that [End Page 491] document. Paradoxically, this current brand of radical anti-universalism is adopted with allegedly libertarian, left-wing objectives, despite the support that it unavoidably lends to the anti-democratic relativism of the extreme right.

### 3. NIETZSCHE IS DELUSIONAL AND FASCIST

Greg Barnes (Former Senior Advisor to the Howard Government), *THE AGE OF UNREASON*, 2004. Accessed online from [home.iprimus.com.au/ltuffin/barnsderrida.html](http://home.iprimus.com.au/ltuffin/barnsderrida.html). Nietzsche, Wolin correctly surmises, was delusional (he wrote to musician Carl Fuchs in 1888, "I shall be ruling the world from now on") and an enemy of democracy. He fought against democracy "tooth and nail. His training as classicist convinced him that greatness was the province of elite and that a meritocracy was synonymous with mediocrity." But of equal concern in political terms was Nietzsche's sympathy for the "annihilation of the weak", his toying with the idea of a Master Race and his contempt for the Jews. No wonder, as Wolin rather surprisingly reveals, that buffoonish Italian dictator Mussolini became a "Nietzsche connoisseur and admirer". In short, for Wolin, Nietzsche is the arch enemy of the Enlightenment. But running a close second in the race to claim that mantle is Carl Jung, so beloved of the New Age baby boomers in the developed world today.

Greg Barnes (Former Senior Advisor to the Howard Government), *THE AGE OF UNREASON*, 2004. Accessed online from [home.iprimus.com.au/ltuffin/barnsderrida.html](http://home.iprimus.com.au/ltuffin/barnsderrida.html). The core idea of postmodernism -- that we should accept as correct Friedrich Nietzsche's debunking of the idea that we can ground political and moral values in some form of objective truth -- is offensive to Wolin. He argues that "postmodernism's hostility towards 'reason' and 'truth' is intellectually untenable and politically debilitating". And postmodernism is all the more dangerous because of the political actions and rhetoric of its progenitors in Germany and France.

4. NIETZSCHE KRITIK ERODES FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC AND LEADS TO FASCISM

Mihailis Diamantis (Law Review Editor, Yale, J.D. Candidate), *YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL*, 2005, 247. "Thinking begins only when we have come to know that Reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought." With this quotation from Martin Heidegger's "The Word of Nietzsche: "God is Dead," Richard Wolin opens his account of the enduring presence of the Counter-Enlightenment thinking of fascists and proto-fascists in his *The Seduction of Unreason*. Wolin's thesis is twofold: "les extremes se touchent" in their criticism of universalized truths of Enlightenment Reason, and this fact is dangerous for modern liberal developments in the realms of civil liberties and human rights. n1 *The Seduction of Unreason* is not only an introductory course in fascist and proto-fascist thought, it is also a political guide to those who would oppose Counter-Enlightenment thought and the rejection of human rights, civil liberties, and democratic equality that it entails. Behind the 1920s German movement, the 1960s French movement, and the present Europe-wide movement, Wolin uncovers a similar cause. The early trend towards Counter-Enlightenment values in Germany was fueled by a "fairly large middle-class electoral base ... the 'losers of the modernization process' ..." n2 In 1960s France, the antipathy to determinacy and reason resulted from post-World War II Vichy Syndrome and a resultant ""will to nonknowledge": a desire to keep at bay an awareness of unsettling historical complicities, facts, and events." n3 Finally, "the constituency of [\*247] the New European Right is also heavily composed of potential "losers of the modernization process." n4 More generally, ""feelings of anxiety and social isolation, political exasperation and powerlessness, loss of purpose in life, and insecurity and abandonment provide social conditions conducive to the success of far-right political views."

Mihailis Diamantis (Law Review Editor, Yale, J.D. Candidate), *YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL*, 2005, 247. Theoreticians and practitioners who take as their guiding light the pursuit and realization of universal human rights must recognize and appreciate not only present illiberal trends, but also the root sources of those trends. Wolin, gesturing towards these poisoned wellsprings, has given direction to those human rights advocates who would not attempt merely to dam back proto-fascist trends, but who would plug them at their issue. Interestingly though, Wolin suggests that in part, the philosophical discourse of the political left may be one of those sources of that fundamentally illiberal thought which is so damaging to a human rights agenda. The serious advocate must also address these concerns. Wolin, engaging in what he describes as "philosophical archaeology," begins with an account of the irrationalist currents in fascist German thought before and during World War II, focusing on Nietzsche, Jung, and Gadamer. He then traces the often forgotten transmutation of these ideas to the postmodernist and poststructuralist thought of the French left in the 1960s, emphasizing the contributions of Bataille, Blanchot, and Derrida. To each of these accounts, Wolin appends a narrative of the rise of the New Right in both Germany and France. To crown the book, Wolin's final chapter traces the development and present manifestation of the process by which critical "images of America once a staple [of] the European Counter-Enlightenment have been assimilated and recycled by the multicultural left," n7 as America has come to symbolize at various and concurrent times: infertile wasteland (de Pauw), n8 cultural/racial mongrelization (de Masitre and Gobineau), n9 Semitism (Sombart), n10 liberalism (de Bonald), n11 capitalism, dehumanizing mechanization (Heidegger and Spengler), n12 and cinematic [\*248] hyper-reality (Baudrillard).

5. NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE GUTS POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ACTIVITY.

Richard Wolin (Prof. History, CUNY University), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 8. Yet, too often, those who rushed to mount the Nietzschean bandwagon downplayed or ignored the illiberal implications of his positions. Moreover, in retrospect, it seems clear that this same generation, many of whose representatives were comfortably ensconced in university careers, had merely exchanged radical politics for textual politics: unmasking "binary oppositions" replaced an ethos of active political engagement.<sup>20</sup> In the last analysis it seems that the seductions of "theory" helped redirect formerly robust political energies along the lines of acceptable academic career tracks. As commentators have often pointed out, during the 1980s, while Republicans were commandeering the nation's political apparatus, partisans of "theory" were storming the ramparts of the Modern Language Association and the local English Department.

Charles Yablon (Prof. of Law, Cardozo), *CARDOZO LAW REVIEW*, 2004, 741. It is tempting perhaps, to say that the use of Nietzschean philosophy by the Nazis was largely pretextual, that Nietzsche was not so much the source of Nazi ideology as a convenient prop, a famous name to lend some intellectual respectability to the brutal, [\*741] racist and stupid ideas that made up the true Nazi ideology. There is undoubtedly much truth to this. Yet the fact remains that when the Nazi apologists sought an intellectual forebear to justify their horrific regime, they had the whole rich German philosophical tradition to choose from. It was no accident that they chose Nietzsche rather than Kant, or Hegel, or Leibniz. They saw something in Nietzschean philosophy that they could use. Indeed, they saw many things. It is also tempting to say that the Nazis perverted the philosophy of Nietzsche, distorted many concepts, like the *ubermensch*, so that they were vastly different from their original meaning, and simply ignored other Nietzschean concepts that were incompatible with Nazi ideology. Again, there is undoubtedly much truth to this. But in order for this to be a fully satisfactory answer to the problem of Nietzsche and the Nazis, one must explain why certain accounts of Nietzschean philosophy which modify some concepts and de-emphasize others constitute "perversions" of the philosophy, while others are merely "interpretations." In short, one needs not just a theory of interpretation, but also a theory that will enable one to recognize incorrect, invalid or perverted interpretations of complex and ambiguous texts. In our post-modern world, informed, in no small part, by the philosophy of Nietzsche itself, it is hard to find such theories and harder still to believe in them.

Richard Wolin (Prof. History, CUNY University), *THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON*, 2004, 13. Yet in an age of globalization, when markets threaten to become destiny, this omission proves fatal to any theory that stakes a claim to political relevance." From latter-day anti-philosophes like Nietzsche and Heidegger, poststructuralists have inherited a distrust of reason and democracy. The ideas they have recommended in their stead-"diferance" (Derrida), "transgression" (Foucault), "schizophrenia" (Deleuze and Guattari)-fail to inspire confidence. Their denunciations of reason's inadequacies have an all-too-familiar ring: since the dawn of the Counter-Enlightenment, they have been the standard fare of European Reaction. By engaging in a neo-Nietzschean assault on "reason" and "truth," poststructuralists' criticisms remain pitched at a level of theoretical abstraction that lets capitalism off the hook. Ultimately, their overarching pessimism about prospects for progressive political change-for example, Foucault contended that the idea of emancipation is a trap laid by the forces of "govern mentality" to inscribe the "subject" in the clutches of "power-knowledge"-seems conducive to resignation and inaction. After all, if as Foucault claims, "power" is everywhere, to contest it seems pointless. Instead of challenging domination practically, postmodernists prefer to remain on the relatively safe terrain of "metapolitics"-the insular plane of "theory;" where the major risks are "conceptual" and concrete politics are rendered ethereal. But "culturalist" approaches to power leave the structural components of domination untouched-and, ultimately, unchallenged. The complacency of this approach surfaces in Foucault's recommendation in *The History of Sexuality* that, in the place of traditional left-wing paradigms of social change, which he considers discredited, we seek out a "different economy of bodies and pleasures."<sup>29</sup> One thereby runs the risk of substituting a narcissistic "lifestyle politics" for "movement politics." "Identity politics" usurps the traditional left-wing concern with social justice. To be sure, differences need to be respected-but not fetishized. An uncritical celebration of "difference" can readily result in a new "essentialism" in which questions of group identity are elevated to the rank of a first principle. Since efforts to achieve consensus are a priori viewed with derision and mistrust, it seems virtually impossible to restore a meaningful sense of political community. Historically, the end result has been the cultural left's political marginalization and fragmentation. Instead of spurring an attitude of active contestation, a narrow-minded focus on group identity has encouraged political withdrawal. As one astute commentator has pointed out, today the apostles of "cultural politics" do not even bother to pretend to be egalitarian, impartial, tolerant, or solidary with others, or even fair. In its worst guise, this politics has turned into the very opposite of egalitarian and democratic politics-as the emergence of virulent forms of nationalism, ethnocentrism, and intolerant group particularism all over the world witness.

## **KRITIK OF TRADITIONAL DEBATE ANSWERS**

### **1. THE FOCUS ON TRADITIONAL DEBATE AS THE MONOLITHIC PROBLEM OF ALL OPPRESSION IS MISGUIDED. THE FOCUS ON DIRECT SPEECH ACTIVISM WITHOUT RESEARCH LEADS TO EXCLUSIVE MICROCOMMUNITIES.**

Matt Stannard (Prof. of Communication, Wyoming), LEGAL COMMUNICATION, April 2006. Online. Internet. legalcommunication.blogspot.com. Accessed May 2009. I prefer that interpretation to the second one: That the switch-side, research-driven "game" of debate is politically bankrupt and should give way to several simultaneous zones of speech activism, where speakers can and should only fight for their own beliefs. As Gordon Mitchell of the University of Pittsburgh has pointed out, such balkanized speech will break down into several enclaves of speaking, each with its own political criteria for entry. In such a collection of impassable and unpermeable communities, those power relations, those material power entities, that evade political speech will remain unaccountable, will be given a "free pass" by the speech community, who will be so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resources and true believers in the service of continued material domination. Habermas's defense of the unfinished Enlightenment is my defense of academic debate: Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, seek to expand this method of deliberation to those who will use it to liberate themselves, confront power, and create ethical, nonviolent patterns of problem resolution. If capitalism corrupts debate, well, then I say we save debate. Which brings me to another important point, which I think we can draw from Hicks and Greene's criticism: I would submit that the biggest danger we face is not in underestimating the power of debate. The danger lies in overestimating it, precisely because dictatorial tendencies of all stripes have never hesitated to shut down debate and crush dissent in the name of expediency. Academics, and particularly communication scholars, have a hard time understanding brutal, material power. We tend to think reason will prevail—or that if it doesn't, we can explain its failure discursively.

Matt Stannard (Prof. of Communication, Wyoming), LEGAL COMMUNICATION, April 2006. Online. Internet. legalcommunication.blogspot.com. Accessed May 2009. The complexity and interdependence of human society, combined with the control of political decisionmaking—and political conversation itself—in the hands of fewer and fewer technological "experts," the gradual exhaustion of material resources and the organized circumvention of newer and more innovative resource development, places humanity, and perhaps all life on earth, in a precarious position. Where we need creativity and openness, we find rigid and closed non-solutions. Where we need masses of people to make concerned investments in their future, we find (understandable) alienation and even open hostility to political processes. The dominant classes manipulate ontology to their advantage: When humanity seeks meaning, the powerful offer up metaphysical hierarchies; when concerned masses come close to exposing the structural roots of systemic oppression, the powerful switch gears and promote localized, relativistic micronarratives that discourage different groups from finding common, perhaps "universal" interests. Apocalyptic scenarios are themselves rhetorical tools, but that doesn't mean they are bereft of material justification. The "flash-boom" of apocalyptic rhetoric isn't out of the question, but it is also no less threatening merely as a metaphor for the slow death of humanity (and all living beings) through environmental degradation, the irradiation of the planet, or the descent into political and ethical barbarism. Indeed, these slow, deliberate scenarios ring more true than the flashpoint of quick Armageddon, but in the end the "fire or ice" question is moot, because the answers to those looming threats are still the same: The complexities of threats to our collective well-being require unifying perspectives based on diverse viewpoints, in the same way that the survival of ecosystems is dependent upon biological diversity. In Habermas's language, we must fight the colonization of the lifeworld in order to survive at all, let alone to survive in a life with meaning. While certainly not the only way, the willingness to facilitate organized democratic deliberation, including encouraging participants to articulate views with which they may personally disagree, is one way to resist this colonization.

2. THE FOCUS ON ACTIVISM ALONE WITHOUT TRADITIONAL POLICY DEBATE LEADS TO THE INABILITY TO COME TOGETHER TO DELIBERATE.

Matt Stannard (Prof. of Communication, Wyoming), LEGAL COMMUNICATION, April 2006. Online. Internet. legalcommunication.blogspot.com. Accessed May 2009. : First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism." Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.

### 3. SWITCH SIDE DEBATE AND ROLEPLAYING THROUGH A TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK IS IMPORTANT FOR ARGUMENTATIVE DIVERSITY

Starr Muir (Professor of Speech Communication, George Mason University), *PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC*, 1993, Vol 26. 290. It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach about ethics, and the skills of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism requires the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs. The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freely notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions. Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values—tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree or credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question...inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side...The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent man [sic person], however such views may clash with one's own....Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer. The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted. While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right....the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race....If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error. At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-reflective questioning to reason dialogically and dialectically and to "reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically." Our system of beliefs is, by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of the opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight.

Starr Muir (Professor of Speech Communication, George Mason University), *PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC*, 1993, Vol 26. 290. A final point about relativism is that switch-side debate encourages fairness and equality of opportunity in evaluating competing values. Initially, it is apparent that a priori fairness is a fundamental aspect of games and gamesmanship [sic gamespersonship]. Players in the game should start out with equal advantage, and the rules should be construed throughout to provide no undue advantage to one side or the other. Both sides, notes Thompson, should have an equal amount of time and a fair chance to present their arguments. Of critical importance, he insists, is an equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is manifest throughout many debate procedures and norms. On the question of topicality —whether the affirmative plan is an example of the stated topic—the issue of "fair ground" for debate is explicitly developed as a criterion for decision. Likewise, when a counterplan is offered against an affirmative plan, the issue of coexistence, or of the "competitiveness" of the plans, frequently turns on the fairness of the affirmative team's suggested "permutation" of the plans. In these and other issues, the value of fairness, and of equality of opportunity, is highlighted and clarified through constant disputation. The point is simply that debate does teach values, and that these values are instrumental in providing a hearing for alternative points of view. Paying explicit attention to decision criteria, and to the division of ground arguments (a function of competition), effectively renders the value structure pluralistic rather than relativistic. In a tolerant context, convictions can still be formed regarding the appropriateness and utility of differing values. Responding to the charge that switch-side debaters are hypocritical and sophistical, Windes responds with a series of propositions: Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the controversial problem under consideration...This thorough understanding of the problem depends upon careful analysis of the issues and survey of the major arguments and supporting evidence....This measured analysis and examination of the evidence and argument can best be done by the careful testing of each argument pro and con....The learner's sound conviction covering controversial questions [therefore] depends partly upon his[sic their] experience in defending and/or rejecting tentative affirmative and negative positions. Sound conviction, a key element of an individual's moral identity, is thus closely linked to a reasoned assessment of both sides. Some have even suggested that it would be immoral not to require debaters to defend both sides of the issues. It does seem hypocritical to accept the basic premise of debate, that two opposing accounts are present on everything, and then to allow students the comfort of their own untested convictions. Debate might be rendering students a disservice insofar as moral education is concerned, if it did not provide them some knowledge of alternative views and the concomitant strength of a reasoned moral conviction.

#### 4. TRADITIONAL DEBATE'S FOCUS ON RESEARCH LEADS TO ACTIVISM

Kristen Dybvig and Joel Iverson (PhD's, Arizona State University), *UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT DEBATE ARCHIVES*, 2000. Accessed Online from [debate.uvn.edu](http://debate.uvn.edu). Addressing all of these differences is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus upon the research process involved in the more research intensive forms of debate: National Debate Tournament (NDT) and Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) style debate. We have surmised that research has several beneficial effects on debaters. Research creates an in-depth analysis of issues that takes students beyond their initial presuppositions and allows them to truly evaluate all sides of an issue. Not only is the research involved in debate a training ground for skills, but it also acts as a motivation to act on particular issues. It is our contention that debate not only gives us the tools that we need to be active in the public sphere, but it also empowers some debaters with the impetus to act in the public sphere. We examine the role of research by analyzing the arguments regarding the role of debate for critical thinking as well as the role debate has begun to play in activism. Specifically, we closely examine the analysis of Mitchell (1998) regarding the empowerment of debaters and the role of research in academic debate. Next, we provide analysis of the role research plays in developing personal opinions and action based upon examples from our collective debate experiences (Clandinin & Connelly, 1994) and conversations in situ. Finally, we offer some potential pathways for future conversations and investigations into the role of research in policy and parliamentary debate.

Kristen Dybvig and Joel Iverson (PhD's, Arizona State University), UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT DEBATE ARCHIVES, 2000. Accessed Online from [debate.uvn.edu](http://debate.uvn.edu). Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world. Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students' awareness of issues that go beyond their front doors. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large. Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate makes us good public advocates. The public sphere is the arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler and Pelias 1983, Nobles 1985) and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on students as they prepare to enter the public sphere.

Kristen Dybvig and Joel Iverson (PhD's, Arizona State University), UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT DEBATE ARCHIVES, 2000. Accessed Online from [debate.uvn.edu](http://debate.uvn.edu). Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues.

Kristen Dybvig and Joel Iverson (PhD's, Arizona State University), UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT DEBATE ARCHIVES, 2000. Accessed Online from [debate.uvn.edu](http://debate.uvn.edu). In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs.

##### 5. DEBATES ABOUT POLITICS ARE IMPORTANT

Kristen Dybvig and Joel Iverson (PhD's, Arizona State University), UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT DEBATE ARCHIVES, 2000. Accessed Online from [debate.uvn.edu](http://debate.uvn.edu). Some of these arguments have been used every year for decades. One example is the "Clinton Disadvantage" (in its current, but soon to be renamed manifestation). This argument typically contends that passage of the plan somehow affects the political process or another, more important vote. And while this argument may at first appear to lack educational value, it has helped educate students about the world in which we all live. One long time impact to political disadvantages was the United States trade policy. When the protests happened in Seattle against the World Trade Organization, there were many debaters in attendance. Discussion on the listserve focused on the protests. The debates that occurred over United States trade policy helped to educate the community on the issues involved with US policy.



6. THE COLLEGE SANCTIONS TOPIC PROVES TRADITIONAL DEBATE IS IMPORTANT

Kristen Dybvig and Joel Iverson (PhD's, Arizona State University), UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT DEBATE ARCHIVES, 2000. Accessed Online from [debate.uvm.edu](http://debate.uvm.edu). The debaters who take active roles such as protesting sanctions were probably not actively engaged in the issue until their research drew them into the topic. Furthermore, the process of intense research for debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create, reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was developed. In this manner, exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence, hearing it as the opponent in a debate round (or as judge) acts as an initial spark of awareness on an issue. This process of discovery seems to have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report.

Kristen Dybvig and Joel Iverson (PhD's, Arizona State University), UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT DEBATE ARCHIVES, 2000. Accessed Online from [debate.uvm.edu](http://debate.uvm.edu). Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year the college policy debate topic was, Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea. This topic spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in support of various movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.

7. FAST DEBATE IS VERY EDUCATIONAL

Holly Doremus (Professor of law at UC Davis), WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW, Winter 2000, 11. Accessed Online. Nexis. Telling Political Stories It is not difficult to understand why the complex strands of each of the three discourses of nature have been reduced in the political context to a handful of shorthand stories. In the political arena, the most nuanced discourse tends to be simplified in this way. Political argument is better suited to soundbite-sized stories, brief accounts that evoke striking images intended to communicate larger points, than to multifaceted discussion. [\*42] It is easy to condemn the tendency of political debate to simplify arguments. Political rhetoric certainly can camouflage complexity, encourage people to overlook important principles, and distort issues. n191 Sound-bites can substitute for, or even obscure, principled analysis. But these brief stories can also serve a valuable, and valid, political function. Stories, particularly familiar ones, are well suited to quick, effective communication. Every teacher knows the power of a good rhetorical image to communicate a subtle concept. Stories also can invoke intuitions that may otherwise be overlooked because they are not readily accessible through reason alone. n192 Furthermore, the emotional power of stories can spur listeners to action in ways that abstract rational argument, no matter how logically compelling, typically does not.

## **KRITIK OF “DEBATE COMMUNITY” ANSWERS**

### **1. THE IDEA OF A STATIC DEBATE COMMUNITY REIFIES OPPRESSION, TURNING THE BENEFIT TO THE KRITIK.**

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. *Communio* is a word for military formation and a kissing cousin of the word “munitions”: to have a *communio* is to be fortified on all sides, to build a “common” (*com*) “defense” (*munis*), as when a wall is put up around the city to keep the stranger or the foreigner out. The self-protective closure of “community,” then, would be just about the opposite of . . . preparation for the incoming of the other, “open” and “porous” to the other. . . . A “universal community” excluding no one is a contradiction in terms; communities always have an inside and an outside. (p. 108) Thus, the word community has negative connotations suggesting injustice, inequality, and an “us” versus “them” orientation. Community, as a thing, would constitute a binary opposition with the aforementioned concept of democratic society. The latter evolves with, not against, the other. Although the connotations may be latent and unconscious, any reference to a community or a derivative thereof connotes the exclusion of some other. A democratic society, then, must reject the analogical conceptions of community and present itself as a receptacle for receiving difference, that is, the *demos* (the people) representing a democratic society. Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. An etymological problem akin to that of the word community is also discernible with the word hospitality. Caputo (1997) again provides insightful elucidation on Derrida: “The word hospitality derives from the Latin *hospes*, which is formed from *hostis*, which originally meant a ‘stranger’ and came to take on the meaning of the enemy or ‘hostile stranger’ (*hostilis*), + *potis* (*potis*, *potes*, *potentia*), to have power” (pp. 110-111). The implications, then, of Derrida’s deconstructive analysis are profound. The word hospitality and, thus, the function of hospitality becomes a display of power by the host (*hospes*). Being hospitable is an effort to welcome the other while maintaining or fortifying the mastery the host has over the domain. Thus, the host is someone who welcomes the other and gives to the other while always sustaining control. The host is always someone who possesses the power to welcome someone or something. If one did not enjoy some control, some dominance over the situation, one would not be a host at all: One would be on equal terms with the other (actually, there would be no other), and neither would constitute the host or guest. A display of hospitality, then, does not endanger the inherent power that the host experiences. The power, control, and mastery of the host and the alterity of the stranger or other are not disrupted by the display of hospitality. As Caputo (1997) notes, “there is an essential ‘self-limitation’ built right into the idea of hospitality, which preserves the distance between one’s own and the stranger” (p. 110).

### **2. THE GIFT OF ALLOWING MORE PEOPLE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY WILL ONLY MAKE MATTERS WORSE BY STIGMATIZING THE NEW MEMBERS. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ALLOW OTHERS TO COME IN ON THEIR OWN VOLITION.**

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. The conceptual underpinnings of hospitality and community were deliberately juxtaposed. If the notion of community is constructed around a common defense that we (the majority) fashion against them (the minority), then it is designed around the notion of inhospitality or hostility. Community and hospitality are similarly and equally subject to self-limitations. These intrinsic liabilities are largely unconscious. Notwithstanding the mythical, spectral foundations (Derrida, 1994) on which American society’s thoughts and actions are grounded, the detrimental consequence of our economy of narcissism is revealed. In offering hospitality to the other, the community must welcome and make the other feel at home (as if the home belongs equally to all) while retaining its identity (that of power, control, and mastery). As Caputo (1997) notes, “If a community is too unwelcoming, it loses its identity; if it keeps its identity, it becomes unwelcoming” (p. 113). Thus, the *aporia*, the paralysis, the impossibility of democratic justice through hospitality and the gift is our community.

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. The notion of giving while retaining power is embodied in the concept of hospitality: “A host is only a host if he owns the place, and only if he holds on to his ownership; [that is,] if one limits the gift” (Caputo, 1997, p. 111). The welcoming of the other into and onto one’s territory or domain does not constitute a submission of preexisting power, control, mastery, or identity. It is simply, as Derrida (1997) describes, a limited gift. The hospes, then, is the one engaged in an aporetic circumstance. The host must appear to be hospitable, genuinely beneficent, and unbounded by avaricious narcissism while contemporaneously defending mastery over the domain. The host must appeal to the pleasure of the other by giving or temporarily entrusting (consigning) something owned to the care of the other while not giving so much as to relinquish the dominance that he or she harbors. The host must feign to benefit the welfare of the other but not jeopardize the welfare of the giver that is so underwritten by the existing circumstances— whether they be democratically and justly legitimated or not. Thus, hospitality is never true hospitality, and it is never a true gift because it is always limited. Derrida (1997) refers to this predicament as the “im-possibility of hospitality” (p. 112, italics added). True hospitality can only be realized by challenging this aporia, ascending the paralysis, and experiencing the (im)possible. The inherent self-limitation of hospitality must be vanquished. Hospitality must become a gift beyond hospitality (Caputo, 1997). Hospitality is . . . that to which I have never measured up. I am always . . . too unwelcoming, too calculating in all my invitations, which are disturbed from within by all sorts of subterranean motivations—from wanting to show off what I own to looking for a return invitation. (Caputo, 1997, p. 112) Thus, hospitality, like the gift (the gift of hospitality), is always limited by narcissistic, hedonistic cathexes. Avaricity governs the Western capitalistic psyche and soma. As the (im)possibility of hospitality and the gift denote, one will never fully compromise that which belongs to the self.

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. To emancipate both agency and structure, an affirmative postmodern perspective would require that subjects themselves be deconstructed and reconstructed, that is, function as subjects-in-process or as emergent subjects (JanMohamed, 1994; Kristeva, 1986). Under- and nonrepresented groups would actively engage in the task of uncovering, recovering, and recoding their identities (e.g., Collins, 1990; hooks, 1989) in ways that are less encumbered by prevailing (majority) sensibilities regarding their given constitutions. The economy of narcissism would, more likely, be suspended, and the culture of difference would, more likely, be positionally and provisionally realized.

**CONCLUSION** This article was less a condemnation of existing legislative reform than it was a critique of Western culture in general and American society in particular. We contend that revisions in the name of equality, and equality in the name of justice, as presently constructed are not only inadequate but also detrimental to and countertransformative for those very (minority) groups who are purportedly benefiting from such initiatives. Derrida’s socioethical exploration was instructive, directing us to the limitations of the gift of the majority in relation to law, hospitality, community, and the (im)possibility of justice. The work that remains is to displace the aporia located in Derrida’s critique with supplemental processes of understanding and sense making. An affirmative postmodern framework, as we have loosely sketched, identifies some protean areas of potential exploration and worth. We submit that it is time to move to a new plateau in understanding alterity; one that more completely embraces racial, cultural, sexual, gender, and class differences. We contend that it is time to transform what is and more fully embody what could be. The search for equality realized through a radical and ongoing deconstructive/reconstructive democracy demands it. We also contend that by examining several supplemental notions found in affirmative postmodern thought, important in-roads for the aporia of justice and the destination of equality are within (in)calculable, (un)recognizable reach.

3. ATTEMPTS TO REIFY OPPRESSION BY INCREASING PARTICIPATION WILL FAIL AND EXACERBATE OPPRESSION.

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. The impediments to establishing democratic justice in contemporary American society have caused a national paralysis; one that has recklessly spawned an aporetic1 existence for minorities.2 The entrenched ideological complexities afflicting under- and nonrepresented groups (e.g., poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, crime) at the hands of political, legal, cultural, and economic power elites have produced counterfeit, perhaps even fraudulent, efforts at reform: Discrimination and inequality in opportunity prevail (e.g., Lynch & Patterson, 1996). The misguided and futile initiatives of the state, in pursuit of transcending this public affairs crisis, have fostered a reification, that is, a reinforcement of divisiveness. This time, however, minority groups compete with one another for recognition, affirmation, and identity in the national collective psyche (Rosenfeld, 1993). What ensues by way of state effort, though, is a contemporaneous sense of equality for all and a near imperceptible endorsement of inequality; a silent conviction that the majority3 still retains power.4 The “gift” of equality, procured through state legislative enactments as an emblem of democratic justice, embodies true (legitimated) power that remains nervously secure in the hands of the majority.5 The ostensible empowerment of minority groups is a facade; it is the ruse of the majority gift. What exists, in fact, is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1983) of equality (and by extension, democratic justice): a pseudo-sign image (a hypertext or simula-tion) of real sociopolitical progress. For the future relationship between equality and the social to more fully embrace minority sensibilities, calculated legal reform efforts in the name of equality must be displaced and the rule and authority of the status quo must be decentered. Imaginable, calculable equality is self-limiting and self-referential. Ultimately, it is always (at least) one step removed from true equality and, therefore, true justice.6 The ruse of the majority gift currently operates under the assumption of a presumed empowerment, which it confers on minority populations.

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. Yet, the presented power is itself circumscribed by the stifling horizons of majority rule with their effects. Thus, the gift can only be construed as falsely eudemonic: An avaricious, although insatiable, pursuit of narcissistic legitimacy supporting majority directives. The commission (bestowal) of power to minority groups or citizens through prevailing state reformatory efforts underscores a polemic with implications for public affairs and civic life. We contend that the avenir (i.e., the “to come”) of equality as an (in)calculable, (un)recognizable destination in search of democratic justice is needed. However, we argue that this displacement of equality is unattainable if prevailing juridico-ethico-political conditions (and societal consciousness pertaining to them) remain fixed, stagnant, and immutable. In this article, we will demonstrate how the gift of the majority is problematic, producing, as it must, a narcissistic hegemony, that is, a sustained empowering of the privileged, a constant relegitimation of the powerful.

4. THE INDIVIDUALS WHO WILL BE BROUGHT INTO THE DEBATE COMMUNITY WILL BE CAUGHT IN A CYCLE OF INDEBTEDNESS.

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. Relying on Derrida's (1991, 1992, 1997) critique, we can regard such statutory reform initiatives as gifts; that is, they are something given to non-majority citizens by those in power; they are tokens and emblems of empowerment in the process of equality and in the name of democratic justice. The majority is presenting something to marginalized groups, something that the giver holds in its entirety: power.<sup>16</sup> The giver or presenter of such power will never, out of capitalistic conceit and greed, completely surrender that which it owns. It is preposterous to believe that the narcissistic majority would give up so much as to threaten what they own; that is, to surrender their hospice and community while authentically welcoming in the other as stranger. This form of open-ended generosity has yet to occur in Western democratic societies and, perhaps, it never will. Thus, it is logical to assume that, although unconscious in some respects, the efforts of the majority are parsimonious and intended to secure (or accessorize) their own power.<sup>17</sup> The following two means by which a gift enables self-empowerment were already alluded to by Derrida (1997): (a) the giver (i.e., the sender or majority) either bestows to show off his or her power or (b) gives to mobilize a cycle of reciprocation in which the receiver (i.e., the minority) will be indebted. It is for these reasons that the majority gives. This explanation is not the same as authentically supporting the cause of equality in furtherance of a cultural politics of difference and recognition. To ground these observations about gift sending and receiving, the analogous example of a loan may be helpful. Let us suppose that we have \$100.00 and that you have \$1.00. If we were to give you some of our money (less than \$49 so as not to produce pecuniary equality), we would be subtly engaged in a number of things. First, following Derrida (1997), we would be showing off our power (money) by exploiting the fact that we have so much more money than you do that we can give some away and remain in good fiscal standing. Second, we would be expecting something in return—maybe not immediately, but eventually. This return could take several forms. Although we may not expect financial reciprocation, it would be enough knowing that you know that we have given currency to you. Thus, you are now indebted to us and forever grateful, realizing our good deed: our gift. Reciprocation on your part is impossible. Even if one day you are able to return our monetary favor twofold, we will always know that it was us who first hosted you; extended to and entrusted in you an opportunity given your time of need. As the initiators of such a charity, we are always in a position of power, and you are always indebted to us. This is where the notion of egoism or conceit assumes a hegemonic role. By giving to you, a supposed act of generosity in the name of furthering your cause, we have not empowered you. Rather, we have empowered ourselves. We have less than subtly let you know that we have more than you. We have so much more, in fact, that we can afford to give you some. Our giving becomes, not an act of beneficence, but a show of power, that is, narcissistic hegemony!

Bruce Arrigo and Christopher Williams (PhD of Psychology at the University of California, *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE*, August 2000, No. 16, 3. Thus, we see that the majority gift is a ruse: a simulacrum of movement toward aporetic equality and a simulation of democratic justice. By relying on the legislature (representing the majority) when economic and social opportunities are availed to minority or underrepresented collectives, the process takes on exactly the form of Derrida's gift. The majority controls the political, economic, legal, and social arenas; that is, it is (and always has been) in control of such communities as the employment sector and the educational system. The mandated opportunities that under- or nonrepresented citizens receive as a result of this falsely eudemonic endeavor are gifts and, thus, ultimately constitute an effort to make minority populations feel better. There is a sense of movement toward equality in the name of democratic justice, albeit falsely manufactured.<sup>18</sup> In return for this effort, the majority shows off its long-standing authority (this provides a stark realization to minority groups that power elites are the forces that critically form society as a community), forever indebts under- and nonrepresented classes to the generosity of the majority (after all, minorities groups now have, presumably, a real chance to attain happiness), and, in a more general sense, furthers the narcissism of the majority (its representatives have displayed power and have been generous). Thus, the ruse of the majority gift assumes the form and has the hegemonical effect of empowering the empowered, relegitimizing the privileged, and fueling the voracious conceit of the advantaged.

## ANSWERS TO “HABERMAS”

### 1. PURE INTERPRETATION OF HABERMAS WOULD DESTROY POLITICS.

Mary Dietz (Professor of Polisci at Minnesota) *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 129-30. Now it is important to recognize that the Machiavellian does not deny the moral value of the notion of sincere interest in reciprocal conversation, nor even rule out the possibility of its realization in certain domains of social interaction. The Machiavellian simply denies the translatability of moral conversation into the practice of political speech and, moreover, warns against developing the capacity "to assume the moral point of view" (Benhabib 1990, 359) as a mode of being (as opposed to acting) in politics.<sup>25</sup> "If men were all good," as Machiavelli puts a related point, "this precept would not be a good one; but as they are bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them" (Machiavelli 1950, 64).<sup>26</sup> This is not so much a theory of human nature as it is an observation about human conduct in the milieu proper to politics and political speech. 0, Because the politician's world and hence the politician's speech cannot be readily separated from any of the elements that Habermas links to strategic action (the attempt to reach objectives by influencing others' definitions of a situation, the purposeful pursuit of outcomes and consequences, the use of "weapons, goods, threats or enticements" to achieve the "success" of a policy, plan or operation), political speech cannot be cleansed of the elements that present gratuitous obstacles to Habermasian moral conversation. In the political world, if speech is mostly convention and convention is mostly aimed at securing certain strategic ends, then claims to validity, coherence and truth, not to mention "sincerity" and "truthfulness," have to be understood not only as "redeemables" but also as potential rhetorical tools, or "reliables" that enable political actors to go about their work, if not their life.<sup>27</sup> To put this otherwise, the Machiavellian thesis holds that it is necessary for those who wish to maintain themselves in politics to learn, among other things, how not to be open to the argumentative redemption of validity claims, and to use this knowledge and not use it, according to the necessity of the case.<sup>28</sup> I take the import of Machiavelli's advice as underscoring the importance of both adapt-ability and strategic calculation in political speech. The effective political rhetorician, whether citizen or politician, speaker or hearer, recognizes that political speech is (quite often and necessarily) the rhetorical art of strategically deploying claims to "truth" and instrumentally appealing to "sincerity" while calculatingly disguising the fact that one is acting strategically, instrumentally, or calculatingly. Success in the domain of half-truth hinges on one's ability to grasp validity-claims as reliable techniques of persuasion and to deploy them effectively in response to problematic contexts.<sup>29</sup> It also requires cognizance of the fact that one is doing so.<sup>30</sup> The political actor must be cognizant, that is, of working in half-truth, as opposed to "being," in some constant or consistent characterological sense, "half-truthful" (or, for that matter, a "liar" or a "truth-teller"). Working in half-truth is a skill, an art, and a mode of acting, not a mode of being. In politics, the effective strategic deployment of claims to validity, coherence and truth and the activity of effectively resisting their "redemption," does not necessarily take place in an ethical vacuum, even though it may be a moral one. Indeed, the skillful appeal to moral notions of "reciprocity" or "mutuality," and the rhetorical manipulation of moral values that one does not necessarily believe may, if successfully delivered, mark the difference between order and disorder, security and chaos, freedom and enslavement—even the polity's life or death. "A certain prince of the present time, whom it is well not to name," Machiavelli writes, "never does anything but preach peace and good faith, but he is really a great enemy to both, and either of them, had he observed them, would have lost him state or reputation on many occasions" (Machiavelli 1950, 66).

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics*, 126. The achievement of secure mastery, equivocal though it may be, requires a background consensus that Machiavelli repeatedly characterizes as the support of the people (Machiavelli 1950, 38-39, 67, 68, 70, 71, 81; also Merleau-Ponty 1964, 212). "And let no one oppose my opinion in this," he warns, "by quoting the trite proverb, 'He who builds on the people, builds on mud'" (38). Yet this collective consensus is not "interpretive understanding," much less the end or goal of politics in Machiavelli's view. Rather, consensus is a means (perhaps the most significant means) that allows politics (as the activity that aims at the fate of the collectivity) to continue. In Merleau-Ponty's words, consensus is "the crystallization of opinion, which tolerates power, accepting it as acquired" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 212). On a third level of action, then, politics imposes upon the politician the imperative to maintain the consensus that is the support of the people, or at least to work to avoid its dissolution, which can happen at any time. Thus, Machiavelli reiterates, "Well-ordered states and wise princes have studied diligently not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to satisfy the populace and keep it contented, for this is one of the most important matters that a prince has to deal with" (Machiavelli 1950, 69). I have located the milieu proper to politics on these three levels of action in order to illuminate a primary Machiavellian point. On all three levels of instituting and constituting acts, from the grandest and most visionary (i.e., the institution of new modes and orders), to the gravest and most elementary (i.e., the anticipation and remedy of evils), to the grittiest and most rudimentary (i.e., the maintaining of consensus between politician and public), politics is an irreducibly strategic concern and a domain of strategic action. Our basic political commitments notwithstanding, this is the case in princedoms as well as republics, authoritarian as well as democratic regimes, Communist and post-Communist nations. Although there is much that must be said by way of evaluation and critique about how ideals get articulated, power organized, consensus sought, and tensions managed in these various forms of state, there is no prior or more basic "truth of the matter" than the presence of strategic interests in the power struggle that is politics, whatever the regime (Machiavelli 1950, 56). Nor does the strategic quality of politics embody a necessary distinction between ruler and ruled, or politicians and citizens. As Isaiah Berlin puts it in reference to Machiavelli, "The subjects or citizens must be Romans too ... if they lead Christian lives, they will accept too uncomplainingly the rule of mere bullies and scoundrels" (Berlin 1982, 55). When it comes to the pursuit of objectives, the feasibility of different courses of action, the struggle for competitive advantage, the contest for mastery, and the likelihood of success, there is no a priori or predetermined division between the "strategic" or active state and the "non-strategic" or inert citizenry. Indeed, the very division between the ruler and the ruled is often the outcome of strategic struggles between participants in politics. Once the line is drawn, the relationship between ruler and ruled may be the continuation of this struggle in a different, but always strategic, form. Thus, when Machiavelli counseled the prince against perceiving (much less treating) the people as "mud," he also conveyed the notion that the strategic domain that is politics extends into the people itself—even if the means of containment and control of the subjects differ from princedom to principdom, and the possibilities for transforming princely subjects into republican citizens differ from state to state.

## ANSWERS TO "USE DEBATE AS A PROJECT"

### 1. FOCUSING ON PARTICIPATION IN DEBATE OVERSIMPLIFIES SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND EXAGGERATES BIAS AND CONFLICT. POLICY TRAINEES ARE BLAMED FOR THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY POLICYMAKERS THEY CAN'T YET AFFECT

Adolf G. Gundersen (Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 100. With roots that extend at least as far back as Pericles' funeral oration,<sup>3</sup> the participatory alternative is certainly the most venerable of the two dominant strategies for containing partisanship. It is also the more ambitious of the two, aiming as it does not simply at the diffusion or containment of partisanship but rather at its transcendence. The formula is as well known as it is simple: Participation in democratic decision-making turns self-interest into civic virtue. Notice that the emphasis here is on participation in the act of making public decisions. Even when participatory democrats underline the deliberative nature of public decision making, they are assuming that citizens are deliberating at the point of decision, that deliberation will issue in proximate action. For example, Benjamin Barber's "strong talk" (1984) and John S. Dryzek's "discursive democracy" (1990) are both decision-making procedures as much as they are modes of deliberating. Given what I said earlier about the inescapable necessity of partisanship, it will come as no surprise that I find this strategy hopelessly naive. More specifically, it is the immediacy of the link between deliberation and decision-making or action that I believe is problematic in the participatory strategy for countering partisanship. Participatory democrats are right to suppose that public discussion does encourage civic virtue, and does allow at least a partial transcendence of partisanship. But deliberation's chances of blunting partisanship are hindered, not helped, by wedding it to participation. By binding deliberation directly to decision-making, the participatory strategy renders deliberation itself partisan. Deliberation is only complete when it issues in decision, and decisions are inherently partisan. No form of deliberation is exempt from the requirement to move from thought to action, from a consideration of plural options to a decision that this or that particular option is best.

Adolf G. Gundersen (Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 100. Hence, no form of deliberation can do away with partisanship altogether. Collective choice is always a matter of moving from plural wills to the unity of decision. As soon as the demand for unity, required by action itself, is imposed, deliberation must come to an end. The closer the choice point comes, the greater the pressure will be to cease deliberating. Participatory arrangements thus tend to exaggerate existing partisan biases. The participatory strategy for dealing with partisanship envisions citizens deliberating about public affairs over which they have some immediate control. Partisanship, in other words, is to be controlled (or transcended) by engaging citizens directly in public decision making. The participatory strategy thus views partisanship as a kind of disease that can be cured homeopathically: inject partisanship into the political process early on, and the body politic will fight it. On the face of it, this prescription seems promising. Direct action in the public sphere might conceivably transform partisanship by heightening citizen interest in public affairs, by discouraging the narrow consideration of self-interest, and/or by promoting an exploration of shared interests. But notice what the metaphor assumes: that the body politic really does have the equivalent of an autoimmune system that need only be triggered so as to kick into high gear. Unfortunately, we cannot simply presume that such an immune system exists. As a result, partisanship cannot be expected to give way automatically before the beneficent dynamics of public participation. On the contrary, the closer citizens get to the point of decision, the more likely partisanship is to become contagious. Inserting partisanship into politics before deliberation has had a chance to develop any immunity to it in the form of public mindedness will render politics more, not less, partisan. Aristotle and Rousseau, who occupy lofty positions in the participatory democratic pantheon, understood the problem well. Ruling and being ruled in turn requires a certain kind of citizen. For Aristotle, this meant that the polis had to take special care in educating its young and in attending to the formative influence of its laws. And Rousseau admitted that, absent the intervention of a civil religion or civic savior, such citizens were likely to be hard to come by. Both thinkers were sensitive, in a way their contemporary disciples are not, to the fact that fashioning publicly minded citizens on the potter's wheel of participation presupposes a certain kind of clay. Both were aware that participation will transform partisanship only if participants are already ready to participate as citizens. Likewise, Pericles knew full well that he was preaching to the converted.



2. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JOIN THEIR PROJECT WHICH GUTS ITS SOLVENCY.

Ruth Lessl Shively (Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M), *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 183. This is the ordinary ebb and flow of debate. Argument continues as long as there is some hope of progress in coming to agreement or as long as there are other lines of argument to be explored. But if there comes a point at which the two sides run out of new claims or cannot agree about the facts supporting claims already made, the argument is effectively over. The participants may continue to shout at one another, as they often do, but there is no longer anything positive or informative that can come from their interaction. There is nothing more to be learned and nothing that either side will find convincing. The point here is that in arguing—and the point holds equally for other forms of contest—we assume that it is possible to educate or persuade one another. We assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the participants in an argument are open to this possibility. Otherwise, there is no point to the exercise; we are simply talking at or past one another. At this point, the ambiguiists might respond that, even if there are such rules of argument, they do not apply to the more subversive or radical activities they have in mind. Subversion is, after all, about questioning and undermining such seemingly "necessary" or universal rules of behavior. But, again, the response to the ambiguiist must be that the practice of questioning and undermining rules, like all other social practices, needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation and other forms of tyranny.

3. THE PROJECT LEADS TO SOCIAL CONFLICT

Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Polisci at Duke, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 90. I have argued here that a well-ordered democratic society comprises three layers or modes of association among its citizenry. The first is the political marketplace of free exchange and contractual agreements among individuals on the basis of mutual interest. The second is the juridical mode of association in which the democratic citizenry seeks to establish norms of social justice and to allocate the benefits and burdens of their common life in accord with them. And the last mode of association is that of civic friendship, in which the democratic citizenry seeks to know and to attain together a humanly good life of its members. Each of these modes of association, I have argued, deploys a distinctive mode of rationality: instrumental, deontological, and practical respectively. And in the case of the last two of these, the logic of moral discourse functions to compel a focus on transsubjective principles and norms of behavior, thereby simultaneously compelling the various participants in the public dialogue to transcend their idiosyncratic interests, identities, and viewpoints. Absent this feat of partial and imperfect transcendence of unadorned and unmediated partisanship, I have suggested, a democratic society will begin to succumb to the logic of mutual predation limned for us so memorably by Thomas Hobbes. This argument carries with it, it seems to me, implications both for democratic practice and for the vocation of political theory. A democratic society, it suggests, needs to nurture what John Rawls has called the "moral powers" and their attendant passions: the devotion to justice and the desire to pursue a humanly good life. It should nurture as well the intellectual virtues that are necessary to render these passions effectual: the powers of the sympathetic imagination and the capacity to consider and assess public policy in a dialogic and rationally disciplined fashion. And it should bolster wherever and however possible those practices and institutions that foster the most broad based public dialogue possible and that force political partisans to perform those feats of partial transcendence which are required of all those who would participate in this form of discourse.

4. THE PROJECTS FOCUS ON NON-FALSIFIABLE CLAIMS

Mary Dietz, Professor of Polisci at Minnesota, *POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS*, 2000, 128. Just as the work of politics tends to generate a good many needs for which deeds of varying extremity are required, so political speech—the activity of articulating and justifying these needs and the deeds that spring from them—may prove impenetrable to discourse ethics, if not agonizing to communicative actors of the Habermasian kind. What "kind" of actor is this? Simone Chambers offers a succinct characterization of the participants in Habermasian practical discourse: Working in Half-Truth "In discourse a participant must recognize his [or her] dialogue partner as responsible and sincere in her desire to reach agreement, even if he disputes the validity of her claim. ... A sincere interest in reaching authentic agreement presupposes that participants are not interested in deception, manipulation, misdirection, or obfuscation" (Chambers 1996, 99). Similarly, Seyla Benhabib writes of "good partners" in moral conversation and notes, "In conversation, I must know how to listen, I must know how to understand your point of view, I must learn to represent to myself the world and the other as you see them. If I cannot listen . . . the conversation stops, develops into an argument, or maybe never gets started" (Benhabib 1990, 359). As a theory of deliberative democracy, Habermasian discourse ethics projects precisely this kind of moral conversation upon political speech, if only to enable the communicative actor to identify and challenge instrumental and strategic effects in situations of political interaction with a view toward approaching truly rational agreement if not absolutely securing it.

## **ANSWERS TO CHALOUPKA/ REPRESENTATIONS OF NUCLEAR WAR KRITIK**

### **1. DISCOURSIVELY SIMULATING THE ATROCITIES OF NUCLEAR WAR ARE CRITICAL TO CREATE A "CRYSTAL BALL EFFECT" WHICH WILL PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR**

Lee (Professor of Philosophy at Hobart and William Smith), *MORALITY, PRUDENCE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS*, 1993, 326. When one can foresee clearly and unambiguously the total ruin, the societal destruction, that a large-scale nuclear war would involve, the prospect of using nuclear weapons, or of engaging in lesser aggression that could lead to this ruinous outcome, tends to become unthinkable. The tendency is for leaders not even to consider aggression, or to dismiss the thought, should it occur, without doing the prudential calculations. Aggression comes to be seen as abhorrent. The point is that the crystal ball effect can play a double role. First, it can guarantee that should leaders do the prudential calculations, the result would come up against aggression. This is the role of the crystal ball effect discussed in the earlier chapters. But, second, the crystal-ball effect tends also to instill habits of mind such that the leaders never get to the point of doing the prudential calculations. This is the role it would play in supporting the prospects for delegitimation. But to succeed in showing that delegitimation is possible, one must show, second, that the crystal-ball effect is sufficient for the existence of the habits, especially in the light of the tendency of a long period of nonuse of nuclear weapons to undermine the creation and maintenance of the habits.<sup>-5°</sup> Though the crystal ball effect tends to promote habits of delegitimation, it is not clear that it is sufficient to insure their existence. The success of the crystal ball effect, both in insuring that prudential calculations come out for nonaggression and in instilling habits of mind that would insure nonaggression by guaranteeing that the option of aggression would never even enter the prudential calculus, depends on the sharpness of the apocalyptic vision. But the fact of the nonuse of nuclear weapons dulls the apocalyptic vision, the more so the longer the nonuse lasts, by making that vision seem less immediate, more remote.

Lee (Professor of Philosophy at Hobart and William Smith), *MORALITY, PRUDENCE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS*, 1993, 327-328. At the individual level, persons, singly and in groups, should seek constantly to bring to the attention of the public and its leaders the consequences of nuclear war, to keep everyone's attention focused on the full implications of the potential destruction. At the governmental level, the proper policy choice is a strategy of minimum deterrence. Consider first the individual level. The prospects for the delegitimation of nuclear weapons depend on the clarity of the crystal ball - that is, on the keenness and the immediacy with which the horrors of nuclear war are present in the minds of those who make decisions about military matters. When the vision is sharp, the mental connection between a possible act of aggression, whether nuclear or nonnuclear, and the potential for societal destruction, is clear, and when that connection is clear, the aggression will likely be unthinkable. When each side believes that this connection is clear and strong for the other, it comes to expect nonaggression from the other, and this allows its own inclination against aggression to become habitual. The problem is that time clouds the crystal ball, and an expectation that nuclear weapons would not be used by the other side in response to non-nuclear aggression clouds it further, and this weakens the connection. To promote the habits, one must counteract this obscuration. One way to do this is constantly to remind people in general, and leaders in particular, of the horrors of nuclear war. Leaders must be continually scared straight. There must be an ongoing educational campaign to keep the potential destructiveness of nuclear war ever-present in their minds.

2. CHALOUPKA'S POST MODERN IRONIC POLITICS FAILS – IT MISCONCEPTUALIZES ONGOING CONFLICT AND THE NATURE OF THE "NUCLEAR" WEST

Sankaran Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 1993, *ALTERNATIVES*, v. 18, p. 400-401. William Chaloupka argues that we need new ways to understand and live in nuclear times. Both the proponents of nuclearism and its mainstream opponents share a belief in humanistic, universalist narratives (often constructed on the notion of "survival") that are themselves, in large part, responsible for the nuclear impasse. They have, together, rendered the nuke unspeakable. To navigate one's life in this nuclear world, to begin to talk, however ironically and elliptically, about nukes, Chaloupka suggests we give up our universalist conceits and learn to live "without substituting a new, replacement metaphysics or universalism." (KN: xiv) Having rendered the nuke unspeakable, Chaloupka suggests that society used the metonymies of the computer and the robot to deal with the nuke.<sup>21</sup> Chaloupka foregrounds this discussion with the claim that nuclear war has never happened and that modern warfare is fabulously textual (echoing Baudrillard, Der Derian, Derrida, Foucault, and Virilio), has resulted in the disappearance of the warrior, and has become a battle for sign systems rather than for territory or materiality. In all this, Chaloupka seems to miss a rather immediate point: more than the computer or the robot, the Third World has served as the most common metonymy for Western conflicts in the age of the unspeakable nuke. Whether talking of Korea or Vietnam or the tens of "proxy" wars in the period of deterrence, which have witnessed an incredible degree of violence; or the thousands of nuclear tests and experiments on humans and the environment in the "untenanted" Pacific; or, for that matter, the most recent Gulf War to "secure" the identity of a superpower suddenly left naked in the ring—in each instance, the "nuclear" West has shifted or displaced the violence to the site of the Third World. To talk of the nuclear war that never happened, or the disappearance of "the warrior" in the face of this reality of violence and extermination visited on the Third World seems misplaced, to put it mildly. Chaloupka here buys into a self-contained version of the West and is unable to extend his purview beyond a narrow and overt definition of "war" and see the multiple ways in which nuclear war has been ongoing in the last five decades, both in the West and elsewhere. Chaloupka argues that once one has given up on metaphysical conceits, one of the ways in which to continue to politicize and oppose the reigning fictions masquerading as truth is to ceaselessly ironize them.

Sankaran Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 1993, *ALTERNATIVES*, v. 18, p. 400-401. Unfortunately, Chaloupka is unable to maintain this unremittingly postmodernist posture and cannot resist the temptation to enlist the recent changes in Europe and US-Soviet relations as illustrating the effectivity of a postmodernist politics. He thus makes the following highly unconvincing claim: Opposition to new forms of authority, propitious use of speed and fractal character of change, the sometimes frivolous attitude towards the ends of radical action—all of these were evident in 1989 and 1990, and each confirms the possibility of postmodern oppositional tactics . Gorbachev and Reagan had finally issued forth an unmistakably postmodern era, a triumph of deconstructive strategies\_ What else could the removal of the Berlin Wall mean? (KN: 123-25) To argue from a putative similarity between (textual) strategies of postmodernist practice and the events of 1989 and 1990 that there was some kind of causal connection, or that this somehow demonstrates the political effectiveness of postmodernist politics, sounds disingenuous. Whatever else the collapse of the Berlin Wall might signify, the claim that it "confirms the possibility of postmodern oppositional tactics" will have to be substantiated by convincing empirical argumentation and not mere assertion.

3. CHALOUPKA'S KRITIK DESTROYS ACTIVIST COALITION BUILDING INHIBITING REAL CHANGE

Sankaran Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 1993, *ALTERNATIVES*, v. 18, p. 400-401. The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic," essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the move mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities," while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

4. CHALOUPKA'S KRITIK IS SEXIST AND RELIES ONLY ON EUROPEAN MEN.

Jane Caputi (Assoc. Prof. of American Studies @ the U of New Mexico), *AMERICAN QUARTERLY*, March 1995, Vol. 47. While Chaloupka looks almost exclusively to European men such as Baudrillard, Derrida, and Foucault to offer essential insights, he ignores relevant perspectives from those who occupy less privileged realms (and use far more accessible language) but long have "problematized" nuclearism by deconstructing its signs and wrenching it out of traditional Western paradigms. For example, European-American feminist thinkers (including Diana E. H. Russell, Charlene Spretnak, and Carol Cohn) have pointed to the investiture of patriarchal (rapist and domineering) desire/sexuality into nuclear weaponry.' Simultaneously, feminists of color (including June Jordan, Alice Walker, and Winona LaDuke) have pointed to a continuing legacy of colonialism, environmental racism, and genocide against peoples of color, particularly indigenous peoples, who have been disproportionately afflicted by the acknowledged and unacknowledged atomic experimentation and development.

## **ANSWERS TO CRITICAL PEDAGOGY KRITIK**

1. THEIR STRATEGY ONLY REPLICATES THE OPPRESSIVE STRUCTURES CRITICAL PEDAGOGY IS DESIGNED TO DECONSTRUCT. THEIR CRITICISM IS A GUISE FOR FAR RIGHT COERCION AND LEGITIMIZES THE IDEOLOGIES OF NIHILISM, RELATIVISM, AND EDUCATIONAL MARKETISATION.

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 1998, 4. Yet at the level of classroom life, critical pedagogy is often seen as synonymous with whole language instruction, adult literacy programs, and new "constructivist" approaches to teaching and learning based on a depoliticized interpretation of Lev Vygotsky's work, and a tie-dyed optimism of "I'm okay, you're okay." While critics often decry this educational approach for its idealist multiculturalism and harmonious political vision, its supporters, including the late Paulo Freire, have complained that critical pedagogy has been frequently domesticated in practice and reduced to student-directed learning approaches devoid of social critique and a revolutionary agenda. Of course, this is due partly to the educational Left's retreat from historical materialism and metatheory as dated systems of intelligibility that have historically run their course, and to the dislocation of power, knowledge, and desire brought on by the New Left's infatuation with more conservative forms of avant-garde apostasy found in certain incarnations of French postmodernist theoretical advances.

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 1998, 4. According to Glen Rikowski, the insertion of postmodernism within educational discourses lets in some of the most unwelcome of guests -- nihilism, relativism, educational marketisation, to name but a few -which makes thinking about human emancipation futile. Left postmodernism, in denying the possibility of human emancipation, merely succeeds in providing complacent cocktail-bar academic gloss for the New Right project of marketising education and deepening the rule of capital within the realm of education and training.

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 1998, 4. In actual fact, notes Green, a radically relativist postmodern approach to cultural politics may appear on the surface to valorize the marginalized and the excluded but such an approach is unable to build solidarity or genuinely pluralist forms of curricula as an alternative to an exclusionary, monocultural, national curriculum. He concludes that "[w]hat we are left with in the end is a 'free market' in classroom cultural politics where the powerful dominant discourses will continue to subordinate other voices and where equality in education will become an ever-more chimerical prospect." [51] The applied barbarism of conservative postmodernism reduces identity to a psychogram, to an instance of discourse delinked from the social totality of capitalist relations of exploitation.

## 2. WITHOUT CHALLENGING REASON, CRITICAL PEDAGOGY FAILS TO CHALLENGE DOMINANT STRUCTURES

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 1998, 4. In other words, a critical pedagogy must not concede any ground with respect to the position that asymmetrical relationships of power and privilege in any society have determinate effects on who will succeed and who will not. Who gets into universities, for instance, is not controlled by merit; if that were the case, then one would have to make the absurd argument that the members of the capitalist class are cognitively more gifted. However, we could easily concede that the capitalist class is considerably gifted insofar as it is able to control the definition of what counts as legitimate knowledge (for example, through test measures, official knowledge in textbooks, and the lack of challenges to "official" versions of history) and to make sure that such knowledge serves the interests of the global economy. As criticalists have pointed out, official knowledge, the ruling hierarchy of discursive authority, sovereign epistemes, and the official social transcripts of the capitalist class all oppose in one manner or another the pursuit of freedom and social justice. The official transcript of U.S. citizenship implicitly assumes that only the white Euro-American elite are capable of achieving a universal point of view and speaking on behalf of all groups. Yet we know from Paulo Freire and other critical educationalists that the conditions of knowledge production in the "act of knowing" always involve political relationships of subordination and domination.[77] Criticalists need to excavate the coded meanings that constitute knowledge, and bring to light the rhetorical and formal strategies that go into its interpretation. Further, criticalists need to acknowledge the complex acts of investiture, fantasy, and desire that contribute to the social construction of knowledge. Dominant knowledge forms must be challenged and so must claims which try to divorce knowledge formations from their ideological and epistemic assumptions. Human capital ideas presently underwriting neoliberal educational policy fetishize education and reduce the pursuit of knowledge to the logic of commodification tied to future employment opportunities, to schooling's power of economic return, and to investment in human labor. To ensure favorable returns, education slavishly prostrates itself before the dictates of the labor marketplace and the Brain Lords of the corporate elite.

## 3. THE PERMUTATION IS CRITICAL TO COMBINE THEORY AND PRACTICE

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 1998, 4. However, in contrast to the conservative postmodernists' game of infinite postponement of meaning, of infinite deferral of the real, of ever-recurring promises of a future that is unattainable, the revolutionary praxis undergirding the politics of critical pedagogy speaks to an eschaton of peace and labor, of final victory for the oppressed. Billionaire corporate barons, jawing with their cronies in Davos, the Bohemian Grove, the Bildberg, or the Trilateral can chuckle over the fact that the combined assets of 358 of their billionaire friends are greater than that of 2.5 billion people in the world's poorest countries. Postmodern culture has provided them with a sense of irony; after all, they can even joke about themselves. The revolution that will remove the smirks from their faces and the profits from their maquiladora factories will not be a revolution of style, but of revolutionary struggle, by whatever means necessary. What I would like to underscore is that the struggle over education is fundamentally linked to struggles in the larger theater of social and political life. The struggle that occupies and exercises us as school activists and critical educators should entertain global and local perspectives in terms of the way in which capitalist social relations and the international division of labor are produced and reproduced. While I am largely sympathetic to attempts to reform school practices at the level of policy, curriculum, and classroom pedagogy, such attempts need to be realized and acted upon from the overall perspectives of the struggle against capitalist social relations.

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 1998, 4. Eighth, critical pedagogy must involve a politics of economic and resource distribution as well as a politics of recognition, affirmation, and difference. In other words, it must be a politics that speaks both to a transformative politics and to a critical and feminist multiculturalism,

4. THE PERMUTATION IS CRITICAL TO HAVE POLICY REFLECT THE CRITICISM.

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 1998, 4. Critical pedagogy as a partner with multicultural education needs to deepen its reach of cultural theory and political economy, and expand its participation in social-empirical analyses in order to address more critically the formation of intellectuals and institutions within the current forms of motion of history. Critical pedagogy and multicultural education need more than good intentions to achieve their goal. They requires a revolutionary movement of educators informed by a principled ethics of compassion and social justice, a socialist ethos based on solidarity and social interdependence, and a language of critique capable of grasping the consequences of history's narratives.[71] This is an especially difficult task, because educational imperatives linked to corporate initiatives often use the language of public democracy to mask a model of privatized democracy.[72] Given current U.S. educational policy, with its goal of serving the interests of the corporate world economy -- one that effectively serves a de facto world government made up of the IMF, World Bank, G-7, GATT, and other structures -- it is imperative that critical and multicultural educators renew their commitment to the struggle against exploitation on all fronts.[73] In emphasizing one such front-- that of class struggle-- I want to emphasize that the renewed Marxist approach to critical pedagogy that I envision does not conceptualize race and gender antagonisms as static, structural outcomes of capitalist social relations of advantage and disadvantage but rather locates such antagonisms within a theory of agency that acknowledges the importance of cultural politics and social difference. Far from deactivating the sphere of culture by viewing it only or mainly in the service of capital accumulation, critical pedagogy and multicultural education need to acknowledge the specificity of local struggles around the micropolitics of race, class, gender, and sexual formation. But in doing so it must not lose sight of the global division of labor brought about by the forces of capitalist accumulation. A critical pedagogy based on class struggle that does not confront racism, sexism, and homophobia will not be able to eliminate the destructive proliferation of capital. The critical pedagogy to which I am referring needs to be made less in-formative and more per-formative, less a pedagogy directed toward the interrogation of written texts than a corporeal pedagogy grounded in the lived experiences of students.

5. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY IS INSUFFICIENT TO CHALLENGE DOMANENT SOCIAL STRUCTURES

Peter McLaren (Professor in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies UCLA), EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 1998, 4. Once considered by the faint-hearted guardians of the American dream as a term of opprobrium, critical pedagogy has become so completely psychologized, so liberally humanized, so technologized, and so conceptually postmodernized, that its current relationship to broader liberation struggles seems severely attenuated if not fatally terminated. The conceptual net known as critical pedagogy has been cast so wide and at times so cavalierly that it has come to be associated with anything dragged up out of the troubled and infested waters of educational practice, from classroom furniture organized in a "dialogue friendly" circle to "feel-good" curricula designed to increase students' self-image. Its multicultural education equivalent can be linked to a politics of diversity that includes "respecting difference" through the celebration of "ethnic" holidays and themes such as "Black history month" and "Cinco de Mayo." If the term "critical pedagogy" is refracted onto the stage of current educational debates, we have to judge it as having been largely domesticated in a manner that many of its early exponents, such as Brazil's Paulo Freire, so strongly feared.

6. CRITICAL PEDOGOGY IS A TROJAN HORSE WHICH DISEMPOEWRS THE POOR.

Paolo Blackburn (phd candidate in Development Studies at University of Sussex), COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 2000, 35, 1. 4. We saw that the literacy method devised by Freire, and the educational philosophy that underlies it, requires of the educator an almost heroic feat: the rejection of those in-built 'banking education' reflexes that all educated people suffer from in the presence of the 'uneducated'; and a willingness effectively to disempower oneself in order to provide the empowerment space which the oppressed require. Furthermore, we saw how easily Freirean methods can provide a convenient veneer behind which the edu-cator's interests can continue to be satisfied, be they political or religious. The greatest danger of Freire's pedagogy, it would thus appear, is that it can be used as a very subtle Trojan Horse, one which appears to be a gift to the poor, but can all too easily contain a hidden agenda.



## 7. CRITICAL PEDOGOGY IS DISEMPowering TO THOSE IT TRIES TO PROTECT.

Paolo Blackburn (phd candidate in Development Studies at University of Sussex), *COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT*, 2000, 35, 1. 7. Freire's view that there are 'powerless' populations is, on anthropological grounds, highly questionable. Even in a political context of extreme exploitation of one group by another (e.g. landless illiterate peasants in 1960s North East Brazil – practically enslaved by semi-feudal large land-owners), those who appear powerless and fatalistic – stuck in what Freire called a 'culture of silence', or a 'magical' as opposed to a 'critical' consciousness – may in fact express (at least some) power in more subtle ways, such as sabotage, non-cooperation, and the secret observance of a distinct culture and identity. This is certainly the case of much of Latin America's indigenous population. Despite the extreme (and often violent) discrimination and exploitation suffered by Guatemala's Indians, for example, we find in Rigoberta Menchu's life story<sup>4</sup> a celebration of what she calls the 'culture of resistance' of her fellow people. Freirean and other participatory activists have tended to dis-value traditional and vernacular forms of power, such as those expressed by Rigoberta Menchu, because their understanding of power is largely derived from European Leftist traditions (Rahnema, 1992). In particular, Marx's notion of power in capitalist societies – the concentrated ownership of the means of production in the hands of an elite, and the control by that elite of those institutions designed to protect their ownership – is present in Freire's perhaps over-simplistic categorization of people as either oppressed or oppressor, and in his critique of 'banking education' as a means of maintaining an unjust class system. It is true that Freire did not directly advocate increased control of material resources by the poor as the way to increased power per se. But he did envision empowerment as – at the very least – the gaining of greater political and social space by the poor and the oppressed. In short, the inappropriate imposition of a certain vision of power on people who may not perceive themselves as powerless and, moreover, may not want to be empowered in the way that is being prescribed, is a problem area that has not been sufficiently addressed by Freireans. Nowhere is this more evident than in Freire's failure to address the possibility that educators may be unable (or even unwilling) to strangle the oppressor within them, and may consequently misuse their position to manipulate those over which they (potentially) have so much power.

## **A GLOSSARY OF TERMS & PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE KRITIK (UPDATED FOR MILITARY PRESENCE TOPIC)**

**Absolutist:** Having a strictly defined sense of values that are not open to question.

**Agamben, Giorgio: (1942 -)** Agamben is an Italian philosopher who has been highly critical of the United States' reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. He teaches that the United States now operates in "the state of exception," creating different rules for itself than those it is willing to apply to other nations.

**Alienation:** The Marxist notion that individuals are alienated from one other by the dehumanizing processes of industrial labor.

**Archaeology:** Michel Foucault's term for his historical researches into the hidden discourses of Western society. The aim of these archaeologies was to show that Western culture was based on power relations rather than such idealistic notions as truth or justice.

**Badiou, Alain. (1937 -)** Badiou is a prominent French philosopher who is an advocate of Marxism. He has positioned himself even further to the left than Marxist colleagues such as Jean-Francois Lyotard. He is an advocate of Maoist thought.

**Base/Superstructure:** In classical Marxist theory, society is made up of an economic base or infrastructure and a superstructure which comprises all other human social and cultural activities.

**Baudrillard, Jean. (1929 -)** Baudrillard is a French philosopher and sociologist associated with postmodern and poststructuralist thought. He developed the notion of "hyperreality" — intended primarily as a critique of American culture. In his view, America has created a culture obsessed with timelessness, perfection, and objectification of self. Baudrillard was once a Marxist, but now claims that Marx himself was overly influenced by capitalism and "the virus of bourgeois thought." He sees little hope for repair of the social world, but rather a further retreat into hyperreality (led by the United States and Japan). He referred to a visit to the United States as an opportunity to observe "the finished form of the future catastrophe."

**Being:** Martin Heidegger provides a radical reinterpretation of the nature of being, using the term "Dasein" to mean the condition of beings within Being.

**Borders Critique:** This critique is associated primarily with University of Hawaii professor, Michael J. Shapiro. He says that national borders are artificial creations which are the world's major source of conflict. This is especially true of Africa since borders were created by colonial powers almost randomly, ignoring the fact that ethnic groups were separated by national boundaries. Borders also are metaphors for the artificial separations that divide people in interpersonal relationships.

**Bourgeois:** French for middle class. The term is used by Marxist theorists to refer to privileged classes within society.

**Butler, Judith: (1956 -)** Butler is a professor of rhetoric and comparative literature at the University of California at Berkeley. She is one of the most prominent advocates of radical feminism.

**Capitalism:** Any system of economic relations which is driven by the profit motive. The capitalism kritik, or "cap k" indicts capitalism as the root cause of the harms identified by the affirmative.

**Carnival:** Mikhail Bakhtin saw the institution of carnival as a model for subversion of socio-political authority in the way that it parodied the ruling class.

**Chaos theory:** Chaos theory emphasizes how sensitive systems are to changes in their initial conditions, and how unpredictable this makes their behavior.

**Class consciousness:** The sense of belonging to a specific social class.

**Commodification:** The process by which an object or a person becomes viewed primarily as an article for economic exchange — or a commodity. The term originates from Karl Marx.

**Complexity theory:** Complexity theory argues that physical systems can evolve to higher levels of development through spontaneous self-organization.

Counter-Kritik: A kritik used to answer a kritik. For example, using a feminism kritik to answer a Foucault kritik (by arguing that Foucault's ideology would be oppressive to women) would be a counter-kritik.

Critical Race Theory (CRT): This approach has been developed among legal scholars by NYU professor of law Derrick Bell and others (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Alan Crenshaw, and Richard Delgado). CRT basically argues that people are marginalized within Western culture because of a refusal to consider the lived experiences of people within minority groups. Critical race theory proceeds primarily through the telling of detailed narratives featuring everyday experiences of black, Hispanic, or other minority voices.

Critical realism: Georg Lukacs's term for narratives that demonstrate how the economic system forms human character. In the case of capitalism, this is assumed to encourage the development of competitiveness and self-interest.

Cultural relativism: This critique was supported by Jacques Derrida and most other postmodern philosophers. Cultural relativism essentially argues that the West is in no position to force other cultures to accept its values and lifestyle because liberal democracy, with its racism, class divisions, economic oppression and sociocultural inequalities is not a model to be emulated. In any case, norms and values are culturally and politically contingent: "all values are socially constructed." On this view, values are products of human beings, acting in particular historical and social contexts. As such, the international human rights movement, rooted in the Western rationalist tradition, is "imperialistic" in its imposition of a particular normative structure on the rest of the world.

De-center: To undermine the usual hierarchy of a dominant system by showing that its center may hold only a relative, not a fixed point, or that the center may be exchanged with a place on the margins.

Deconstruction: A method of criticism associated with the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction seeks to expose those concepts or ideas (assumptions) that we might easily pass over unless we were to make a conscious effort to look for them.

Deep structure: In structuralist theory, systems are held to have deep structures which dictate how they operate. Roland Barthes, for example, assumed an underlying structure of rules to narrative.

De-familiarization: By "making strange" the aspects of our world, authors force us to notice what we normally take for granted. The concept was coined by Viktor Shklovsky.

Derrida, Jacques: (1930-2004) Derrida (pronounced Dairy-Dah) was an Algerian-born French literary critic of Jewish descent who is the founder of deconstruction. Deconstruction has had enormous influence within the circles of literary criticism as a method for conducting a postmodern examination of literature in particular and social institutions in general. Deconstruction, though difficult to define specifically, attempts to locate the hidden meanings and assumptions which underlie social institutions.

Dialectical materialism: Marx believed that in the class structure, resolution would come about through the inevitable victory of the proletariat (working classes) over the bourgeoisie (lazy rich).

Dialectic: Arriving at truth by exposing contradictions in debate; systematic analysis. A term associated with Marxism.

Dialogism: The notion that rather than being fixed, meaning is plural and always open to reinterpretation.

Difference: In poststructuralist and postmodernist thought, difference is always emphasized over unity, and is taken to be an inescapable aspect of human affairs.

Differend: Jean-Francois Lyotard's term for an irresolvable dispute which happens when the stronger side imposes its will on the weaker.

Discourse: In the work of Michel Foucault, discourse constitutes a social practice governed by an agreed set of conventions. Medicine is a discourse, as is law, or any academic discipline. The choice to use a specialized vocabulary is a form of power over others, often meaning illegitimate power.

Double coding: Charles Jencks's term to describe how language ought to work to appeal both to a specialist and to a general audience.

Empiricism: Basing judgments on observed patterns of facts—that which has occurred in the past is likely to occur again in the future.

Epistemology: How we know what we know. Kritiks of epistemology question the way by which we come to understand the world. Usually, kritiks of epistemology claim that our world-view is corrupted by elites, who distort our understanding of the world. An example is the kritik of Threat Construction, which argues that defense elites and international relations experts have incentives to hype up foreign policy threats for their own self-interest. Other kritiks like Capitalism and Feminist International Relations also claim that the epistemological claims of the affirmative case are flawed.

Ethnophilosophy: This philosophy is associated with Placide Tempels, a Belgian Catholic missionary. Most collections of African philosophy feature prominently Bantu philosophy as re-told by Tempels. An Ethnophilosophical approach seeks to unearth the philosophies of non-western cultures through the study of oral traditions, analysis of linguistic categories, social structures and religion. Ethnophilosophy claims to add new perspectives to the body of knowledge in philosophy by considering the philosophical meanings in texts from non-western cultures that have been traditionally excluded from the philosophical canon.

Feminist Kritik of International Relations: Also known as Gender in International ReLations (GIRL). A kritik which argues that international relations has largely replicated the societal structure of gender, with dominant masculine nations oppressing nations deemed to be feminine. In addition, the kritik usually uses “women’s voices” as a sub-component, arguing that leading international relations theorists both ignore and intentionally avoid the viewpoint of women. The kritik also challenges realism by contending that international relations should not be state-centric, and should instead focus on the implications that decisions about international relations have on the domestic sphere and how women’s lives are subordinated in militaristic, hyper-masculine societies. Judith Ann Tickner’s book *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security* (Columbia University, 1992) is a primary text for feminist kritiks of international relations.

Foucault, Michel: (1926-1984) Foucault (pronounced Foo-Coh) was a French philosopher known for his critical studies of social institutions, especially psychiatry, medicine, and the prison system. Many of his writings concern the relationship between knowledge and power.

**Framework:** Framework has two meanings. The first meaning is the question of what the debate itself is about. An affirmative framework argument usually contends that debate is simply not about questions of representations linguistics, or philosophical underpinnings, but rather should only be about the tangible consequences of the plan. The second meaning is that a way of viewing the world is problematic. A common catch-phrase is that “life has no value in the affirmative framework.” Usually this is a way of indicting capitalism, militarism, patriarchy, etc. as making life useless in the worldview offered by the affirmative.

**Frankfurt School:** The philosophers associated with the Frankfurt School coined the term “critical theory.” Thus the term “the critique” or its German equivalent “the kritik,” refers primarily to the views of the scholars associated with the Frankfurt School. The members of the Frankfurt School shared an association with the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany. Each of these philosophers shared Karl Marx’s theory of “historical materialism.” This theory holds that communism will inevitably replace capitalism as the economic system of choice. The members of the Frankfurt School spent their academic lives providing explanations as to why this inevitable transition to communism is being delayed. The centerpiece of this explanation involves “masking” — meaning that the “masses” are being deluded into thinking that capitalism is an acceptable moral alternative. A prime example of “masking,” according to this view was the way that the Roosevelt administration dealt with the Great Depression. The economic collapse in the 1930s should have been the death knell of capitalism (according to Marxist theory), but the defenders of capitalism applied “band-aids” such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Similarly, the creation of Social Security “masked” the poverty which was the inevitable result of capitalism. The primary philosophers associated with the Frankfurt School are Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer and Jurgen Habermas.

**Gendering:** Assigning a gender specificity to a particular element of culture or pattern of behavior or theme, idea, or image.

**Genealogy:** An attempt to trace the history of an idea by looking at the role of that idea in a culture, the ways it influences other cultural forms, and the traces that it leaves.

**Grand narrative:** In the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, a grand narrative constitutes a universal explanatory theory which admits no substantial opposition to its principles. Marxism is the prime example of an attempt at a “grand narrative.”

**Habermas, Jurgen: (1929 - )** Habermas is a German philosopher, political scientist, and sociologist writing in the tradition of critical theory. He is one of the philosophers of the Frankfurt School, committed to the Marxist grand narrative. Much of his work is a critical analysis of advanced capitalist industrial society and in modern liberal institutions.

**Hegemony:** Hegemony has multiple different definitions depending on the context. In Marxist theory, hegemony explains how the ruling class exerts domination over all other classes; elites use the media to make the masses willingly give over this control. In cultural theory, the term is associated with Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci that refers to the cultural or intellectual domination of one school of thought, social or cultural group or ideology over another (or others). In international relations, hegemony refers to the dominance of one major power over others. Most would consider the United States to be the world’s hegemon. This definition can be contrasted with multi-polarity.

**Heidegger, Martin: (1889-1976)** Heidegger was a German philosopher who has had a great influence on the development of 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy. He was (and is) controversial, however, because of his status as a prominent academic member of the Nazi Party in Germany. He pushed Western philosophy away from *epistemological* questions (meaning a study of the way of knowing), toward questions of *ontology* (a study of the nature of being). Heidegger is often cited as one of the founders of existentialism. Heidegger emphasize that human thought is indefinable and easily subject to multiple interpretations. He criticized the modern reliance on science and subjugation to technology.

**Hermeneutics:** A branch of symbol interpretation developed from modern linguistics and philosophy.

**Heuristic:** A philosophical tool or educational method used to guide one in the investigation of a philosophical problem. Case studies are often used as a heuristic to determine the validity of a general philosophical principle.

**Idealism:** The theory of international relations that nations can act beyond their own self-interest to create a common good for all humankind. The United Nations and much of international law are founded on idealist principles. Idealism can be contrasted with realism.

**Imperialism:** A policy of territorial expansion by which one culture or nation appropriates the land, people and resources of another.

**Inhuman:** For Jean-Francois Lyotard, all those processes which conspire to marginalize the human dimension in our world. Examples would include the growth of computerization, and particularly the development of sophisticated, and eventually autonomous, systems of Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life.

**Kritik:** A catch-all category for an argument which challenges the language or philosophical assumptions behind an argument. Kritiks come in so many different varieties and forms that a precise definition is difficult to pin down. An important early essay in understanding the history of kritiks was written by William Shanahan, entitled "kritik of thinking." The article can be accessed at <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Shanahan1993HealthCare.htm>

**Kritik of FIAT:** Arguably the first kritik, the kritik of fiat merely claims that the assumption that the affirmative plan happens is an illusion. Because nothing happens when the judge signs the ballot either affirmative or negative, the primary value of debate is to focus on our language choices or philosophical understanding of the world we do have control over.

**Kritik of Topicality:** A kritik which argues that the effort to force the affirmative team to uphold the resolution is an exercise in domination and exclusion.

**Lacan, Jacques-Marie-Emile: (1901-1981)** Lacan was a French psychoanalyst, psychiatrist and doctor who focused on the role of language in psychoanalysis.

**Little narrative:** The opposite to grand narrative; little narratives comprise groups of like-minded individuals who attempt to subvert the power of grand narratives.

**Lyotard, Jean-Francois: (1924-1998)** Lyotard was a French philosopher and literary critic whose views have been central and formative in the development of postmodernism. He was thoroughly Marxist and engaged in an exploration of the Marxist grand narrative.

**Modernism:** Term referring to the literary, artistic and general culture of the first half of the twentieth century.

**Multi-polarity:** The belief that the world lacks one major power, and is in fact controlled by multiple world powers who can act in concert or opposition to each other. Bi-polarity, or the belief that the world is controlled by two major powers, can be considered a form of multi-polarity. Multi-polarity can be contrasted with hegemony.

**Negritude:** This philosophy is associated with Léopold Sédar Senghor, the former president of Senegal, who used the term "Negritude" to a celebration of the Black African culture. Senghor seemed to believe that the essence of black culture is an immersion in rich emotionalism as opposed to "sterile" Western rationalism.

**Ontology:** Branch of philosophy addressing the meaning or essence of being. In international relations theory, ontology is considered to be a core principle, and could be defined as "how do people act in international relations?" The difference in the answer from realists, idealists, and postmodernists, shapes a great deal of such groups thinking about international relations.

**Other:** A notion from the psychology of Jacques Lacan that we project negative feelings or fears from within ourselves onto our images of other people, creating a view of that other person or group of people as being totally opposite to ourselves.

**Paradigm:** A framework of thought which dictates what counts as acceptable inquiry in an intellectual field. Thomas Kuhn saw scientific history as consisting of a series of paradigms, each unlike its predecessor.

**Patriarchy:** The rule of the father. Patriarchy is the name given to the whole system of male dominance of a society. Patriarchy is the value system indicted by feminist kritiks.

**Performance/performative:** An off-shoot of kritik theory that values the in-round presentation of arguments. Performance affirmatives frequently act out the mode of criticism they are attempting to illustrate, for example by acting out a protest, building a physical wall to illustrate the exclusion of a group of people, etc. Performance affirmatives frequently claim that the debate should be judged by the value of the performance, and not the consequences of enacting a policy as per the resolution.

**Positivism:** The notion of Auguste Comte, which values observable facts and phenomena over other modes of knowledge.

**Postcolonialism:** Popularized by Columbia University professor Edward Said and others; the claim is that colonialism and imperialism have caused the West to become rich and other nations to become mired in perpetual poverty; the true source of African problems is the legacy of colonialism.

**Postmodernism:** The rejection of the positivism implicit in “modernism,” meaning the views prevalent during the first half of the twentieth century. Postmodernists are generally skeptical in the validity of any one way of looking at the world.

**Power:** Power has at least two different definitions in kritik debating. The first is Michel Foucault’s notion that power means control over others, usually resulting from control of knowledge or resources, and is illegitimate. The second comes from realist branches of international relations, which assert that nation-states are fundamentally motivated by the desire and quest for power. In this context, power may mean military control over others, economic power for the nation-state, or cultural power to create the world in the nation’s image.

**Rationalism:** Reliance upon reason as the basis for establishing religious or philosophical truth.

**Realism:** The international relations theory guided by the idea that state actors ultimately seek power and the desire to dominate others. Realism has three primary philosophical foundations. First, the state is the primary actor in international relations—leaving realism open to the criticism that it ignores sub-state actors like non-governmental organizations and corporations. Second, that nations act primarily in their own self-interest with the desire to dominate and control the international arena. Third, nations are ultimately rational, and will back down from larger military forces (they can be deterred). Realists can be contrasted with idealists.

**Reification:** The process by which complex and questionable notions become accepted because of their common insertion into everyday language and transactions. This is a concept used in Marxist to explain how “masking” deludes the masses.

**Rorty, Richard:** (October 4, 1931 – June 8, 2007). A prominent American philosopher who claimed to be a postmodern pragmatist. Rorty is used by many debaters to claim that the dense philosophical questions asked by many kritik authors are useless in practice, and we must do the best we can even with somewhat questionable philosophical foundations. Some of Rorty’s writings were deployed aggressively by Northwestern University in the 1998 final round of the National Debate Tournament to defeat Emory’s Spanos kritik. An important work by Rorty is *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*.

**Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis:** Developed by linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. This hypothesis is central to language critiques because it argues that that language structures thought.

**Savage/Victim/Savior (SVS) metaphor:** This critique was popularized by New York University School of Law professor, Makau Mutua. The Mutua says the “savage-victims-saviors” (SVS) metaphor allows human rights activists to perceive themselves as “rescuers, and redeemers of the benighted world, trying to rescue victims, redeem (or punish) third world aggressors and recreate both as clones of Western civilization.” Mutua criticizes any effort to portray Africans as victims or Westerners as saviors.

**Schmitt, Carl:** (1888-1985) Schmitt was a German legal scholar and political scientist. Schmitt was a member of the Nazi Party in Germany until the end of the war. His writings have been influential concerning the nature of sovereignty and the state.

**Security Kritik:** A common kritik on international relations topics which argues that the motivation for nation-states and individuals to act in international relations is premised on an impulse to be secure. The kritik argues that unraveling such motivations is essential to prevent the desire to secure ourselves from manifesting itself in warfare, environmental destruction, oppression of other populations, etc. Ronnie Lipschutz’s book, *On Security*, is an important work in understanding security kritiks.

**Semiology:** Ferdinand de Saussure used this term to mean “the science of signs.”

**Speech-act theory:** A theory of language established by British philosopher John L. Austin. Austin divided all language use into constatives and performatives. Constatives can be shown to be either true or false. Performatives refer to sentences which engage in questioning, admonishing, or pleading.

**Structuralism:** Refers to the critical methodology used by French philosophers and linguists such as Roland Barthes to study the nature of signs.

Szasz, Thomas: (1920 -) Szasz is professor emeritus of psychiatry at the State University of New York Health Science Center in Syracuse. He is a critic of psychiatry who claims that there is no such thing as "mental illness." The whole concept of "mental illness" is invented by psychiatrists who willingly serve the state by labeling and isolating people who are different. Szasz opposes most types of drug therapy. He is a libertarian and is associated with the Church of Scientology.

"Truth with a capital T." A philosophical phrase used to denote a belief that there is one method or truism about philosophy or international relations. The phrase is almost always used disparagingly, to denote that the quest for one principle of international relations or human nature is a flawed one. Can be contrasted with little truths or limited truths, the belief that even without a grand theory of philosophy or international relations, one can still be correct in a given instance.

Zizek, Slavoj: (1949 -) Zizek is a Slovenian sociologist and philosopher who has applied the work of Jacques Lacan to a variety of topics such as fundamentalism, tolerance, political correctness, and globalization. Though a critic of social institutions, he recently created a stir within the community of critical scholars by agreeing to write the text of a catalog for Abercrombie & Fitch.